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Abstract Page i 
 
This thesis examines the development by local authorities of alternative models of 
ownership of public housing, focusing on large scale voluntary transfers (LSVTs) to 
specially created housing associations.  I attempt to place stock transfer within the 
wider policy context of changes in the State’s role in the provision of services; and 
changes in organisational development, reflected in transfer structures; and the wider 
shift in responsibility for the delivery of public services to the private sector.   
I examine theories that explain the development of the State’s role in housing and 
discuss their relationship to LSVT.  As discussions involving ‘the State’ must 
recognise the different interests and motivations of Central and local government, I 
examine action taken to promote and achieve stock transfer by local authorities and 
central government.   
The research method adopted to achieve my aims includes both analysis of existing 
data and the collection of new data through a sample survey of twenty LSVT 
associations.  I approached the research in five stages: background research – 
including reviewing literature and examining the legal and regulatory framework for 
LSVT; identifying the characteristics of early LSVT associations; selecting a sample 
of twenty selected associations for in-depth survey; conducting in-depth interviews 
with the twenty associations; analysing and tabulating the data collected and drawing 
conclusions. 
The survey focuses on staff perceptions of the reasons for transfer and why politicians 
and tenants accepted the change;  organisational and management change brought 
about by the new landlords; and the changes brought about by private sector 
involvement, including new personnel brought in to help run the organisations and the 
influence of private funders.  I attempt to draw key conclusions about LSVT 
associations from the evidence presented.  Finally, I examine how early LSVTs paved 
the way for a wider stock transfer programme, including transfers by inner-urban 
authorities and large city councils.  I argue that while LSVT may have been developed 
in response to the financial pressure upon local authorities from the early 1980s 
onwards, the process has created a new style of business orientated social landlord.   
Contents  Page ii 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................i 
Contents .....................................................................................................................ii 
Tables and figures ......................................................................................................ix 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................xiii 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
THE FOCUS OF THIS STUDY................................................................................1 
Why it is important to examine LSVT associations.......................................1 
The aims of this thesis................................................................................................7 
Research Methodology ..................................................................................8 
Stages of research development .........................................................8 
Developing the study approach..........................................................9 
Stage 1: Background research............................................................9 
Stage 2: Identifying the characteristics of the first 51 LSVT 
associations ........................................................................................9 
Stage 3: Survey of twenty LSVT associations...................................10 
Stage 4: In-depth interviews...............................................................11 
Stage 5: Data analysis ........................................................................12 
The Structure of the thesis..........................................................................................13 
 
CHAPTER TWO – PROVIDING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING 
STOCK TRANSFER 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................15 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE STATE.................................................16 
The rational model .........................................................................................17 
Marxist rejection of the idea of the benevolent state .....................................17 
Structures of housing provision .....................................................................18 
1. EXPLAINING THE STATE’S ATTEMPTS TO WITHDRAW FROM  
DIRECT PROVISION OF HOUSING......................................................................19 
Stages of development of housing policy systems.....................................................19 
The fourth stage of housing policy development in the UK ..........................20 
Fiscal crises ................................................................................................................22 
Re-invention of the role of Government ........................................................22 
Stock transfer and the changing role of Government in housing provision...23 
Fiscal crisis or reorientation of housing expenditure? ...................................24 
Central-local relations ................................................................................................26 
2. DOES ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT HELP TO 
EXPLAIN STOCK TRANSFERS? ...........................................................................29 
Scale of housing provision.........................................................................................30 
Why growth leads to break-up .......................................................................32 
Mass scale, incentives and producer interests............................................................32 
Devolving control to tenants ..........................................................................34 
Arm’s length ownership and public sector management ...........................................35 
Public sector management ethos ....................................................................37 
Management or administration ......................................................................38 
Organisational culture ................................................................................................39 
Organisational culture in housing and local government...............................40 
Seeking excellence in service provision ....................................................................41 
Contents  Page iii 
3. LSVT AND SHIFTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND  
PRIVATE SECTORS ................................................................................................43 
Background: Privatisation and the ‘New Right’ ........................................................44 
Rolling back the State ....................................................................................45 
The politics of privatisation ...........................................................................46 
Privatisation in practice: Right to Buy.......................................................................47 
Quasi privatisation and competition – Is LSVT really ‘privatisation’? .....................49 
The wider objectives of privatisation and LSVT ...........................................49 
User consultation through ballots...................................................................50 
Shareholding members...................................................................................50 
The ambiguous status of RSLs.......................................................................50 
How LSVT is different from other shifts in the role of the public  
and private sectors..........................................................................................51 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................55 
 
CHAPTER THREE – CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S INVOLVEMENT IN 
STOCK TRANSFER 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................58 
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S  
INVOLVEMENT IN STOCK TRANSFER..............................................................58 
The Review of cooperatives (1976) ...............................................................60 
Difficult to let estates (1981) .........................................................................61 
Estate Action (1985) ......................................................................................63 
Housing Act 1985 ..........................................................................................63 
Housing Action Trusts (1988)........................................................................63 
Tenants Choice (1988) ...................................................................................66 
Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (1995) .......................................................68 
Overhanging HRA debt (1999)......................................................................69 
Summary ....................................................................................................................69 
2. WHY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROMOTED TRANSFER .........................70 
Stock transfer as a means of withdrawal from direct provision.................................73 
State housing programmes and housing needs...............................................73 
UK reliance on direct provision and management difficulties.......................74 
Uniform design and low quality.....................................................................76 
Insensitivity of slum clearance.......................................................................77 
Dependence on Central Government funding................................................78 
Summary ....................................................................................................................79 
Stock transfer as a means of delivering organisational change..................................79 
Why organisational change was needed ........................................................81 
Weak management? .......................................................................................81 
Housing as part of a multi-purpose local authority........................................82 
The scale of public housing ...........................................................................83 
Summary ....................................................................................................................83 
Stock transfer as a means of shifting the public-private balance in service delivery 84 
Reducing the State’s financial commitment to socially rented housing ........84 
Creating a “quasi market” by empowering tenants........................................86 
Authorities “enable” while the private sector “provides” ..............................87 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................88 
 
Contents  Page iv 
CHAPTER FOUR – LOCAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN STOCK 
TRANSFER 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................90 
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH  
TO STOCK TRANSFER...........................................................................................90 
Attempts to deliver radical change in management through decentralisation ...........93 
A model for stock transfer: Stockbridge Village Trust..............................................94 
Glasgow City: Community Ownership Schemes.......................................................96 
The problems Glasgow faced in the 1980s ....................................................96 
The development of Community Ownership.................................................97 
Outcomes of Glasgow’s attempts to withdraw ..............................................99 
Whole stock transfers by smaller authorities through LSVT.....................................99 
Local authorities’ leading role in developing LSVT......................................101 
Partial withdrawal through local housing companies ................................................101 
Developing the model ....................................................................................102 
Pioneering authorities: Hackney and Tower Hamlets....................................104 
Central Government support for local housing companies............................107 
City-wide transfers .....................................................................................................108 
Summary ....................................................................................................................108 
2. WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADOPTED STOCK TRANSFER AS A 
SOLUTION TO ITS HOUSING PROBLEMS .........................................................109 
Stock transfer as an acceptable means of withdrawal from direct provision.............110 
The financial regime for local authorities after “ring fencing”......................110 
Tenants Choice...............................................................................................111 
Stock transfer as a means of delivering organisational change..................................112 
The failure of management reform leading to stock transfer.........................112 
Single purpose landlord organisations ...........................................................112 
Stock transfer as a means of shifting the public-private balance in service delivery 113 
Why local authorities sought greater private sector involvement..................115 
Why private sector funders provided funding for stock transfers..................116 
Summary ........................................................................................................116 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................117 
 
CHAPTER FIVE – TECHNICAL REVIEW: REGULATORY AND 
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND TO LSVTs 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................118 
1. CHRONOLOGY OF LEGISLATION AND REGULATION..............................118 
Key legislation ...........................................................................................................119 
Housing Act 1985 ..........................................................................................119 
Housing Act 1988 ..........................................................................................120 
Local Government & Housing Act 1989 .......................................................120 
Housing & Leasehold Reform Act 1993........................................................120 
Housing Act 1996 ..........................................................................................121 
Central Government Guidance ..................................................................................121 
1988 Guidelines .............................................................................................121 
1993 Guidelines .............................................................................................121 
1998 Guidelines .............................................................................................121 
1999 DETR Consultation of changes to the Annual Disposals Programme..122 
1999 DETR Proposals on overhanging debt..................................................122 
Contents  Page v 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK......123 
Controlling the speed and scale of transfer through the  
Annual Disposals Programme....................................................................................123 
Changes to the Annual Disposals Programme...............................................124 
Size limits on transfers ...................................................................................125 
Central Government guidance on acquiring landlords...............................................127 
Rules and requirements for acquiring landlords ............................................127 
Selection of acquiring landlords ....................................................................129 
Governance of new landlords.........................................................................130 
Ensuring acquiring landlords are clearly independent of the State................130 
Valuing transfers of tenanted local authority housing stock......................................131 
Levy on transfer receipts to pay for the costs of transfer...........................................132 
Dealing with the problem of low demand..................................................................134 
Enabling authorities with overhanging debts to transfer............................................134 
Tenant Consultation ...................................................................................................135 
Informal consultation .....................................................................................137 
Formal consultation........................................................................................137 
3. EXPLAINING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK................137 
Enabling the State to withdraw from direct provision ...............................................138 
Changing the organisation and management of council housing...............................140 
Shifting responsibility for social housing towards the private sector ........................140 
Public or Private? ...........................................................................................140 
Moving local authority activities to the private sector...................................142 
Changing public borrowing rules...................................................................142 
Creating a quasi market by empowering tenants through LSVT ballots .......143 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................143 
 
CHAPTER SIX - STUDY OF LSVT ASSOCIATIONS 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................145 
EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL THROUGH LSVT..................................................145 
Regional distribution of transferring authorities ............................................147 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH LSVT...............................................148 
Types of authorities undertaking transfers.....................................................148 
SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOUSING TOWARDS THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR ....................................................................................................................151 
Stock valuation...............................................................................................151 
Private sector financing for stock transfers....................................................152 
Ballot results ..................................................................................................154 
ANALYSIS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRST 51  
LSVT ASSOCIATIONS............................................................................................156 
Why only the first 51 LSVT associations? ................................................................156 
Regional distribution of the 51 LSVT associations .......................................156 
Size of associations ........................................................................................157 
Population density of local authority areas ....................................................158 
Political control of transferring authorities at time of transfer.......................159 
Tenure patterns in the transferring authorities’ areas.....................................161 
What this analysis tells us ..........................................................................................162 
SAMPLE OF TWENTY REPRESENTATIVE ASSOCIATIONS...........................163 
Regional breakdown ......................................................................................164 
Size of association and population density of local authority area ................165 
Political control of transferring authorities ....................................................166 
Contents  Page vi 
Performance ...................................................................................................166 
Selection of twenty survey associations.....................................................................166 
1. West Midlands ...........................................................................................166 
2. East.............................................................................................................167 
3. Yorkshire and Humberside ........................................................................168 
4. South East ..................................................................................................169 
5. South West .................................................................................................170 
SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................171 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN - FINDINGS FROM REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE 
SURVEY: HOW LSVT CAME ABOUT 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................172 
INTERVIEWS ...........................................................................................................172 
RATIONALE FOR TRANSFER...............................................................................174 
Respondents’ perceptions of Local authority culture.....................................174 
Respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for transferring the housing stock.176 
Campaigns against stock transfer...................................................................178 
Respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for tenants’ support for transfer ....180 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SPONSORING 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS LANDLORDS............................................................182 
Performance issues.....................................................................................................183 
‘Good’ performers..........................................................................................183 
‘Satisfactory’ performers ...............................................................................183 
‘Poor’ performers ...........................................................................................184 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING AS AN 
ACTIVITY TO THE SPONSORING AUTHORITIES ............................................185 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................187 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: FINDINGS FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE 
SURVEY: PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH 
STOCK TRANSFER 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................189 
ABOUT THE STAFF ................................................................................................189 
Respondents’ views on the importance of the origins of senior staff ............191 
BREAKING AWAY FROM SPONSORING LOCAL AUTHORITIES .................193 
Breaking away from sponsoring local authorities..........................................193 
Perceptions of relations with local authorities in 1998/99 .............................197 
Geographical expansion.................................................................................198 
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT................................................................................200 
Management ethos and style ..........................................................................200 
Adapting to new culture and working practices.............................................202 
Management structures ..................................................................................205 
Devolved budgets...........................................................................................205 
Local offices...................................................................................................206 
Creation of group structures...........................................................................208 
Respondents’ perception of staff morale........................................................210 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF HOW THE ASSOCIATIONS ARE 
DIFFERENT FROM THE LOCAL AUTHORITY PAST........................................212 
Changes from the past................................................................................................212 
Single purpose organisations .........................................................................212 
New influences...............................................................................................214 
Contents  Page vii 
Freedom to innovate.......................................................................................215 
Freedom from local authority politics............................................................215 
Long term approach .......................................................................................216 
Developing a customer focus .........................................................................217 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................219 
 
CHAPTER NINE - FINDINGS FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE 
SURVEY: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF HOW THE 
ORGANISATIONS CHANGED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A MORE 
PRIVATE SECTOR STYLE OF PROVISION 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................222 
CREATING A FORM OF QUASI MARKET BY INVOLVING TENANTS.........222 
A drive for improvements in customer service? ............................................225 
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ..........................................................226 
LSVT Board structure ....................................................................................226 
Effectiveness of Boards..................................................................................226 
Selection of tenant board members ................................................................228 
Respondents’ perceptions of councillors’ roles on boards.............................229 
Respondents’ perceptions of the roles of housing committees in comparison 
with LSVT boards ..........................................................................................231 
Accountability ................................................................................................233 
LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY...........................................................................236 
Level of demand for social housing...............................................................236 
Low demand for certain types of stock ..............................................238 
Strategies to deal with low demand ...................................................239 
Local lettings policies ........................................................................241 
An increasing ‘welfare housing’ role? ...........................................................244 
Market renting................................................................................................245 
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS............................................................................248 
Arranging funding..........................................................................................249 
Financial performance against business plans ...............................................250 
Impact of Housing Corporation rent controls ................................................257 
Impact of Right to Buy sales..........................................................................261 
Influence of funders .......................................................................................264 
Influence of boards on their associations finances.........................................266 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................268 
 
CHAPTER TEN – THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LSVTs IN CHANGING THE 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE, CULTURE AND FINANCING OF 
SOCIAL HOUSING 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................270 
Data sources ...................................................................................................270 
1. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE RESULTING FROM THE TRANSFER 
PROCESS ITSELF ....................................................................................................272 
Links to State withdrawal ..........................................................................................272 
Rent setting ....................................................................................................273 
Rent increases ................................................................................................274 
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery...................................................275 
New influences – boards and funders ............................................................276 
Empowering tenants and the creation of a quasi market................................276 
Summary ....................................................................................................................277 
Contents  Page viii 
2. EXPANSION BEYOND THE CORE LOCAL AUTHORITY AREA ................278 
Grow or face pressure to merge .....................................................................279 
Links to State withdrawal ..........................................................................................279 
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery...................................................280 
Expansion as a response to financial pressure ...............................................281 
Summary ....................................................................................................................281 
3. ADAPTING MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES TO MANAGE EXPANDED 
STOCKS ....................................................................................................................282 
Lack of strategy in development ....................................................................284 
Links to State withdrawal ..........................................................................................284 
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery...................................................285 
Emphasis on performance..............................................................................285 
Financial pressure ..........................................................................................287 
Too much focus on business aims at the expense of customer service?........287 
Summary ....................................................................................................................290 
4. DIVERSIFICATION AWAY FROM SOCIAL HOUSING PROVISION...........291 
Links to State withdrawal ..........................................................................................292 
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery...................................................293 
Commercial freedom......................................................................................293 
Focus on sustainability...................................................................................293 
Summary ....................................................................................................................293 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS..............................................................................295 
 
CHAPTER ELEVEN - CONCLUSIONS: MOVING ON FROM COUNCIL 
HOUSING 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................297 
1. EXPLAINING THE STATE’S ATTEMPTS TO WITHDRAW FROM  
DIRECT PROVISION...............................................................................................297 
Central government’s involvement in stock transfer .....................................297 
Explaining local authorities’ approach to stock transfer................................299 
2. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES INTRODUCED BY STOCK TRANSFER  
AND THE IMPACTS ON SERVICE DELIVERY ..................................................300 
How significant is management change?...................................................................301 
Are there fundamental organisational changes? ............................................302 
How transfers are evolving from the whole stock model ..............................304 
What were the impacts of organisational change on housing services? ....................305 
3. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN COUNCIL HOUSING .....................307 
The public to private shift and organisational changes..................................309 
Private sector funding for LSVT associations ...............................................309 
Private sector involvement in whole stock transfers......................................310 
OVERVIEW ..............................................................................................................311 
HOW EARLY TRANSFERS PAVED THE WAY FOR INNER URBAN AND 
LARGE CITY-WIDE TRANSFERS.........................................................................313 
CONCLUSION: MOVING ON FROM COUNCIL HOUSING?.............................317 
  
APPENDIX 1: Checklist of issues for interviews ....................................................318 
APPENDIX 2: LSVT survey – pro-forma for analysis of interviews ......................326 
 
REFERENCES .........................................................................................................336 
 
 
Tables and figures  Page ix 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
1.1 Key questions about the LSVT process and its outcomes................................6 
1.2 Key aspects of LSVT associations examined...................................................11 
2.1 Changes in the role of government and the nature of organisations.................15 
2.2 Jacob’s criteria for success and local authority housing...................................32 
2.3 Handy’s organisational cultures .......................................................................39 
2.4 Lettings of local authority housing...................................................................48 
2.5 Privatisation and quasi-privatisation in Britain ................................................53 
3.1 Central and local government transfer initiatives.............................................59 
3.2 Government proposed HATs 1988...................................................................64 
3.3 Voluntary HATs ...............................................................................................65 
3.4 Tenants’ Choice schemes 1988-1996 ...............................................................67 
3.5 Council housing and the Conservative Governments 1979-1997 ....................71 
3.6 Conditions of manageability and unmanageability ..........................................80 
4.1 Local initiatives leading to moves towards indirect provision .........................91 
4.2 Landlords acquiring stock through Hackney’s Estates Renewal Strategy .......106 
5.1 Legislation governing Large Scale Voluntary Transfer ...................................119 
5.2 Information required by DETR from local authorities applying for places  
 on the Annual Disposals Programme ...............................................................123 
5.3 Sizes of housing stocks owned by local authorities in 1992 ............................126 
5.4 Explaining the legislative and regulatory framework.......................................139 
6.1 LSVTs 1988 – 2001..........................................................................................146 
6.2 Whole stock, split and partial transfers 1988 – 2001 .......................................147 
6.3 Transfers by region...........................................................................................147 
6.4 Types of authorities undertaking transfers .......................................................148 
6.5 Type of transfer by Council type – number of transfers...................................149 
6.6 Type of transfer by Council type - number of units .........................................150 
6.7 Stock values – transfer price per unit ...............................................................152 
6.8 Transfer price, grants received and private finance raised ...............................153 
6.9 LSVT ballot results...........................................................................................154 
6.10 Successful LSVT ballot results 1988 – 2001....................................................155 
6.11 Un-successful LSVT ballot results 1988 – 2001 ..............................................155 
6.12 Regional distribution of 51 LSVT associations................................................157 
6.13 Sample urban authorities used to provide comparisons with  
 51 LSVT local authority areas..........................................................................161 
6.14 Tenure division in transferring authorities’ areas.............................................162 
6.15 Groupings of characteristics used in the selection process...............................164 
6.16 Regional breakdown of the 51 LSVT associations ..........................................164 
6.17 Regional breakdown of the 20 sample survey associations .............................165 
6.18 Size of 20 associations......................................................................................165 
6.19 Population densities in 20 local authority areas ...............................................166 
6.20 Measures of performance of the 20 associations..............................................166 
6.21 Associations in the West Midlands ..................................................................167 
6.22 Associations in the East ....................................................................................167 
6.23 Associations in Yorkshire and Humberside .....................................................168 
6.24 Associations in the South East..........................................................................169 
6.25 Associations in the South West ........................................................................170 
7.1 Staff interviewed...............................................................................................173 
7.2 Summary of topics discussed with staff ...........................................................174 
Tables and figures  Page x 
7.3 Sponsoring authority culture ............................................................................175 
8.1 Employment of senior managers prior to transfer ............................................190 
8.2 Interviewee perception of the importance of the working background  
 of senior staff to their organisations .................................................................192 
8.3 Relationships between associations and transferring authorities post-transfer 194 
8.4 Factors affecting post-transfer relationships.....................................................194 
8.5 Extent of devolution of control over budgets ...................................................205 
8.6 Organisation of housing management services ................................................207 
9.1 Method of selection of tenant board members .................................................229 
9.2 Councillors’ roles on boards.............................................................................229 
9.3 Roles of LSVT association board in comparison with a  
 LA housing committee .....................................................................................231 
9.4 Strategies adopted to deal with low demand ....................................................240 
9.5 Factors accounting for performance of the four associations not meeting  
 their business plan targets.................................................................................255 
10.1 Catalysts for organisational change and links to withdrawal of State  
 and public-private shift .....................................................................................271 
10.2 Key differences between LSVT associations, traditional housing 
associations and local authority housing departments......................................295 
11.1 Applying key attributes for excellence: Management change as a result  
 of stock transfer ................................................................................................302 
 
Tables and figures  Page xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
2.1 Central-local conflict and stock transfer...........................................................28 
2.2 Effects of money on poor neighbourhoods.......................................................31 
2.3 Perspectives on privatisation ............................................................................46 
3.1 Models of social housing provision..................................................................75 
4.1 Shifting from public to private sector provision...............................................114 
5.1 Example of LSVT levy calculation ..................................................................133 
5.2 Classification of activity by reference to ownership and control .....................141 
5.3 Definitions of borrowing and the implications for public corporations ...........143 
6.1 Transfers by authority type 1988 – 2001..........................................................149 
6.2 The pattern of transfer activity by type of authority.........................................150 
6.3 Distribution of private finance and grants between LA and HA......................154 
6.4 LSVT ballots – Average votes in favour (all ballots).......................................156 
6.5 Size of 51 LSVT associations...........................................................................158 
6.6 Population density ............................................................................................159 
6.7 LSVT authorities: Political control at transfer..................................................160 
6.8 LSVT authorities: Political control May 1996 .................................................161 
6.9 LA housing as a proportion of all housing .......................................................163 
7.1 Local authorities’ reasons for transferring stock ..............................................177 
7.2 Tenants’ reasons for voting in favour...............................................................180 
7.3 Views on local authority performance: Perception of staff formerly  
 with local authority ...........................................................................................183 
7.4 Views on local authority performance: Perception of staff not with  
 local authority ...................................................................................................183 
7.5 Status of Housing within sponsoring authorities ..............................................185 
8.1 Staff members interviewed and employment background ...............................191 
8.2 Geographical expansion ...................................................................................198 
8.3 Cultural changes to which staff had to adapt....................................................202 
8.4 Steps taken towards establishing or joining group structures...........................209 
8.5 Respondents’ perceptions of how LSVT associations are different from local 
authority housing departments..........................................................................213 
9.1 Demand for social housing ...............................................................................237 
9.2 Demand for social housing by region...............................................................237 
9.3 Low demand for certain types of stock ............................................................239 
9.4 Use of local lettings policies.............................................................................242 
9.5 Staff perception of social mix of new tenants ..................................................244 
9.6 The twenty LSVT associations’ market renting activities................................246 
9.7 Financial performance against business plans..................................................251 
9.8 Factors accounting for financial out performance ............................................252 
9.9 Impact of Housing Corporation rent controls...................................................258 
9.10 Levels of Right to Buy sales against predictions..............................................262 
9.11 Influence of boards ...........................................................................................266 
10.1 Average rents ....................................................................................................274 
10.2 Average annual rent increase............................................................................275 
10.3 Drivers for expansion through development ....................................................278 
10.4 Net interest cover..............................................................................................280 
10.5 Gearing ratio .....................................................................................................281 
10.6 The impact of development upon management structures ...............................283 
10.7 Rent collection..................................................................................................286 
Tables and figures  Page xii 
10.8 Rent losses through bad debts and voids ..........................................................286 
10.9 Rent arrears as a proportion of total rental income ..........................................287 
10.10 Approaches to competing organisational goals ................................................288 
10.11 Management costs ............................................................................................289 
10.12 Average number of full time equivalent staff per 100 dwellings .....................290 
10.13 Constraints, opportunities and risks..................................................................292 
11.1 Elements in LSVT development that bring about key changes in  
the areas considered..........................................................................................311 
11.2 How early LSVTs helped shape inner-urban and large city transfers ..............314 
 
Acknowledgements  Page xiii 
I am grateful to the staff of the twenty survey LSVT associations who generously 
gave their time to speak to me about their experiences.  I hope this thesis will 
contribute in some small way to furthering their progress in enhancing services to 
former council tenants.   
 
I would like to thank Claire Tyrrell, who helped fill the gaps in my knowledge on 
research methodologies.  I am grateful to Christine Whitehead and Steve Wilcox, who 
commented on parts of the text and Chris Hamnett and David Clapham, my 
examiners, whose helpful comments enabled me to make substantial improvements to 
the final thesis.  Liz Richardson and Rebecca Tunstall helped me in many ways and I 
thank them for their inspiration and for constructively challenging my ideas.  Most of 
all, I am indebted to Anne Power for her patience and encouragement, and for keeping 
going, long after others would have given up on me!  Finally, I thank my father for his 
support and help in getting me this far.   
 
In memory of my mother, without whom this study, and so much else, would not have 
been possible.   
 
London, September 2002 
 
 
 
Chapter One ~ Introduction  Page 1 
THE FOCUS OF THIS STUDY 
Between 1988 and 2001, 118 local authorities (25 per cent of authorities in England) 
transferred all or some of their housing stocks to newly created or existing registered 
social landlords under the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer regime (LSVT). Almost 
600,000 units were transferred. The earliest transfers, pre-dating the LSVT regime, 
took place in 1982. Scottish authorities undertook transfers to community-based 
housing associations and co-operatives from 1986 onwards, paving the way for a 
much wider programme. Local authorities transferred their housing stocks for four 
practical reasons – to tackle an increasing backlog of repairs; to secure new sources of 
investment; to avoid large rent increases imposed by central government; and to 
provide resources for the development of new social housing (Mullins et al, 1995). 
LSVT is linked to wider changes in the way government and local authorities deliver 
services (Forrest & Murie, 1988; Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993; Pollitt, et al, 1996), 
which followed the election of the Conservative Government in 1979 and its 
ambitions to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’ (Thompson, 1990). 
In this study, I attempt to place stock transfer within the wider policy context of 
changes in the role of local authorities in the provision of services and the 
Conservative Government’s aim of reducing direct provision; and to analyse changes 
in organisational development in both the private and public sectors, reflected in 
transfer structures.  I explore how stock transfer organisations have developed; 
whether they helped the Conservative government to achieve its aims; and whether 
stock transfer changes council housing fundamentally.  Existing literature, some of 
which is explored in this thesis, suggests that the Conservative Government was 
pursuing an ideologically driven policy shift through transfers.  However, my main 
focus is on the managerial and ownership changes that have led to the creation of new 
style, business oriented social landlords.   
Why is it important to examine LSVT associations 
Councillors of the 118 transferring local authorities have promoted LSVT to their 
tenants as a solution to the problems they face. Councillors in the remaining 360 
authorities have either attempted to transfer only for their tenants to reject their 
proposals; are still considering the idea of transfer; or have decided that the interests 
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of their tenants and communities are best served by retaining council ownership of 
housing.  
LSVT is the voluntary transfer by a local authority of 500 or more units of housing to 
a newly created or existing registered social landlord (RSL) with major restrictions on 
use and protection of tenants’ existing rights. The transferred housing must continue 
to be used as social housing, and is valued on an “existing use” basis, which means 
that the new landlord must continue to provide social housing to people in housing 
need. This method of valuation helps to ensure that the new landlord can be 
financially viable, while continuing to function as a social landlord (DoE, 1988; 
Gardiner et al, 1991). LSVT seems to provide a solution to some of the problems that 
local authorities face. During the 1980s, councils began to realise that their ability to 
maintain and improve their housing would be limited by an increasingly tough 
financial regime imposed by the Conservative Government elected in 1979, whose 
aim was to shift responsibility for service provision to the private sector (Thompson, 
1990). Many councils had already accumulated large repairs backlogs (Audit 
Commission, 1986), which could not be addressed with the resources at their disposal. 
Development of new housing all but ceased by the early 1990s due to restrictions on 
local authorities’ ability to borrow to invest, but at the same time, demand in many 
authorities continued to outstrip supply. Local authorities also faced the prospect of 
imposing large rent increases on their tenants, as Central Government reduced 
housing subsidies from the late 1980s onwards. Although the prospect of large rent 
increases receded, the financial regime introduced in 1989 severely constrained the 
ability of local authorities to keep their housing stocks up to date, and to provide 
services that more closely met tenants’ expectations in the 1990s. The new landlord 
organisations created by LSVT are largely free of the financial constraints faced by 
local authorities. As independent sector organisations, LSVT associations are able to 
access private finance to provide for long term investment. They are able to offer 
tenants a programme of repairs and improvements to their homes, as well as a degree 
of certainty about the future level of rents (Mullins et al, 1992; 1995). The new 
landlords appear to adopt more private sector styles of management and perhaps focus 
more closely on the needs and aspirations of tenants, in order to ensure that they meet 
the business objectives imposed by their debts (Interviews, 1998 and 1999). Although 
transferred tenants lose their Secure tenancies, their Assured tenancies with the new 
Chapter One ~ Introduction  Page 3 
landlords contain similar rights, including the Right to Buy and succession of the 
tenancy.  New tenants do not enjoy these rights.  Local authorities that transfer are 
then able to develop new roles as ‘enablers’ involving regulating and monitoring 
performance of providers; identifying local needs and providing funding to other 
organisations to address these needs (Goodlad, 1993; Aldbourne Associates, 1997). 
They retain their statutory homelessness duties so they have a continuing interest in 
the new landlord, but at arms length. Freed from management responsibility, and the 
need to defend the performance of organisations under their control, councillors are 
seen to be better placed to act more effectively as ‘tenants’ champions’ (Interviews, 
1998 and 1999).  
To examine the impacts, outcomes and progress of LSVT is important, as the process 
involves the largest transfer of undertakings from local authorities to the independent 
sector that has taken place. The LSVT process has created what appears to be an 
entirely new breed of organisation, which has its roots firmly within local 
government, and also has much in common with housing associations, which are 
independent and apolitical not-for-profit providers of affordable housing governed by 
voluntary boards. Transfer provides an opportunity for staff to create new structures, 
to adopt new ways of working, and to provide tenants with opportunities to participate 
in management more directly than is traditionally possible in local authorities 
(Clapham, 1989: Henney, 1984). Some LSVT associations have expanded rapidly 
beyond the boundaries of their sponsoring authorities, while others concentrate on 
their original area.  Many LSVT associations have used their new freedom to address 
housing needs in different ways from local authorities by developing new housing for 
market renting and working with NHS trusts to develop housing for key workers, for 
example.  
The LSVT process has already moved over half a million tenants and their families 
from the public sector to newly created and often heavily indebted independent sector 
organisations. All major political parties promote LSVT as a solution to the 
investment problems of council housing, but arguably also to the organisational and 
management problems of large public landlords. LSVT has the potential to remove 
housing from the arena of local politics (Malpass & Mullins, 2002), where housing 
issues are often used to gain political advantage over other parties. The current Labour 
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Government has expanded the transfer programme to 200,000 units per annum, and 
allows for more units should there be demand from local authorities and sufficient 
funds (DETR, 2000). In 2000, the Conservative Party expressed an aspiration for all 
local authorities transfer their housing as soon as possible, and was reportedly 
prepared to compel councils to transfer if they do not do so voluntarily (Conservative 
Party, 2000). Although the Conservative Party’s more recent stance has softened (see 
for example Conservative Party, 2001), the major political parties appear to have 
reached a consensus about the long term future for publicly owned housing - that the 
state should divest itself of responsibility for direct provision. Describing, analysing 
and explaining stock transfer “constitutes a significant challenge to housing studies” 
(Malpass, 2001: 2) and consequently, very little is known about the nature of the 
organisations created by the LSVT process, and the long-term implications of handing 
control of a valuable national asset to the independent sector. There are many 
unanswered questions about LSVT associations, some of which are set out below and 
summarised in table 1.1.  
LSVT associations are set up to attract investment. They take on a large debt burden 
for up to twenty-five years, and spend up to their first ten years of independence 
making losses, funded by private finance. The only assets they hold as security are 
tenants’ homes. What are the risks to the associations of taking on such debts, and 
what might be the result if plans are thrown off course? Are there financial pressures 
upon LSVT associations to expand in order to generate revenue and spread overheads, 
and are there implications for the quality of service to existing tenants? Are they 
sustainable over the long term, and are they better equipped than local authorities to 
deal with changes in demand for their ‘product’?  
LSVT associations are initially staffed almost exclusively by former local government 
employees who transfer with the housing stock. Are LSVT associations therefore 
housing departments ‘in exile’ or do they actively seek to evolve into new 
organisations with distinctive aims, objectives and working practices? 
LSVT associations are governed by boards, which include tenant representatives, 
local authority nominees and independent members. How effectively do they control 
their associations, and do tenant board members participate as fully as others do? Do 
board members take a lead in developing policy and strategy, or do they follow the 
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direction adopted by their chief executives and senior managers? Is the board 
perceived as being more effective than a Housing Committee, and is it seen as 
accountable to tenants and the wider community?  
Are tenants offered an opportunity to get involved in the management of their homes? 
Do tenants take up these opportunities, or do they prefer to leave management in the 
hands of paid staff?  
Tenants continue to enjoy the rights they had as council tenants, and they are offered a 
package of catch-up repairs and improvements to their homes. They are offered a 
short-term guarantee on the levels of future rent increases. Tenants who join the 
association after transfer are not covered by the guarantee, and start on rents which 
reflect average rents charged by other housing associations operating in the same area. 
They do not enjoy the enhanced rights offered to former council tenants. What are the 
implications for organisations and tenants of operating “two tiers” of tenancies?  
Development of additional housing units by LSVT associations may mean that some 
housing applicants are re-housed more quickly. But will LSVT associations seek to 
become more selective to weed out potentially ‘difficult’ prospective tenants in order 
to make their management ‘task’ easier and to protect their long-term financial 
viability? Is there a danger that LSVTs may divert more resources into peripheral 
activities, such as market renting and key worker housing, at the expense of 
developing their social role? Or will they house a broader range of tenants in line with 
Government policy concerning the need to create mixed and viable communities?  
How much control do local authorities retain over access to housing? 
LSVT associations attract on average £9,000 of investment per home for catch-up 
repairs and improvements in 2001 prices (DETR, 2000). Is LSVT an opportunity for 
reinvestment in a national asset, which transfers to the independent sector, but 
continues to be subject to public regulation? Or is LSVT merely a disguised way of 
attracting the investment council housing needs, without diverting resources from 
other priorities, including health and education? Does LSVT change council housing 
fundamentally? 
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Table 1.1: Key questions about the LSVT process and its outcomes 
• What are the risks for councils, tenants and the new landlords of their heavy debt burden? Are 
LSVT associations sustainable in the long term? 
• Are LSVT associations perceived as being fundamentally different from local authority housing 
departments? 
• How are LSVT boards perceived compared to local authority housing committees as effective 
bodies for developing strategy? 
• Are tenants offered more opportunities to get involved in the management of their landlord? 
• What are the implications of “two tiers” of tenancies? 
• Have LSVT associations sought to be more selective in the tenants they re-house? 
• Is LSVT a way of changing the way social housing is managed or just a disguised way of 
attracting investment for council housing? 
 
This study does not claim to give definitive answers to all these questions, but it 
provides background and historical information on the change in the role of 
government and the changing balance between the public and private sectors in 
service provision, which appears to have led to stock transfer. The study examines the 
central government framework for LSVT, which enables local authorities to withdraw 
from direct provision. It examines in detail the first fifty-one LSVT associations to 
provide detailed information on the pattern of stock transfers. By examining twenty 
in-depth case studies of LSVT associations, I provide evidence on the outcomes, 
processes and early impacts of stock transfer. Finally, I draw conclusions about the 
changes stock transfer brings about, and make an early assessment of the impacts.  
This thesis does not explore in detail the reasons why many councils have not yet 
transferred, although councillors’ and tenants’ reluctance to consider transfer might 
possibly be attributed partly to the lack of research on the process and outcomes of 
LSVT associations (Malpass, 2001). Some councillors and anti-transfer campaigners 
have arguably filled this gap with misinformation and anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that any costs of LSVT outweigh any potential benefits (see, for example, 
www.defendcouncilhousing.org.uk).  A major motivation in carrying out this research 
for a PhD was to provide accurate information on the process and outcomes, with a 
preliminary assessment of the impacts.   
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THE AIMS OF THIS THESIS  
This thesis examines the emergence of LSVT as a widely adopted strategy to help 
address the housing problems local authorities have faced for at least twenty years. It 
examines a number of theories that may help explain the development of the 
Government’s role in housing and discusses their relationship to LSVT. It explores 
how closely LSVT organisations match broader theoretical models of organisational 
development and how transfer is linked to the changing role of government in service 
delivery and the shift in the balance between the public and private sectors in service 
provision.  
The aim of this thesis is to help advance our understanding of the following three 
questions: 
1. To what extent has LSVT helped the Conservative Government achieve its 
aims of encouraging local authorities to withdraw from direct provision? 
2. How have the new housing organisations developed at ground level, in terms 
of management, ethos, goals, operation and structure? 
3. Has the influence of a shift away from public provision towards a more private 
sector style of provision affected how the organisations develop and operate? 
In order to develop our understanding of LSVT I examine in detail the following 
issues: the background to the changes in housing policy introduced by the 
Conservative Government and early attempts to withdraw from direct provision; the 
legislative and financial framework that enables local authorities to transfer; the 
characteristics of LSVTs undertaken up to 1996; the impacts and outcomes of LSVTs 
in a survey of twenty associations in 1998 and 1999; and the changes transfers have 
created in established patterns of the organisation and management of social housing.  
The theoretical framework for the thesis is provided by wider studies of how states 
have sought to withdraw from direct provision of public services; organisational and 
management theories; and the shift in responsibility for service delivery from the 
public to the private sector.   
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Research Method 
The research method adopted to achieve the aims set out above includes both analysis 
of existing data and the collection of new data through a sample survey of LSVT 
associations. The detailed methods used are outlined below. 
Stages of research development 
1. A review of the literature on the financial problems of council housing, linked to 
the changes in housing policy introduced by the Conservative Governments from 
1979 and management problems that emerged from the early 1970s onwards, and 
and the approaches developed by central government and local authorities 
connected to the transfer of stock. This sets LSVT in context of wider housing 
policy and organisational development. 
2. Analysis of the central government framework that enables local authorities to 
transfer their stock, including legislation, guidance and consultation documents, 
and interviews with senior civil servants, consultants and local government 
officers responsible for stock transfer. 
3. A detailed study of the size and nature of LSVT associations and the political 
control of the local authorities that create them. Three sources of existing data 
were analysed. Firstly, the DETR’s database of completed LSVTs was examined 
to determine the regional spread and size of LSVT associations; the political 
control of authorities undertaking transfer; and the level of turnout and support 
among tenants for transfer. Secondly, the annual reports of the first 51 LSVT 
associations were collected and examined to gather background information on 
their aims, values, structures and finances. Thirdly, the Housing Corporation’s 
monitoring data on LSVT associations and the Audit Commission’s data on local 
authorities was examined to compare their performance to housing departments 
and “traditional” housing associations.  
4. A “close-up” examination of how LSVT associations develop from the 
perspective of senior managers; how they operate; the changes they bring about; 
and the perceptions of risks and opportunities associated with their independent 
status and large debts. This information was gathered in a survey of twenty 
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representative LSVT associations. The selection of the sample and survey method 
is discussed below.  
5. All information was processed through the use of a matrix of characteristics and 
analysis of systemised raw material, bringing together all the survey information 
into tabulated form.  
Developing the study approach 
My initial interest in LSVT was sparked by my involvement in a two year study of a 
stock transfer in Brent (see Lee, Power and Tunstall, 1999). This study provided an 
opportunity to examine the financial, legal and political implications of stock transfer 
and the impact upon tenants on the basis of a single case study, which we tracked over 
two years. We examined government documentation regulating the LSVT process; 
Local Authority documentation on its difficulties and how stock transfer might help 
address its problems; the role of a Housing Association as partner in the stock transfer 
association; and interviewed regulators of the transfer process including the DETR 
and the Housing Corporation. We also interviewed Board members, councillors, 
council officers, tenants and consultants involved in establishing the Association. The 
findings from the Brent study are not included in this study as it was an urban housing 
company transfer under a later Government framework. Nonetheless it provided me 
with a clear knowledge base and method of research from which I developed my 
approach to this study – a combination of historic and document research; with a cross 
section of interviews with key actors.  
Stage 1: Background Research 
This background research sets LSVT in context of wider housing policy and 
organisational development. 
Stage 2: Identifying the characteristics of the first 51 LSVT associations 
In order to analyse the characteristics of the first fifty-one LSVT associations, four 
indicators were selected from the Housing Corporation data to assess the relative 
performance of each organisation - rent collection, new development, void levels and 
rent increases – to help our understanding of organisational efficiency and the ability 
of the associations to adapt to their new operating environment. Indicators on rent 
collection, rent increases and voids help us to assess the efficiency of housing 
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management services, both in terms of cost control and effective use of resources and 
procedures. Indicators on new development reflect the ability of the organisations to 
identify new development opportunities, to borrow and deliver schemes. Since this 
often requires innovative ways of working and the ability to change course quickly if 
projects run into difficulties, it helped us to assess how efficient, viable and adaptable 
the associations are.  
Stage 3: Survey of Twenty LSVT associations 
It was not possible to conduct in-depth interviews with all 51 LSVT associations. I 
studied a significant sample from the whole population of LSVT associations. Ferber 
(1980: 3) describes a sample survey as “a method of gathering information from a 
number of individuals, in order to learn something about the larger population from 
which the sample is drawn”. Moser and Kalton (1983) identify several advantages to 
the study of a sample drawn from a population, rather than attempting to study the 
population in its entirety. In contrast to enumeration of the whole population, data are 
cheaper and easier to collect; it saves time in both collecting and analysing data; and a 
smaller number of cases makes it possible to collect and deal with more elaborate 
information from each. Bell (1999: 11) argues that such an approach enables the 
researcher to “concentrate on a specific instance or situation and to identify, or 
attempt to identify, the various interactive processes at work…[which] may remain 
hidden in a large scale survey but may be crucial to the success or failure of systems 
or organisations”.  Similar approaches have been adopted by other researchers, 
including, for example, Centre for Housing Research (1989), Mullins et al (1995) and 
Power (1997).  Studying a sample of twenty LSVT associations enabled me to spend 
time with each organisation, interviewing three representatives on average in each. 
This helped to produce detailed in-depth data.  By studying a sample of twenty 
associations, the process of analysing detailed qualitative material was more 
manageable than a larger sample of all 51 LSVT associations.  
The sample of twenty associations was selected so that it was as representative of the 
whole population of 51 LSVT associations as possible, along the lines of region, size 
of association, the nature of the area of operation and performance. Random sampling 
was rejected in favour of quota sampling, described by May (1993: 70) as a method 
that “attempts to approximate or represent the population characteristics by dividing 
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the sample along dimensions of, for example, class, race and gender”. In the LSVT 
sample, such divisions would not have been appropriate. However the method was 
particularly suitable to ensure representation of the whole population along the lines 
of region, size of association, the nature of the area in terms of its level of 
urbanisation, and performance of association. The actual selection process is detailed 
in Chapter six.  
Stage 4: In-depth Interviews 
Self completion questionnaires and focus group approaches were rejected in favour of 
in-depth face to face interviews. Self completion questionnaires are limited in scope 
and offer no opportunities to probe or seek clarification. Interviews have the 
advantage of offering opportunities for probing and clarifying, and enabling the 
respondent to provide sensitive information.  Interviews were semi-structured in order 
to allow the interviewee to “answer more on their own terms than the standardised 
interview permits”. (May 1993: 93). I used a checklist of issues (attached as Appendix 
1) to explore respondents’ perceptions of the motivations behind their authority’s 
decision to transfer, why they believed tenants voted in favour, their perceptions of 
the hopes and fears of staff, councillors and tenants, and whether, in their view, those 
hopes and fears have been realised. The checklist was sent to interviewees in advance 
to enable them to consider their response. The key aspects of LSVT associations that 
were examined are summarised in table 1.2.  
Table 1.2: Key aspects of LSVT associations examined 
• Background on local authority, including perceptions of performance as landlord 
• The organisational culture of the transferring authority and the respondents’ perceptions of the 
reasons for transfer 
• Respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for tenant support  
• Respondents’ views on the effectiveness of LSVT associations’ systems of governance 
• The process of breaking away from the sponsoring local authority from the perspective of 
respondents 
• Financing arrangements and the influence of private finance upon the organisation 
• How LSVT associations develop their own culture and the respondents’ perceptions of how 
that culture affects the way the organisations work  
• How staff perceive the differences in the management of housing compared to the local 
authority housing department.  
• How LSVT associations operate on the ground. 
• How LSVT associations seek to involve tenants in the running of the organisations. 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
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Within each of the twenty associations, I interviewed between one and five members 
of staff. In total, I interviewed fifty-four members of staff between August 1998 and 
March 1999.  Respondents were notified in advance of the issues to be discussed 
during the interviews.  All interviews were carried out face-to-face and lasted for 
approximately one hour. Interviews were tape recorded in order to maximise data 
collection.  Following initial analysis of the interviews, further information was 
obtained to ensure clarity.        
Each interview involved adapting a core checklist of issues to relate them specifically 
to the roles of interviewees (see Appendix 1). Discussions with chief executives, for 
example, focused on organisational and corporate issues, and discussions with 
Housing Directors focused on housing management issues. The main focus of the 
interviews was to examine how respondents perceived affect of the withdrawal of the 
State from social housing provision upon their jobs and organisations; to explore the 
organisational changes that LSVT associations introduced and the impacts on housing 
services; and to examine how the new organisations match wider changes in public 
service delivery.  
Stage 5: Data analysis 
The taped interviews were analysed in two stages. In the first stage, I developed a 
single pro forma based on the issues discussed in the interviews with all respondents 
(attached as appendix 2). The approach was piloted with one association, and 
amendments were made to the pro forma to rectify its limitations. Fifty-four taped 
interviews were analysed using this method with a single pro forma per organisation. 
All the interviews in each organisation were analysed and views recorded in the pro 
forma. This helped to identify common themes and areas where members of staff 
disagreed. The questionnaire grouped the views and perspectives of all the main 
actors in each organisation in a single location on the form, which facilitated the 
second stage of analysis.  
The second stage involved tabulating key data from the twenty completed pro formas. 
Thirty-eight tables of key data on motivations for transfer, service delivery and 
organisational development were developed. This second stage analysis provided both 
numerical data on the perspectives of interviewees, which was used to build charts 
included in the text, and key quotations that were used to illustrate particular themes.  
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This research examines the development and operation of LSVT associations from a 
specific perspective, namely the perspective of senior staff involved in managing, and 
in many cases establishing, the organisations taking over council housing.  This places 
limitations upon the conclusions that can be drawn from the case studies, although the 
respondents are well placed to report on both the historical background of their 
organisations as well as the ways in which they are changing and developing. It also 
provides insight into organisational change, social responsibility and quality, for 
which the respondents were responsible for delivering.   
The Structure of this thesis 
The thesis is divided into two sections – section one reviews the literature on transfers 
and the legal and regulatory frameworks that enable stock transfers, and section two 
examines transfer activity and presents the findings of the representative survey of 
twenty LSVT associations.   
Chapter two develops a framework for the study by exploring a number of theoretical 
models based on political, economic and management theory and housing 
management literature, that help us to understand stock transfers.  I develop a core 
thesis that stock transfer provides a practical way for the State to withdraw from direct 
provision of housing; that it helps change the organisation and management of public 
housing; and that it reflects wider changes in the State’s approach to service delivery, 
which involves shifting more responsibility to the private sector.  This development is 
driven by the ideological opposition of the Conservative Governments from 1979 to 
public provision of housing, but arguably Ministers were interested in changing the 
way housing is organised and managed to address alleged poor performance in some 
local authorities (Malpass & Mullins, 2002).   
Chapter three explores how Central Government came to be involved in developing 
stock transfer; the steps it took to promote transfers; and how these steps fit within the 
core thesis outlined in Chapter two.   
In Chapter four I attempt to explain how local government responded to Central 
Government pressure to become involved in developing stock transfer; and how their 
actions fit within the core thesis.   
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Chapter five examines the regulatory and legislative regime for LSVTs that enables 
local authorities to withdraw from direct provision; change the way social housing is 
organised; and shift responsibility for housing to the private sector.   
In Chapter six I present data on the transfers that were completed between 1988 and 
2001, including the regional distribution, political control and type of transferring 
authorities; size of associations; successful and unsuccessful ballot results; valuations 
and private finance raised. The Chapter concludes by presenting the process used to 
select a representative sample of twenty associations for inclusion in the survey.  In  
Chapters seven, eight and nine I present the findings from the survey.  I examine the 
respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for transfer among the twenty local 
authorities; organisational change brought about as a result of establishing the new 
organisations; and how a move to the private sector is perceived to impact upon the 
tenants, staff and housing transferred.   
Chapter ten draws out main findings from the survey and shows how the findings 
relate to the three themes of the core thesis.   
In Chapter eleven, I examine how the evidence presented in the thesis fits within core 
thesis, and explain how the early transfers examined have helped to pave the way for 
a wider stock transfer programme.  
The idea that councils should cede their landlord role to the RSL sector through LSVT 
has been gaining broader acceptance across the political spectrum, if only at national 
level, since the mid 1990s, although some political groupings, tenants’ organisations 
and trades unions are opposed.  It is therefore important that we understand the 
implications of handing over ownership of a valuable national asset to the private 
sector.  This thesis explores some of these implications and attempts to place LSVT 
within the wider policy context of withdrawal of the State from direct provision; 
organisational change and development; and the shift in responsibility for the delivery 
of services towards the private sector.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine a number of explanations of the State’s role in housing 
provision in order to develop a framework for studying stock transfers. How should 
we account for stock transfers? What is the most convincing way to explain them? In 
what ways are stock transfers different from other initiatives that change the way 
public services are provided? We study a number of accounts of the withdrawal of the 
State from direct provision of housing; explanations of organisational development in 
housing provision; and the relationship between stock transfer and wider changes in 
the State’s approach to the delivery of public services. These three different sets of 
theories offer different  - but interlinked - ways of advancing the understanding of a 
major structural change in housing provision. Table 2.1 sets out accounts of 
governments’ attempts to withdraw from direct provision; explanations for 
organisational change and their relevance to stock transfer; and the way LSVT 
matches the wider shift in the balance between the public and private sectors in 
service delivery. This table of theories provides the framework for this chapter. 
Table 2.1: Changes in the role of government and the nature of organisations 
Explanations for the 
withdrawal of the State from 
direct provision of housing 
Shifting balance between the 
public and private sectors 
Drivers for organisational 
change 
Stages in development of 
housing policy 
McGuire (1981)  
‘Rolling back the State’ 
Forrest & Murie (1988) 
Thompson (1990) 
Feigenbaum, Henig & Hamnett 
(1998) 
Scale, producer interests and 
break-up of municipal landlords 
Henney (1984) 
Jacobs (1961) 
Clapham (1989) 
‘Fiscal crises’ 
Osborne & Gaebler (1992) 
Forrest & Murie (1987) 
Hamnett (1987) 
 
Right to Buy 
Jones & Murie, (1999)  
 
Arms length ownership and 
management and public sector 
management ethos 
Power (1987; 1993) 
Stewart (1988) 
Leach, Stewart & Walsh (1994) 
Changes in organisational 
culture 
Handy (1993) 
Central-local relations 
Jones & Stewart (1985) 
Harloe (1994) 
Forrest & Murie (1985) 
Quasi privatisation through 
stock transfer  
Le Grand & Bartlett (1993) 
 Excellence in service provision 
Peters & Waterman (1982) 
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In this chapter, I will argue that although the main driver for local authorities pursuing 
transfer was the financial difficulties they faced since 1979, due to cuts in public 
housing budgets by the Conservative Government, transfer has also helped to address 
organisational problems of council housing, identified by a number of writers, 
including Power (1987; 1993; 1997), Henney (1984), Stewart (1988) and Clapham 
(1989).  Clapham, for example, has argued that:     
“the defenders of council housing are right to place much of the blame for 
its present parlous state at the door of the [Conservative]government, but 
the key question is whether council housing, even in its ideal form, is 
worth defending.  Has the ‘crisis’ been entirely caused by the malevolence 
of central government or are there weaknesses in council housing which 
have contributed to its decline and lack of support?” (Clapham (1989:16) 
It is not my intention to give a definitive answer to this question, but I will draw upon 
different sources of evidence that suggests that the problems of council housing are 
rooted both in the financial regime under the Conservative Government and also the 
way council housing management is structured and operated by local authorities.  
While the major motivation of local authorities to transfer may have been to escape 
from the financial ‘straightjacket’, they were also motivated in part by the political 
need to change the way services were delivered in response to sustained attacks by the 
Conservative Government (Cairncross, Clapham & Goodlad, 1997: Malpass & 
Mullins, 2002).  I start this chapter by examining interpretations of the role of the 
state in order to develop an understanding of council housing, and its transfer to 
independent landlords, within the context of wider social and economic structures.   
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
In this section, I briefly examine a number of alternative interpretations of the role of 
the state in the direct provision of housing to assist us in understanding the changes 
that occurred since the mid 1970s onwards: the rational model of state welfare, as 
expounded by the Fabian movement; the Marxist interpretation (Castells, 1987; 
Ginsburg, 1979 and Gough, 1979); and Ball, Harloe & Marten’s (1992) interpretation 
of the state’s role which recognises that structures of housing provision are embedded 
in the wider economic, social and political structures of society. 
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The rational model 
The rational model interprets the state’s role as identifying problems, surveying their 
causes, and finding and implementing solutions (Pickvance, 1982: 19).  The state is 
therefore seen as essentially benevolent, acting in the interests of society as a whole 
by enacting reform to help foster social progress.  Rees & Lambert (1985) argue that 
this interpretation is attractive for those within the state, as it is seen as acting in the 
interests of society as a whole and not in the interests of a particular group or groups.  
Through this interpretation, it is therefore possible to assume that there was “a fairly 
direct relationship in welfare state regimes between the existence of housing needs 
and state policies which responded to them” (Harloe, 1995: 4).   
Marxist rejection of the idea of the benevolent state 
From the 1970s onwards, the idea of a neutral, benevolent state came under attack by 
Marxists writers (Castells, 1987; Ginsburg, 1979 and Gough, 1979), but also by the 
New Right, who challenged the Fabian view that government “must be the chief 
architect of welfare provision” (Taylor-Gooby, 1991:3).   Pierson (1991) summarises 
the Marxist interpretation of the role of the state as serving the needs of the ruling 
class, by assisting in the reproduction of labour power to ensure capitalist 
accumulation.  He goes on to point out that “the benefits of the welfare state to the 
working class are not generally denied, but they are seen to be largely the adventitious 
by-product of securing the interests of capital” (Pierson, 1991:51).   
The Marxist interpretation has been criticised on a number of fronts.  Daunton (1983) 
points out that there are alternative vehicles to direct state provision for reproducing 
labour and legitimating capitalist social relations, including, for example, tax breaks 
for owner occupation and capital grants for provision by the private sector.  Cole & 
Furbey (1994) argue that State housing policies may emerge in response to the needs 
of capital, but the Marxist account does not offer any explanation as to why the State 
continues to provide when political and economic conditions have improved.  
Dearlove & Saunders (1984) suggest that Marxist interpretations imply that only a 
minimum standard of housing should be provided to support the reproduction of 
labour.  However, they argue that  
“the post war welfare state in Britain would seem in many respects to 
have exceeded these ‘requirements’.  It simply makes no sense, for 
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example, to suggest that capital ‘requires’ its workers to be housed in 
centrally-heated council housing with garages…There is an enormous 
gap between the level of provision which capitalists may deem ‘necessary’ 
for reproducing labour-power or ensuring legitimacy, and that which has 
actually been provided over the years” (ibid: 317).   
Structures of housing provision 
Ball, Harloe and Martens (1992) reject both of the interpretations outlined above, in 
favour of an approach which analyses changes in structures of housing provision.  
They argue that such an approach recognises that housing provision is a social 
construct and “there are combinations of social agents involved in housing provision 
that relate to each other in empirically observable ways” (ibid: 3).  Harloe (1995) 
identifies three structures of housing provision: the ‘workers co-operative model’ – 
which seeks to replace commodified forms of housing provision by decommodifed 
alternatives – the “mass” model – which saw widescale direct provision by the state – 
and the “residual” model – which sees direct state activity focusing on provision only 
on those members of society unable to procure housing for themselves through the 
market.   
This analysis is arguably superior to the rational state model and Marxist 
interpretation as the role of the state is interpreted in relation to changing social 
structures of accumulation.  Harloe (ibid) argues that the role of the state changes 
during the periods of liberal capitalism, welfare capitalism and post-Fordism.  During 
the post-Fordist era, public housing became an ever more residualised form of 
provision as “the initial rationale for post-war mass housing was eroded by the very 
social and economic developments to which it had earlier contributed” (ibid:11).   
The move away from the mass model – which gained state support only in 
“abnormal” times (ibid: 7) - towards a more residual model, through policies of 
‘privatisation’, can be interpreted as a signal of further progression of the post-fordist 
structure of accumulation (Amin, 1994; Burrows & Loader, 1994).  Malpass (2001) 
argues that the centralised and bureaucratic style of local authority housing provision 
can be seen as “exemplars of Fordist service providers, concentrating on mass 
production of standard products for homogenised consumers” and that their 
replacement by housing associations, which are reputed to respond to a wider range of 
needs “can then be interpreted in terms of a transition to post-Fordism” (ibid: 12).   
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1. EXPLAINING THE STATE’S ATTEMPTS TO WITHDRAW FROM 
DIRECT PROVISION OF HOUSING  
The state has been involved in the direct provision of housing in Britain for most of 
the 20th century. The Conserative Government elected in 1951 started a gradual 
process of withdrawal, with a quickening of the pace of withdrawal from 1979. This 
section examines three explanations for this withdrawal; McGuire’s (1981) stages in 
housing policy development; Osborne and Gaebler’s  (1992) thesis that fiscal crises 
lead to the re-invention of government services, a position which is challenged by 
Forrest & Murie (1987) and Hamnett (1987), who point to changes in political 
ideologies that change the way governments direct public expenditure; and the role of 
central-local relations (Jones & Stewart, 1985; Harloe, 1994; and Forrest & Murie, 
1985). 
Stages in development of housing policy systems 
McGuire’s (1981) comparative study of housing systems identifies four stages of 
housing development, based on the experience of America, Japan and countries in 
Europe. Firstly, as countries industrialise, cities grow rapidly to accommodate 
expanding populations. There is an acute shortage of housing and “State intervention 
is required to stimulate the level of housing production in order to ameliorate the 
housing shortage in a numerical sense” (ibid, p.11). Housing is designed to meet basic 
needs only and each household has one room only. Secondly, when basic needs have 
been provided for, households aspire to better their conditions by obtaining access to 
more than one room. The State is compelled to intervene in housing as the first two 
stages result in a high degree of social dislocation. The State’s role at this stage is to 
help stimulate provision. In the third stage of development, emphasis shifts from 
quantity and size to quality of accommodation. There are enough units of 
accommodation of the right size to satisfy demand and population growth slows to a 
level that cities are able to more readily absorb. There are still major differences in the 
quality of accommodation enjoyed by citizens, and the State still has a high level of 
involvement in housing, through regulation, subsidy and possibly direct provision of 
housing for a wide range of social groups. The fourth stage “sets in once this 
upgrading of a nation’s housing stock has been completed”  (ibid, p.12). The State 
attempts to withdraw from housing, as the majority of the population is now well 
housed.  The State seeks to reduce the scope of its activities and its financial burden 
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by targeting assistance on people on low incomes, and by encouraging people on 
higher incomes to rely less on the state by taking responsibility for their own housing 
by purchasing properties of their own or renting privately. The State has an on-going 
role either as direct provider or through financial support for people who are unable to 
provide for themselves. The State may also provide support to other organisations that 
provide low cost housing.  
McGuire asserts that “political reality will not let a government withdraw from 
housing” (ibid: 14). Once involved in housing, governments are reluctant to withdraw 
altogether, although they may seek to reduce their role due to the burden of the 
financial commitment required, particularly in direct provision of housing. It is even 
more unlikely that they will be able to withdraw from the provision of support for 
people on low incomes. They are also likely to continue to provide grants to housing 
providers, and to continue to regulate them.  
The fourth stage of housing policy development in the UK 
The origins of the Government’s withdrawal from direct provision of housing can be 
traced back to the mid 1950s, at a time when the State had become deeply involved in 
housing following the inter-war and post war building programmes. Following the 
Second World War, there was tremendous pressure on the State to provide new 
housing, due to the combined effects of a virtual cessation of house building during 
the War, bomb damage and an accelerating decay of existing housing (Power, 1987: 
41). The Government’s aim in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War was 
for housing to become a service that the State provided for all people. The 
Government was “determined to make council housing a general service, like health 
and education” (ibid, p.41). The pressure to build continued into the 1950s, although 
the Conservative Government re-focused the housing programme on re-housing the 
most deprived people on a minimal welfare basis, and relied increasingly upon the 
private sector to help meet its target of building 300,000 new homes per annum. By 
the 1960s, the Government encouraged councils to sell properties to sitting tenants as 
it felt that the most pressing needs had been met. The Government believed that the 
private sector was now capable of providing for general needs (Cooper, 1985: 15). 
When returned to power in 1964, Labour took several steps to increase home 
ownership, recognising the popularity of the tenure among its own supporters, whose 
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increasing prosperity meant that home ownership had become a realistic goal. But the 
Party was still ideologically attached to the idea that public rented housing was 
preferable to private landlordism, and so aimed to reflect the increases in national 
spending on private owner occupied housing with higher state spending on public 
housing (Cooper, 1985: 15).  By this point, the UK had reached stage three in 
McGuire’s schema – the State’s building programme had re-housed large numbers of 
people from poor quality and overcrowded private rented accommodation, and the 
growth in owner occupation helped people who could afford to buy to access better 
quality accommodation. In the context of McGuire’s four stages of development, the 
Government’s attempts to be even handed between the private and public sectors by 
seeking to match spending of the former by the latter were possibly misplaced. The 
expansion of the public housing building programme in the second half of the 1960s 
helped contribute towards an oversupply of housing which later became unpopular 
and difficult to let, as people’s aspirations had moved beyond what the state seemed 
to be capable of delivering.  
The financial crisis in the mid 1970s and intervention of the International Monetary 
Fund led to reductions in public expenditure on direct provision of housing. By this 
time, the Labour Government  argued that there was a surplus of housing (Department 
of the Environment, 1977), most of which provided reasonable accommodation. 
However, any surplus was merely a crude surplus, and it coexisted alongside an 
unmet need (Greve, 1964; Glastonbury, 1971; Greve, 1985), unleashed in part by the 
contraction in the private rented sector and the extension of an obligation upon local 
authorities to house a wider range of people under the Housing (Homeless Persons) 
Act 1977 (Donnison and Ungerson, 1982). Following the general election in 1979, the 
Conservative Government began withdrawing public expenditure significantly from 
1980 onwards. I explore the reasons for these cuts later in this chapter.  Seventy-five 
per cent of the reductions in public expenditure between 1980 and 1984 were borne 
by the Housing budget “as it was felt that any shortfall in production would be met by 
the private sector” (Cooper, 1985: 3).  The anticipated expansion of activity by private 
house builders failed to materialise (Malpass & Murie, 1987).  
The Right to Buy appeared to demonstrate that it was possible for the State to 
partially withdraw from direct provision of housing, but that the majority of tenants 
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did not have access to the necessary resources, or did not want to buy their homes. 
However, Malpass & Murie (1987:97) argue that the Conservative Government’s 
policy of privatisation through the Right to Buy “has not meant a disengagement of 
government from housing” and that new policies represented “a shift in the nature, 
direction and methods of state intervention, rather than a simple withdrawal or 
abandonment of the tradition of intervention through the general provision of council 
housing”. When the momentum of the Right to Buy began to slow by the mid 1980s, 
the Government sought other ways of maintaining the pace of privatisation (Malpass 
& Mullins, 2002). The stock transfer models adopted by the Conservative 
Government relied on a degree of pressure on local authorities and were successfully 
resisted by local authorities. The Conservative Government’s failure to force local 
authorities to transfer did not result in any change in its ideological opposition to 
public landlordism, and the financial regime for council housing was indeed tightened 
further from 1990 onwards.  A small number of local authorities started to explore 
ways of removing their housing from the impact of this financial regime (Kleinman, 
1993), following the early lead set by Knowsley in 1982 and Glasgow in 1996 (see 
chapter four), resulting in LSVT, which is a voluntary process that occurred in spite of 
conflict between Central and local government, not because of it. The role of relations 
between central and local government in the withdrawal of the State from direct 
provision is explored later in this chapter.  
Fiscal crises  
In this section, we explore the work of Osborne & Gaebler (1992) who assert that 
fiscal crises have forced states to change the way they provide services.  We go on to 
examine the perspectives on fiscal crises and housing policies expounded by Forrest 
& Murie (1987) and Hamnett (1987), who assert that the Conservative Government 
cut public housing programmes for ideological, rather than economic reasons.     
Re-invention of the role of governments 
Osborne & Gaebler (1992) and other American writers (see for example, Wolch, 1990 
and Wunthnow, 1991) advance the thesis that the fiscal crises of the 1970s helped 
bring about changes in the way governments deliver services. They argue that 
politicians offered voters two choices to escape from a cycle of repeated crises in 
public finances – to increase taxes or cut spending. Osborne and Gaebler claim to 
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have identified a demand among voters for a third option - the same level of taxes and 
enhanced services. They describe governments as being like fat people who need to 
lose weight – “they need to eat less and exercise more; instead, when money is tight, 
they cut off a few fingers and toes” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 23). Governments 
needed to find a way of reconciling demands for better services while their budgets 
remained static or even decreased in real terms.  This pressure is believed to have 
driven change in the way services are delivered: 
“Under intense fiscal pressure, state and local leaders had no choice but 
to change the way they did business.  Mayors embraced ‘public-private 
partnerships’ and developed ‘alternative’ ways to deliver services.” 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992: 12) 
Osborne and Gaebler assert that the debate about the scale of government, and 
whether there is too much or too little, is a “red herring”, and that the fundamental 
problem is that “we have the wrong kind of government” (ibid: 23).  They argue that 
fiscal crises taught governments that it is possible to procure better services with less 
tax revenues if they “facilitated problem solving by catalysing action throughout the 
community…to steer rather than row” (ibid: 28). Political leaders are said to have 
discovered that it is easier and often more cost effective for them to facilitate action to 
address problems if they disengage from service delivery: “Steering is very difficult if 
an organisation’s best energies and brains are devoted to rowing” (ibid: 30). 
Separating strategy from service delivery is believed to leave governments free to 
“see the entire universe of issues and possibilities” and to “balance competing 
demands for resources”, while providers are said to concentrate on “finding the best 
methods to achieve their goals” (ibid: 35).   
Stock transfer and the changing role of government in housing provision 
One interpretation of Osborne & Gaebler’s thesis is that fiscal pressures and 
resistance among voters to pay higher taxes, coupled with voter expectations of better 
services for less money, encouraged local authorities to search for new ways of 
providing services. Many politicians and officers started to ask searching and difficult 
questions about the services they provided, and came to the conclusion that it was not 
in the interests of their tenants and communities to continue to own and manage 
housing. Stock transfer appeared to be an acceptable option for local authorities for 
two reasons. Firstly, it offered a solution to some of the problems they faced, and 
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enabled withdrawal in a way that helped to ensure that the interests of tenants were 
protected. Transfer could be structured in a way that gave comfort to councillors that 
their housing stock could be preserved as a single entity (Malpass & Mullins, 2002), 
even though they gave up direct control.  They also have a certain degree of influence 
over the independent organisations they create as one of the major stakeholders. 
Secondly, it was a course of action that local authorities were not directly forced by 
Central Government to enter into.  In assessing the relevance of Osborne & Gaebler’s 
work to housing policy in the UK and actions by local authorities, it is important to 
consider the ideological position of the Conservative Government, which made public 
provision of housing an early target for budget reductions (Cooper, 1985; Forrest & 
Murie, 1988).  Arguably, the ideologically driven fiscal pressure upon local 
authorities left some councillors feeling that they had little alternative but to transfer.   
Fiscal crisis or reorientation of housing expenditure? 
While Osborne & Gaebler’s study provides a useful account of how states may have 
reacted to fiscal pressure, a number of authors challenge the view that the 
Conservative Government’s housing policy was driven by the perceived need to 
reduce public expenditure.  Forrest & Murie (1987) assert that the Conservative 
Government reoriented public expenditure from public housing programmes towards 
funding measures to support the promotion of owner occupation, and alongside 
Hamnett (1987), they assert that Conservative housing policies were ideologically 
driven, and the savings to the Exchequer that resulted were an unintended, although 
perhaps welcome outcome.    
Forrest & Murie (1987) examine changes in public expenditure between 1979 and 
1986, and identify a major shift from capital investment in public housing towards 
means tested personal housing subsidies and support for owner occupation through 
mortgage interest tax relief.   
Political debates at that time were said to have been dominated by the perceived need 
to address a fiscal crisis and shifting greater responsibility for financing housing to the 
private sector (Cooper, 1985).  Forrest & Murie reject the notion that changes in 
public expenditure on housing should be seen as an inevitable outcome of fiscal 
constraint, as the combined cost of mortgage tax relief, central and local government 
subsidies, benefits and improvement grants increased by two thirds between 1979 and 
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1983.  They go on to argue that  
“the policy of privatisation through council house sales did not emerge 
because of some financial calculation.  Rather it was presented as a 
means of extending home ownership; redistributing wealth; and reducing 
the power and control of the State.  However, as the policy has emerged 
since 1979, it has increasingly contributed to the relief of fiscal 
problems.” (ibid, p29). 
The authors assert that, despite the rhetoric of austerity, the reality was an expansion 
of existing expenditure, with redirection from direct provision of housing to support 
for private provision.  Kleinman’s (1996) assessment of the Conservative 
Government’s financial support for owner occupation draws rather different 
conclusions.  He argues that “behind the rhetoric, the reality was [that] the Treasury 
was known to be hostile to mortgage tax relief” (ibid: 30).  The real value of mortgage 
interest tax relief was eroded over the course of the 1980s, due to a combination of 
lower income taxes; increases in house prices, while the level qualifying for relief 
remained constant; and the withdrawal of dual tax relief, where joint owners could 
both claim (ibid).    
Hamnett (1987) argues that the financial benefits of council house sales were not the 
principal rationale for the Conservative Government’s policies, as to do so “would be 
to fall into the trap of inferring causes from their effects” (p212).  He identifies the 
primary motivating factor for sales of council housing and cuts in public housing 
programmes as being the Conservative Government’s ideological objective of 
expanding home ownership.  Although there were fiscal benefits from sales and cuts, 
these were “a secondary bonus” (p212).  To back up this thesis, Hamnett points to a 
number of alternative cuts available to the Conservative Government to reduce 
expenditure that were not explored – including, for example, cutting or withdrawing 
mortgage interest tax relief – all of which were rejected as being politically 
unacceptable.  
In the section above we outlined accounts of the withdrawal of the state from direct 
provision to help advance the understanding of stock transfer. The State began to 
withdraw from direct provision, perhaps reluctantly, in the 1970s because of the fiscal 
and economic problems of the Labour Government, although it argued that the vast 
majority of the population were, by then, well housed. The Conservative Government, 
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elected in 1979, asserted that direct provision had become both a financial burden and 
a source of conflict between central and local government. Ministers were 
ideologically opposed to direct provision by the public sector and wanted to 
encourage local authorities to withdraw.  Withdrawal from service delivery would 
help to resolve central-local conflict over housing policy; shift – but not eliminate - 
the financial burden of housing provision; and enable government to focus on strategy 
and to monitor the performance of providers.  
Central-local relations 
Central and local government both claim that they have legitimacy of authority 
delivered through the electoral system, although local authorities are directly 
judicially dependent upon the centre. Housing has been a major political issue 
throughout the 20th century, and central governments chose at various stages to 
address housing needs through direct local authority provision. Over time 70 per cent 
of rented housing was provided by local authorities, which became increasingly 
difficult to manage (DoE, 1981; Power, 1987; Henney, 1984). In spite of these 
mounting problems, Central government attempts to take more control of the 
activities of local authorities were met by resistance. Local authorities were reluctant, 
for example, to accept imposition of statutory homelessness duties and the duty to 
prevent racial discrimination in allocations policy and practice.  Relations between 
central and local government have been in crisis since 1979 due to increasing attempts 
by the centre to control and constrain the activities of local authorities. The Right to 
Buy, for example, was accepted reluctantly by many authorities, but others refused to 
divert resources from other services to process sales within centrally set timescales.  
Anticipating opposition from some councils, the Conservative Government included 
powers of intervention in the Housing Act 1980, resulting in intervention in the 
administration of council house sales in Norwich (Forrest & Murie, 1985).  Central 
government sees local authorities as agents through which it delivers its policies, 
while local authorities seek to implement their own programme, upon which they 
were elected into office. The result is a relationship characterised by conflict and 
blame:  
“Central government and local authorities… are organisations subject to 
many and often conflicting pressures, and whose key actors may be as 
likely to disclaim responsibility for their actions and to blame others, as to 
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seek responsibility in order to achieve their goals.” (Jones and Stewart, 
1985:27)  
The post second World War era witnessed a growing pressure for better public 
services and uniformity of provision. There were pressures upon both central and 
local government for enhancements in services. Local authorities’ dependence upon 
grant funding meant that the Government felt most of the pressure to find the 
additional resources required to provide more services, whereas local authorities were 
under intense pressure to provide beyond their capacity to organise or manage. 
Central government has to be concerned about the totality of expenditure, of which 
spending by local authorities is an important component. The election of the 
Conservative Government in 1979 precipitated a crisis in relations between local and 
central government. One of the main manifesto commitments of the Conservative 
Party in the election was to reduce Government spending (Conservative Party, 1979). 
In order to deliver upon its commitment, the Government increasingly sought to 
control the spending and activities of local authorities.   
By the time the Conservative Party came to office in 1979, public housing - 
particularly flatted estates in inner urban areas - was becoming less popular (see for 
example Dennis, 1970; Parker, 1983; Cooper, 1985; Kleinman, 1996). A widely held 
perception of public provision was that the professionals who developed it had paid 
scant regard to the needs and aspirations of the people they housed (Dunleavy 1981; 
Henney, 1984) and that the scale of estates proved unmanageable for local authorities 
(Power 1987). However, Forrest & Murie (1987) challenge the view that council 
housing was unpopular.  They reject assertions by other authors (see, for example, 
Saunders & Harris, 1987) that tenants chose to exit the sector because of their 
dissatisfaction with their landlord.  Forrest & Murie point to survey evidence 
suggesting that 85% of tenants purchasing their homes in London were satisfied with 
their experience as tenants.  However, this survey data was gathered between 1968 
and 1973, and it is possible that these tenants exited the sector before management 
problems emerged, or before tenants were encouraged to expect higher quality 
services from their landlords.  It is clear, however, that the provision of housing by the 
State was antithesis to the Conservative Government’s commitment to private 
provision. Withdrawal on a wide scale began with the Right to Buy, which 
compounded the problems of public provision, by removing the most attractive stock 
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and limiting opportunity and choice for those remaining in the sector (Sewell, Twine 
& Williams, 1984).   The Right to Buy was popular with tenants, who were more 
likely to be Labour supporters than Conservative supporters (Johnston, 1987). 
Kleinman (1996) argues that although Labour’s support for council housing began to 
waver in the mid 1970s, the Party instinctively opposed forced sales through the Right 
to Buy and pledged to end the policy in its then current form in its 1983 manifesto 
(Labour Party, 1983).  Following its poor results in the 1983 General Election, this 
commitment was dropped and the party accepted the Right to Buy (Merrett, 1985).  
The Right to Buy was accompanied by central government attempts increasingly to 
control the activities of local authorities (Forrest & Murie, 1987). Local authorities 
attempted to resist these assaults on what had become their empires or “municipal 
fiefdoms” (Cooper, 1985).  
The Conservative governments devised a number of policies that were designed to 
either encourage or force local authorities to downsize the scope of their activities, 
including cuts in grants, rate-capping, Compulsory Competitive Tendering and 
compulsory stock transfer through Tenants’ Choice and Housing Action Trusts. The 
Conservative Government had a vision of local authorities that did not provide 
services directly, but employed contractors instead and acted as a regulator and an 
enabler (DoE, 1987; Waldegrave, 1987; Ridley, 1988). Stock transfer can be seen as a 
model that the Government attempted to use against councils who were reluctant to 
transfer their housing voluntarily (Clapham, 1989) as shown in see figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1: Central-local conflict and stock transfer  
Source: Based on Cooper (1985
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Government attempts to impose its will upon reluctant local authorities through 
directed transfer were successfully resisted by local authorities and feared by tenants 
(Woodward, 1991). The combined efforts of local authorities and tenants set up a 
“barrier” to the success of the Government’s schemes. Tenants were suspicious of 
central government motives and were fearful of the involvement of ‘private’ 
landlords. They felt disenfranchised by the Government’s approach to stock transfer, 
and wanted to have a say in the process. At the same time, however, tenants had a 
high stake in their housing and a desire for better conditions, including re-investment 
and improved management (Woodward, 1991; MacDonald, 1986). Local authorities 
came under pressure to transfer their stock due to centrally imposed restrictions on 
housing budgets but the problems of direct provision were arguably also an important 
factor (Cole and Furbey, 1994; Henney, 1984; Stewart, 1988; Clapham, 1989). These 
problems are explored in the next chapter. Tenants arguably accepted transfers 
proposed by their local authorities as their existing rights were largely unchanged 
following transfer. The authorities sought the opinions of tenants, and asked them to 
vote on the process. This engendered trust and a new feeling of partnership between 
councils and tenants (Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999). We explore further the reasons 
for the limited direct impact of the Government stock transfer initiatives in Chapter 
Three.  
2. DOES ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT HELP TO 
EXPLAIN STOCK TRANSFERS? 
In this section, we explore four accounts of organisational change and development in 
housing provision and their relevance to the changes brought about by LSVT 
associations.  Direct provision of housing by local authorities was believed to be 
problematic (see for example Henney, 1984; Clapham, 1989; Saunders, 1990 and 
Power, 1997), and the Conservative Government and some local authorities looked 
for ways of changing the organisation and management of their housing stocks to 
improve the services provided to tenants (Malpass & Mullins, 2002). The 
Conservative Government wanted to “break up local authorities’ near monopoly of 
rented housing” and “diversify tenures and bring in private sector money and 
expertise” (Ridley, 1988: 20).  In response to the Conservative Government’s changes 
to the financial regime for council housing and political attacks on management 
(Cairncross, Clapham & Goodlad, 1997), local authorities started to explore new ways 
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of placing the management and ownership of their housing at arms length, where it 
could be run by independent organisations.  Organisational change can help to break 
up local authority monopolies and reduce the scale of public housing, arguably 
leading to fundamental changes in the nature of public housing (Clapham, Kintrea and 
Whitefield, 1991; Tym et al, 1988). We explore Jacbob’s (1961) thesis that public 
housing bodies are unsustainable as they are too large, leading to break-up into 
smaller entities, and Henney’s (1984) assertion that public housing has failed due to 
its mass scale and lack of incentives for the organisations providing services to 
tenants, echoed later by Clapham (1989), who argues in favour of the phased transfer 
of council housing to tenant controlled bodies, to redress the inherently unequal 
power relationship between producer and consumer; Power’s (1997) thesis that direct 
provision is inherently weak, leading to pressure to move towards arms length 
ownership and management; and we also explore the organisational theories of Handy 
(1993) and Peters and Waterman (1982) and discuss their relevance to stock transfer.  
Scale of housing provision  
Jacobs (1961) describes a number of prerequisites for cities to work. Cities are said to 
need diversity and a good mix of primary uses and a high concentration of people. 
“Massive single elements” in cities can cast a “deadening influence”, and both private 
and public money have a tendency to either glut or starve development and change. 
Under this pattern, public housing is cited as a prime example.  
Jacobs predicted that slum clearance and replacement by public housing would be 
self-defeating, adding its own “tincture of extra hardship and disruption”. Cities in 
Britain were subjected to the kind of “cataclysmic money” described by Jacobs. 
Generous subsidies from central government encouraged local authorities to clear 
“slums” and replace them with council housing (see figure 2.2). Parts of many cities 
in Britain were subjected to mass clearance and new build when local authorities 
received considerable levels of grant funding: 
“Public housing is employed cataclysmically instead of for gradual, 
steady street and district improvement, because we thought that 
cataclysms would be good for our slum dwellers.” (ibid: 328) 
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Figure 2.2: Effects of money on poor neighbourhoods 
Poor neighbourhoods (starved of private money) 
 
 
Cataclysmic money (public investment) 
 
 
“slum” clearance and replacement by public housing 
 
 
Public housing “abstracted out of wider city” 
 
 
Break-up essential to restore diversity to make areas work 
Source: Based on Jacobs (1961) 
When central government subsidies to local authorities were reduced, investment in 
some areas dried up, and they declined rapidly.  
The effect of “cataclysmic money” was that public housing did not meet Jacobs’ key 
criteria for success: 
“All city building that retains staying power after its novelty has gone, 
and that preserves the freedom of the streets and upholds citizens’ self-
management, requires that its locality be able to adapt, keep up to date, 
keep interesting, keep convenient, and this in turn requires a myriad of 
gradual, constant, close-grained changes.” (ibid:284)  
Much of post war council housing, in its original form, arguably fulfilled the large-
scale cataclysmic money category, and not the staying power criteria of Jacobs, as it 
has not kept pace with changing expectations (see table 2.2). Councils appeared to 
find it difficult to maintain the new forms of housing and keep them up to date so that 
they met the expectations of tenants in the 21st century. Residents found it 
increasingly difficult to manage or control the conditions immediately around their 
home, because of design, scale and lack of defensible space (Newman, 1973). Scale 
and design also made council housing difficult to adapt or keep up to date. The size of 
buildings means that reconfiguration – where possible at all – is expensive and time 
consuming. This makes a large proportion of council housing incapable of both 
gradual and constant change: 
“Although the need to break up large estates was frequently recognised, 
their form was often such, and the expenditure involved likely to be so 
high, that there was little possibility of doing this.”  (DoE, 1981: 5)   
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Table 2.2: Jacob’s criteria for success and local authority housing 
Jacob’s criteria for success Local authority housing 
• Staying power  
 
• Declining popularity and increasing demolitions suggest that 
local authority housing has not kept up with expectations. 
• Self management • Self-management of areas around homes is believed to be 
difficult because circulation spaces on estates are ‘public’ or 
‘communal’ areas and there is very little ‘defensible’ space.  
• Adaptability • Scale makes adaptability difficult and prevents individual 
control over residents’ homes and surrounding areas. 
• Capable of gradual change • Arguably incapable of gradual change due to size of 
buildings and estates, which are difficult to adapt without 
major reconfiguration.  
Source: Based on Jacobs (1961) 
Why growth leads to break up 
Rescuing public housing involves re-integrating areas which have been “abstracted 
out of the ordinary city” (Jacobs, 1961) back into fabric, which strengthens the fabric 
too. To rescue public housing, Jacobs asserts that cities need to identify which 
conditions for diversity are missing, including a lack of mixed primary uses; blocks 
that are too large; an insufficient mixture in ages and types of buildings; and whether 
the concentration of people is sufficient to maintain an area. Diversity is said to equal 
difference, which makes the break up of the monotony and “sameness” of public 
housing essential.  
Jacob’s model of growth and diversity may offer a useful explanation for stock 
transfers in urban areas with large estates. Her explanation also offers some useful 
pointers in explaining stock transfers in shire district authorities. Although the bulk of 
council housing in these areas is not built in estates, and more of the pre-requisites for 
diversity are in place, management structures were arguably centralised and remote, 
and tenants often tended to have little influence or control. 
Mass scale, incentives and producer interests   
In a publication that arguably helped to influence later Conservative Government 
housing policy, Henney (1984) attacks council housing on a number of fronts.  He 
criticises the scale of council housing and recommends the transfer of small groups of 
dwellings to statutory trusts, as a way of increasing tenant satisfaction by providing 
sharper incentives for producers.  Henney accuses councils and professionals of 
developing council housing programmes “on far too large a scale, which took little or 
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no heed of popular preference, little or no heed of scope for improvement rather than 
[slum] clearance, little or no heed of the likely social and economic consequences”  
(ibid: 12). 
Henney characterises the system that evolved as more expensive than other housing 
solutions, having produced defective stock with day to day management problems, 
due to remote staff “locked within the town hall system” (ibid:15).  He makes six 
specific criticisms of council housing:  little consumer influence over the construction 
of their homes or over allocations; rents that did not reflect the cost of housing, and a 
lack of transparency in the true cost of housing to the public; councillors using 
construction and management of council housing to seek political advantage; a 
widescale failure by architects to design the types of homes that people wanted to live 
in; a lack of accountability to the end user as council housing was "commissioned by 
one group of people, designed by another group, managed by another, occupied by 
another, paid for by another" (ibid:18); and that the scale of the operation of managing 
the housing constructed was too big, and smaller landlords would eventually be 
required. 
Henney’s proposed solution was to give tenants more responsibility for, and control 
over, their homes; remove political patronage; introduce more choice and 
competition; and re-focus local authorities’ activities on a residual welfare role, while 
other agencies provided for a broader range of needs.  These aims would be achieved 
through a number of measures, the most radical at the time being the transfer of 
council homes to Housing Management Trusts (HMTs) either at the initiative of local 
authorities themselves, or tenants or at the direction of ministers.  Each HMT would 
own and manage between 500 and 2000 units, and would be controlled by trustees, 
five of whom would be elected by tenants, one member nominated by the local 
authority, a representative of the funder, and two independent members.   
Henney’s analysis of council housing is clearly partial, and assumes public provision 
per se to be inferior to market based solutions.  His analysis clearly influenced 
Conservative Government housing policy in the 1980s, as his proposal to transfer 
housing to small quasi independent trusts would help break up the near local authority 
monopoly of provision of rented housing, as well as shifting responsibility for 
financing social rented housing to the private sector, and is reflected in both the 
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Housing Action Trust and Tenants Choice models.    
Devolving control to tenants 
Clapham (1989) echoes some of the themes of Henney (1984) although he considers 
council housing within the context of the social objectives of equality, freedom, 
democracy and community.  Clapham argues that, while council housing has provided 
access to decent housing for disadvantaged people and placed the provision of 
housing firmly within local political debates, it has a number of weaknesses.  Firstly, 
Clapham argues that the provision of housing by the State has not significantly 
enhanced equality.  Owner occupiers accumulated personal wealth, aided by state 
subsidies in the form of mortgage interest tax relief, resulting in wider inequalities 
between owners and tenants.  Secondly, the systems of management of council 
housing have placed unnecessary restrictions upon tenants’ use of their homes, as well 
as restricting personal choice.  Thirdly, Clapham argues that councillors have been 
reluctant to devolve control to tenants, as this might threaten their role as elected 
representatives.  For staff, the requirement to be accountable to politicians for all 
decisions results in “rigid management structures and the use of standardised 
procedures, resulting in the stifling of initiative among staff” (ibid: 32).  Finally, 
Clapham argues that council housing has not nurtured communal living.  Standardised 
approaches, especially slum clearance, have been insensitive to existing communities.  
Council housing itself is said to have reinforced social divisions by locating 
disadvantaged people on highly visible and often segregated estates. 
Clapham proposes a fundamental shift in the power relationship between landlords 
and tenants as a means of helping to achieve the social democratic goals of equality, 
freedom, democracy and community.  This would be achieved by devolving 
ownership and control of housing to as small a scale as possible: 
“small scale is necessary to achieve effective tenant involvement in which 
all tenants can be informed of what is happening and have the chance to 
participate in decision-making.  Small scale is also important in the 
provision of an effective, speedy and flexible repairs service.  What seem 
to be insurmountable problems in organising an effective repairs service 
at the scale of a large district council seem to become insignificant when 
the service is organised at estate level.”  (ibid:43)     
Chapter Two: Providing a framework for analysing stock transfer Page 35 
 
Clapham acknowledges the advantages of larger scale organisations (for example, 
greater opportunities for developing specialist staff; cost savings through bulk 
purchasing), while Dearlove (1979) points to a number of disadvantages of small 
scale, with reference to local authorities.  They are said to have more difficulties in 
recruiting staff of a high calibre; they are believed to be unable to derive the benefits 
of economies of scale; and they are believed to be unable to benefit from 
specialisation and division of labour.  However, Clapham argues that small scale 
organisations are essential for management of housing stock, while larger 
organisations could take on the role of building and refurbishment.  Maclennan et al 
(1989) and Clapham (1992) provide further evidence that small landlords perform 
better than larger ones.  Clapham argues that tenant co-operatives of up to 300 units 
could take over the ownership and management of the stock and that the new 
organisations would be well placed to inform and involve tenants in taking decisions.   
Arms-length ownership and public sector management  
Power’s (1997) study of housing in Britain, Ireland and continental Europe advances 
the argument that direct state provision of housing is inherently weaker than 
management by independent bodies operating at arms length from the State. Power 
argues that state landlords cannot adapt easily to changes in circumstances, and are 
torn between the need to be accountable to their political masters and the need to 
provide services to their tenants. Arms length landlords are said to be stronger and 
more focused on the needs of tenants and able to adopt a long-term approach afforded 
by secure and stable funding.  For example, Emms (1990) argues that councils have 
weak incentives to maintain their housing stocks as a result of the lack of a direct link 
between an individual tenant’s rent and the service received, due to the practice of 
rent pooling.  The Centre for Housing Research study (MacLennan et al, 1989) points 
out that housing associations are able to devote more resources to housing 
management, resulting in some cases in higher tenant satisfaction than in local 
authorities.  Power argues that the strength of independent landlords encourages 
central and local governments to seek to move management and ownership of their 
housing to independent bodies in order to introduce “greater flexibility, autonomy, 
business efficiency and investment into the complex management tasks of social 
landlords” (ibid: 369) as well as to extend withdrawal from direct provision, as 
discussed above.  Kleinman (1996) argues that developments including LSVT and a 
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reduced direct role for the State point to a convergence between British and European 
housing systems.  
Direct management of social housing arguably placed councillors in a difficult 
position of being responsible for a service and at the same time acting as tenants’ 
democratically elected representatives. Councillors received a large volume of 
complaints about the housing service, but often responded defensively, leading to 
disillusionment among tenants with both politics and public housing (Power 1987).  
Councillors seemed to be able to do very little to improve management or the 
condition of their housing stock, given the financial constraints imposed by the 
Conservative Government and placing management and ownership of housing at arms 
length offered a possible route to improvements. This meant that more resources 
could be accessed, but more importantly, it meant that councillors would be free to act 
on behalf of their tenants, with no compulsion to defend the performance of the 
service provider. Some councils have placed ownership and management of housing 
at arms length through LSVT. Their continuing role as key stakeholders, with 
nomination rights and places on LSVT boards, arguably helps to ensure that local 
interests are protected. It can also be argued that councillors are better placed to act on 
behalf of the consumers of housing services, as they have less interest in defending 
the performance of the provider.  
Power argues that the complex business of social housing requires a single purpose 
and vision. She asserts that while local authorities can change the way they work - for 
example, through decentralisation - management will always be weaker, as they are 
multi-purpose bodies, which lack the single purpose required (Power, 1997). This 
view is supported by Stoker (1985) who demonstrates how local authority 
interdepartmental conflicts can lead to the division of functions that would be more 
efficiently handled by a single department.  Malpass (1975), Paris & Blackaby (1979) 
and Stoker (1985) argue that interdepartmental rivalries can make the management of 
a project difficult and cause delays, while Davies (1981) argues that rivalries may 
even lead to the abandonment by departments of policies which have been adopted by 
councillors.  In a challenge to the dominant view in the literature – that LSVT is 
driven by Central Government fiscal policies and ideology – Power asserts that local 
authorities need to transfer to place the ownership and management of housing at 
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arms length to provide the focus and investment required.  
Public Sector management ethos 
Linked closely to arms-length management and ownership, it is possible that stock 
transfer can be explained by a desire by some staff to remove housing from the effects 
of public sector management ethos.  There is a tension within local authorities as 
organisations for effective service delivery, and as political institutions constituted for 
debate and challenge (Leach, Stewart & Walsh, 1994).  In order to provide an 
effective service, an organisation is said to require shared aims and values. This is 
often not compatible with the governing process of a local authority, which involves 
groups of actors with different values engaging in debate and disagreement. Where 
shared aims and values do exist, the organisations are often not sufficiently focused to 
deliver, which can create the impetus for a move towards single purpose 
organisations, which operate independently of local authorities. 
Public sector management is believed to seek to steer a route between service delivery 
aims, and the political processes operating within an authority. Management is 
consequently geared to the needs of politicians and the political cycle.  Clapham 
(1989: 33) argues that “the emphasis on representative democracy has overburdened 
channels of accountability and control and contributed to inefficiency and 
unresponsiveness to tenants’ needs.  Few top managers in local authority housing 
know what tenants think about the service provided, but all know what councillors 
feel about the service”. Henney (1984) argues that local authorities need to consider 
political priorities as well as the business needs of their Housing departments and in 
the past this has often led to low levels of rent and a consequential lack of resources 
for investment in some authorities.    
Stock transfer can provide officers with an opportunity to establish organisations that 
are less constrained by the effects of public sector management ethos, arguably 
making it easier to structure the organisations around the service of providing social 
housing, and not the political cycle. The boards of the new organisations are intended 
to be apolitical and are believed to structure their approach to service delivery around 
a common statement of aims and values. The new organisations have access to their 
own core long-term funding, and no longer need to compete with other departments 
for resources (Stoker, 1991).  
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Management or administration?  
Stewart (1998) argues for widescale changes in the way council housing departments 
are organised and managed, to reflect the changing environment in which they 
operated from the early 1980s onwards, particularly changing social norms and 
aspirations.  He argues that “local authorities can no longer so readily assume that the 
public is or should be satisfied with their services.  Neither can they assume that the 
tenant is or should be grateful for the housing provided” (ibid: 11).  Although Stewart 
stops short of advocating a change of ownership, he encourages housing departments 
to move away from the administration of procedures to management of services for 
tenants.   
Through visits to local authorities, interviews with key staff and through the 
examination of documentary evidence, Stewart concludes that housing departments 
have traditionally operated by establishing procedures and implementing them, 
leading to centralisation, specialisation and restricted learning: 
“The administrative tradition was linked to the paternalism of the past. 
The organisation knows best and the organisation operated through its 
procedures.  Success was measured by adherence to procedures.”  (ibid: 
17) 
Stewart agues that this type of structure has a tendency to centralise, as centralisation 
is the best way of ensuring that the organisation implements procedures.  The staff 
within the structure are said to become more remote from the tenants, and “the 
organisation becomes closed to learning from outside” (ibid:17).  When demands 
from tenants grew and resources declined, housing departments withdrew further from 
the frontline and took on the role of gatekeeper.  The result can be a Housing 
Department that does not manage its stock or recognise the implications of its actions 
or lack of actions: 
“The enclosed department can enclose itself against learning, whether it 
is learning about the changing housing situation; about the changing 
composition of its own tenants; about the state of its stock; the results of 
its allocations policies; the extent of discrimination being applied; 
tenants’ views; or problems not dealt with and issues not resolved.” (ibid: 
18) 
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Stewart advocates wide ranging changes to the structure of housing departments, 
including changes in the role of councillors, who would focus on strategy and the 
broad direction of their staff.  New management for council housing would require 
moving staff back to the frontline, helping them to focus on conditions on the ground 
and stay closer to their tenants.  If housing departments remained as centralised and 
remote organisations, it is argued that conditions would deteriorate rapidly.   
Organisational Culture  
Handy (1993) stresses the importance of ensuring that an organisation adopts the right 
kind of structure to fit its culture. He attributes many of the problems experienced by 
organisations to the imposition of “an inappropriate structure on a particular culture, 
or from expecting a particular culture to thrive in an inappropriate climate” (ibid: 
181).  Handy identifies four main organisational cultures – Power, Role, Task and 
Person. These cultures are outlined in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Handy’s Organisational Cultures 
 Power Culture Role Culture Task Culture Person Culture 
Characterised 
by 
Spider’s web Greek temple Net Cluster of stars 
Organisation Strong central 
figure 
Roles and 
departments 
strictly 
demarcated 
Small autonomous 
teams which are 
task orientated 
Individuals are focal 
point of organisation 
Control Few rules and 
little bureaucracy 
Bureaucratic and 
rule driven 
Focus is on outputs 
rather than means 
Few shared rules. 
Difficult to impose 
management 
structure 
Advantages Fast to adapt to 
changing 
circumstances 
Cannot adapt 
easily to changing 
circumstances 
Extremely 
adaptable and 
sensitive to the 
market 
Enables individuals 
to pursue their own 
goals 
Disadvantages Only works in 
small 
organisations 
Liable to collapse 
in unstable 
environment 
Working 
environment can be 
tough leading to 
high turnover and 
low morale 
Impossible to agree 
and/or achieve any 
organisational goals, 
unless another 
culture is adopted.  
Source: Based on Handy (1993) 
Organisations characterised by the Power culture depend on a strong central figure or 
small nucleus of leaders. There are few organisational rules and they are only 
effective when the central figure is able to trust his subordinates, who must be 
empathetic with the organisation’s aims and values. This type of organisation can 
“move quickly and react well to threat or danger” but only works well in small 
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organisations as “the web can break if it seeks to link too many activities” (ibid: 184).  
Role cultures depend on “defined job roles, procedures for communication and rules 
for settlement of disputes” (ibid: 185). This type of culture only works well when the 
organisation can control its operating environment, and when conditions are stable. 
Handy characterises this culture as a Greek temple, which “rests its strength in its 
pillars” which are “strong in their own right” but when the operating environment 
changes “Greek temples are insecure when the ground shakes” (ibid: 185). These 
organisations find it difficult to identify the need to change and are slow to change, as 
employees and departments do not look beyond their own individual tasks. This type 
of organisation therefore only works where there is little competitive pressure, such as 
the work of government departments or local authorities.  
Handy describes the Task culture as “job or project orientated” with an emphasis on 
“getting the job done” (ibid: 187). There are very few rules and outputs are more 
important to the organisation than the way the teams go about achieving them. 
Individual teams are afforded a great deal of autonomy. This type of organisation is 
adaptable and is appropriate where “flexibility and sensitivity to the market or 
environment are important (ibid: 188). The focus on results can often create a highly 
pressured working environment, and this may lead to low morale and a high turnover 
of staff.  
The Person culture can be found in small organisations where “the individual is the 
central point” (ibid: 190), such as small consultancies or barristers’ chambers.  Handy 
characterises such organisations as clusters or galaxies of stars, as there is no 
management structure and individuals have autonomy and control over their own 
work. There are few, if any shared or common goals, and it is very difficult to impose 
control or management on organisations with this type of culture.  
Organisational culture in housing and local government 
Handy warns of the dangers of imposing an inappropriate structure on a particular 
culture. Local authority housing departments are believed to adopt the “role” culture, 
which works well in stable operating environments, but can be unstable when there is 
change. This culture can prevent variations in styles and systems, in order to prevent 
staff from innovating, taking risks and making mistakes, which might be turned into 
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political issues at councillor level.  These structures can consequently be slow to 
recognise the need to change and slow to adapt. Individual employees and 
departments are said to focus on their own tasks, as laid down in their job 
descriptions, and they are often unable to recognise the need for change. If they do 
recognise the need to change, their attempts to adapt are often fruitless, unless other 
departments change too. LSVT associations arguably move closer to the “task” 
culture, with an emphasis on getting the job done. They are able to operate with more 
flexibility and with less demarcation. Pay scales can be linked more closely to 
performance. Staff can be given more freedom from their managers to innovate and 
take risks, and collectively, the organisation can learn from its mistakes and develops.  
Handy’s schema helps us understand stock transfer by demonstrating the effects of the 
local authority culture on service delivery, and explaining how stock transfer can help 
to provide a more appropriate structure for alternative management styles. Local 
authority structures are designed to ensure that staff work only within a defined role. 
It largely prevents them from innovating and making improvements within their own 
roles difficult. The structure arguably prevents local authorities from being as 
responsive as they could be.  In contrast, stock transfer organisations are structured 
around the task of providing services.  The methods used to achieve the goal of 
effective service delivery are said to be less important than the goal itself.   
Seeking excellence in service provision 
Peters and Waterman (1982) give an account of research undertaken by the 
management consulting firm McKinsey between 1977 and 1980. McKinsey was 
concerned with problems of management effectiveness, and the nature of the 
relationship between strategy, organisational structure and effectiveness. The authors 
studied 75 highly regarded organisations in order to identify key criteria for 
excellence. They identified eight attributes that characterise most closely the 
distinction of what are described as “excellent innovative companies”. Firstly, 
excellent organisations have a bias for action, and have at their disposal a range of 
devices to maintain “corporate fleetness of foot” in order to avoid the “stultification 
that inevitably comes with size”. Secondly, excellent organisations are close to their 
customers and learn from the people they serve. They obtain their ideas from 
customers by listening intently and regularly.  Thirdly, excellent organisations give 
Chapter Two: Providing a framework for analysing stock transfer Page 42 
 
their staff autonomy and enable entrepreneurship. They foster innovation and 
leadership among their staff, and give them sufficient scope to enable maximum 
creativity.  Companies allow staff to take risks and make mistakes so that the 
organisations can learn.  Fourthly, excellent companies focus on improving 
productivity through people.  They treat their staff as their most important resource 
and seek to break down “them and us” cultures between workers and management. 
All employees are treated as “sources of new ideas” rather than as a pair of hands. 
Fifthly, excellent companies are hands on and value driven. Managers aim to be as 
close to the “shop floor” as they can, by visiting outlets and assessing them on the 
factors that are important to the companies.  Sixthly, excellent companies stick to the 
knitting. In other words, they only do what they are best at and what they know about. 
They do not seek to diversify into areas of business that are not closely allied to their 
core business. Companies who diversify into non-core areas are less likely to be 
successful. Seventhly, excellent companies have simple forms and lean staff. They 
have structures and systems that are “elegantly simple” and very lean top level staff 
complements, so that there are as few layers between the most senior person and the 
interface with the customer as possible. Finally, excellent companies have 
simultaneous loose-tight properties. They are both centralised and decentralised. They 
seek to push autonomy down to the lowest levels of staff, but at the same time, seek to 
centralise control over their companies’ values and mindsets.  
It is possible to apply the measures of success to LSVT associations as a way of 
assessing the value of organisational change from public bureaucracies to single 
purpose, arms length organisations.  Stock transfer arguably moves social housing 
into an arena where it is more easily able to adopt the attributes required in order to 
provide excellent services. Within local authority structures, operational and policy 
matters must be referred to committees for approval by politicians. Housing 
departments can be slow to make decisions and it is difficult for them to change 
course once politicians have made a decision. Officers cannot connect as closely to 
tenants as they may wish to, as they must have regard to the political process 
(Stewart, 1989). Staff lack the autonomy and freedom to innovate (Stewart, 1988), 
and their creativity and ideas can therefore remain untapped. Tenants often feel that 
they have no control over their homes and their landlords are unresponsive (Henney, 
1984; Stewart, 1988; Clapham, 1989).  
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In Chapter 11 we use Peters and Waterman’s analysis to assess how far arms length 
management and private sector practices can achieve excellence through provision of 
housing services through LSVT associations.  
Some local authorities attempted to find new ways of delivering housing services 
because of the Conservative Government’s limits on their finances, which affected 
their ability to deliver services, but possibly also because direct provision proved to be 
problematic. They placed the ownership and management of their housing at arms 
length. The new landlords are single purpose organisations that focus on the core 
business of running social housing. Some local authorities also sought to reduce the 
scale of housing operations by creating more than one transfer landlord, although the 
dominant model is whole stock transfer to a single landlord.  Placing management and 
ownership at arms length enabled the new landlords to adopt  alternative structures for 
managing housing, which enabled staff to deliver different styles of services to 
tenants.  
3. LSVT AND THE SHIFTING BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE SECTORS 
In the previous section, I developed the idea that stock transfer can be viewed as a 
way of helping to remove housing departments from the bureaucratic local authority 
structure, helping staff to change the way they deal with their customers; providing 
greater scope for innovation; and to adopt alternative ways of providing services.  In 
the 19th and 20th centuries, direct provision of services by the State arose from 
perceived market failures and the need to address inequalities resulting from market 
provision (Le Grand, 1982).  Local authorities became large multi-purpose 
organisations, providing services ranging from housing to education and refuse 
collection.  Elected councillors were responsible for both the strategy and provision of 
all these services, even though they do not necessarily have any expertise in these 
areas (Audit Commission, 1986), and cannot reasonably be expected to do so. 
Consequently, councillors necessarily came to rely heavily on officers (Wilson, et al 
1998), who in turn are not directly accountable to the end user.  Focusing more 
effectively on tenants’ needs might therefore require two things – firstly, breaking up 
the multi-purpose local authority into smaller autonomous or quasi-autonomous 
entities, and secondly, making service providers directly accountable to consumers.  
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LSVT can be seen as both a way of creating break away entities from local 
authorities, and also to help to make staff more directly accountable to tenants through 
tenants on governing boards and encouragement of more customer feedback.  Right to 
Buy, LSVT and similar initiatives in other sectors have reduced the scope of directly 
provided activities, leaving local authorities to re-focus on purchasing services on 
their electorates behalf.  
Stock transfer can contribute towards the shift in the balance of provision of services 
from the public to the private sector.  Following this shift, the role of the public sector 
is typically to identify needs; commission and fund services provided by private 
sector organisations; and to act as regulator to prevent exploitation of users by 
monopoly providers (Goodlad, 1993). Stock transfer can be seen as a ‘quasi 
privatisation’, as the new landlord acquires public sector assets - to which the public 
sector will have long-term access on agreed terms – with a continuing involvement by 
the public sector, both as funder and regulator, but also as a board member.  
Privatisation of council housing can be viewed from two perspectives (Feigenbaum, 
Henig & Hamnett, 1998).  It can be seen as a pragmatic response to solving some of 
the organisational or economic problems emerging from direct provision, particularly 
lack of certainty over long term funding for investment.  Alternatively, privatisation 
can be viewed as being driven by of a wider ideological goal of reasserting market 
mechanisms and shifting responsibility from the State to the individual.  In this 
section I outline briefly the beliefs of the New Right, the goals of privatisation and 
how privatisation of council housing has played out in practice. 
Background: Privatisation and the ‘New Right’ 
Thompson (1990) points to a lack of any agreed definition of the beliefs of the New 
Right, beyond a faith in the market in the allocation of goods and services.  The New 
Right is said to believe that “the market dispenses benign virtue and discipline” and 
that political involvement in the allocation of resources leads to coercion and 
corruption (ibid: 3).  The New Right’s ideas came to ascendancy in the higher 
echelons of the Conservative Party in the second half of the 1970s, as a result of 
perceived ‘Government failure’, and a failure to develop adequate economic and 
financial controls for nationalised industries (Veljanovski, 1987).  This ‘failure’ was 
believed to have been at the root of the UK’s economic problems and poor 
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performance of public corporations (Thompson, 1990), which were increasingly seen 
as a political and financial burden (Feigenbaum, Henig and Hamnett, 1998).  The 
New Right believed that the market was best placed to maximise welfare, asserting 
that the State was inherently less efficient at providing services than the private and 
voluntary sectors, as there were constraints on the information governments can 
gather about the economy in order to manage it: 
“Government is largely seen as…invading an otherwise self-regulating, 
cost minimising and welfare maximising social arrangement – the market 
mechanism.”  (Thompson, 1990: 16)  
Borrowing by governments to invest diverted capital from private sector organisations 
(which are said to create wealth) to government sponsored activities (which are said to 
be were unproductive).  Privatisation of state agencies was said to have reduced the 
burden of public sector borrowing upon the economy, and arguably encouraged them 
to become more competitive and efficient. 
Rolling back the State 
Forrest & Murie (1988) argue that the Conservative Government, elected in 1979, 
broke the post World War II consensus that the State had a legitimate role as a direct 
provider of services, allocated on the basis of need.  Privatisation would reassert 
market forces, reduce costs, increase efficiency and freedom and reduce, in the 
Conservative Government’s view, “the perceived debilitating effects of dependency 
on paternalistic, oppressive bureaucracies” and “roll back the frontiers of the State” 
(ibid: 4) 
The Conservative Government’s overriding priority was its ideological goal of 
extending home ownership and reducing state provision, initially through the Right to 
Buy and later through transfers of tenanted stock.  Home ownership was seen as the 
most effective way of decentralising power from the state to the market and to 
individuals: 
“The creation of a property owning democracy was a central part of the 
ideological crusade of the Thatcher administration.” (ibid: 6) 
The Conservative Government sought to shift the emphasis of public housing 
provision from a position where it was viewed as a right of citizenship and preferable 
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to private landlordism, to a system which provided only for the most disadvantaged 
members of society.  Those who had access to resources would have to secure their 
own housing through the private market.  This shift in emphasis has led to a 
residualisation of council housing, which lowered its status and increased stigma (see, 
for example, Murie & Forrest, 1980; Malpass & Murie, 1982; Malpass, 1983; 
Clapham & English, 1987; Forrest & Murie, 1991).   
The politics of privatisation 
Feigenbaum, Henig and Hamnett (1998) argue that privatisation is viewed by many 
commentators as a pragmatic solution to problems of service delivery or as a way of 
addressing fiscal or economic problems.  They argue that while fiscal and economic 
aspects are important, the political dimension of privatisation is of equal or greater 
importance.  
The authors categorise privatisations as administrative; economic or political (see 
figure 2.3).  The administrative perspective sees privatisation as one of a number of 
tools which can be employed to solve a service delivery problem.  The emphasis of 
this approach is on ‘who does what best’ and officials and politicians are seen as 
being ambivalent between public and private providers.  The “third way” advocated 
by the Labour Government since its election in 1997 provides a good example of this 
type of approach.   
Figure 2.3:  Perspectives on privatisation 
 Administrative  Economic Political 
Emphasised goal Achievement of 
socially defined 
goals 
Maximisation of 
individuals’ 
utilities 
Redistribution of 
power and control 
Unit of analysis Discrete social 
problem 
Individual or firm Group or class 
Concept of 
privatisation 
Tool box Preferred 
mechanism 
Weapon 
Source: Feigenbaum, Henig & Hamnett, 1998 
The economic perspective presents privatisation as “the “inevitable consequence of 
neoclassical truths that dictate the retraction of a bulky, intrusive and parasitic state” 
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(ibid: 38).  Advocates of this approach to privatisation argue that public provision is 
less efficient than provision through market mechanism, leading to higher costs and 
higher taxes, and less private investment.   
Fiegenbaum et al develop the idea that privatisation is essentially a politically driven 
phenomenon, rather than an adjustment to solve service delivery problems or 
economic difficulties.  Privatisation is viewed as a mechanism with which politicians 
can further the cause of a particular class or interest group: 
“privatisation often takes the form of a strategy to realign institutions and 
decision making processes so as to privilege the goals of some groups 
over the competing aspirations of other groups.” (ibid: 41) 
Housing privatisation through the Right to Buy was designed to radically change 
tenure patterns in the United Kingdom.  It can be viewed as part of a “systemic 
privatisation” as the Conservative Government’s motivation was to “reshape the 
entire society by fundamentally altering economic and political institutions and by 
transforming economic and political interests” (ibid:42).  Privatisation through the 
Right to Buy helped to shift public perceptions of the activities which Governments 
should take responsibility for, resulting in a more residual role for council housing, as 
described earlier in this section.   
Privatisation in practice: Right to Buy 
Although local authorities had powers to dispose of their housing from 1936 onwards, 
very few units were sold before 1980. Conservative governments in the post war era 
sought to encourage sales, while Labour governments sought to restrict them (Murie, 
1975). The Conservative Government elected in 1979 introduced the Right to Buy 
(RTB), which granted tenants a statutory right to purchase their council property at a 
discount on the market value of up to 70 per cent, subject to limitations on the cash 
amount of discount granted.  The RTB is the largest government privatisation to date, 
with some 2.2 million homes sold and receipts totalling £7.6 billion by 1996 (Moody 
& Ball, 1996), and a further 251,000 sales up to 1999/2000.  
RTB has significantly reduced the stock of social rented housing in many authorities. 
While this has reduced local authorities’ overall capacity to re-house homeless people 
and waiting list applicants, the reduction in the stock was accompanied by an increase 
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in turnover in the retained stock.  Lettings to new tenants in England increased from 
236,200 in 1988/89 to 249,900 in 1998/99 (see table 2.4). However, lettings to new 
tenants in the south east, south west and London fell, where pressure on affordable 
housing appears to be greatest.  
Table 2.4: Lettings of Local Authority Housing 
All lettings Government Office 
Region 1988/89 1998/99 
South East 20,500 17,000 
South West 13,400 12,900 
London 33,200 32,200 
East 15,500 18,300 
West Midlands 31,700 32,000 
East Midlands 20,500 26,000 
Yorkshire & Humberside 34,600 37,900 
North East 22,300 25,100 
North West 44,600 48,300 
Total (England) 236,200 249,900 
Source: DTLR, 2001 
Although the sale of council housing to tenants is popular as it is perceived to enhance 
an individual’s control over his or her dwelling (Saunders 1990), the RTB has 
deliberately contributed to the residualisation of the sector by removing economically 
active households from council housing and by removing the most desirable 
accommodation, thus reducing choice for those who remain in the sector (Sewell, 
Twine & Williams, 1984; Jones and Murie, 1999). It is also reducing the stock of 
affordable rented housing which the private sector has largely failed to replace, 
although it is possible to argue that increasing prosperity and changing aspirations 
have reduced the requirement for such a large rented stock (Saunders, 1990).  
Continued ownership by local authorities will allow the sale of dwellings to continue, 
but in contrast LSVT protects the existing tenants and helps to preserve the transferred 
stock for future generations of applicants (Malpass & Mullins, 2002) - once 
transferring tenancies have been relinquished, the new assured tenants who take their 
place do not have the RTB.  
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Quasi-Privatisation and competition - Is Large Scale Voluntary Transfer really 
“privatisation”? 
LSVT is a form of privatisation, in that assets are moved from the public sector to the 
private sector, for which local councils receive a capital payment. Services attached to 
the asset are then provided by a ‘private’ sector organisation. LSVT shares many of 
the objectives of other privatisations, which have been identified by Veljanozski 
(1987). There are, however, some clear distinctions between ‘privatisation’ of council 
housing through LSVT, and other privatisations that took place in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Tenants of local authorities are balloted on transfer proposals, whereas users of 
other services, such as the utility companies or British Rail, were not consulted.  In 
contrast to other privatisations, LSVT associations do not make profits and are not 
“floated” on the stock market, and their status as registered social landlords is 
ambiguous. In this section, I explore the objectives LSVT shares with other 
privatisations and some of the distinctions which sets the policy apart from the wider 
programme.  
The wider objectives of privatisation and LSVT 
Veljanovski (1987:8) identifies eight objectives of privatisation, which are “to reduce 
government involvement in the decision making of industry; to permit industry to 
raise funds from the capital market on commercial terms and without government 
guarantee; to raise revenue and reduce the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (the 
PSBR); to promote wider share ownership; to create an enterprise culture; to 
encourage workers’ share ownership in their companies; to increase competition and 
efficiency; and to replace ownership and financial controls with a more effective 
system of economic regulation designed to ensure that the benefits of greater 
efficiency are passed to the consumer.”   
It can be argued that LSVT shares many of these objectives with the wider 
programme of privatisation.  The Conservative Government had long espoused the 
idea of an “enabling state” (Ridley, 1988) which facilitated action by private sector 
bodies, with no direct government involvement in day-to-day decision making.  
LSVT can be interpreted as a way of enabling housing departments, as going 
concerns, to move into the private sector to access private finance without increasing 
the PSBR.  LSVT and the changes in the grant funding regime for housing 
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associations has arguably led to more competition and a more entrepreneurial style in 
social housing provision, arguably resulting in more effective use  of social housing 
grant (DETR, 2000).  LSVT has also moved council housing into an arena where it is 
regulated by the Housing Corporation, including regulation of rents and rent setting.  
It cannot be demonstrated, however, that LSVT results in wider share ownership, nor 
does it facilitate employee shareholdings in social landlords, which would, in any 
case, be inappropriate for not-for-profit landlords.  There are further specific 
distinctions between LSVT and other privatisations, which are outlined below.   
User consultation through ballots  
LSVT guidelines have always laid emphasis upon the requirement to consult tenants 
on whether authorities should transfer their stock. Although the Guidelines have never 
prescribed a ballot of tenants, no transfer to date has been approved without one. Nor 
has any local authority attempted to seek the Secretary of State’s approval to transfer 
without having balloted tenants.  In contrast, the Conservative Government never 
balloted users of British Telecom, British Gas, the water authorities or British Rail on 
privatisation, although it sought approval of voters indirectly through the ballot box at 
general elections.  Tenants of a local authority considering stock transfer therefore 
have a level of control over the future of a public asset that users of other services do 
not enjoy.  
Shareholding members 
Privatisations of profit making state owned corporations commonly involved 
“floatation” on the stock market.  Shares were sold to small investors and investment 
funds, who appear to demand continuously increasing dividends and growth in 
business. In contrast, housing authorities are legally prevented from distributing 
profits, and the concept of floatation does not work in this context. Although they are 
not suitable for floatation, councils’ housing stocks and the management services 
attached are attractive to RSLs, who are keen to expand their core business by 
purchasing the stock on an existing-use basis.  
The ambiguous status of RSLs 
Recipient landlords of the LSVT process are registered social landlords. There is a 
debate as to whether RSLs are really ‘private sector’ organisations at all. As industrial 
and provident societies or limited companies, RSLs have legal autonomy.  They are 
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governed by independent boards and are financed privately. But they receive 
government grants and are subject to Housing Corporation regulation.  The Housing 
Corporation has authority to place RSLs “under supervision”, which can include 
placing its own nominees on RSL boards (Housing Corporation, 2002).  The 
Conservative Government up to 1997 was keen on RSLs being seen as firmly in the 
private sector, although they stopped short of branding LSVT as ‘privatisation’. This 
was essential in securing positive ballot results, as many tenants would not have voted 
in favour of a proposal that transferred their homes to ‘private’ landlords (Woodward, 
1991). 
The aims and objectives of associations are determined largely by regulations laid 
down by the Housing Corporation. They continue to be highly regulated by 
Government agencies, and also receive substantial government grants. In other 
privatisations, the new company formed from the former public corporations are 
undoubtedly in the private sector. They are subject to an element of Government 
regulation, but the regulators do not have the same extensive powers to intervene as 
the Housing Corporation.  
LSVT is not “privatisation” in its purest sense, as the new bodies do not distribute 
profits and they are not “floated” on the stock exchange or sold to private companies. 
The State retains an involvement both as stakeholder and member of governing 
bodies, and also as an active regulator. LSVT shares many more characteristics with 
the quasi-market revolution in education, health and social services, where service 
provision has been split from purchasing (Le Grand, Glennerster and Maynard, 1991). 
Local authorities become “enablers” and effective “purchasers” or commission new 
services by inviting housing associations to bid for grants, which are awarded on a 
competitive basis (Goodlad, 1993). In contrast to NHS trusts and grant-maintained 
schools, LSVT associations are more clearly in the private sector, and consequently 
appear to be more independent of the State.  
How is LSVT different from other shifts in the roles of the private and public sectors? 
Table 2.5 outlines the key characteristics of, and motivations for, privatisations and 
‘quasi’ privatisations in Britain.  To explore the key differences between LSVT 
associations and other organisations created by privatisations, I divide the 
organisations into two distinct groups. The first group – including, for example, BT, 
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utilities companies and Railtrack - comprises organisations whose primary driver is 
profit maximisation. Distribution of their services is based upon ability to pay.  Key 
drivers for the second group – LSVT associations, NHS trusts and grant maintained 
schools – are to increase turnover, to grow, to maximise outputs, while minimising 
costs.  Distribution of their services is based on need, which is defined and assessed 
by professionals within each sector. 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) schemes sit somewhat uncomfortably between the two 
groups – they are run by private companies whose aim is to make a profit, but their 
contracts include incentives to increase outputs and quality of service. PFI schemes 
are also common for public services where access is determined on the basis of need 
and not ability to pay. They are effectively ‘public’ services provided by a for-profit 
provider.  
LSVT shares only one common feature with the first group of organisations. The 
process yields a capital receipt for the disposing council, in the same way that Right to 
Buy and flotations of former public corporations produce capital receipts for the local 
authorities and the Government respectively.   LSVT has much more in common with 
the other organisations in the second group.  NHS trusts, LSVT associations and grant 
maintained schools are all managed by boards of volunteers; they have a fairly high 
degree of operational control; fairly low level of involvement by politicians; and they 
are regulated by non-departmental organisations, such as the Housing Corporation or 
OFSTED.  
The crucial difference between LSVT associations and health trusts and GM schools 
is arguably the proximity of the service user to the provider.  For LSVT associations, 
the relationship with the tenants can be seen as close, as they are often direct 
purchasers of the organisations’ services.  LSVT associations do not, therefore, 
require complex ‘purchasing’ or commissioning structures found in other reformed 
public services, such as the ‘internal’ or ‘quasi’ market in the NHS.  LSVT 
associations do not require quasi markets to function effectively. The nature of their 
relationship with users makes LSVT a unique kind of reform – a ‘quasi’ privatisation 
because the new landlords depend more directly on consumers for their income, like 
private organisations.   
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Table 2.5: Privatisation and quasi privatisation in Britain 
 BT, utilities 
companies, 
Railtrack 
Right to 
Buy 
PFI schemes LSVT NHS Trusts GM schools 
Motivation  Political  Political  Admin-
istrative and 
economic 
Admin-
istrative 
Admin-
istrative 
Admin-
istrative 
Capital receipt 
for state? 
Yes Yes Sometimes Sometimes No No 
Key drivers Profit and 
meeting 
demands for 
increasing 
dividends 
from private 
shareholders 
Profit, 
control, 
ownership 
Profit for 
provider. 
Reduction in 
risk for 
public sector 
Turnover, 
growth, 
value for 
money 
Turnover 
and growth 
Revenue and 
results 
Structure Public limited 
companies  
Single 
owner 
occupier 
Special 
purpose 
vehicle, or 
long term 
contract, 
short term 
transfer of 
assets 
IPS or 
limited 
company 
Charitable 
Trusts 
Financially 
autonomous 
charitable 
bodies 
Control  Directors and 
shareholders 
Owner 
occupier 
Public sector 
purchaser 
Voluntary 
Board 
Voluntary 
Board 
Voluntary 
Governors 
Nomination of 
directors 
Shareholders N/A Shareholders Existing 
board 
members, 
LAs and 
tenants 
Department 
of Health 
Existing 
governors 
and parents 
Funding Sale of shares 
on stock 
market, 
private 
funding 
Mortgage 
lender 
From service 
income and 
revenue 
payments 
from 
purchaser 
Self financed 
through 
rents. Private 
finance for 
major repairs 
Health 
authority 
purchaser 
pays for 
work 
undertaken 
Per capita 
funding 
Level of 
autonomy 
High High High – focus 
on outcomes 
not methods 
Medium to 
high 
Medium  Medium  
Responsibility 
for strategy and 
policy 
Directors  Owner Public sector 
purchaser 
Housing 
Strategy for 
area – LA. 
Operational 
strategy - 
Board 
Local health 
authority as 
‘purchaser’ 
of services 
Local 
Education 
Authority 
Involvement of 
public sector 
None None Low Low to 
medium 
Medium – 
NHS highly 
politicised 
Medium 
Regulation Government 
appointed 
regulatory 
bodies 
Mortgage 
funder 
Public sector 
purchaser/ 
contract 
monitor 
Government 
Agency 
(Housing 
Corporation) 
Very strong 
regulation by 
NHS 
Executive, 
self 
regulation by 
BMA 
Very strong 
regulation by 
Local 
Education 
Authority/ 
Government 
agency 
(OFSTED) 
 
Although tenants may not chose which RSL houses them, they have a direct 
purchasing relationship with their provider, which is almost unique in public services, 
as other services rely on internal markets, or other mechanisms, where a purchasing 
Chapter Two: Providing a framework for analysing stock transfer Page 54 
 
body will have a purchasing relation with providers on behalf of users.  In the NHS 
for example, general practitioners act as gatekeeper and as ‘purchasers’ on behalf of 
their patients. (Ham, 1991).  Patients often do not have sufficient expertise or 
purchasing experience to buy their own care (ibid). Although tenants may not have 
much experience of receiving services from a wide range of housing providers, it is 
possible that some are able to judge the performance and value for money offered by 
their current landlord.  However, social researchers attempting to quantify tenant 
satisfaction have come in for heavy criticism (for example, Donnelly, 1980; Lipman 
& Harris, 1980) for oversimplifying the relationship between respondents and their 
housing. However, there is a direct relationship between tenants and housing 
departments, so that providers are arguably more exposed to customers than other 
public services.  Some local authority housing departments reacted to their exposure 
to customers by withdrawing from estates and communities (Andrews, 1979; Henney, 
1984; Stewart, 1988). Financial incentives for LSVT associations may encourage 
them to forge successful relationships with their customers to ensure that rents are 
collected, and that turnover and empty properties are minimised to protect income.  
For many tenants, the relationship with the landlord is not a direct commercial one, as 
the State pays some or all of their rent through Housing Benefit. It is still important 
for landlords to forge a relationship with these tenants, partly to ensure that benefit is 
claimed and paid to the organisation, and also because they may, at some point in the 
future, start paying rent directly to the landlord.  
In this section, we explored how stock transfer fits within the wider shift in 
responsibility for the delivery of public services towards the private sector.  Both 
central and local government sought private sector involvement, for very different 
reasons.  The Conservative Government was ideologically attached to the notion that 
private sector provision was preferable to public sector provision, and cut public 
housing budgets to encourage a shift away from state landlordism.  Local authorities 
consequently sought to involve the private sector, perhaps reluctantly, as they faced 
the twin pressures of dwindling resources available for investment and increasing 
demands from users for enhanced services.   Shifting responsibility for managing 
public housing and financing reinvestment in the stock helped address some of the 
local authorities’ financial difficulties and helped the Conservative Government 
achieve ideological goals.    
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
Although the first LSVT was completed in 1988 there is very little research on the 
ground in the organisations that the programme has created. Therefore it was not 
possible to determine at the outset of undertaking this study what bigger ideas LSVT 
was rooted in. LSVT clearly has links with the ideological position of the 
Conservative Government and its desire to reduce the scope of public provision, but 
there must be links with wider ideas, otherwise local authorities would have been 
unlikely to voluntarily cede their landlord role to independent housing providers.   
Governments from 1919 onwards have accepted public provision of housing with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, but there was a consensus, particularly following the 
end of the second World War, that local authorities had an important role to play as 
landlords to a wide range of people (Harloe, 1995).  The Conservative Government 
elected in 1979 broke this consensus by declaring that direct provision was inferior to 
owner occupation and private renting.  Referring back to the discussion about the 
interpretations of the role of the State at the beginning of this chapter, British State 
housing has moved from the ‘mass’ model to the ‘residual model’ as the post-Fordist 
era advanced.  Ministers argued that council housing had become a financial burden 
that central government was unable to bear, and sought to force local authorities to 
withdraw, through policies including the Right to Buy and compulsory stock transfer. 
At the same time, however, the Conservative Government continued to provide 
financial support for owner occupation.  While local authorities were able to resist the 
imposition of compulsory stock transfer, the financial regime for council housing 
encouraged some councillors to consider withdrawing voluntarily, in a way that 
protected the stock and tenants’ rights.  Withdrawal from direct provision in housing 
has some links with wider changes in the provision of public services, where 
Governments sought fundamental changes to deliver better services while devoting 
the same or less taxpayers’ money to those services. Governments disengaged from 
direct provision and enabled other bodies to provide services.  
Stock transfer can also be explained to a less important degree by a desire to radically 
alter the way housing is organised and managed. It has been argued that the scale of 
provision and management of public housing became too big, and multi-purpose 
political authorities are believed to be weaker landlords than independent bodies, such 
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as housing associations. Stock transfer can be seen as an attempt to place the housing 
‘culture’ – which arguably requires a strong business focus, flexibility, adaptability 
and a focus on customers – within a more appropriate structure. By doing so, housing 
organisations may have a better chance of delivering services that more closely reflect 
tenants’ aspirations. Housing organisations have more freedom to innovate, get closer 
to their customers by giving staff more autonomy, and to develop and expand upon 
their strengths.  
Finally, LSVT is part of a wider shift in the balance between the public and private 
sectors in the provision of public services. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
Conservative Government attempted to reduce the State’s direct role, through outright 
privatisations – such as the Right to Buy or flotations of nationalised industries such 
as BT and Railtrack – and by breaking up multi-purpose bodies into smaller entities, 
and the splitting of commissioning of services from provision.  In local authorities, 
schools were given the opportunity to manage themselves; refuse collection and other 
services have been contracted out; and some authorities have transferred the 
ownership and management of housing through LSVT. In other public services, such 
as the National Health Service, providers of services have been given semi-
autonomous status as NHS trusts, while health authorities retain responsibility for 
identifying needs and commissioning services to meet those needs.  Although there 
are clear ideological undertones to the shift towards private provision, there are 
arguably strong links with a desire on the part of the Conservative Government to 
change the way services are delivered.  Veljanovski argues that the original impetus 
for privatisation “appeared to be purely financial and managerial” stemming from “a 
desire to discipline the nationalised industries by subjecting them to market forces” 
(Veljanovski, 1987:8). Existing systems of control and performance management 
“had largely failed” and organisational change would be required, including “the fear 
of bankruptcy” and non-political management at arms length from government 
(ibid:8).  Conservative Government housing policy after the 1987 can be interpreted 
as an attempt to introduce market disciplines into public housing by giving tenants a 
collective exit and creating independent landlords which operate at arms length from 
local authorities.   
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This thesis helps to set what is a significant structural change at ground level in the 
context of broader changes driving the new role of local authorities in housing; a 
contraction in their role as direct providers, as a result of the shift in responsibility for 
provision to the private sector, driven by reductions in public funds made available for 
investment; which has resulted in changes in the way social housing is organised and 
managed.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter, I explore how Central Government came to be involved in stock 
transfer; the steps it has taken to promote transfer; and how these steps fit within the 
core thesis outlined in Chapter Two. I begin by providing a historical account of the 
development of Central Government’s involvement in stock transfer. In the second 
section, I examine the reasons for Central Government’s involvement in stock 
transfer.  These reasons derive from changes in the way public services are organised 
and delivered, resulting from the Conservative Government’s ideological opposition 
to state landlordism and preference for owner occupation and private renting; the 
attempts by the Conservative Government to encourage local authorities to withdraw 
from direct provision of housing; the political need to deliver organisational change; 
and the policy of shifting the balance of service delivery from the public to the private 
sector.  Thirdly, I examine how far the nature of the Government’s involvement helps 
us to understand and explain the phenomenon of stock transfer, which is one of the 
most significant shifts in recent policy and ownership of housing (DETR, 2000).  
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S INVOLVEMENT 
IN STOCK TRANSFER 
This section provides a historical account of the development of Central 
Government’s involvement in stock transfers between 1974 and 2001. Table 3.1 
provides a chronology of transfer initiatives developed by Central and Local 
Government.  
Central Government mooted stock transfer as early as the 1960s, although its first 
steps can be traced back to 1975, when its Review of Co-operatives (DoE, 1975) 
provided positive support for small scale local initiatives already started by local 
authorities, such as the London Borough of Islington, in the early 1970s. The 1981 
Study of Difficult to Let Estates (DoE, 1981), which commenced in 1974, provided 
Government with evidence that demand for new publicly built housing was falling, 
and that the State was not always a good provider (Andrews, 1979). In 1985, the 
Conservative Government introduced the Estate Action programme, which provided 
funding for reconfiguring and improving unpopular and difficult to let estates, and 
through which Ministers hoped to encourage organisational change and greater 
private sector involvement (Pinto, 1992).  In the same year, the Conservative 
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Government introduced legislation to enable local authorities to dispose of their 
tenanted stock to other landlords, although the intention was to facilitate partial 
transfers (Malpass & Mullins, 2002).  
Table 3.1: Central and Local Government Transfer Initiatives 
Initiative Year 
established 
Local authority management co-operatives (e.g. LB Islington) 1974 
Glasgow Tenant Management Co-operatives 1976 
Government Review of Co-operatives 1976 
Difficult to Let Study (commenced 1974) 1981 
Cantril Farm/ Stockbridge Village Trust 1982 
Thamesmede Town 1982 
Glasgow Community Ownership Schemes 1985 
Estate Action (involving some transfers) 1985 
Housing Act 1985 enables voluntary transfer 1985 
English local authorities  first propose whole stock transfers  1986 
First whole stock transfers in England 1988 
Housing Act 1988 introduces Tenants Choice and Housing 
Action Trusts 
1988 
Rapid expansion of the LSVT programme outside metropolitan 
authorities and Greater London 
1988-1995 
Estates Renewal Challenge Fund introduced to facilitate urban 
transfers 
1995 
Continued expansion of stock transfer programme following 
election of Labour Government 
1997 onwards 
First large city whole stock transfer proposed  1998 
Central Government proposals on dealing with Overhanging Debt 1999 
Housing Green Paper – target of transfer of 200,000 units per 
annum 
2000 
Source: DoE/DETR/DTLR 1974-2000 
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The Housing Act 1988 introduced Housing Action Trusts (HATs) and Tenants 
Choice. HATs were originally conceived as a method of forcing some local 
authorities to withdraw, but later provided a framework for partial voluntary transfer 
for a small number of authorities.  Tenants Choice provided tenants with the power to 
exit from their local authority by ‘selecting’ another landlord. The impact of both 
HATs and Tenants Choice was marginal, but they arguably helped pave the way for a 
wider local authority led transfer programme by providing a model which councils 
could adapt (Cole & Furbey, 1994; Kleinman, 1996).  In 1995, the Conservative 
Government introduced the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF), which aimed to 
facilitated transfers of inner urban housing in very poor condition by providing 
dowries for acquiring landlords (DoE, 1995). The ERCF helped to facilitate the 
creation of new partnerships between the public and private sectors to address the 
housing problems of some inner urban authorities (Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999).  In 
1999, the Labour Government changed the rules on overhanging Housing Revenue 
Account (HRA) debt in order to make whole stock transfers of negatively valued 
housing stock possible. These developments are examined in turn below.   
The Review of Co-operatives (1976) 
Tenant co-operative initiatives established in the early 1970s served to demonstrate 
that public housing could be made to work more effectively with significant local 
involvement and devolution of control, providing that the solution adopted was 
appropriate for local circumstances (Power, 1977; MacDonald, 1986). The first 
breakthrough came in 1972, when residents established the Holloway Tenants’ Co-
operative (HTC) to provide more local control, more sensitivity to tenants, and to 
house people who councils were unwilling to accept (Power, 1988). The success of 
HTC and other pioneering cooperatives led to a growth in tenant co-operative 
initiatives, including the Granby co-operatives in Liverpool, the Summerston tenant 
management co-operative in Glasgow, and thirteen other housing co-operatives in 
Islington. 
Noting the success of early tenant management co-operatives, the Government 
established a working group on housing co-operatives in 1975. The group examined 
ways of encouraging the formation of co-operatives and enhancing opportunities for 
tenants to control the management of their homes separately from local authorities. 
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Central government wanted to support co-operatives as they represented “a highly 
desirable departure from traditionally remote and depersonalised forms of [public] 
housing management” (DoE, 1975:5). They reportedly fostered shared responsibility 
and involvement, as well as protecting tenants from “the arbitrary decisions of even 
an efficient and well meaning landlord” (ibid:5). For local authorities, the main 
advantage was perceived to be that housing co-operatives could take over 
responsibility for management and maintenance, and that their small scale and local 
control could help them focus more closely on tenants’ aspirations. For tenants and 
housing applicants, one of the main advantages was that co-operatives provided an 
alternative to council rented accommodation, access to which was restricted for some 
groups, particularly ethnic minorities (Henderson & Karn, 1987).  The creation of co-
operatives is also seen as effective in improving services and enhancing opportunities 
for tenant involvement (Clapham & Kintrea, 1992).   
Although there was significant interest in housing co-operatives, very few were 
established, due largely to a lack of support from the Conservative Government (ibid).  
Very few councils actively encouraged tenants to form co-operatives. Even when 
councils were keen, tenants were often put off by the “substantial commitment and 
time” required in setting up a co-operative and the on-going management (ibid, 128).   
Difficult to Let Estates (1981) 
From the early 1970s onwards, reports of difficult to let estates, some of which were 
newly built, became increasingly common. The Government commissioned a research 
study into the phenomenon in 1974. The study (DoE, 1981) revealed that difficult to 
let estates varied in age, design and location. The emergence of difficult to let estates 
was “disturbing because they involved new dwellings of a technically high standard” 
and the problem “gave rise to speculation that there was simply no demand for 
housing” (ibid: 1). Although estates were not empty, they displayed signs of 
instability, including high turnover and large numbers of applications for transfers. 
The study found that only the most desperate housing applicants accepted offers on 
many of the difficult to let estates, and that councils had left in areas designated as 
slums the most ‘difficult’ tenants, or tenants ineligible for rehousing, until last.   
The authors of the study attribute the unpopularity of difficult to let estates to three 
main factors: design and quality; the policies and practices of the local authority 
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landlords who owned and managed the estates; and social stigma. Firstly, the study 
points to the inhuman scale of the estates, and the recognition by landlords that break 
up into smaller units was needed to help make the estates more manageable and 
acceptable to tenants and applicants. Although the study revealed a widespread 
recognition among politicians and managers that break up of the most difficult estates 
was vital, “their form was often such that there was little possibility of doing this” 
(ibid: 5). Secondly, the authors argued that intensive housing management inputs 
were frequently missing from difficult to let estates. Up to the 1970s, many councils 
concentrated on their role as developers, but as their stock expanded through 
development, they did not expand the expertise of their housing management service 
to cope with the additional workload created by new and more difficult to manage and 
maintain forms of building. Thirdly and equally importantly, there was reportedly a 
social stigma, which originated in the slum clearance areas that the estates replaced, 
exacerbated by subsequent allocations policies, which concentrated tenants with 
social problems on estates that were commonly the most difficult to live on. 
The Report pointed to evidence that councils had built sufficient units of housing to 
satisfy demand. The study arguably provided practical justification for the 
Conservative Government’s ideologically driven policy of favouring owner 
occupation and private renting.  Evidence that new council estates were unpopular and 
simply ‘not wanted’ by potential tenants arguably gave the Conservative Government 
grounds for halting new building of council housing and shifting the emphasis of 
council housing from a service for all to an ‘ambulance’ service (Forrest & Murie, 
1988).  Central Government housing investment for development channelled through 
local authorities was subsequently cut severely between 1981 and 1984, following 
earlier less draconian – and reluctant (Malpass, 1990) - cuts by the Labour 
Government from 1976 onwards (Cooper, 1985). The DoE study also argued that 
tenants’ and prospective tenants’ expectations of quality and amenity had moved 
beyond what local authorities appeared to be able to provide.  It pointed towards the 
need to break up the most difficult estates and to change the way they were managed.  
The scale of the task of breaking up and reconfiguring estates meant that it was 
unlikely that the public sector would be able to provide the resources and the focus to 
deliver change (DoE, 1981:5).  
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Estate Action (1985) 
Estate Action is arguably a response by the Conservative Government to the Difficult 
to Let study.  Estate Action had two core aims.  Firstly, the programme aimed to 
encourage local authorities to create independent co-operatives and trusts to take over 
responsibility for the provision of socially rented housing. This would “encourage the 
contraction of the council housing sector” (Pinto, 1992: 77). Secondly, the programme 
aimed to encourage local authorities to change the way they managed their housing; to 
improve tenant consultation; and to improve the environment and security on their 
estates (ibid).  
Estate Action built in as a condition of central government grant some degree of 
diversification of ownership, often involving housing associations, although the 
original aim had been more direct privatisation (Provan, 1993).  
Generous Central Government funding for Estate Action schemes was clearly 
attractive to local authorities.  They used this funding to look for new ways of 
improving the management and maintenance of their stock.  They were not, however, 
interested in tenure diversification, or transferring ownership of their housing to the 
private sector, or to “involve it in any way so as to renovate run-down estates in 
partnership” (ibid: 109). Estate Action was mainly targeted at cities and Labour 
controlled local authorities, which generally had a hostile attitude towards the 
Conservative Government.  
Housing Act (1985) 
The Housing Act (1985) enabled local authorities to undertake voluntary transfers of 
tenanted stock to other landlords, subject to approval by the Secretary of State. 
Approval was subject to a majority of secure tenants not being opposed to transfer. 
This section of the Act became more significant in the late 1980s when some non-
urban local authorities developed an interest in transferring their housing. The 
Housing Act 1985 provided the legislative framework that enabled them to do so.   
Housing Action Trusts (1988) 
Housing Actions Trusts (HATs) were introduced by the Conservative Government in 
its Housing Act 1988. HATs were non-departmental bodies with a time-limited life, 
sponsored by the Department of the Environment. They were to be responsible for the 
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physical, social and environmental regeneration of geographically defined areas 
covering large council estates. HATs were devised for estates where “the social 
problems and housing problems [were] so serious that in the Government’s view, 
more direct action – involving both public and private sectors – [was] needed to 
obtain improvements over a reasonable timescale” (Department of the Environment, 
1987b).  HATs were devised to focus ‘scarce’ resources on the worst estates, 
supposedly leaving local authorities with a more manageable portfolio. 
The Conservative Government originally envisaged that HATs would be imposed 
upon estates or areas, with or without the cooperation of the local authority landlords 
and without consulting tenants (DoE, 1987b).  The Government’s proposal to push 
ahead with changes of landlords, from local authorities to HATs, without consultation 
with tenants met with widespread opposition, both from tenants themselves – who 
feared the prospect of private landlords and property speculators taking over their 
estates - and from the House of Lords (Woodward, 1991). The House or Lords 
amended the Housing Act to force the Government to consult with tenants before 
transfers to HATs could proceed. Following this change, if a simple majority of those 
voting were in favour, schemes could proceed.  
Central Government proposed six transfers to HATs in 1988, all of which were either 
withdrawn or rejected by tenants in ballots. Table 3.2 shows the six proposed HATs, 
the estates and local authorities involved, and the reasons for their failure.  
Table 3.2: Government proposed HATs 1988 
HAT Estates  Reasons for failure to establish 
Lambeth Angell Town & 
Loughborough 
Withdrawn – vocal public opposition and Tenants Association refused to proceed 
to a vote. 
Southwark North Peckham & 
Gloucester Grove 
Rejected in tenants ballot (80% against) after expensive efforts on both sides to 
sway tenants. 
Tower 
Hamlets  
Solander Gardens, 
Shadwell Gardens, 
Berner, Boundary, 
Holland, and part of Ocean 
Strong political opposition.  Withdrawn on the basis that inadequate land was 
available to provide additional housing off site. Disruption to existing 
communities would have been unacceptable. 
 
Leeds Halton Manor,  
Seacroft South & 
Gipton 
Consultants concluded that the only compelling case for a HAT was at Gipton. 
Tenants Association refused to proceed to a vote. 
Sandwell Lion Farm,  
Wallace Close & Titford 
Consultants concluded that the case for a HAT was inadequate. 
Sunderland Downhill, Town End Farm 
& Hylton 
Rejected in tenants ballot (70% against). 
Source: Chumrow (1995) Note: In addition, Hulme and other estates were considered, 
but local opposition undermined the proposals. 
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In the late 1980s, a number of local authorities began to take interest in the success of 
Glasgow Council in transferring estates to community-based ownership schemes. 
These authorities sought approval from the Conservative Government to voluntarily 
use the HAT model for transfers of some of their stock. The Conservative 
Government imposed strict controls on transfers but at the same time accepted several 
key changes to HAT proposals, including the right to return to the local authority 
following the completion of improvements; tenant representation on HAT boards; and 
the introduction of programmes to help regenerate local economies and communities 
(Karn, 1993; Power & Bergin, 1999). The Conservative Government granted its 
approval for transfers to proceed, although this was made conditional upon the new 
landlords being called ‘Voluntary HATs’. Local authorities proposed six Voluntary 
HATs, all of which achieved positive ballot results (see table 3.3). 
Table 3.3: Voluntary Housing Action Trusts 
Housing Action Trust Number of 
dwellings 
transferred 
Planning figure 
for central 
government 
grants 
(£ million) 
Government 
grant per unit 
(£) 
North Hull 2,084 115 52,200 
Waltham Forest (London) 2,422 227 93,700 
Liverpool 5,337 260 48,700 
Castle Vale (Birmingham) 3,423 205 59,900 
Tower Hamlets (London) 1,629 123 75,500 
Stonebridge (London) 1,777 165 92,900 
Totals 16,672 1,095 Average 65,700 
 
Source: DoE 1991   Note: There were often additional indirect financial inputs on a 
large scale, including spending on training, community facilities, tenants advisers and 
social and economic regeneration programmes (Power & Bergin, 1999). 
In 1997, the National Audit Office undertook an evaluation of the Waltham Forest 
HAT and found that it had made considerable progress in transforming four estates 
and had made “a significant impact in achieving a new sense of community and 
helping tenants become more involved in the management of their homes” (NAO, 
1997). But the success of the scheme came at a high price of £93,700 per unit. While 
more local authorities may have pursued the option for reducing the scale of their 
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stock through transfers to voluntary HATs, the scheme proved too expensive to be 
sustainable as all costs were grant funded directly by central government.  
Tenants Choice (1988) 
Tenants Choice was introduced alongside HATs in the Housing Act 1988. The 
provisions of Tenants Choice enabled tenants to transfer with their homes to 
alternative landlords. The Government suggested that tenants might wish to transfer 
“…to do something about serious, cumulative disrepair, [to obtain] a better standard 
of maintenance [and to] take control over their own destiny” (Department of the 
Environment, 1987a). The Government argued that the scheme would give council 
tenants the power to ‘choose’ a new landlord, and it was seen as a way of breaking up 
municipal housing monopolies and reducing the role of local authorities. 
A key element of Tenants Choice was consultation with residents. Before any transfer 
could proceed, landlords proposing to take over an estate were required to formally 
consult residents on their proposals. In common with HATs, ballots on Tenants 
Choice proposals gave tenants an unprecedented level of say in the future of their 
homes. Local authorities recognise that Tenants Choice was a threat to both their 
future financial viability and to their future role as landlords (Cairncorss, Clapham & 
Goodlad, 1997). This was because the legislation forced local authorities to pay 
dowries to acquiring landlords to clear the backlog of repairs (see, for example, 
WECH, 1998).  No Central Government funding was provided for funding dowries, 
and local authorities had to fund them from existing capital programmes. This would 
probably have resulted in reductions in investment in the retained stock.  
Although a very small number of estates was transferred through Tenants’ Choice, the 
programme arguably acted as a catalyst for change (Kemp, 1991; Kleinman, 1996; 
Cairncross, Clapham & Goodlad, 1997; Malpass & Mullins, 2002). It can be seen in 
terms of enfranchising tenants by giving them greater control over the future of their 
housing stock, although the scheme provided a “once and for all transfer” (Clapham, 
1990).  For those councils who had largely ignored the wishes of their tenants up to 
1988, the programme could have threatened their future as landlords. Many councils 
sought to change, either by making improvements to their services, or by seeking 
voluntary transfer. 
Chapter Three: Central Government’s Involvement in Stock Transfer Page 67 
 
Tenants Choice transfers attracted little interest from both tenants and potential new 
landlords. Only eight potential landlords carried out initial feasibility work, involving 
a little over 2,000 council dwellings (see table 3.4).  
Table 3.4: Tenants’ Choice schemes 1988 – 1996 
 
 Number of 
properties 
considered 
Number of 
properties 
transferred 
Initial feasibility work on eight schemes 2,114 - 
Schemes which did not progress to ballot 
Dawson Heights (London Borough of Southwark) 
Trowbridge Community Homes (London Borough of Hackney) 
 
297 
260 
 
 
- 
Schemes unsuccessful in Ballot 
Torbay Tenants’ HA (Torbay) 
Wheathampstead (St Albans) 
 
2,709 
 
 
500 
 
 
- 
Schemes successful in Ballot 
Walterton and Elgin Community Homes (City of Westminster) 
Holtsfield (Buckinghamshire) 
Hayles Community HA (London Borough of Southwark) 
Family HA (Merton) 
Minster HA (Peterborough) 
 
918 
 
55 
21 
8 
1 
 
918 
 
55 
21 
8 
1 
Total units 6,883 1,003 
Source: Housing Corporation 1995 
Seven schemes proceeded to ballots of tenants, five of which were successful. The 
largest scheme involved the transfer of 918 council dwellings from Westminster City 
Council to Walterton and Elgin Community Homes. A highly organised residents 
action group pushed strongly for transfer through Tenants Choice, as a way of 
preventing the Council selling the estates to private developers. The action group went 
on to form its own community-based housing association, which acquired the estates 
from Westminster City Council in 1992 (WECH 1992; 1998). 
The WECH experience unearthed major faults in the Tenants’ Choice scheme: the 
definitions of “repair” and “disrepair” in the 1988 Housing Act were open to very 
different interpretations; residents were virtually powerless when faced by strong 
opposition from their local authority; and the scheme relied on intensive voluntary 
effort by tenants, which meant it was unlikely to work in the absence of a core group 
of dynamic and charismatic individuals (WECH, 1998). 
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The scheme seemingly proved to be too expensive to be sustainable. The Housing 
Corporation provided grant funding totalling £4.2 million between 1988 and 1996, to 
work up schemes involving just 6883 units, of which 1003 eventually transferred. The 
high costs were related to the lengthy timescales between the initial proposals and 
transfer, largely because local authorities resisted, thus slowing the process down. 
Tenants Choice proved to be highly political, as the largest transfer was based in the 
City of Westminster, where tenants used the scheme to bite back at a council which 
attempted to act against tenants’ wishes (ibid). The Conservative Government 
arguably hoped that the scheme would be used against Labour councils, but the 
negative publicity surrounding Westminster Council’s activities arguably weakened 
ministerial commitment to the scheme.  
Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (1995) 
Following the failure of the Conservative Government’s housing policy measures 
introduced under the Housing Act 1988, no major new measures were introduced 
until 1995.  Between 1989 and 1995, the new financial regime had considerably 
tightened local authorities’ finances, and many more started to consider transfer, 
including inner urban authorities (Inside Housing, 1995).  In 1995, the Conservative 
Government introduced the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) to  assist local 
authorities with low or negative value housing stock to address their most pressing 
stock condition problems by transferring small amounts of stock, enabling them to 
place the management and maintenance of their retained stock on a more sound 
footing. Without some form of Central Government grant funding, many transfers of 
run-down housing would almost certainly have been impossible (Wilcox, 1993).  
The ERCF facilitated the transfer of 43,114 units of council housing in 39 transactions 
over three years. The scheme provided total grant funding of £488m, awarded on a 
competitive basis, while the acquiring landlords themselves raised £827m of private 
finance, using the value of future net rental income and their track record as 
successful managers of socially rented housing as security.  The scheme helped to 
establish new forms of partnership between local authorities and housing associations 
(see for example, Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999). This arguably helped local 
authorities to place the management of their retained stock on a more sound footing, 
and offered RSLs opportunities to expand their core business into inner urban areas, 
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where local authorities tended to dominate as landlords of socially rented housing. It 
also helped establish the notion that urban, Labour led local authorities could gain 
from stock transfer (Jacobs, 1999). 
Overhanging HRA Debt (1999) 
Until 2000, local authorities could only consider transferring their housing if the 
capital receipt they would receive was greater than the debt outstanding in their 
Housing Revenue Account (HRA). This prevented a majority of local authorities in 
inner urban areas from considering whole stock transfer (DETR, 1999).  For these 
authorities, only partial transfers were possible, as the outstanding or ‘overhanging’ 
HRA debt could be serviced from the rental income from the retained stock. 
In 1999, the Labour Government recognised a growing demand from cities and inner 
urban authorities for the option of whole stock transfer to be made available to them. 
The Government proposed that it would provide grants to redeem overhanging debts 
in order to make transfer possible. This change in Government policy made the 
prospect of large citywide transfers in Birmingham and Glasgow more feasible. 
Although the proposals in Birmingham were rejected by tenants, both of the proposed 
transfers would not have been possible without Central Government assistance. 
Summary 
Central Government used local authorities as the vehicle through which it would 
deliver public housing programmes from 1919 onwards (Merrett, 1979). The 
Conservative Government elected in 1979 broke the consensus around the role of 
local authorities as landlords, and shifted support towards the promotion of owner 
occupation (Forrest & Murie, 1988) and provision of housing for those not able to 
house themselves towards housing associations (Kemp, 1991; Malpass, 2001).  The 
financial regime for council housing became increasingly tough, arguably as a way to 
force local authorities to withdraw from direct provision.  When the Conservative 
Government sought a change in pace in 1988 - by shifting decision making power 
from local authorities to tenants through Tenants Choice and HATs  - local authorities 
resisted what they saw as an assault on their power bases. Local authorities 
successfully resisted wide scale transfers through Tenants Choice and HATs, as 
tenants feared the prospect of private landlords or property speculators taking over 
their estates, and trusted their councils more than central government. However, these 
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schemes – accompanied by a step change in financial pressure upon housing 
departments by the Conservative Government from 1989 onwards – arguably paved 
the way for a wider voluntary transfer programme by enfranchising tenants and 
encouraging them to expect more from their landlords, but at the same time limiting 
councils’ capacity to respond.  
2. WHY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT PROMOTED STOCK TRANSFER 
In this section, we review explanations for the development by the Conservative 
Government of policies and frameworks that encouraged and facilitated stock 
transfers by local authorities. The section explores why the Conservative Government 
sought to encourage local authorities to withdraw from direct provision; how transfer 
would help to change the way council housing is managed; and how it helped the 
Conservative Government to encourage greater involvement by the private sector in 
the ownership and management of social rented housing.  
Table 3.5 below plots the Conservative Government’s perception of the problems of 
council housing and public provision, and its policy responses, between 1979 and 
1997.   
It is possible to identify four policy stages, which roughly coincide with each 
government elected in 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1992.   
In the first period, between 1979 and 1983, the Conservative Government’s prognosis 
of the role of the state generally, was that it had become involved in areas of society 
that belonged in the private sphere, at the expense of individual freedom.  Allied to 
this, the Conservative Government believed that the state took too large a share of 
national income (Conservative Party, 1979).  Its housing policy response was to cut 
local authorities’ capital budgets and reduce public provision by encouraging tenants 
to purchase their homes through the Right to Buy (Forrest & Murie, 1987: Hamnett, 
1987).    
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Table 3.5 Council housing and the Conservative Governments 1979-1997 
Period Perceived problem Policy response 
1979 – 
1983 
• Balance of society titled in favour of the 
State. 
• Government taking too great a share of 
national income (Conservative Party, 
1979). 
• Right to Buy. 
• Cuts in public housing investment. 
1983 – 
1987 
• Government succeeds in cutting housing 
budgets for LA housing (Conservative 
Party, 1983). 
• Reduced budgets exacerbate problems of 
many inner urban LAs, which began to 
emerge in the 1970s (DoE, 1981; Audit 
Commission, 1986). 
• Concern about social unrest in inner city 
areas, for example riots at Broadwater 
Farm (Gifford, 1986). 
• Estate Action to target worst estates. 
• Extension of RTB to tenants in flats and 
increases in maximum discount. 
1987 – 
1992  
 
• Estate Action fails to diversify 
ownership of council housing (Pinto, 
1993). 
• RTB appears to stall, with low 
proportions of dwellings sold on some 
estates. 
• Tenants remaining in the LA sector 
denied choice and an effective voice in 
the management of the housing service 
(Conservative Party, 1987). 
• Perceived inefficiency of LA landlords 
(Conservative Party, 1987).   
• Conservative Government takes powers 
to impose HATs to focus public 
resources on worst estates.  House of 
Lords forces Government to include 
provisions for balloting tenants.  
• Shift in decision making power from 
councils to tenants through ‘Tenants 
Choice’. 
• Ringfencing of HRAs to increase 
financial pressure upon councils and 
encourage them to reconsider their role 
as direct providers. 
1992 – 
1997 
• Tenants Choice and HATs successfully 
resisted by LAs and tenants.  
• Ringfencing increases financial pressure 
on LAs, including district councils. 
• Voluntary transfer fails to make 
significant in-roads into urban areas. 
• Government allows some urban councils 
to transfer voluntarily. 
• LSVT, pioneered by district councils, 
supported by Conservative Government. 
• Targeted Central Government support 
(ERCF) to pave the way for a wider 
reduction in the State’s role as direct 
provider.   
 
In the second period, between 1983 and 1987, the Government claimed that it had 
halted “the relentless growth of local government spending” and to have reduced 
staffing to 1974 levels (Conservative Party, 1983).  Budget reductions arguably had 
the indirect effect of exacerbating the problems of some inner urban authorities, which 
had already begun to emerge in the 1970s, as identified by DoE (1981) and Audit 
Commission (1986).  Deep rooted social problems on some estates resulted in social 
unrest, including, for example, riots at the Broadwater Farm Estate (Gifford, 1986).  
The Conservative Government’s policy response during this period was to continue to 
rely on shifting council housing to the owner occupied sector through sales to tenants 
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at a discount to market value.  The Right to Buy was extended to tenants in flats, and 
the maximum discount was increased to 70 per cent of the value of a property.  The 
Government also introduced Estate Action to help  tackle conditions on some of the 
worst estates and diversify tenure and ownership on estates. 
In the third period, between 1987 and 1992, Estate Action had largely failed to 
diversify ownership of housing (Pinto, 1993) and the RTB had failed to make 
significant in-roads into some urban estates.  The Conservative Government 
suggested in its 1987 Manifesto that tenants remaining in the local authority sector 
were denied choice and an effective voice in the management of the housing service, 
which was characterised as being inefficient and unresponsive (Conservative Party, 
1987).  Kemp (1991) argues that the Conservative Government exploited apparent 
weaknesses in design, management and maintenance on some estates to support their 
critique of public sector provision.  Apparent discontent among some tenants helped 
the Conservative Government to portray local authority housing itself as the problem 
(Kemp, 1989).  The Conservative Government’s response was to attempt to break up 
local authority housing, by taking powers to establish Housing Action Trusts (HATs) 
to focus public resources on the worst estates, and to give tenants the power to 
instigate transfers of their homes to alternative landlords under ‘Tenants’ Choice’.  
The rationale behind HATs was that council housing itself was the problem, and that 
the private sector could provide the solution (Kemp, 1991).  Allied to these changes, 
the Government introduced a new financial regime for local authorities, which 
involved ‘ring fencing’ their Housing Revenue Accounts and changes to the subsidy 
regime, enabling greater central control over local authorities’ finances, including rent 
setting.   
In the fourth period, between 1992 and 1997, both of the Conservative Government’s 
policies aimed at breaking up council housing – HATs and Tenants Choice - had 
failed to make any significant impact.  Meanwhile, a significant number of district 
councils had successfully transferred their stock through LSVT.  Ringfencing of 
HRAs was more successful at encouraging more local authorities to reconsider their 
role as direct landlords, and by 1995, as many as 50 per cent of all housing directors 
were considering the option of transferring to alternative landlords (Inside Housing, 
1995).   LSVT had so far failed to make in-roads into inner urban authorities, and the 
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Conservative Government introduced targeted support through the ERCF to pave the 
way for a wider reduction in the role of local authorities in direct provision.   
Stock transfer as a means of withdrawal from direct provision 
After 80 years of large scale construction of rented housing by local authorities, 
housing needs had crudely been met, in that the Nation’s stock of dwellings was 
sufficient to house all households (Department of the Environment, 1977), although 
there was still a large unmet housing need (Greve, 1964; Glastonbury, 1971; Greve, 
1985). The UK was unusual in its reliance on the State to develop and manage 
housing in response to need (Daunton, 1987), and the post Second World War mass 
housing programmes left the State with responsibility for managing and providing 
funds for investment in a large stock of dwellings. The State started a gradual process 
of withdrawal from the 1970s onwards, as the Labour Government argued that needs 
had broadly been met (DoE, 1977), and because the financial burden of housing began 
to mount at a time of fiscal crisis from 1976, and evidence of low demand for council 
housing emerged from 1974.  The juxtaposition of perceived lower demand for 
council housing and the economic problems of the Labour Government arguably 
enabled the Conservative Government elected in 1979 to justify its ideological 
position that new housing needs should be met by the private sector.  Consequently, 
the Conservative Government shifted state intervention from council housing to 
owner occupation, in the form of tax relief for mortgage interest payments (Malpass 
& Murie, 1987).     
State housing programmes and housing needs 
The DoE’s (1981) study of difficult to let estates provided some evidence that public 
housing was difficult to manage, while the 1977 Housing Green Paper (Department of 
the Environment, 1977) argued that demand for public housing had broadly been met. 
By 1981, the State house building programme had already slowed dramatically to 
some 50,000 completions in that year, compared to over 100,000 completions 
throughout the 1970s and even higher rates in the previous two decades (Holmans, 
1987).  This can be attributed largely to deep cuts in public housing budgets from 
1981 onwards, which were part of the Conservative Government’s strategy to re-
orientate state intervention to owner occupation (Forrest & Murie, 1987; Hamnett, 
1987).  A majority of households aspired to owning their own homes, as demonstrated 
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by the popularity of Right to Buy, which showed that many residents of council 
housing were satisfied with the quality and amenity offered by their homes (Forrest & 
Murie, 1990) but were dissatisfied with the form of tenure (Saunders, 1990). Hamnett 
(1984) compares census data from 1961, 1971 and 1981 to show the development of 
socio-tenurial polarisation.  This provided evidence that “the semi-skilled and 
unskilled have become increasingly concentrated in the council sector relative to other 
socio-economic groups” (ibid: 397).  White (1983) points to evidence showing that 
two thirds of the long term unemployed were in council housing.  Council housing 
was arguably becoming a tenure of last resort, and increasingly only the most 
desperate households applied for or accepted council housing in some areas (Power, 
1987).  
In the 1990s, new evidence began to emerge that some estates were becoming 
unviable, and required major changes that local authorities were unable to fund or 
deliver (London Borough of Tower Hamlets, 1995; London Borough of Hackney, 
1995; Lee Power & Tunstall, 1999). Lack of investment in some estates, combined 
with wider city de-population and specific trigger factors, such as neighbour nuisance, 
led to near abandonment of some estates (see for example Power & Mumford, 1999). 
In areas where populations were declining, council housing suffered 
disproportionately, as other tenure forms were more attractive and increasingly 
affordable in comparison to social housing (ibid). In these areas, some authorities 
sought to withdraw, either by demolishing unlettable estates, or by transferring to 
private sector organisations, which are able to fund long-term investment 
programmes, so that the housing met or exceeded current expectations.  
UK reliance on direct provision and management difficulties 
Power (1993), Emms (1990), McCrone & Stephens (1995) and Oxley and Smith 
(1996) examine social policy in Europe. Power (1993) identifies two extremes in 
housing policy. Housing can be seen as a consumer good, which is bought and sold in 
the market like any other commodity. In this model, the State’s role is to provide 
housing only for those who cannot compete in the market due to insufficient income 
or inability to borrow to finance the purchase of property. Housing in the USA is 
perhaps the best example of this type of system. At the other extreme housing can be 
considered to be a universal right, rather than as a consumer good. Housing is seen as 
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a citizenship right, provided to all regardless of their economic status. This type of 
housing system could have been found – at least as a stated aim - in former 
communist countries in Eastern Europe.  
Housing systems in western Europe are located around the centre of this spectrum, 
where housing is seen as a consumer good, but also as a limited social right, in so far 
as the State accepts a duty to house the homeless or subsidise rents for those people 
on low incomes (see figure 3.1). In other words, the State supports the market, by 
attempting to make it affordable and provide directly where it fails.  
Figure 3.1: Models of Social Housing Provision 
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Source: Based on Power (1993) 
 
Within the western European social housing tradition, Britain’s reliance upon the 
State to provide the majority of social housing is unusual (Daunton, 1987). At its 
peak, British council housing accounted for some thirty per cent of the total housing 
stock, and it enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the rented sector, providing over 70 per 
cent of all rented units. 
Most European countries faced massive new housing needs during the 20th century, 
particularly after the two world wars (Power, 1987, 1993; Cole & Furbey, 1994). 
Britain responded with a major State building programme, particularly after the 
Second World War (Dunleavy, 1981).  In contrast, continental European countries 
met new housing needs through a variety of providers. Housing policies on the 
continent combined controls on rents, subsidies to private landlords, support for semi-
private organisations, and sometimes a modest element of direct State provision 
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(Kleinman, 1996). The reasons for the State’s dominance in Britain are unclear, 
although Daunton (1987) and Power (1993) suggest that this is due to a combination 
of chronic housing shortages and the threat of political unrest; the weakness of private 
landlords; rigid rent controls which limited incentives to invest in rented housing; 
scarce resources; and the after effects of two world wars. Private and voluntary 
sectors were seen by Government as being incapable of meeting housing needs 
quickly enough, and only a direct response by the State could deliver; “It was hard to 
conceive of the State doing other than directly controlling an expansion in house-
building straight after the War when conditions were so acute (Power, 1993: 180).  
Central Government saw local authorities as the most appropriate vehicle for 
developing new social housing because the private sector was seen as having failed to 
provide significant amounts new housing for rent (Daunton, 1984) and councils were 
believed to be more willing partners than private landlords. Britain did not share the 
European tradition of large scale provision through housing associations and other 
independent landlords, relying instead almost exclusively on local authorities to 
provide rented housing. Central government believed that councils could raise 
standards while at the same time remove the profit element from housing, which led 
to abuse and exploitation of tenants by some unscrupulous landlords (Milner Holland 
Report, 1965). The incentive of profit was to be replaced by the kudos for councillors 
of delivering new housing for local constituents.  
For local authorities, building housing was seen as an attractive proposition as they 
believed it helped them to win votes, as well as attracting large resources and, in its 
hey day, carried great political prestige (Macey, 1963). However, the complex task of 
managing the homes day to day was not politically attractive (Malpass & Mullins, 
2002).  Councils soon discovered that public landlords experience the same 
difficulties in running housing as private landlords (Power, 1993), as well as 
encountering other problems unique to the public sector. We explore these problems 
below.  
Uniform design and low quality 
Problematic design, and lack of variety in design, are the most widely cited criticisms 
of state housing in Britain. Council housing is variously described as “drab, inelegant 
and uniform” (Robinson, 1983), and “uncomfortable and prison-like” (Orwell, 1937). 
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Dunleavy & McDowell (1982) claim that the problems of council housing today stem 
from their design, and that “the policy would not be in its current parlous state” if 
designers had built the kind of houses people wanted to live in.  Dominated by 
producer, rather than consumer interests, council housing often did not meet the needs 
and aspirations of tenants (Henney, 1984). Architects were seen as remote and 
seemingly made few efforts to engage with the future residents of the estates they 
designed (Dunleavy, 1981) and they were often planned and designed to be built 
quickly. They treated housing as “machines for living” (Le Courbusier, 1924).  
Quality also suffered at the height of the slum clearance programme during the 1950s 
and 1960s, when standards were cut due to materials shortages, and then later by 
economic difficulties.  On some estates, walls were thin, roof coverings were 
inadequate and social facilities and estate environments were poor and precluded 
resident control over the space immediately around their homes (Henney, 1984; 
Coleman, 1985). On the other hand, Cole & Furbey (1994) suggest that this view is 
too restrictive, and council housing offered vastly improved conditions for many of 
those who councils re-housed, at least inside their homes.  
Insensitivity of slum clearance 
The after-effects of the slum clearance programme caused many new difficulties for 
local authorities. Slum clearance up-rooted and broke up communities and decimated 
social networks. Without these networks, many tenants struggled to cope on vast and 
alienating estates (Young and Wilmot, 1962). Councils moved the most “difficult” 
tenants to the last slum clearance areas. The final areas to be cleared housed the most 
marginal tenants (DoE, 1981). The private rented sector was all but wiped out by slum 
clearance, so local authorities could not escape from re-housing those left in the last 
clearance areas.  They were re-housed deliberately on the worst and most unpopular 
estates, exacerbating the problems of difficult to let estates as demand tailed off when 
the slum clearance programmes came to an end (ibid).  There were deep social 
problems of stigmatisation, management incompetence and hostility between tenants 
and local authority managers, more characteristic of American ghettos than of utopian 
solutions to slum conditions (Power, 1993).  
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Dependence on Central Government funding 
Finally, local authority housing is subject to local and central government spending 
constraints. Council housing’s vulnerable position is underlined by the Conservative 
Government’s deep cuts in housing budgets from the early 1980s onwards, which 
were driven by its desire to shift support to private provision, to the detriment of 
public provision (Forrest & Murie, 1988).  At local level, rents charged were 
commonly set at an unrealistically low level (Clapham, 1989), in order to win or 
retain the votes of tenants (Henney, 1984). This reduced revenues available for 
investment in maintaining and updating housing stocks (Audit Commission, 1986).  
Consequently, only minimal repairs were undertaken. Indeed, councils were not 
permitted to spend on major repairs or improvement of housing stocks until 1980. Up 
to 1989, local authorities were able to cross-subsidise housing revenue accounts from 
their general funds, or vice versa. This practice was outlawed by ring fencing of 
housing revenue accounts in 1990, severely limiting the ability of many local 
authorities to maintain and improve their housing stocks. Local authorities’ ability to 
borrow to invest in housing is limited by central government.  The Conservative 
government also required councils to set aside capital receipts from the sale of council 
houses against outstanding debt.  The Labour Government elected in 1997 permitted a 
partial release of capital receipts in 1998 and 1999, through the issue of additional 
credit approvals.  Even though the Labour Government has introduced a three year 
planning cycle for expenditure, there is arguably still a high degree of uncertainty 
about future levels of investment in the future. Even if local authorities develop long-
term plans, they may still be frustrated by reductions or standstills in the level of 
capital available, cost rises and changes in requirements.  
A problem for local authorities is the apparent ‘big bang’ approach to spending on 
housing. Regeneration funding is provided for an area or an estate, and some 
substantial improvements may be made. But nothing may then be provided for 
lengthy periods as long as twenty or thirty years, and there can often be little by way 
of planned maintenance and very few long term plans, because rents are too low to 
fund such works. In addition, the Housing Subsidy regime has, in the past, prevented 
local authorities from retaining surpluses to provide a sinking fund for future 
maintenance. Jacobs (1961) points to the negative effect of government’s tendency to 
starve an area of investment, only to pour money into it at some point in the future. 
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She asserts that areas require steady and sustained investment, to assist gradual 
change, rather than large investments with no investment for long periods.  
Summary 
By the early 1970s, developers had built sufficient new housing to create a crude 
national surplus of housing.  Local authorities played a big role in this overall process. 
At the same time, the phenomenon of difficult to let estates emerged, but many 
housing needs remained unmet. Britain had an unusually large public housing stock 
compared to other European countries, which created a number of difficulties. 
Housing was designed to be built quickly, and was consequently of uniform design 
and low quality. The clearance and building programmes largely failed to take into 
account the needs and aspirations of the people who were re-housed (Dunleavy, 
1981). Communities were broken up and placed in alienating environments, resulting 
in social dislocation. The massive public housing stock relied on central government 
funding for investment of major repairs (Emms, 1990). Budgets were subject to 
shifting political priorities, and also to the changing fortunes of the Exchequer. 
Housing became more and more vulnerable to reductions in budgets  after the election 
of the Conservative Government, which was elected on a platform of forcing local 
authorities to sell homes to sitting tenants at a discount. The housing service was more 
vulnerable to cuts as it was less widely used than, for example, the National Health 
Service (Goodin & Le Grand, 1987), and focused increasingly on more marginal 
social groups (Forrest & Murie, 1988). The election of the Conservative Government 
in 1979 laid bare the financial vulnerability of council housing.  Cuts in central 
government support for council housing, driven by the Conservative’s ideological 
attachment to private sector provision (Forrest & Murie, 1988), forced many local 
authorities to reconsider whether direct provision was viable (Malpass, 2001).  Stock 
transfer offered local authorities an opportunity to withdraw from direct provision, 
which reduced public responsibility for both managing the stock and financing long-
term investment.  
Stock Transfer as a means of delivering organisational change 
In the 1980s, anxieties began to emerge that council housing was not manageable in 
its present form (Audit Commission, 1986) and as it became increasingly associated 
with the more marginal members of society, politicians’ attachment to public 
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provision of social housing waned (Harloe, 1990; Kleinman, 1996; Malpass & 
Mullins, 2002).  Central and local government concern about the problems of public 
housing, and the search for solutions, led to the establishment of the Investigation into 
Difficult to Let Housing (DoE, 1981), experiments in local management through the 
Priority Estates Project, Estate Action and experiments with management co-
operatives. The Difficult to Let study and the PEP experiments pointed to the failure 
of council housing to meet three conditions of manageability, shown in table 3.5. 
Table 3.6: Conditions of Manageability and unmanageability 
 
Management 
conditions 
Actions involved Problems caused 
by failure 
Outcomes 
Sufficient and 
sustainable demand for 
council housing 
• Maintain waiting 
list 
• Advertise 
vacancies 
• Provide as much 
choice as possible 
 
 
• Low Demand 
• High turnover 
• Concentrated 
poverty 
• Unlettable and 
unpopular estates 
• Only demolition 
or radical changes 
to management 
can prevent further 
slide in conditions 
Efficient management 
structure to carry out 
basic functions and 
maintain good relations 
with tenants. 
• Provide estate or 
area based 
services 
• Give tenants a say 
in decision making 
• Consult tenants to 
obtain feedback on 
services  
• Cuts at frontline 
• Housing staff 
retreat to remote 
offices 
• Lack of landlord 
presence on 
estates  
• Hostile relations 
between tenants 
and staff 
A sufficient amount of 
rental income to 
maintain housing stock 
and to ensure that it 
continues to meet 
current expectations. 
• Operate efficient 
rent collection 
systems to prevent 
arrears. 
 
• High rent arrears 
• Staff focus on role 
income 
maximisation 
activities at the 
expense of 
management and 
supervision of 
estates 
• Deterioration in 
physical condition 
as investment 
withdrawn 
• Reduces resources 
available for 
investment in the 
stock and the 
service 
Source: Adapted from Power (1987b) 
The study of Difficult to let estates (DoE, 1981) identified management problems and 
the scale of housing estates as key factors in the unpopularity of the estates. In 
addition, allocations policies channelled the most vulnerable and desperate people 
onto the worst estates, while local authorities’ failure to recognise the importance of 
management “played a large part in precipitating or accelerating the downward spiral 
in status and acceptability of estates” (ibid: 35). In order to help make estates 
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manageable, the authors argued that local authorities needed to change their housing 
organisations in order to strengthen management, provide more focus on the task in 
hand, and to reduce the scale of management operations by establishing smaller and 
more locally based organisations.   
Why was organisational change needed? 
Organisational change appeared to be required for three key reasons. Firstly, 
management structures were not always able to deliver the intensive inputs required to 
provide effective services to tenants, because they were often too remote and 
inflexible (Henney, 1984; Clapham, 1989). Secondly, housing management was part 
of a multi-purpose organisation, which had many other responsibilities, which meant 
that housing had to compete with other services and activities for time and resources 
(Stoker, 1985; Stewart, 1987; Power, 1993). Housing departments evolved in 
response to local authorities’ building programmes, and the structures were rarely 
planned. In many cases, the task of managing housing was spread across different 
departments, and no one was directly responsible. Thirdly, the scale of public housing 
led to the incremental creation of a public bureaucratic response to an essentially 
ground level “hands on” task (Power, 1987). Stock transfer was seen by Central 
Government as a way of delivering effective management by placing it at arms length 
from local authorities, and creating a diversity of landlords to provide more choice 
(DoE, 1987). 
Weak Management? 
Management of housing in some authorities has been considered to be weak, both in 
terms of the building process (Dunleavy, 1981) and subsequent “housekeeping” 
management (Henney, 1984; Power, 1987 and 1993; Clapham, 1989; Emms, 1990). 
The sheer scale of the slum clearance and rebuilding process made it difficult, if not 
impossible, to manage the construction process effectively (Dunleavy, 1981). The size 
of contracts was massive, as developers preferred to build on a massive scale in order 
to reduce costs and speed up construction. The design of estates, combined with poor 
supervision of contractors, meant that estates looked “cheap and utilitarian” (Power, 
1993).  The management of the slum clearance and re-building process occupied 
virtually all of the local authorities’ efforts, and management of housing previously 
built was said to be neglected.  
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Housing managers also had to work within the multi-purpose structures of local 
authorities, which were geared towards four-year electoral cycles (Leach Stewart & 
Walsh, 1994).  Local authorities can therefore be seen to lack a focus on tenants and 
not have a single purpose that can arguably help provide effective management.   The 
1964 local government re-organisation reduced the number of local authorities by 
merging smaller authorities. As a result, the size of some authorities’ housing stocks 
became five times larger and their structures even more complex (Power, 1993). For a 
long time, Central Government had not laid down any statutory requirements of local 
authorities in terms of management of housing stocks (Central Housing Advisory 
Committee, 1969).  In this respect, council housing enjoyed a level of autonomy 
unlike any other service (Macey and Baker, 1982).  Councils are now subject to 
greater scrutiny by the Audit Commission and the Housing Inspectorate, but are still 
relatively free to decide how they manage their housing at estate-level, where it really 
could make a difference to conditions.  
Malpass (2001: 7) argues that the Conservative Government’s enthusiasm for 
demunicipalisation is “a reflection of the perceived failure of local authority housing” 
resulting in a shift to housing associations.  Kendall and Knapp (1996) have argued 
that the voluntary sector – in the guise of newly created stock transfer housing 
associations - re-emerged in response to failures by both politically motivated 
governments and profit motivated private companies to solve contemporary problems. 
Transfer to newly created housing associations therefore provided greater diversity, 
but also provided the Conservative Government with “a powerful instrument capable 
of disempowering or undermining” local authorities (ibid: 6).   
Housing as part of the multi-purpose local authority 
The multi-purpose nature of local authorities meant that no single department took 
ownership of housing and it was “no one’s specific responsibility”. Power (1987) 
characterises management as a “disparate landlord service within a large multi-
purpose political bureaucracy” (Power, 1993). This style of management led to 
problems of vastly increased rent arrears (Duncan & Kirby, 1984); centralised, 
unresponsive and inefficient repairs services; loss of control of housing estates by 
housing managers; and distant relations between the landlord and tenants (Andrews, 
1979; Seabrook, 1984; Stewart, 1988; Clapham, 1989).   
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Although multi-purpose bodies may appear problematic, a shift to single purpose 
organisations may not always provide a neat solution.  Research by Reid (1997) 
points to the practical difficulties of coordinating and managing the work of networks 
of single purpose organisations in the “emerging mixed economy” (ibid:109).  This 
work points to the complexities of an array of organisations working together to 
address multi-layered social problems.  However, while it can be argued that a local 
authority, as a multi-purpose organisation, might be a more effective vehicle than a 
large number of independent bodies, Stoker (1991) points to problems of achieving 
cooperation between different departments.  Within local authorities, there is a risk of 
inter-departmental conflict between Housing and other departments (Stoker, 1985), 
which can delay the implementation of policy (Malpass, 1975; Paris & Blackaby, 
1979), or even undermine agreed policies (Davies, 1981).   
The scale of public housing 
The scale of public housing landlords – average metropolitan councils owned some 
33,000 units each – arguably required breaking up in to smaller management 
organisations to enable managers to carry out basic functions more efficiently 
(Henney, 1984; Clapham, 1989). This would help bring managers closer to tenants 
and their estates, so they could structure their teams to concentrate on tackling 
conditions on the ground.  Local authorities dominated the rented sector for over 40 
years.  Breaking up “monolithic” local authority housing stocks was seen by Central 
Government as essential if run down public housing was to be improved (DoE, 1987): 
“…the system of ownership is not in the tenants’ best long term interests, 
…housing operations are so large that they inevitably risk becoming 
distant and bureaucratic.” 
Summary 
Problems of large publicly built and managed housing stocks began to emerge in the 
1970s and 1980s. Management was regarded by some commentators as being weak in 
some respects, due to the scale of public housing, but also because of disparate 
management structures, which were part of multi-purpose local authorities. Although 
the dominant view in the literature is that local authorities transferred to address their 
financial difficulties, resulting from ideologically driven cuts by the Conservative 
Government, transfer also arguably provided a way of changing the structure of public 
ownership of rented housing in favour of more diversity. It provided a way of 
Chapter Three: Central Government’s Involvement in Stock Transfer Page 84 
 
changing management by shifting responsibility for housing from multi-purpose local 
authorities to single purpose not-for-profit landlord organisations.  
Stock transfer as a means of shifting the public-private balance in service 
delivery 
In the previous two sections, I outlined how stock transfer can facilitate withdrawal 
from direct provision and can provide opportunities for changes in the organisation of 
housing management. The third linked theme in my explanation of the Conservative 
Government’s involvement in stock transfer is that it helped to shift responsibility for 
service delivery from the public to the private sector.  The aim of this shift was 
threefold.  Firstly, the shift towards the private sector helped the Conservative 
Government to achieve its ideological goal of ‘rolling back the state’ by shifting 
responsibility for providing and financing housing to private sector bodies.  Secondly, 
the consultation process involved in transfer enfranchises tenants – a very large body 
who were arguably excluded from decision making in many local authorities.  This 
has shifted decision-making power away from local authorities and more towards 
service users.  Thirdly, the shift can be seen in terms of freeing local authorities from 
responsibility for service delivery, thus enabling them to concentrate on identifying 
needs and ensuring that providers deliver the services that people want.  
Reducing the State’s financial commitment to socially rented housing 
Central governments of both main political parties since 1976 have focused closely on 
controlling the level of public expenditure. Central Governments sought to reduce 
their financial commitment to socially rented housing.  The Labour Government 
reluctantly cut expenditure in 1976 under a degree of pressure from the International 
Monetary Fund (Merrett, 1979).  The Conservative Government from 1979 actively 
cut expenditure on public housing programmes to enable it to reorientate support 
towards owner occupation and private provision (Malpass & Murie, 1987; Forrest & 
Murie, 1988).  Firstly, capital spending on new building was cut as the pace of 
building by local authorities slowed down.  Evidence of lower demand for newly built 
housing estates emerged from the mid 1970s onwards (DoE, 1981), which arguably 
made the public housing budget vulnerable to cuts when the Labour Government 
sought to reduce expenditure in 1976 as a condition of a loan from the IMF (Merrett, 
1979). Earlier cuts by the Labour Government were followed by deeper cuts by the 
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Conservative Government from 1979, with the intention of shifting state support from 
public to private housing provision (Forrest & Murie, 1988). For governments that 
wanted to reduce spending, cuts to capital programmes were less visible than cuts to 
budgets for on-going maintenance, and were easier and quicker to implement with a 
larger impact on spending in the short term (Cooper, 1985).  Secondly, the 
Conservative Government sought to reduce its commitment for financing 
reinvestment in the stock that local authorities had already built.  In 1970/71, 8 per 
cent of the Government’s capital budget was allocated to Housing. By 1983/84, 
Housing’s share of the capital budget had declined to 2 per cent. In revenue terms, 
spending on Housing increased, largely as a result of increasing Housing Benefit 
payment from £2.5 billion in 1978/79 to £12.4 billion in 1996/97 (at 1995/96 prices) 
(Glennerster & Hills, 1998).  
The Labour Government elected in 1997 demonstrated its interest in continuing the 
shift in service delivery from the public to private sector in a number of services, 
including the London Underground and Air Traffic Control. After the 2001 election, 
Labour has signalled greater private sector involvement in the NHS and schools 
(Labour Party, 2001).  The Labour Government not only wants the private sector to 
take responsibility for financing public services, but also to manage them.  This is 
because the Labour Government believes that private sector organisations respond 
more effectively to incentives than the public sector: 
“…there are some things that the public sector can learn from the private 
sector. Private companies can in many cases be more responsive to the 
immediate needs of demanding consumers. If they don't they go out of 
business. They know that poor service, lack of courtesy, massive delays, 
destroys their image and their success. It would be surprising if the public 
sector could not learn something from that responsiveness to consumers.” 
(Blair, 2001).   
If the Government could get the private sector to take on the burden for providing 
funding for social housing, and services such as transport and air traffic control, then 
it would effectively be levering in new resources and expanding investment.  There 
are, however, concerns about private sector involvement in public service provision, 
particularly PFI schemes in hospitals and schools.  Research by Pollock et al (2002) 
indicates that although the private sector contractor takes responsibility for financing 
the construction of PFI hospitals, revenue payments by the NHS can be one third 
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more than a publicly funded scheme.  There are concerns that the Government’s case 
for using PFI rests on value for money assessments that are skewed in favour of 
private finance (ibid).  This concern is echoed by IPPR (2001) which argues that the 
case for public-private partnerships should be more evidence based.  The report also 
raises concerns about workers’ rights and procedures for accountability.   
Creating a “quasi market” by empowering tenants 
The statutory consultation process required in the establishment of HATs and 
transfers through Tenants Choice arguably gave disenfranchised tenants 
unprecedented decision-making power over the future of their homes.  The scheme 
gave council tenants a new collective power of exit from their council landlord, 
although as noted earlier, there was no right to transfer again if the new landlord 
failed to perform (Clapham, 1990).  The Conservative Government hoped that 
thousands of tenants would grasp this opportunity to fundamentally change the way 
their homes were managed and to “do something about serious cumulative disrepair, 
[to obtain] a better standard of maintenance [and to] take control over their destiny” 
(Department of the Environment, 1987). 
The Conservative Government had already taken steps to encourage the growth of 
consumerism in housing, which in turn commodifed the service, making the idea of 
provision by alternative landlords a logical next step (Cairncross, Clapham and 
Goodlad, 1997).  The Conservative Government hoped that giving tenants the power 
of exit from their local authorities would help accelerate the shift the balance of 
service delivery towards the private sector.  The Conservative government envisaged 
that private sector landlords would take responsibility for managing homes and 
providing access to long-term sources of finance for reinvestment.  The Conservative 
Government believed that provision through market systems was preferable to 
provision through municipal landlords, as explored in Chapter two.  In the market 
system, consumers possess the power to take their custom to a range of competing 
suppliers if they are dissatisfied with their current provider. In the public sector, 
clients or recipients of services can only express their dissatisfaction with services 
they have received (Voice), either to the service provider directly, or through the 
political system. However, voice requires “…an articulation of one’s critical opinions, 
rather than a private “secret” vote in the anonymity of a market” (Hirschman, 1970). 
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Very few consumers who are dissatisfied will complain, but will simply purchase 
their goods or services from another supplier. 
Council tenants who are dissatisfied with their housing have always had the opinion 
of exiting from their local authority landlord into either owner occupation or the 
private rented sector, provided that they have sufficient resources to do. The majority 
of tenants remaining in the local authority sector do not have the option of exiting by 
buying a property or renting privately, although Right to Buy discounts have helped 
many more tenants to buy than would otherwise have been possible.  Indeed, it is 
likely that many of the problems of local authority housing stem from the exit of the 
more stable and articulate tenants (Forrest & Murie, 1988). Tenants who remain are 
more likely to be residualised and are less likely to possess the motivation to effect 
any change. For those who remain, the alternatives of owner occupation or private 
rented housing are likely to be unattainable or worse than their current housing 
conditions. Many of the best local authorities had, by 1987, been sold under the Right 
to Buy, leaving the less attractive stock (Sewell, Twine & Williams, 1984).  Tenants 
may not find purchasing these homes attractive, even if they could raise the finance to 
do so.  Renting a home in the private sector is likely to be more expensive, and the 
quality of housing is often broadly comparable to local authority stock, and often 
worse.  Tenants were “deprived of the opportunity to obtain the landlord they want, 
offering the service they deserve” (Department of the Environment, 1987).  The 
inability of tenants to exercise the right to exit individually arguably made the 
collective exit offered by Tenants Choice potentially very significant.  
Authorities ‘enable’ while the private sector ‘provides’ 
Prior to the 1988 Housing Act, the vast majority of local authorities owned, managed 
and regulated their own housing stock.  The Conservative Government believed that 
local authorities should be ‘steering and not rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  A 
small number of local authorities had already transferred some or all of their stock, 
leaving them with responsibility for regulation and assisting independent providers.  
Nicholas Ridley, former Secretary of State responsible for Housing in the late 1980s, 
saw this as the future model for all local authorities; 
“The role of the local authority will no longer be that of the universal 
provider.  But it will have a key role in ensuring that there is adequate 
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provision to meet needs, in encouraging the various providers to develop 
and maintain the necessary services, and where necessary in providing 
grant support or other assistance to get projects started and to ensure that 
services are provided and affordable for the clients concerned.”   (Ridley, 
1988: 17) 
In practice, the Conservative Government perceived local authorities as playing a 
strategic role; identifying housing needs and demands; encouraging innovative 
methods of provision by private sector bodies to meet these needs; maximising the 
use of private finance; and encouraging the revival of the independent rented sector 
(Department of the Environment, 1987). The Conservative Government had been 
encouraging local authorities to consider other methods of provision, if it could be 
shown that they were more effective, as early as 1979. Housing Associations were 
expected to make a significant contribution to both new build and rehabilitation 
(Department of the Environment, 1979). To some extent, a number of authorities had 
been developing this role for some time (Ennals & O’Brien, 1990). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Although the Labour Government first started the reductions in public housing 
programmes in 1976, for largely fiscal and economic reasons, the Conservative 
Government elected in 1979 introduced far deeper cuts.  The Conservative 
Government’s believed that the State was too involved in direct provision, and this 
threatened individual choice and freedom.  The policy response was to shift financial 
support from public housing to support for owner occupation and selling homes to 
tenants under the Right to Buy.  From the mid 1980s onwards, the Conservative 
Government asserted that the Right to Buy could not address the problems of much of 
the stock that remained in local authority ownership.  In 1987, the Government 
proposed transfers of council housing through HATs and Tenants Choice, to further 
reduce the State’s role as a direct provider, but also arguably to address some of the 
management problems associated with council housing.  Stock transfer could 
arguably change the way public rented housing was managed by, for example, passing 
it to single purpose bodies with access to private finance.  Such a shift to private 
sector bodies would reduce the State’s financial commitment to housing provision, 
enabling the Conservative Government to achieve its ideological objective of 
supporting owner occupation and private provision.  The shift would also enfranchise 
tenants by giving them more decision making power over the future of their housing.  
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Local authorities, once having passed ownership of their housing stock to other 
bodies, would be left with an enabling role, involving identifying needs and 
monitoring the performance of providers. 
Local authorities, tenants and private sector organisations were reluctant to accept the 
shift in the way Central Government proposed.  Tenants were reluctant to change 
landlords when local authority services were only barely adequate. Their fears of the 
private sector and the Government’s models of transfer were heightened by the initial 
refusal of ministers to allow ballots of tenants on HAT proposals (Woodward, 1991). 
Local authorities were reluctant to use the models developed by central government 
because of the perception among tenants and councillors that they might have allowed 
private landlords and property speculators to take over their estates.  Under pressure 
from the financial regime introduced by the Conservative Government, many local 
authorities were interested in exploring ways of involving the private sector, but in a 
way that offered tenants more protection and opportunities to participate, and that 
addressed their housing departments’ problems in a more structured and holistic way, 
including the possible retention of control by a single landlord (Malpass & Mullins, 
2002).  
Private sector organisations themselves resisted the shift from the public sector in the 
way the Conservative Government had proposed, as they wanted to work in 
partnership with local authorities. The housing association movement was reluctant to 
involve itself in anything that would threaten its relationship with local authorities 
(NHFA, 1987; Mullins, 1991).  
HATs and Tenants Choice paved the way for a wider transfer programme, however, 
by providing a model for local authorities to adapt. In the next chapter, we examine 
how local authorities began to develop their own models of transfer, which central 
government began to accept and encourage.  Models developed by local authorities 
have been more successful in helping the State to withdraw from direct provision, and 
encouraging more private sector involvement, than Central Government’s models.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter, I attempt to explain how Local Government responded to Central 
Government pressure to become involved in developing stock transfer; and how their 
actions and behaviour fit within the framework that we use to analyse this recent 
housing phenomenon, set out in the core thesis outlined in Chapter Two.  Firstly, I 
provide a historical account of local authorities’ approach to stock transfer.  In the 
second section, I examine how local authorities responded to the pressure resulting 
from the Conservative Government’s changes to the financial regime for council 
housing.  Local authorities responded to this pressure by withdrawing from the direct 
provision of housing; changing the way public services are organised and delivered; 
and by shifting the balance of service delivery from the public to the private sector.   
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO 
STOCK TRANSFER 
This section provides a historical account of the development of Local Government’s 
approach to stock transfer. Table 4.1 provides a chronology of initiatives which 
helped local authorities move from direct to indirect provision of housing.  
Local authorities’ approach to their role as landlords began to change in the 1970s, as 
building programmes began to slow; the phenomenon of difficult-to-let estates began 
to emerge (DoE, 1981); and the Labour Government first cut the housing budget after 
a long period of continual growth (Merrett, 1979).  Growing disillusionment with 
slum clearance and mass housing solutions, coupled with resistance to clearance by 
some communities (Ward, 1974) helped the housing association movement to grow.  
Housing associations helped to rehabilitate inner city housing as an alternative to the 
clearance approach of local authorities, and became part of “a more local, more direct 
and more responsive housing movement” (Power, 1993: 210). By the late 1970s, 
financial pressure upon local authorities, resulting from cuts in 1976, began to mount 
and management of rented housing by local authorities was believed to be in ‘crisis’ 
by the first half of the 1980s (Audit Commission, 1986), following much deeper and 
enthusiastic cuts  in housing budgets by the Conservative Government from 1979 
onwards (Malpass, 2001). Despite this, councillors appeared reluctant at first to give 
up direct ownership of their housing stocks unless the financial problems of their 
housing authorities were severe (see, for example, Glasgow DC, 1985 and Tym et al 
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1988), because private sector involvement was arguably difficult to ‘sell’ to tenants, 
but also because they had grown accustomed to the control that being landlords gave 
them (Macey, 1982).  There was, however, “no popular groundswell of opposition to 
Government policy” of a reduction in the State’s role as direct provider of housing 
and indeed there was widespread support for the Government’s aims, “if not the 
methods” (Clapham, 1989: 15) 
Table 4.1: Local initiatives leading to moves towards indirect provision 
 
Initiative 
 
 
Year initiated 
Development of Tenant Management Co-operatives 
in Islington, Glasgow and the Greater London Council, and 
Ownership Co-operatives in Islington and Liverpool, providing 
arms length service delivery, tenant control and delegated 
authority over budgets. 
1974 
Co-operation with Priority Estates Project, creating the 
conditions for changes to housing management. 
1979 
Walsall MBC: Decentralisation of Management 
An attempt to change the way public housing was managed by 
breaking up central structure and creating 32 local bodies.  
1982 
Knowsley MBC: Stockbridge Village Trust 
Provided first model for stock transfer and involvement of private 
sector in public housing. 
1982 
Glasgow City: Community Ownership Schemes 
Proposed wide-scale withdrawal from direct provision through 
stock transfer to small community-based and community 
controlled housing associations and co-operatives. 
1985 
Small whole stock transfers through LSVT 
Built upon early transfers but enabled complete withdrawal from 
direct provision. First stock transfers to involve stock with 
positive value.  
1988 onwards 
Partial transfer through Local Housing Companies 
Transfers of negatively valued stock in inner urban areas with the 
aid of central government ERCF grant funding. 
1996 onwards 
City-wide transfers 
Attempts by large city councils to completely withdraw from 
direct provision. In 2002, Glasgow succeeds in ballot of tenants, 
while Birmingham fails.  
2000 onwards 
 
Source: DoE / DETR / DTLR 1974-2001 
As outlined in earlier chapters, the Conservative Government’s policies in the early 
1980s focused on cutting public housing expenditure and increasing support for 
owner occupation, coupled with sales of council houses to sitting tenants (Forrest & 
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Murie, 1988).  As the pace of sales through the Right to Buy slowed by the mid 
1980s, the Conservative government focused increasingly upon local authorities’ 
management of housing (Malpass & Mullins, 2002), and sought to encourage a 
departure from the system that had evolved (DoE, 1987; Ridley, 1988).  Local 
authorities had already begun to consider new approaches to service delivery, 
including decentralisation, for example (Seabrook, 1984; Mainwaring, 1988). In the 
1980s, some local authorities faced such pressing problems that they sought to hand 
over some of their most difficult estates to other landlords.  Early models such as the 
Stockbridge Village Trust (Tym et al, 1988) and the Glasgow Community Ownership 
Schemes (Clapham, Kintrea & Whitefield, 1991) demonstrated to others how housing 
departments could change. Other authorities seeking to withdraw, including Chiltern 
and Newbury district councils, did not face the same pressing problems, but believed 
that direct ownership was not in their tenants’ best long term interests, as the financial 
regime would increasingly limit their ability to provide services at their current levels.  
Many authorities, particularly big city, Labour controlled councils, changed their 
services to demonstrate that local authority ownership and management of housing 
was a viable long term strategy (Mainwaring, 1988). They set out to reform their 
services by introducing local management; decentralising services; while others 
adopted ‘consumerism’ in order to depoliticise housing management (Cairncross, 
Clapham & Goodlad, 1997). These reforms, while successful in delivering some 
improvement in management (Seabrook, 1984; Power, 1997; Cairncross, Clapham & 
Goodlad, 1997), did little to help address the local authorities’ financial problems, 
which resulted from the Conservative Government’s reductions in the public housing 
budget. Reforms were arguably vulnerable to shifting political priorities (Mainwaring, 
1988), which appeared to strengthen the case for more fundamental change.  
Later in the 1980s and 1990s, some local authorities that attempted to reform their 
housing services, but failed, started to explore transfer. They pioneered whole stock 
transfers to newly created housing associations; partial transfers to local housing 
companies; and estate transfers, which are all discussed below. More recently, big 
cities have explored the possibilities of transferring their entire housing stocks to city-
wide trusts, with local subsidiaries delivering services to tenants (see, for example, 
Glasgow Housing Association, 2001).  In two highly politicised ballots held during 
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2002, tenants in Glasgow accepted the City Council’s proposals to transfer its stock, 
while tenants in Birmingham rejected transfer proposals.  
Attempts to deliver radical changes in management through decentralisation 
A small number of authorities with difficult to manage estates sought assistance from 
Central Government, and were seemingly willing participants in the Department of 
the Environment sponsored Priority Estates Project (Power, 1984 and 1987 provide 
full accounts of the work of PEP). Other authorities sought to address their problems 
through reconfiguring their worst estates, to reduce their scale and make them less 
inhuman (see, for example, Tym et al, 1988; and the Broadwater Farm case study in 
Power, 1997). The Conservative Government funded a number of capital projects 
through the Estate Action programme, which attempted to tie grants to changes in 
management and greater diversity of ownership (Pinto, 1993; Provan, 1993).  
However, the programme did little to deliver transfers of estates to alternative 
landlords.  Works funded through the programme were generally limited to new build 
by housing associations or demolition of existing stock (ibid).   
Some councils recognised a growing need to improve the management of council 
housing (Seabrook, 1984), possibly linked to a concern that the Conservative 
Government would intervene if they could not deliver radical change, as it had done 
when some councils failed to prioritise Right to Buy sales (Forrest & Murie, 1985). 
There are also indications that local authorities actively wanted to improve the way 
they delivered services, and decentralisation became “a source of hope and renewal to 
many local authorities who felt themselves becoming more and more remote from the 
people they served” (Seabrook, 1984: 1). Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council 
decentralised its housing service to 32 neighbourhood offices in 1982, taking its 
inspiration from the Caldmore Advice Centre. The Centre was established and run by 
a group of Walsall residents, and there were no limits on the issues that it was 
prepared to deal with. The Council hoped to build up a network of offices that could 
similarly deal with any problem residents might have.  
The extent of the remoteness of staff from tenants was clear when they prepared to 
move out to the neighbourhoods. Many were apprehensive, as they had had little or no 
contact with the tenants: “personal contact – on such rare occasions as it had been 
unavoidable – had nearly always meant some more or less frightening confrontation 
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with a tenant driven to despair by neglect or indifference and who had somehow 
managed to evade the elaborate defences provided by the Civic Centre” (ibid: 125).  
While decentralisation appeared to help staff to forge better relations with tenants, the 
initiative was hampered by lack of autonomy at local level (Mainwaring, 1988). 
Neighbourhood offices did not, for example, have any control over the repairs service, 
which remained with the Council’s Direct Labour Organisation (DLO). This 
weakened accountability, as neighbourhoods were responsible for processing repairs 
orders, but were not in a position to account to the public for poor services provided 
by the DLO (Mainwaring, 1988).  
A change of political control of Walsall Council in 1982 arguably demonstrates the 
vulnerability of housing management initiatives to shifts in political priorities. 
Although public pressure prevented the incoming Conservative Council from re-
centralising the housing service, some offices were closed, and those that remained 
gradually lost autonomy to the centre (ibid).  
A Model for Stock Transfers: Stockbridge Village Trust 
Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council established the Stockbridge Village Trust in 
1982 as a means of rescuing Cantril Farm – an unpopular and difficult to manage 
estate. The Trust acquired the Cantril Farm Estate from the council in 1983, using a 
mixture of public and private finance to demolish the most unpopular properties and 
reconfigure and refurbish the retained units.  
Cantril Farm was built by Liverpool City Council in the 1960s as an overspill estate 
for residents displaced by the slum clearance programme. Knowsley took ownership 
of the Estate as a result of local government reorganisation in 1974. The Estate 
consisted of 3,007 dwellings, built as maisonette blocks, tower blocks and houses. 
The Estate was beset by problems almost from the time of completion - rent arrears 
soared and void levels increased. The estate was declining rapidly and was “expected 
to be vacant within ten years and fit only for demolition” (Tym et al, 1988: 5) 
The Council was said to be unable to address the problems the estate faced and 
“senior council officers admitted they were at a loss to know what to do” (ibid: 6). 
The Council did not have the resources necessary to fund the radical changes that it 
believed the estate needed to make it work. The Council was also concerned about the 
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prospect of serious disturbances, as had occurred in Toxteth in the previous year 
(Bedford, 1982). Withdrawal and private sector involvement was arguably an 
attractive proposition for Knowsley, as the Estate appeared to have become a 
management and political burden for the Council. Transfer would leave the Council 
with a smaller but arguably more manageable stock.  
Michael Hesletine, on his now famous tour of Merseyside following the riots in the 
early 1980s, brought together private lenders, developers, the local authority and 
Central Government in a new model that appears to have shaped much of the future 
policy relating to transfer.   
Stockbridge Village Trust provided a new model for withdrawal, organisational 
change and private sector involvement with local authorities. The Trust is essentially a 
non-profit distributing company limited by guarantee, which owns a registered 
Housing Association, Stockbridge Village Housing Association. The Trust is 
governed by seven trustees, three of whom are nominated by funders; one by the local 
authority; one by the local parish council; and one by residents.  Later stock transfer 
landlords used similar structures.   
The Trust pioneered community involvement in the development, intensive on-site 
management and the removal of political control from a Council estate (Tym et al, 
1988). The Trust provided a model for private sector involvement in the ownership 
and management of council housing. While the Cantril Estate required major 
investment, officers also believed that it needed a new vision and new style of 
management, which the Council was unable to provide: 
“Even within a Borough with a number of problem estates, Cantril Farm 
stood out. Residents and many of their leaders feared that Knowsley had 
given up in defeat. Senior council officers admitted that they were at a 
loss to know what to do.” (Tym et al, 1988: 5) 
The Estate appears to have become a financial as well as political burden for the 
council. Knowsley was keen to involve the private sector in developing solutions for 
the Estate, and worked with housing providers and funders to agree terms for transfer 
and regeneration of the Estate. Residents played a key role in developing plans for the 
Estate, and by voting almost unanimously in favour of private sector involvement 
(ibid).  
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Glasgow City: Community Ownership Schemes  
Between 1985 and 1998, the main method of reforming housing provision in Scotland 
was to transfer public housing to “Community Ownership Schemes” (Clapham, 
Kintrea & Whitefield, 1991; Clapham & Kintrea, 1994; 2000). Glasgow District 
Council devised community Ownership in response to the deteriorating condition of 
its housing stock. Other authorities in Scotland have since adopted the model.  In 
1985, Glasgow DC recognised that the Conservative Government’s funding policy 
would lead to a much less favourable financial position and it would not receive 
sufficient resources to invest in its housing (Glasgow, 1985).   
The problems Glasgow faced in the 1980s 
Municipal involvement in housing began in the 1920s, when Glasgow Council first 
built housing for general needs. By the 1930s, in common with trends throughout the 
UK, the Council changed the emphasis of its programme to slum clearance, with 
replacement by flatted estates, built to low standards (Damer, 1989). From 1945 
onwards, the Council built four massive estates on the periphery of the City. These 
four estates consisted of 62,000 dwellings, mainly in blocks of tenement flats. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, space in the City centre became scarce, and the Council 
followed the national trend of the construction of tower blocks. The blocks 
constructed in Glasgow were among the tallest in Europe (Keating, 1988).  
By 1985, Glasgow’s municipal housing stock comprised some 172,000 homes, and 
the sheer size of the stock and management difficulties looked as though they might 
overwhelm the Council: 
“It is the Council’s view that the sheer scale of its housing problems and 
needs is so great, compared with almost any other local authority, that 
new initiatives must be pursued.”  (Glasgow DC, 1985) 
By the end of the 1980s, housing built during the inter-war period remained virtually 
the same as it had been at the time of construction, and the mass estates on the 
periphery were deteriorating rapidly. For example, no planned maintenance had ever 
been carried out (Clapham & Kintrea, 1994). The estates were perceived as unpopular 
and demand was low.  The Council faced the risk of being prosecuted for criminal 
neglect of its properties and tenants (Glasgow DC, 1986).  This meant that radical 
action appeared to be vital to prevent a further deterioration of conditions.  An Inquiry 
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into the Council’s housing in 1986 (ibid) concluded that the Housing operation was 
unsustainable and advocated transfers to alternative landlords. 
The Authority estimated that £1.6 billion would be required for capital investment in 
the years 1985/86 to 1989/90. Glasgow’s housing revenue account expenditure 
declined from £197.5 million in 1980/81 to £153 million in 1984/85, largely due to a 
63 per cent cut in real terms in Housing Support Grant (ibid). 
The development of Community Ownership 
The 1980s saw the emergence of a withdrawal strategy in Glasgow, through which the 
Council aimed to make use of “all available funding, while encouraging resident 
involvement” (Keating, 1988). In a move that might easily be regarded as 
revolutionary for a Labour controlled authority in 1985, the Council advocated 
withdrawal from provision by transferring the housing to community based housing 
associations to draw in private sector finance and to create more diversity in order to 
facilitate the renewal of its housing stock. Described by Glasgow DC as “an 
alternative strategy” Community Ownership was designed to improve the quality of 
housing management; to spread the resources available over as many areas as 
possible; to seek low cost management solutions, instead of expensive capital 
investment; and to harness the resources of the private sector (ibid).  
Community Ownership was seen as a “collective Right to Buy”, although tenants did 
not own their own individual homes (Glasgow DC, 1985). As the scheme attracted 
private finance, and fostered both self-help and mutual responsibility, the 
Conservative Government appeared to welcome it, especially as the impact of Right 
to Buy in Scotland was seen as being limited, and the left accepted it because they 
considered it to be a form of co-operative socialism (Clapham & Kintrea (1994). 
Glasgow DC (1985) claimed that the scheme’s origins lay in the co-operative 
movement of the 19th century. An increased role for tenants was seen as crucial in the 
success of the schemes, as management co-operatives had succeeded in housing 
estates in the USA where conditions appeared to be far worse than in Glasgow 
(Rainwater, 1970; Roneck et al, 1981). The Council also anticipated that the scheme 
would help to stabilise communities “which might otherwise be at risk” from social 
breakdown and serious disorder (Glasgow DC, 1985). 
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Community Ownership involves the transfer of housing to par value co-ops, made up 
of tenants who collectively own the housing in the scheme. Members of the co-op 
commonly purchase a nominal share. The schemes are autonomous, and run by 
elected management committees.  Glasgow has transferred over 12,000 units of its 
stock to 42 community ownership schemes since 1986.  The schemes are funded by a 
mix of Housing Association Grant and private finance.   
The first pilot Community Ownership schemes were established at Broomhouse, 
Calvay and Castlemilk East in 1986 and at Possil, Rosehill and Southdeen in 1987. 
Broomhouse and Rosehill estates were perceived as popular areas with few social 
problems, although the housing was believed to be in need of urgent refurbishment. 
The Castlemilk East, Calvay and Southdeen estates were part of Glasgow’s 
“peripheral” housing stock, and were regarded locally as extremely unpopular. The 
housing stock had deteriorated badly. A majority of residents received state benefits, 
and the adult unemployment rate was above 50 per cent. Possil estate was highly 
stigmatised, and the conditions there were the worst of the six estates. Nearly all 
households on the Possil Estate were reliant on state benefits, and 80 per cent were 
unemployed (Clapham, Kintrea & Whitefield, 1991). 
The main source of funding for the schemes created in 1986 was Housing Association 
Grant, while Glasgow DC funded the 1987 schemes from improvement grants. The 
schemes raised private finance to fund the balance of their investment needs.  
The success of community ownership in delivering re-investment in run down 
housing in Scotland is well documented (See Clapham, Kintrea and Whitefield, 1991; 
Clapham and Kintrea, 1994; 2000). The schemes are locally based and controlled and 
are arguably small enough for local residents to have a high level of control. While 
their small scale helped to deliver improved services, they appear to have been unable 
to address Glasgow’s housing problems quickly enough, as establishing the large 
number of schemes that would be required has proved difficult for the Council. In 
1998, Scotland “went large” with the encouragement of whole stock voluntary 
transfers, with generous funding through “New Housing Partnerships” for feasibility 
studies and set up costs from the new Scottish Parliament (Taylor, 1991). Ministers 
appeared to recognise the importance of the tradition of tenant involvement 
established through community ownership schemes and consultation with tenants who 
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remain with their councils places emphasis upon the opportunities that might open up 
to them if they were to transfer.   
Outcomes of Glasgow’s attempts to withdraw from direct provision 
Despite their success in improving housing and social conditions, it appears unlikely 
that Community Ownership Schemes will acquire many more units from local 
authorities, although there is nothing, in principle, to prevent existing schemes from 
bidding to take on more stock from local authorities. In a keynote speech on Scottish 
housing policy, the then Minister for Housing, Raymond Robertson, made no 
reference to the achievements of Community Ownership, or to their future role in 
other transfers (Robertson, 1995). The pace of withdrawal from direct provision in 
Scotland through community ownership appeared slow, and although there have been 
182 transfers, the number of units involved was relatively low at 21,537, or 118 units 
per transfer.  Glasgow undertook over 50 per cent of all transfers.  In the second half 
of the 1990s, the Government cut Scottish Homes’ approved development programme 
(ADP) which funded Community Ownership Schemes (Robertson & Taylor, 1996). 
Whole stock transfers by smaller authorities through LSVT 
Small district councils began to explore withdrawal from direct provision by 
transferring their entire housing stocks from the mid 1980s onwards. They appeared 
to be under pressure to withdraw because they believed that the new financial regime 
for local authorities threatened their viability as landlords in the long term (Cole & 
Furbey, 1994; Malpass, 1991; 2001; Malpass & Mullins, 2002). Although they did not 
face problems of disrepair on the same scale as large city councils, these authorities 
arguably saw that their ability to maintain their housing in good condition was bring 
eroded by Conservative Government’s increasingly tight control of both their revenue 
and capital spending.  Local authorities who wanted to improve services, in response 
to the vociferous attacks on housing management by the Conservative Government 
(Stoker, 1987) and the potential impact of the Tenants Choice provisions, found that 
their ability to respond positively was limited by financial constraints. Resources for 
development of new housing became increasingly scarce, and because the populations 
of the areas were generally well off, low levels of Housing Corporation grant 
allocations made the areas relatively unattractive to developing housing associations 
(Source: Interviews). This meant that opportunities for people in housing need to 
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access social housing became more and more limited, as the stock was gradually 
diminished through Right to Buy sales.  
More councils have chosen whole stock LSVT than any other stock transfer model 
possibly because it appeared to provide the most comprehensive solution to local 
authorities seeking to withdraw from direct provision. Whole stock transfer enables a 
local authority to divest itself of all landlord responsibilities, although they retain their 
statutory housing functions (Aldbourne Associates, 1997). The process was first 
proposed in 1987 to transfer stock in 1988. Until 1996, whole stock LSVTs were 
undertaken exclusively by shire district councils (or outer urban councils with similar 
characteristics) whose stock was in good or reasonable condition. Although the 
problems did not as appear to be as pressing as in urban authorities, Councillors 
recognised that the new housing finance regime introduced by the 1989 Local 
Government and Housing Act would limit their scope to invest in their stock and 
might hamper attempts by officers to provide improvements in services.  Housing 
need was also growing, but councils were unable to respond by building new housing. 
Equally importantly, many councillors might have noted the success of other 
authorities, especially Glasgow and Knowsley, in successfully transforming some of 
their unpopular housing estates by attracting private investment. Glasgow and 
Knowsley’s problems were arguably many times worse than most other local 
authorities. These transfers appeared to demonstrate that councils could secure private 
sector involvement that would deliver large-scale investment and organisational 
change.   
Estate based and partial transfers became commonplace from 1997 onwards, as the 
ERCF supported transfers demonstrated that urban transfers could work successfully 
(Jacobs, 1999; Murie & Nevin, 1999; Nevin, 1999; London Housing Federation, 
1999). LSVT currently enjoys support from all major political parties at national 
level. Under the Labour Government elected in 1997, the programme of transfers has 
accelerated (DETR, 2000), with more transfers having been completed under the first 
Labour Government from 1997 to 2001 than under the previous two Conservative 
governments (Malpass & Mullins, 2002). 
The only major research on LSVTs so far conducted is a longitudinal study by 
Mullins et al (1992 and 1995). This study is generally positive about the outcomes of 
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stock transfer, but concentrates on a small sample of early transfers. Research by 
Pieda (DETR, 2000) provides a new insight into LSVT recipient landlords from the 
perspective of consumers.  The research indicates that levels of tenant satisfaction are 
slightly higher in LSVT associations than in local authorities although satisfaction 
often falls back slightly following the completion of backlog repairs programmes.  
Research undertaken by Aldbourne Associates (Aldbourne Associates, 1997) 
examines the development by transferring authorities of the enabling function. There 
is, however, no research that examines how organisations deliver services at ground 
level, although this thesis attempts to provide some initial data on the ethos, goals and 
management of LSVT associations.  
Local authorities’ leading role in developing LSVT  
A small group of local authorities – Rochford, Chiltern, Torbay and Salisbury –
pioneered the LSVT process in the mid to late 1980s, by adapting enabling legislation 
contained in the Housing Act 1985.  This legislation was originally intended to enable 
local authorities to transfer stock to private landlords (Usher, 1987).  The 
Conservative Government clearly followed the lead set by local authorities, as it was 
“reactive” rather than proactive in formulating new rules to govern transfers (Birchall 
et al, 1995). The Conservative Government appears to have revised its own guidelines 
as the impact of local action on national policy became clearer (Malpass & Mullins, 
2002). The relevant sections of the Housing Act 1988 can be viewed as a response to 
local government initiatives that were already underway (Mullins et al, 1993), 
although the likelihood of such proposals might also have encouraged local 
authorities to take the initiative.  There was concern among local authorities at the 
time that the 1988 Act marked “a period of sharper hostility than before towards local 
government provision and the extension of privatisation into the core areas of the 
Welfare State” (Cole and Furbey, 1994: 201).  It is noteworthy that no Labour local 
authorities were part of this early LSVT approach (Malpass & Mullins, 2002), even 
though they had developed some of the earlier models at Knowsley and Glasgow.   
Partial withdrawal through Local Housing Companies 
Housing companies were first discussed in the late 1980s in the light of research on 
European housing structures (OECD, 1988; Power, 1993). The Housing Companies 
that were proposed resembled German limited dividend housing companies, French 
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private HLMs (Habitations à loyer modéré) and Societes Anonymes, and Swedish and 
Danish municipal housing companies. 
There has been significant interest in Local Housing Companies among local 
authorities and all major political parties since the early 1990s. In 1995, surveys 
indicated that as many as two thirds of housing directors were actively considering the 
option of establishing a Local Housing Company, with 40 per cent of those in favour 
expecting to do so within two years (Inside Housing, 1995). Local Housing 
Companies have already done more – in terms of the number of units transferred - 
than traditional LSVTs to facilitate the withdrawal or partial withdrawal of inner 
urban local authorities from direct provision, and to create more diversity of 
ownership of public rented housing in cities.  
Developing the Model 
The concept of Local Housing Companies first entered the political arena in the 
1970s, although it was not until 1982 that the first organisation using the structure was 
established at Knowsley (see Tym et al, 1988). In 1987, the Labour Party considered 
the use of management companies to run estates, following a visit to Swedish local 
housing companies by the Party’s Housing Spokesman (Independent, 1987). The 
Party suggested that boards could run the companies, with control split three ways 
between tenants, investors and councillors.  The Chartered Institute of Housing 
(1992), Raynsford (1992) and Wilcox (1993) built upon these initial ideas. Wilcox et 
al (1993) and Zitron (1995) examined the Local Housing Company option in detail 
while the idea was in its infancy. They defined Local Housing Companies as: 
“… independent bodies generally established by public sector landlords, 
in order to attract investment into social housing. They will normally be 
associated with transfers of tenanted public sector housing but can be 
used for new building” (Zitron, 1995)  
and that councils should 
“… transfer housing [to a Local Housing Company] as a going concern, 
without the need to raise very large sums in private capital to purchase 
the properties. Rather the new landlord body would simply assume the 
financial responsibility for the outstanding debt on the council housing 
stock, and be free to raise as much private finance as it required for major 
repairs and improvements programmes”  (Wilcox et al, 1993) 
Chapter Four: Local Government involvement in stock transfer Page 103 
The model owes much to the Swedish system of provision of social housing through 
municipal companies. Municipal housing companies now account for 20 per cent of 
all housing in Sweden. They enjoy generous state subsidies, and a high level of local 
authority influence. Swedish municipal housing companies operate as single purpose 
independent bodies, which enables them to provide local estate based management 
and maintenance more easily than local authorities (Wilcox, 1993). This high level of 
state control differs to local government’s role in British Local Housing Companies. 
The emphasis in Britain is upon ensuring that companies are clearly in the private 
sector in order that any private borrowing can be deemed to be outside the public 
sector (Wilcox et al 1993; Zitron, 1995; Housing Corporation, 1996).  However, there 
is still scope for local authority involvement, particularly in establishing the 
companies.   
Lee, Power and Tunstall (1999) identify a number of key characteristics shared by 
Local Housing Companies. The term “Local Housing Company” encapsulates two 
elements: the transferring body; and the recipient organisation. Companies are single 
purpose housing organisations that typically have long term funded refurbishment and 
development programmes.  
Authorities pioneering the model were often seen as being concerned about the loss of 
control over their housing stock after a transfer. They wanted to develop a model of 
ownership that would have a closer relationship with the authority than they could 
expect to have with an existing RSL or specially created housing association (ibid).  
This closeness is linked to the housing company structure and formal agreements 
reached during the company development process, which would arguably give local 
authorities a considerable stake. In addition, partial transfer inevitably involves some 
ongoing links to the local authority through other stock and nominations. While local 
authorities may lose some influence, the model appears to give greater scope for 
tenant influence over their new landlords than they had as council tenants. 
Furthermore, it is possible that tenants might expect more influence through the board 
of a local housing company than they would be likely to achieve through the board of 
a LSVT association or other RSL.   
Local housing companies have often been seen as synonymous with negative value 
stock transfers supported by the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ibid). However, all 
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local authorities can consider Local Housing Companies as potential recipient 
landlords.  Shire district councils, for example, have adopted the model to acquire 
their entire housing stocks.    
Pioneering authorities: Hackney and Tower Hamlets 
The London boroughs of Hackney and Tower Hamlets were at the forefront of the 
development of Local Housing Company models which help local authorities to 
withdraw and through which the private sector takes more responsibility for the 
ownership, management and upgrading of local authority housing.  The London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets, which was Labour controlled at the time of writing, 
“exhibits levels of multiple deprivation and socio-economic exclusion at levels that 
are the highest both in London and nationally” (LB Tower Hamlets, 1995a). Council 
housing in the Borough was said to be “typical of the worst representation of local 
authority housing”, displaying “extremely poor environmental quality and design 
related crime problems” (LB Tower Hamlets, 1995a). The council rejected the LSVT 
model as an option because it did not provide an acceptable way forward “either 
financially or in terms of the normal accountability arrangements” (LB Tower 
Hamlets, 1995b). This was because the stock had a negative value and the Council’s 
would be left with an overhanging debt, which it would be unable to redeem. It should 
be noted that these discussions took place prior to changes to rules on overhanging 
debt in 2000.  The council believed that direct transfer to existing RSLs did not offer 
tenants sufficient protection and levels of involvement. The Borough initially 
proposed the transfer of 37 of its estates (some 13,000 dwellings) to two “Housing 
and Regeneration Community Associations” (HARCAs), which would be vehicles for 
transforming estate conditions, changing estate services and involving communities 
(Stride, 1997). The Poplar HARCA and Tower Hamlets Community Housing have 
both attracted funding from banks, but in order to provide sufficient security for 
funders, good quality stock was “packaged” with poorer quality stock. 
The first HARCA in Poplar was endorsed in the tenants’ ballot with 72 per cent in 
favour. Tenants rejected initial transfers to the second HARCA, “Cityside”. The 
Cityside transfer was subject to a sustained opposition campaign from Defend Council 
Housing (www.defendcouncilhousing.org.uk) and trades unions. Following a re-
launch of the Cityside HARCA, as “Tower Hamlets Community Housing”, further 
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ballots were successful, with just over 51 per cent of tenants voting in favour of 
transfer.  
The HARCAs follow the governance structure suggested by the Housing Corporation 
(1996), with one third of board members drawn from the council, one third from 
tenants, and one third from the business and professional sectors. Accountability to 
the authority and to tenants is a major attraction of Local Housing Companies for the 
Borough (LB Tower Hamlets, 1995a). 
The Council sees HARCAs as having the following role; raising finance to fund a 
renewal programme; involving residents and the wider community in their work; 
being accountable to the council for the use of public funds and in regard to the 
promises and guarantees made to tenants prior to the ballot; and harnessing the 
expertise and resources of other partners such as housing associations (ibid).  
The London Borough of Hackney adopted a consortium approach to the development 
of Local Housing Companies to receive transfers of its stock. In 1995, the Borough 
acknowledged that its housing stock suffered “serious and widespread disrepair” and 
estimated that it needed to invest £495 million to bring its council homes and estates 
up to modern standards (L.B. Hackney, 1995a). To merely maintain the basic fabric of 
its housing stock, the Borough estimated that it might have to spend £153 million 
within five years (Hackney, 1995b). The Council’s Estate Regeneration Strategy 
(ERS) can be seen as an ambitious attempt to transfer stock to the private sector, and 
shift responsibility for funding and managing major investment in the Council’s stock 
(ibid).  
The ERS was arguably an open invitation to the private sector to take over the 
Council’s role as landlord of a large proportion of the Borough’s housing stock.  The 
Council selected estates comprising 8,000 units, or 20 per cent of the total stock, with 
the highest investment needs, for transfer to the private sector. The Council 
considered the economic viability of the estates, based on their size and previous or 
planned investment. Estates with less than 100 dwellings were excluded, because it 
was felt that smaller estates would not provide a sufficient income stream to attract 
alternative landlords and funders. Factors including the level of unpopularity; the 
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number of homes purchased by residents under the right to buy; void levels and 
average rent arrears were also considered (ibid). 
The Council invited RSLs to form consortia to take over the estates. Twenty-one 
consortia, comprising housing associations, property developers, funders and 
architects, were chosen to proceed to the next stage. Each consortia had drawn up 
outline plans for three estates each. Tenants and officers selected successful bidders, 
and put their proposals in a ballot to all tenants directly affected.  
Up to March 2000, the Council had transferred over 6,000 units on six estates to a 
number of organisations, including existing RSLs, standalone Local Housing 
Companies and subsidiary Local Housing Companies (see table 4.2). Hackney’s 
Estates Renewal Strategy depended heavily upon grant funding from the Estates 
Renewal Challenge Fund, although the Council initially developed the scheme before 
ERCF had been announced. 
Table 4.2: Landlords acquiring stock through Hackney’s Estates Renewal 
Strategy 
Estates 
transferred 
Name and 
structure of 
landlord 
Parent Number 
of units 
ERCF 
funding 
(£m) 
Private 
finance 
raised 
(£m) 
Kingsmead Kingsmead Homes –
subsidiary LHC 
Shaftesbury HA 978 10.64 28.00 
Morningside Sanctuary HA – direct 
transfer to RSL 
N/A 1,091 10.12 20.00 
Haggerston 
estates 
Canalside Housing 
Partnership – subsidiary 
LHC 
Metropolitan 
Housing Trust & 
Community HA 
662 13.24 29.00 
Upper Clapton Clapton Community 
Homes – subsidiary LHC 
Guinness, New 
Islington & 
Hackney HA & 
Ujima HA  
1,000 19.98 38.00 
Pembury 
Estate 
Peabody Trust – direct 
transfer to RSL 
N/A 1,204 15.35 34.00 
Stamford Hill Southern Homes – direct 
transfer to RSL 
N/A 1,060 12.23 35.00 
 
Totals 
 
5,995 
 
81.56 
 
184 
Source: DETR LSVT database 2001   
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In addition to Tower Hamlets and Hackney, other authorities established local 
housing companies in the late 1990s, including Brent (see Lee, Power and Tunstall, 
1999), Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield (Nevin, 1999).   
Central Government support for local housing companies  
In response to local authorities’ plans to establish local housing companies, the 
Conservative Government introduced a challenge fund to assist where a council 
required additional funding to make a transfer financially viable. This can be 
interpreted as an attempt by the Conservative Government to facilitate transfers in 
inner urban areas (Jacobs, 1999) and advance the withdrawal from direct provision by 
authorities who had not yet responded to financial pressure to consider transfer.  It 
was arguably also a way of engendering new ideas for meeting ‘customer’ needs, in 
recognition of changing demands from tenants. 
The aim of the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) was to provide assistance to 
authorities whose housing stocks had poor asset cover, where the value of the 
properties would be insufficient to provide cover for the borrowing the new landlord 
would need to take on (Department of the Environment, 1995c). The ERCF was 
available to fund the payment of dowries to new landlords; to fund essential 
maintenance or repair work; to meet the preparatory costs of transfers; and to help 
facilitate anti-crime or employment initiatives. The fund provided dowries totalling 
£488 million (an average of £13,300 per unit) between 1996 and 1999, to facilitate the 
transfer of 43,114 units. Although the number of units transferred with ERCF 
assistance can be seen as relatively low in comparison to the total stock of urban 
authorities, the programme was important in demonstrating how local authorities 
could shift the balance of service delivery towards the private sector by involving 
existing RSLs, who had long track records of managing socially rented housing and 
access to sources of finance for long term investment.  These models appeared to 
work well in areas of high demand for housing, which provided comfort for funders 
(DETR, 1998), and London borough councils proved particularly keen on 
participating.  
The Labour Government elected in 1997 did not extend the ERCF programme. Local 
authorities therefore need to fund dowries from their own resources, or from other 
regeneration funding, including the New Deal for Communities. The Government has 
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expressed an interest in capturing some of the equity released by shire district 
transfers in order to redistribute it to authorities with very poor stock condition 
(DETR, 2000).  
City-wide Transfers 
In 1998, the first large city-wide transfers were proposed by Birmingham, Coventry, 
Glasgow and other city councils. These proposals appeared to break new ground 
because of the number of units that would be transferred, and also because the value 
of some of the councils’ housing stock was insufficient to redeem their outstanding 
housing debts.  
The proposals were among the first involving large urban housing stocks, which well 
exceeded the 12,000 unit limit of transfers to single landlords. The Government was 
reluctant to relax this limit (DETR, 1998), so the local authorities developed proposals 
to establish city-wide trusts, which would pass housing management on to subsidiary 
organisations, providing local services to tenants.  
The Labour Government has provided a solution to the problem of outstanding 
housing debt, by offering to redeem a council’s housing debt, if it succeeds in 
transferring its stock (DETR, 1999). Without this assistance, city wide transfers would 
almost certainly prove to be impossible, as it is unlikely that funders would be willing 
to offer sufficient funding for the acquiring landlord to fund a programme of catch up 
repairs, as well as making a payment to the local authority to redeem its debt.  
Glasgow City Council has completed its long process of withdrawal following the 
decision of a majority of tenants in favour of transfer of the entire remaining stock of 
93,000 units Glasgow Housing Association, with onward transfers to community-
based housing associations. The Scottish Executive has assumed responsibility for 
servicing Glasgow’s £900 million housing debt, while the acquiring landlord has 
taken responsibility for raising the £1.6 billion investment required to address the 
repairs backlog (Glasgow Housing Association, 2001).    
Summary 
The financial regime for council housing, introduced by the Conservative Government 
from 1979 onwards, placed local authorities’ under a high degree of pressure, which 
has forced some with stock condition problems to consider transfer.  Other authorities, 
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with less pressing problems, arguably took the decision to transfer as a pre-emptive 
action.  Transfer has helped these authorities to access funding for investment in the 
housing stock, by passing ownership and management responsibility to the private 
sector.  This has also brought a degree of organisational change, with at the very least, 
a move to a single purpose body at arms length from local authorities.  
Although organisational change cannot be interpreted as the key driver for transfer, it 
became important in view of the Conservative Government’s attacks on local 
authority management from the late 1980s onwards.   
Some authorities sought to improve services by radically change the way they 
provided housing services through, for example, decentralisation.  These attempts at 
change were short lived, as they often lacked long term political commitment.  Small 
scale transfers, such as the transfer to Stockbridge Village Trust and Glasgow’s 
establishment of community ownership schemes, served to demonstrate what other 
local authorities could expect to achieve through transfer.  Noting the success of early 
transfers, district councils pioneered whole stock transfers from 1987 onwards, which 
appear to have paved the way for inner-urban transfers in the late 1990s.   
2. WHY LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADOPTED STOCK TRANSFER AS A 
SOLUTION TO ITS HOUSING PROBLEMS  
In the 1980s, the legislative and financial regime for local authorities made direct 
ownership of housing increasingly difficult. Local authorities began to investigate 
stock transfer in response to the introduction of Tenants Choice in 1988 and the new 
financial regime introduced in 1989.  Local authorities also faced considerable 
management difficulties and transfer can be viewed in terms of helping local 
authorities to change council housing management, after other attempts at reform 
failed.  Financial constraints and management difficulties made private sector 
involvement attractive to local authorities (Malpass & Mullins, 2002), provided that 
tenants’ interests could be protected and that the new landlords were accountable to 
tenants and local communities.   
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STOCK TRANSFER AS AN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF WITHDRAWAL 
FROM DIRECT PROVISION  
Stock transfer provided local authorities with a means of withdrawing from direct 
provision. Withdrawal became attractive for some local authorities, as the 
Conservative Government changes to the system of funding both revenue and capital 
expenditure hampered their ability to provide the services tenants wanted and to 
reinvest in their stock to keep it up to date to ensure its long term viability. Many 
authorities were already concerned by the findings of the Study of Difficult to Let 
Housing (Department of the Environment, 1981) and the Audit Commission’s (1986) 
findings on management problems. These difficulties were compounded further by the 
possibility that other landlords could acquire estates under the Tenants Choice 
provisions, possibly requiring local authority funded dowry payments under the 1988 
Act (see for example, WECH 1998). 
The financial regime for local authorities after “ring-fencing” 
The 1989 Local Government and Housing Act introduced major changes in the 
system of financing council housing, including long-term reinvestment. The most 
notable change from the pre-1989 regime was that housing revenue accounts (HRAs) 
were “ring-fenced” from other local authority accounts, thus preventing transfers 
either in or out. This effectively ended the practice of some local authorities of 
subsidising housing accounts from Rates funds. Ring fencing also prevented the 
practice of cross-subsiding rates from housing accounts. The subsidy regime was also 
changed in a way that gave Central Government greater control over rent levels, and 
to target subsidy on areas that needed most assistance (Department of the 
Environment, 1988). Central Government also took more control over capital 
spending, by limiting a local authority’s ability to spend its capital receipts, thus 
forcing them to rely upon centrally determined credit approvals.  This appeared to 
give two broad types of local authority a new interest in transfer – shire districts with 
rent surpluses and urban authorities with a rent deficit (Kleinman, 1993).  
The changes introduced by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 appeared to 
encourage many authorities to fundamentally re-examine their role as direct providers 
of rented housing. Greater central government control of both revenue expenditure 
and capital investment could mean that the ability of housing authorities to provide 
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services and invest in their housing might be hampered. Increasing control by the 
Conservative Government arguably made local authorities’ finances uncertain. It also 
arguably limited their political incentives to continue as landlords, as they would be 
less likely to be able to deliver services that matched tenants’ increasing expectations.  
Withdrawal from direct provision could help local authorities remove their housing 
from this situation. Independent landlords, at arms length from local authorities, 
would not be limited by these constraints and could place housing services on a sound 
long-term footing.  Interestingly, many directors of housing welcomed these changes 
and some began to take an active interest in transfer (Inside Housing, 1995).   
Tenants Choice  
The Act bringing about the changes to the financial regime for council housing was 
placed before Parliament just as the Tenants Choice provisions (see Chapter three) of 
the Housing Act 1988 came into force. Local authorities were believed to be 
concerned that private sector landlords might ‘cherry pick’ their best estates, leaving 
them with the most difficult and unpopular estates. In other cases, authorities were 
concerned that tenants on run down estates with the worst conditions might chose to 
‘opt out’, consequently forcing them to pay large dowries to acquiring landlords (see 
for example, WECH, 1998). This would reduce the capital available for reinvestment 
in the stock retained by the local authority.  
Although local authorities’ worst fears about Tenants Choice never came to fruition, 
some councillors chose to seek to withdraw entirely from direct provision to avoid the 
perceived threat of either cherry picking of their best estates, or the payment of 
dowries to landlords acquiring estates of disgruntled tenants. Transfer would place the 
entire housing stock at arms length from the local authority, where the provisions of 
Tenants Choice would not apply.  
The combined effects of ring-fencing of HRAs, changes to the housing subsidy and 
capital investment regimes, and the possibility of forced transfers through Tenants 
Choice, appears to have brought about a fundamental re-examination by some local 
authorities of their role as landlords. They could sense that the operating conditions 
for local authorities were likely to become increasingly difficult, and they decided that 
withdrawal from direct provision offered an acceptable solution (Malpass & Mullins, 
2002). Withdrawal would place socially rented stock beyond the provisions of 
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Tenants Choice, as well as freeing it from Central Government constraints on revenue 
and capital expenditure, giving the landlord greater scope to provide services that 
more closely matched tenants’ aspirations.  
Stock transfer as a means of delivering organisational change 
Relations between tenants and managers were said to be in danger of breaking down 
(Andrews, 1979), due to management difficulties which emerged from the early 1970. 
Central government began to examine closely councils’ management of housing in the 
worst areas, culminating in the Audit Commission’s report, claiming that the 
management of council housing in some local authorities was in ‘crisis’ (Audit 
Commission, 1986).  The report also said that management by a majority of councils 
was satisfactory and in many cases good.  
The failure of management reform leading to stock transfer 
Attempts to decentralise management lacked support across the political spectrum and 
cannot be seen as a permanent shift in service delivery (Mainwaring, 1988). Power 
argues that “political leadership of housing management initiatives is unreliable and 
short lived; it is effective in extreme conditions, but it needs to be followed by a solid, 
non-political business orientated service that residents have a major role in shaping” 
(Power, 1997: 212).  Transfer can arguably be seen as a way of providing such a non-
political service, although stakeholders would need assurance that these bodies are 
accountable. 
Single purpose landlord organisations 
Stock transfer can be seen as a way of giving councils an opportunity to provide long 
term certainty for management initiatives described above by establishing single 
purpose organisation, placed at arms length from politicians. Local authorities provide 
a wide range of services, including education, refuse collection, planning, leisure, 
public and environmental health, environment and Housing. Although there are 
potential benefits from service provision from a single purpose provision, housing 
management is a complex operation, requiring significant and coordinated inputs 
(Power, 1997), but it is often fitted around other departments, all of which may 
perceive themselves as being in competition, deriving from bureaucratic rivalry, 
professional jealousies and value clashes (Stoker, 1991). Furthermore, some 
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councillors are believed to prioritise other services, such as education, leisure and 
planning, above housing (ibid).  
Transfer can arguably help create new impetus, tenant involvement through the 
consultation process, new investment, new business plans, new systems of 
governance through independent boards, all of which can help drive deep 
organisational change. 
Stock transfers as a means of shifting the public-private balance in service 
delivery  
Due to the financial constraints local authorities faced, they sought to involve the 
private sector in provision. Local authorities realised that this could free public 
housing from some of its centrally imposed financial constraints (McCrone & 
Stephens, 1995). The private sector acquired stock from local authorities through 
whole stock transfer, and through smaller, community based organisations or housing 
companies, similar to the forms of provision found in Europe (see figure 4.1). 
Governments in Europe relied much more on the private rented sector, voluntary 
organisations, semi-private and state sponsored companies to provide socially rented 
housing, whereas the UK relied almost exclusively on local authorities. The UK 
State’s dominance of the provision of rented housing is almost unique in western 
Europe (Daunton, 1987). The continental European model of social housing has a 
stronger focus largely due to its ability to access private finance, but also because it 
delivers good standards to a broader population (Kleinman, 1996). It provides 
intensive and high quality management through single purpose organisations (Power, 
1997). European social housing appears to offer a degree of choice of providers and 
tenure, giving people a feeling of control over their lives, which local authority 
tenants in the UK often feel they are deprived of (Saunders, 1990; Forrest & Murie 
(1990).  
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Figure 4.1: Shifting from Public to Private Sector Provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAN
• U
• L
• Po
• Sl
• Sc
• N
INDIRECT 
PROVISION 
(e.g. Germany) 
P  
 
Source: Ada
The transfer
decision ma
broke local 
forced counc
light of the G 
DIRECT 
ROVISION
(UK)  Private landlords, associations, LOCAL AUTHORITIESBREAK UP
STOCK 
WITHD
AGERS WEAKER 
niform style 
ower quality 
or management 
um clearance 
arce public funds 
o consumer choice 
pted from Power (19
 process arguably 
king power on whe
direct political con
ils into radical chan
overnment’s increbecome enablers
semi-private organisations, 
housing companies, limited 
state provision, state subsidy 
WHOLE STOCK 
TRANSFERS 
(LSVTs) 
 OF 
Public-private partnership and shift away from 
public sector service delivery 
NEW MODELS OF SERVICE PROVISION 
• New or existing social landlords 
• Community based model 
• Local housing company model 
RAWAL 
MANAGERS STRONGER 
• Access to private finance 
• Diverse style 
• Good quality 
• Single purpose bodies 
• Choice of tenure 
97)  
enfranchised tenants by giving them the ultimate 
ther transfers should proceed. This enfranchisement 
trol over ‘municipal fiefdoms’ (Cooper, 1985) and 
ges of the management and ownership of housing. In 
asingly tighter regime, local authorities with the most 
Chapter Four: Local Government involvement in stock transfer Page 115 
severe problems were arguably left with little choice but to shift responsibility for 
their landlord functions to the private and voluntary sectors. Large urban authorities, 
including Hackney and Tower Hamlets, actively sought private sector involvement in 
their stock from the mid 1990s onwards, as their management and stock condition 
difficulties became more pressing (LB Tower Hamlets; LB, Hackney. 
Why local authorities sought greater private sector involvement 
Transfer enabled local authorities to access long term private finance within a 
landlord structure that offered acceptable levels of accountability to tenants and 
councillors (L B Hackney, 1995; L B Tower Hamlets, 1995). Transfer landlords could 
arguably offer greater accountability to both tenants and councillors through higher 
shares of places on boards than they were currently afforded through the local 
authority.  However, tenants would lose formal political accountability through their 
elected councillors.  Local housing company boards usually comprise one-third local 
authority nominees, one third tenant representatives, and the remaining third 
independent professionals and local community members (Housing Corporation, 
1996; Nevin, 1999). 
The major impetus for the involvement of the private sector was the search for 
increased investment in social housing, against a background of increasing 
homelessness and growing waiting lists, constraints on public expenditure, and a 
growing backlog of repairs. Wilcox (1993) argued that in order to meet basic housing 
needs, overall social housing investment provision for Great Britain as a whole would 
need to increase by £3 billion per annum. Since 1992, there has been a substantial 
increase in the number of commercial lenders willing to lend to social housing bodies 
(Social Housing, 2001). The Inside Housing (1995) survey confirms that the ability to 
raise private finance is one of the major attractions of private sector involvement, with 
over two thirds of housing directors identifying this factor as important. 
Secondly, stock transfer landlords offer formal accountability to local authorities and 
tenants. Central government has to be satisfied that a local authority does not control a 
stock transfer landlord (DETR, 1998).  However, this arguably leaves scope for a 
considerable degree of local authority influence. The level of formal accountability 
through the Board and Housing Corporation can be seen in terms of giving local 
authorities and tenants a degree of control over the boundaries of the LHC's business 
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(Zitron, 1995). This is in sharp contrast to early LSVTs, where some associations 
have removed local authority representatives from their boards, and have expanded 
the scope of their operations by, for example, bidding for housing management 
contracts for other local authorities' housing management (ibid). 
Why private sector funders provide funding for stock transfer 
The willingness of private sector funders to finance transfers appears to depend on 
several factors. Firstly, the quality of the property to be included in the transfer must 
offer lenders sufficient security. Acquiring landlords need to convince lenders that the 
properties have sufficient value so that they could be sold in the event of the company 
suffering cash flow difficulties. Secondly, the acquiring landlord needs to be in a 
position to present a solid and realistic business plan. Thirdly, the acquiring landlord 
must convince lenders that if its projected income is not sufficient to cover interest 
payments from the outset, it must be capable of keeping the debt within certain agreed 
levels (Zitron, 1995). 
Summary 
Local authorities that have transferred their stock accepted a shift in service delivery 
from the public to the private sector for several reasons. Firstly, their ability to deliver 
services and invest in their housing stocks was limited by the financial regime 
introduced by the Conservative Government. At the same time, tenants were being 
encouraged by Central Government, and local authorities themselves, to provide more 
feedback on services (Stewart & Clarke, 1987: Cole & Furbey, 1994), resulting in a 
shift in tenants’ aspirations. Local authorities consequently felt under pressure to find 
new ways of delivering services. The private sector had the funding available and 
arguably the necessary expertise to provide effective housing services. Many housing 
associations were believed to be looking for new ways of expanding their businesses.  
Secondly, councils were willing to accept a shift to the private sector because the 
models they developed appeared to offer an acceptable level of tenant and council 
involvement in the new landlord organisations (Wilcox, 1993). As a result, some local 
authorities dropped their opposition to private sector involvement and evolved new 
structures that enabled transfer. These structures arguably helped to provide 
reassurance that the long term interests of residents and the wider community could be 
protected.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Conservative Government’s increasing tightening of the financial regime for 
council housing encouraged many authorities to consider transfer, while others with 
the most acute problems were arguably forced to transfer.  In addition to their 
financial problems, some councils’ began to experience management problems by the 
1970s and 1980s. Council housing no longer appeared to be a vote winner for 
councillors, as feelings about the tenure among residents in other tenures was not 
positive, even though those who had the best knowledge of the tenure – council 
tenants – were often satisfied (Gyford et al, 1989; Maclennan et al, 1989).  Some 
councils responded to the difficulties of owning housing by withdrawing from direct 
provision, at least partially. Other councils who rejected transfer attempted to address 
their problems by changing housing management, through initiatives including 
decentralisation. These reforms, while somewhat successful in delivering 
improvement in management (Seabrook, 1984; Power, 1997), did little to help address 
the local authorities’ financial problems, which resulted from the Conservative 
Government’s reductions in the public housing budget. Reforms were arguably 
vulnerable to shifting political priorities (Mainwaring, 1988), which appeared to 
strengthen the case for more fundamental change.  Finally, local authorities were 
pressured to shift responsibility for the provision of socially rented housing to the 
private sector to provide access to long term sources of investment, and possibly also 
to bring an alternative vision for managing the stock (see for example Tym et al 
1988). The Conservative Government wanted to force local authorities to withdraw 
from direct provision (DoE, 1997), and arguably tightened the financial regime for 
council housing in order to do so.  This left local authorities with the most severe 
stock condition and management problems with little choice but to involve the private 
sector.  However, local authorities wanted to work with the private sector on agreed 
terms and, with the help of tenants’ campaigns, successfully resisted the Conservative 
Government’s compulsory transfer models.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine the regulatory and legislative regime for LSVT, which 
enables local authorities to withdraw from direct provision; to change the way social 
rented housing is organised and managed; and to shift the balance of service delivery 
towards the private sector.  The chapter is divided into three sections.  The first sets 
out a chronology of the legislation, regulation and guidance produced by Central 
Government and the Housing Corporation.  The second section describes the 
legislative and regulatory background that has evolved. The third section examines 
how this framework helps the State to withdraw from direct provision; how it delivers 
organisational change; and how it shifts responsibility for managing and financing 
investment in socially rented housing towards the private sector.   
1. CHRONOLOGY OF LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
The principal acts governing the LSVT process are the Housing Act 1985, the 
Housing Act 1988 and the Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 
1993. The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 is not directly relevant to the 
LSVT process itself, but is important in understanding the financial context in which 
local authorities operate. The Housing Act 1996 enabled local authorities to establish 
local housing companies to receive transfers of housing.  Table 5.1 summarises the 
relevant legislation.   
Regulation of the transfer process is largely governed by DETR Housing Transfer 
Guidelines (DETR, 1998) and the Housing Corporation’s (1996) Registration Criteria 
for Stock Transfer Applicants.  The guidance sets out how Central Government wants 
its legislation to be implemented by local authorities.  Most of this section therefore 
concentrates on the regulation that derives from legislation relating to stock transfer. 
First we discuss the relevant Acts, and then we discuss how they are applied through 
Central Government and Housing Corporation guidance. 
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Table 5.1: Legislation governing Large Scale Voluntary Transfer 
 
Act Section Details 
Housing Act 
1985 
Sec. 32 
 
Sec. 43 
 
 
Sec. 106A 
 
 
Sec. 171A - 
171H 
 
Sch. 3A 
Basic power to dispose of HRA land. 
 
Power to dispose of house/flat let on secure tenancy, subject 
to approval by Secretary of State. 
 
Requires local authority & Secretary of State to have regard to 
tenants’ views of any disposal under sections 32 or 43. 
 
Framework for preserved Right to Buy for transferring 
tenants. 
 
Detailed requirements for local authorities to consult their 
tenants. Secretary of State can refuse consent if it appears  
‘that a majority of tenants…do not wish the transfer to 
proceed’. In practice, Secretary of State will require a ballot. 
 
Housing 
Associations Act 
1985 
Sec. 9 Housing associations must seek consent from Housing 
Corporation before using properties transferred from a local 
authority as loan security. 
Housing Act 1988 Sec. 133 Further disposals of transferred houses/land require consent 
from Secretary of State. Consent must also be sought if new 
owner wishes to use property as loan security. 
Local Government 
and Housing Act 
1989 
Sec. 33 – 66 
 
Sec. 74 
 
 
Sec 76. 
New limits on local authorities’ abilities to borrow.  
 
Places a duty upon local authorities to keep a ring-fenced 
Housing Revenue Account (HRA). 
 
Places a duty upon local authorities to prevent a debit balance 
on the HRA. 
  
Housing Act 1996 Sec. 2.1 Enables local authorities to establish local housing companies. 
 
Source: House of Commons 
Key Legislation 
Legislation relating to the transfer of local authority housing to other landlords is 
contained in a number of acts.  In this section we briefly describe the five acts of 
Parliament that enable transfer; provide ground rules for the process; or that 
encourage local authorities to transfer.   
 Housing Act 1985 
The 1985 Housing Act is the key act for stock transfer.  The Act grants local 
authorities the power to dispose of housing occupied by secure tenants, and to dispose 
of land held for housing purposes.  The disposal of housing occupied by secure 
tenants requires prior approval by the Secretary of State. 
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Housing Act 1988 
The Housing Act 1988 introduced little change to the legal framework for LSVT, 
which continued to be governed largely by the 1985 Act. The 1988 Act introduced 
Tenants Choice, which gave tenants the right vote to transfer to “approved landlords” 
and for the Secretary of State to establish Housing Action Trusts to take control of 
local authority properties in a defined area.  
Local Government and Housing Act 1989 
The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 introduced a requirement of local 
authorities to set up and maintain separate Housing Revenue Accounts. The 
legislation required that Housing Revenue Accounts would be ring-fenced from the 
finances of any other local authority activity.  Prior to the introduction of ring-fenced 
housing revenue accounts, a number of authorities had subsidised their housing 
operations from other sources of income. Other authorities had used surpluses of 
rental income net of expenses to subsidise other services or to lower the level of their 
rates. The 1989 Act also placed further limits on local authorities' borrowing powers 
and ability to spend capital receipts from Right to Buy and other asset disposals.  The 
combined effect of ring fencing of HRAs and further restrictions on borrowing was to 
severely hamper local authorities’ ability to fund maintenance and improvement 
programmes.   
Housing and Leasehold Reform Act 1993 
The 1993 Act introduced a number of measures aimed at introducing a greater degree 
of central government control over the LSVT process. The Act introduced an “annual 
disposals programme” on to which all local authorities wishing to transfer more than 
499 dwellings had to secure a place.  Receiving a place on the disposals programme 
did not guarantee that consent for transfer would be granted - local authorities were 
still required to apply for consent under the 1985 Act.  The Act also introduced the 
LSVT levy, which claws back part of a local authority’s capital receipt to help offset 
the higher costs of Housing Benefit associated with stock transfer. The Housing 
finance system for local authorities contains a mechanism to subsidise a small 
proportion of the cost of Housing Benefit from rental income.  Following transfer, this 
contribution stops, and the LSVT levy helps to compensate for the additional cost to 
the Treasury. 
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 Housing Act 1996 
The Housing Act 1996 enables local authorities to transfer their housing to local 
housing companies, as well as housing associations, by introducing the concept of 
“registered social landlords”, which provides greater flexibility in the structures of 
organisations that can seek registration with the Housing Corporation.  
Central Government guidance  
In the period since the Housing Act 1988, the DoE/DETR has produced three 
documents setting out guidelines for LSVT. These guidelines set out a process to 
guide local authorities through transfer, based in part on the experience of early 
transfers.  Guidelines have developed in both sophistication and clarity in response to 
growing experience of the process and greater knowledge of the impacts of transfer 
upon local and central government.  
1988 Guidelines 
The 1988 Guidelines (DoE, 1988b) are clearly a reaction to the development of LSVT 
by the small number of pioneering authorities. The Guidelines convey the 
Government’s views on the receiving landlord; monopoly landlords; consultation with 
tenants; activities which local authorities should and should not continue to undertake 
following transfer; and stock valuation.  
1993 Guidelines  
By the end of 1992, DoE had experience of scrutinising and approving eighteen 
LSVTs.  During its consultation on revised guidelines, it is clear that the Department 
was concerned about the size of the initial 18 recipient landlords, which in all cases 
received whole housing stocks from their sponsoring authorities.  The Government’s 
aim of diversity of ownership was being frustrated.  Central Government was also 
concerned about the public expenditure implications of LSVT. While consulting on 
new guidelines, the DoE explicitly stated that recipient landlords should normally be 
registered with the Housing Corporation.  
1998 Guidelines 
By 1998, the DoE and its successor, the DETR, had experience of approving a further 
45 transfers, including a number of partial and inner urban transfers. The 1998 
Guidelines largely reflect this experience, and also the policy steer from ministers in 
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the Labour Government elected in May 1997. For the first time, DETR suggested that 
all authorities were to be expected to consider transfer when formulating their housing 
strategy. Although this had been mooted by the Conservative Government prior to the 
1997 election, it had never been made a requirement.  Authorities proposing partial 
stock transfers were expected to formulate policies that would address the needs of 
their retained stock, as well as the transferred stock. Partial stock transfer could no 
longer be considered in isolation from authorities’ strategies for their retained stock.  
The Government's key requirements of transfer proposals remained largely unchanged 
from earlier guidance.  Local authorities would need to provide evidence that tenants 
supported transfer; that transfer was part of a stock-wide strategy that provided good 
value for money for central and local government, tenants and other local residents; 
and that the recipient landlords were capable of providing good long term 
management at affordable rents.  
1999 consultation on changes to the annual disposals programme 
In 1999, the DETR consulted on changing some aspects of the Annual Disposals 
Programme (DETR, 1999). Regulations had required that transfers be completed 
within the same financial year. This requirement was primarily introduced as part of 
the Programme in 1993 as a method of controlling the additional exchequer costs 
arising from stock transfers. The DETR makes Public Expenditure Survey transfers to 
the Department of Social Security to compensate them for any higher Housing Benefit 
costs that arise on transfer.  In the consultation exercise, Central Government suggests 
that transferring authorities should be permitted to transfer over a two year, rather 
than one year period.   
1999 proposals on overhanging debt  
A number of authorities have been effectively excluded from transferring their 
housing stocks by the rules on capital receipts and housing debt. The capital receipt 
arising from a transfer must be sufficient to cover all of an authority’s housing debt. 
In 1999, the DETR outlined a proposal that will help make transfer possible for those 
authorities whose capital receipt is not large enough to cover their housing debt 
(DETR, 1999b). Such authorities would be left with an “overhanging debt” if they 
were to transfer.  Under the proposals, Central Government would pay a one-off grant 
to a local authority to redeem its HRA debt, enabling it to transfer.   
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2.  UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In this section, I discuss the legal and regulatory framework for LSVT, which is set 
out in the Acts and guidance documents in the first section of this chapter. I examine 
how the LSVT framework controls both the speed and scale of disposals of council 
housing, through a mechanism known as the Annual Disposals Programme.  I discuss 
the rules and requirements for acquiring landlords; how tenanted stock is valued; and 
how the framework helps to claw back some of the value of council housing to offset 
some of the costs.  I examine recent changes that help councils to transfer, even 
though the receipt they would receive is insufficient to redeem their housing debt. 
Finally, we examine requirements for both formal and informal consultation with 
tenants on proposed transfers.  
Controlling the speed and scale of transfer through the Annual Disposals 
Programme 
The Housing and Leasehold Reform Act 1993 introduced an Annual Disposals 
Programme, which limited the number of transfers in each year.  The Government felt 
it was necessary to control the number of transfers in any one year to limit the impact 
upon public expenditure. In deciding which transfer proposals to place on the 
programme in any given year, the Secretary of State would consider a number of 
factors, listed in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2: Information required by DoE from local authorities applying for 
places on the Annual Disposals Programme 
 
1.  Description of the proposed disposal 
2.  Description of the proposed purchaser 
3.  The Housing Stock to be transferred, including numbers and condition 
4.  The Authority’s rationale for transfer 
5.  Timetable 
6.  Council support, and known opposition, for the proposals 
7.  Details of initial tenant consultation and an estimate of tenant support 
8.  An estimate of Tenanted Market Value 
9.  How the authority proposes to use its capital receipt (if any) arising from transfer 
10. An analysis of the public expenditure (PSBR) implications of the transfer 
Source: DoE (1993) 
Although local authorities were not rushing to transfer their housing stocks in the 
early 1990s, the criterion selected by the Government provided scope for selecting 
one proposal over another, should there be too many applicants in any given year. The 
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Government’s main concern was that transfers should represent good value for 
money, with minimal public expenditure costs. The Government was also interested 
in an authority’s rationale for transfer, and the proposed use of its capital receipt.  
DETR invites applications for the Annual Disposals Programme in the autumn. 
Applications are judged primarily on the effect of a transfer on the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR). Transfers that have a neutral or positive effect upon 
PSBR are accepted on to the Annual Disposals Programme. DETR also considers 
further criteria, including the level of likely support for the transfer (see table 5.2). 
Successful applicants are granted a place on the ADP for the following financial year. 
Authorities transferring less than 500 dwellings do not need to apply for a place on 
the Annual Disposals Programme. 
Once authorities are awarded a place on the Annual Disposals Programme, they are 
expected to complete the transfer by the end of the financial year (although this 
requirement was changed from 1999 onwards, as discussed below).   
Changes to the Annual Disposals Programme 
Until 2000, authorities that were awarded places on the Annual Disposals Programme 
were expected to complete transfers by the end of the financial year.  This is because 
the budget that the DETR has to cover the additional Housing Benefit and Housing 
Revenue Account costs arising from transfer had to be used in the same financial 
year. If authorities failed to complete, their place on the following year's programme 
was not guaranteed. 
The annual approach to stock transfers led to a number of problems for local 
authorities, RSLs and others involved in the process. Most transfers were completed 
late in the financial year, placing a heavy burden on funders, solicitors, consultants 
and advisers. The concentration of activity made it very difficult for advisers to 
provide services effectively.  The Housing Corporation also faced huge pressure in 
undertaking its role as registrar of new RSLs, as many new landlords were seeking 
approval at the same time. The DETR also believes that the terms of loans may be 
adversely affected by a large number of RSLs all seeking funding at the same time.  
The Government’s consultation paper on changes to the Annual Disposals Programme 
(DETR, 1999) signalled a departure from the annual programme.  The move to longer 
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term planning following the Government adoption in 1997 of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review approach enabled the DETR to reallocate funds between financial 
years. This made the annual approach to housing transfers irrelevant, and enabled the 
DETR to consider adopting a more flexible approach.  
The DETR proposed that the period over which transfers must be completed should 
be extended from one year to two years. The aim of the DETR’s proposal was to 
enable key activities to be spread out throughout the calendar, rather than being 
clustered at the end of the financial year. There will be no reduction in controls on the 
transfer programme, and the criteria for obtaining a place on the programme will 
remain the same. The transfer process itself will remain unchanged.  
A two-year period for completion would remove a lot of the pressure upon local 
authorities, RSLs, and professionals involved in the process, making transfer an easier 
and less painful process. There might also be financial benefits for local authorities 
and others involved. Reductions in the peak of activity at the end of the financial year 
would enable private sector organisations to improve their management of resources, 
which might lead to lower costs. More time and less competition for funds might also 
result in lower interest rates and better terms of borrowing for recipient landlords.  
Size limits on transfers 
In the 1988 Guidelines, the government signalled its reluctance to sanction large local 
authorities transferring all their housing stocks to single landlords. Central 
Government was keen to encourage the break up of ‘over-large housing 
organisations’ to avoid the management problems associated with them. ‘Choice’ and 
‘competition’ were buzzwords of the time. Although Central Government was not 
overly prescriptive about the size of new landlords, it took the view that all authorities 
should be able to demonstrate that their options appraisal had included the possibility 
of transfers to multiple landlords. Transfers of 10,000 units to a single landlord were 
unlikely to receive consent.  
At the time the Government issued its consultation paper on future stock transfers in 
1992 (Department of the Environment, 1992), recipient landlords owned an average 
of 5,200 units each. Of the authorities that had not transferred, 246 authorities owned 
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up to 10,000 units, and 96 authorities owned between 10,000 and 50,000 units, and 6 
authorities owned over 50,000 units (see table 5.3).  
Table 5.3: Sizes of housing stocks owned by local authorities in 1992 
 
Size of stock No of authorities 
that had not 
transferred housing 
stock 
Less than 2,500 23 
2,500 - 4,999 91 
5,000 - 9,999 132 
10,000 - 14,999 35 
15,000 - 19,999 21 
20,000 - 49,999 40 
Over 50,000 6 
  
Total 348 
Source: DoE (1992) 
At that time, after four years of stock transfer, the Government was clearly still 
concerned about transfers of large housing stocks to single landlords. Instead of 
turning public monopolies into private monopolies, the DoE believed that transfers 
should diversify the ‘options available to the local community’ (DoE, 1988). The 
Government also acknowledged that existing housing associations might have a role 
to play in transfer. Up to 1992, authorities undertaking LSVT had all established new 
housing associations to receive their housing stocks.  
The 1993 Guidelines reduced the maximum number of units that should be transferred 
to one landlord to 5,000. For those authorities that owned more than 5,000 units, 
transfer could be achieved in a number of ways. There could be a whole stock transfer 
to two or more landlords, which would divide the stock more or less equally between 
them. The Government suggested that it was likely that this would be based upon 
geographical areas. Alternatively, an Authority could undertake a partial transfer of a 
portion of its stock, and continue to manage the remaining stock itself. Options 
involving split transfers necessarily involve greater set up costs and possible loss of 
economies of scale. At the time, the Government took the view that the effects of a 
split transfer on future management of the stock and diversity of ownership was a 
more important consideration.  
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In 1998 the Government’s official limit on the number of units that an authority could 
transfer to a single landlord remained at 5,000 units.  However, the 1998 guidelines 
signalled the Government’s willingness to approve whole stock transfers above the 
limit of 12,000, provided they were “sensible, viable and practical”, although the 
guidelines do not spell out how the DETR would test transfers against this criteria.  
Central Government guidance on acquiring landlords 
The 1998 guidelines suggest that the new landlord might be an existing RSL, a new 
subsidiary of an RSL or a new standalone LHC or HA. The choice of new landlord 
will depend on the size and nature of the stock to be transferred. The Guidelines give 
a strong steer that recipient landlords in smaller transfers should be “large, existing 
and well capitalised RSLs”, on the grounds that the strength and experience of these 
landlords would make the transfer easier to implement and fund. Based on the 
experience of authorities transferring up to 1998, the Guidelines suggest that transfers 
of less than 1000 units should be to existing RSLs. Transfers of between 1,000 and 
1,500 units may sustain a newly established subsidiary of a RSL. Free standing newly 
created RSLs would be viable for transfers of more than 1,500 units.   
RSLs who are members of the same group structure would not be allowed to acquire 
more than 12,000 units from a local authority. The DETR requires each RSL within a 
group to be financially viable on a standalone basis. 
Transfers would not be allowed if the acquiring landlord was itself - or was part of a 
group that was - a dominant provider in a neighbouring local authority. The DETR 
aims to ensure that no acquiring landlord would become a dominant provider in a 
region or a sub-region. 
Some authorities and their tenants may wish to place restrictions on the area of their 
new landlord’s operations. The Guidelines suggest that authorities could include such 
restrictions in the governing instruments of the new landlord. Authorities and tenants 
could restrict their new landlord’s operations to owning an estate or housing in a small 
area, to ensure a local focus on the original community.  
Rules and requirements for acquiring landlords 
The Housing Corporation first issued guidance for stock transfer landlords seeking 
registration in 1996.  A new edition was produced in 1998 in light of the 
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Corporation’s experience in assessing 19 applications under the first edition, and to 
reflect changes in government policy.  
The guidance sets out seven key criteria for applicants seeking to register as social 
landlords. Firstly, to be eligible for registration, an applicant must meet statutory 
requirements contained in the 1985 Housing Act and the 1996 Housing Act. 
Applicants must be an Industrial and Provident Society, a Housing Association, a 
company limited by guarantee or a company limited by shares. The applicant must not 
trade for profit, but may be charitable or non-charitable.  
Secondly, the organisation’s main activity and objective must be to provide and 
manage social rented housing. It must be capable of demonstrating that existing 
organisations do not or cannot meet identified housing needs, and that the new 
organisation will be able to do so. The Corporation regards the award of a place on 
the DETR’s Housing Transfer Programme as sufficient demonstration of this.  
Thirdly, the organisation must be able to demonstrate that it is not under the control of 
any outside influence, which might prejudice its independence. Full control of the 
organisation must be vested in its governing body, which should consist of people 
who are suitably skilled and representative. No single constituent group should hold a 
majority on the board, and at least one third of board members should be independent 
of any constituent group. The landlord’s board could comprise any combination of 
representatives from tenants, councillors and independent members (or the partner 
organisation), but no one group may control more than 49 per cent of the votes. It is 
particularly important that local authority members comprise no more than 49 per cent 
of board membership to ensure that the landlord is independent, and thus avoids being 
classed as a ‘public sector influenced company’. As a ‘private sector’ organisation, 
any borrowing is deemed to be outside the PSBR. Lenders may be unhappy with 
boards that comprise 49 per cent tenant membership, as they may prefer independent 
members to have a more significant influence. 
Fourthly, the applicant must be able to demonstrate that it is capable of operating on a 
sound and proper financial basis.  It must demonstrate that the governing body is able 
to exercise responsibility for financial policy, management and control.  The 
organisation must be capable of producing annual budgets, maintaining proper 
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accounting records, and maintaining adequate systems of control. The organisation 
must have produced a detailed business plan, covering at least three years, as well as a 
longer term plan, both of which must demonstrate long-term financial viability. 
Applicants must demonstrate that they will take a prudent approach to financial risks.  
Fifthly, as a registered social landlord, a stock transfer landlord would be required to 
meet the Corporation’s Performance Standards. Organisations are required to 
demonstrate how their proposed structure and systems of management would ensure 
that those standards are attained and maintained. They are required to demonstrate 
that the housing management service is fully under the control of the governing board, 
and that it is cost effective and responsive to the needs of customers.  
Sixthly, when establishing a RSL, shadow governing bodies are expected to 
demonstrate that the organisation will be capable of meeting the Corporation’s 
regulatory requirements. These requirements are that they must meet or exceed 
performance and development standards; follow management guidance; and follow 
any other regulatory requirements that the Corporation may impose. 
Applicants normally demonstrate that they are capable of meeting the Corporation’s 
regulatory requirements by reference to actual or proposed policies and procedures. 
Policy statements and procedures may include how the RSL will address housing 
need; how it will meet standards of development; allocations policies; terms of 
tenancy agreements; the principles upon which rents are to be determined; how the 
RSL will manage its housing assets, and how the stock will be kept in good repair; 
how tenants will be consulted, informed and involved; how housing management 
services will be provided; and how the RSL will comply with equal opportunities 
legislation and best practice.  
Selection of acquiring landlords 
In 1998 the DETR suggested that authorities might wish to hold a competition for 
selection of a new landlord, although local authorities would not be required to do so. 
If an authority were to hold a competition, it could only involve landlords that would 
be capable of meeting DETR and Housing Corporation criteria for transfer approval. 
In other words, they would need to be registered with the Housing Corporation as 
social landlords. A competition could not, for example, include private-for-profit 
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landlords. In selecting a landlord, local authorities and tenants might consider factors 
such as the reputation of the RSL, track record and expertise, management track 
record, the potential to reduce administrative costs of transfer, and its ability to obtain 
low interest rates on loans. The DETR requires authorities to seek approval of the 
brief for any competition proposed.  
Governance of new landlords 
In its 1998 guidelines, the DETR advocates an equal split of board membership 
between tenant representatives, local authority nominees, and independent members. 
Previous guidelines limited the proportion of local authority nominees on boards to 20 
per cent.  In 1998, the DETR signalled its willingness to approve tenant majorities on 
Boards for the first time, as long as RSLs are able to demonstrate that their boards 
have the necessary skills and experience required to run a complex and highly 
indebted business. They would also need to reserve at least one third of the places on 
the board for independent members. They must also commit to restricting their 
activities to the local authority area. In other words, they must be locally based 
community housing associations. In addition, the DETR would be reluctant to permit 
a tenant majority if the landlord had acquired the whole of a local authority’s stock, or 
if it is a dominant landlord in the area. 
 The Guidelines suggest that landlords should build Minority Protection Agreements 
into their constitutions. These agreements protect the interests of minorities by 
preventing two constituencies combining to pass a decision with which the third 
constituency strongly disagrees. Agreements should not, however, give the power of 
veto as a right to one constituent group to the exclusion of other groups. 
Ensuring acquiring landlords are clearly independent of the State 
The 1988 Guidelines emphasised that recipient landlords must be independent of their 
‘sponsoring’ local authority.  In practice, independence could be demonstrated by a 
maximum local authority representation on boards of less than 20%. The local 
authority would not be permitted to provide services, other than for a transitional 
period. There would be no nomination rights in the case of a whole stock transfer, and 
the recipient landlord would maintain its own waiting list. The local authority would 
not be able to specify which staff were to be employed by the recipient landlord, other 
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than those covered by Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
legislation. 
Although never explicitly stated, it is clear that the Government would only accept 
landlords that fell under the remit of Housing Corporation regulation as recipient 
landlords in stock transfers. Only this type of organisation could fulfil the 
Government’s requirements that recipient landlords should be ‘stable and 
responsible’, be committed to providing a good service, and have a long-term 
commitment to providing social rented housing.  
The 1993 Guidelines signalled a change from the 1988 guidelines in that the 
Government explicitly stated for the first time that unless a recipient landlord was 
registered with the Housing Corporation, approval to transfer would not be given. The 
Government also sought to promote the involvement of existing associations in 
transfers, except where this would lead to the dominance of one landlord or housing 
association group in an area. 
By 1998, the emphasis on independence from local authorities shifted again. In 
comparison to earlier guidelines the DETR signalled that local authorities may have a 
bigger continuing role in the new landlord than was possible in the past, including 
shaping the organisation during the set up period, and a greater share of board 
membership.  The Guidelines set out basic ground rules for roles of councillors and 
officers during the set up stage of the new landlord. Some officers and councillors 
may have roles with both bodies during the set-up stage. The Guidelines recommend 
that Councillors who are on the shadow board of the new landlord should not 
participate in decision making relating to the transfer on the council’s side. DETR 
suggests that councils should set up a sub-committee of councillors who are not on the 
shadow board to deal with these issues. A corporate committee dealing with the 
council’s interest as the seller should deal with the negotiations about the transfer 
price and terms of sale. Finally, the DETR states that the council and the acquiring 
landlord should not use the same consultants, in order to avoid conflicts of interest.  
Valuing transfers of tenanted local authority housing stock  
The 1988 Guidelines established the principle that the price to be paid by acquiring 
landlords should be based on Tenanted Market Value (TMV) described as ‘market 
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value subject to tenancy with an allowance for any backlog of repairs which will need 
to be tackled’. The Guidelines suggested that the purchasing landlord should raise 
finance for the transfer from the private sector. If after making maximum efforts to 
raise finance, the amount granted is insufficient, the DoE would be willing to permit 
the Council to fund a proportion of the transfer payment on a strictly commercial 
basis.  
This valuation method enables acquiring landlords, who are essentially not-for-profit 
organisations, to fund the purchase and long-term maintenance of the housing stock 
on a stable and viable basis.   
 In the 1993 Guidelines, TMV continued as the only accepted method of stock 
valuation. However, the 1993 Guidelines underlined the importance of obtaining 
accurate stock condition information. The Guidelines suggested that a new Stock 
Condition Survey should be carried out before consultation with tenants commenced, 
as without this information, accurate guarantees on rents and repairs would be 
difficult to make.  
The 1993 Guidelines acknowledge the significance of funding for the recipient 
landlord’s future viability and ability to deliver upon promises made to tenants. The 
Guidelines suggest that all landlords should develop business plans at an early stage 
in consultation with potential funders. The Guidelines suggest that funding should be 
arranged over a period of between twenty and twenty five years. 
Levy on LSVT receipts to pay for the costs of transfer 
Many authorities that have transferred their stock received a capital payment from the 
acquiring landlords.  Up to 1990, local authorities had considerable freedom to use 
their capital receipts as they saw fit. They were able to develop a new role as a grant 
funder and enabler of development of new homes by their stock transfer association 
and other housing associations in their area.  
In response to concern about the increased cost of Housing Benefit payments 
following transfer, the Government introduced a ‘levy’ on capital receipts, payable to 
the Treasury. The increased costs for the Treasury arise from the “transfer” of the 
liability for payment of the small portion of the cost of Housing Benefit previously 
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paid from the Housing Revenue Account to the Department of Social Security, and 
hence the Treasury.   
The levy assisted in the continuation of the stock transfer programme by capturing 
some of the value of the transferred stock to partially offset the Treasury’s increased 
costs.  
Between 1988 and 1992, there were significant changes to the Housing finance 
system, introduced under the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. The DoE also 
made significant changes to the use of capital receipts arising from LSVT. The 1993 
Guidelines stipulate ‘general principles’ governing the use of receipts. Firstly, that 
local authorities are required to redeem debt attributed to the housing being sold; 
secondly to pay the LSVT levy to central government; and thirdly to set aside 75% of 
the receipt against outstanding HRA debt, net of the LSVT levy. Local authorities are 
free to use the balance of the receipt. 
The operation of the levy is demonstrated in figure 5.1. In the example, an authority 
transfers 3000 units at a Tenanted Market Value of £10,000 per unit. The Authority’s 
housing debt is £12 million, and general fund debt amounts of £4 million. Although 
the benefits of transfer have been reduced, the prospect of developing an enabling role 
is attractive to some local authorities.  
Figure 5.1: Example of LSVT Levy calculation 
 
 £ 
A Transfer Price 30,000,000 
B Outstanding housing debt 12,000,000 
C Base for levy (A-B) 18,000,000 
D Levy at 20% of C 3,600,000 
E Net receipt after paying 
levy (A-D) of which: 
 
F up to 75% set aside for 
debt redemption 
26,400,000 
 
 
16,000,000 
G 25% useable receipt 10,400,000 
Source: Adapted from DoE, 1993 
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Dealing with problems of low demand 
The 1998 Guidelines acknowledged the emergence of the phenomena of low demand 
for housing, which began to affect primarily large northern cities from 1996 (see, for 
example, Power and Mumford, 1999).  For some authorities experiencing low 
demand, transfer was an option they explored to enhance the quality and management 
of the stock to increase demand.  The Guidelines required authorities to consider the 
level of demand for their stock, and the DETR would only approve transfers where an 
authority could demonstrate that there was likely to be sufficient demand for the stock 
over the period of repayment of loans taken to purchase the stock. For particular types 
of stock suffering low demand, but located in areas of generally high demand, DETR 
believed that transfer could help address specific local problems. In other areas, where 
there was little or no demand for social housing, DETR suggested that demolition 
might be a better option.   
Enabling authorities with overhanging debts to transfer 
A number of authorities have been effectively excluded from transferring their 
housing stocks under rules on capital receipts and housing debt. The capital receipt 
arising from a transfer must be sufficient to cover all of an authority’s housing debt. 
In 1999, DETR outlined a proposal (DETR, 1999b) that will help make transfer 
possible for those authorities whose capital receipt is not large enough to cover their 
housing debt. Such authorities would be left with an “overhanging debt” if they were 
to transfer.  
Overhanging debt is a problem because once an authority has transferred its housing, 
the authority stops receiving rental income to meet outstanding debt charges.  The 
only source of income would be HRA subsidy. DETR suggests that authorities that 
had transferred would need to keep their HRAs open for over sixty years to pay off 
their debts. The DETR would also need to substantially increase the resources it 
devotes to housing subsidy. Only 25 authorities currently receive housing subsidy, but 
this number would increase substantially if the DETR were to support authorities with 
overhanging debt following stock transfer.  
The DETR has approved a number of partial transfers, where the receipt from the 
transfer was insufficient to cover the debt attributable to the stock transferred. The 
Department adopted this approach for transfers under the Estates Renewal Challenge 
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Fund, on the grounds that the problems on the estates were significant, and the overall 
impact of reducing the size of the retained stock on the authorities’ HRAs was small.  
The Department proposed four options for dealing with overhanging debt; retaining 
the debt within the HRA and servicing it through the HRA subsidy system; 
transferring the debt to the General Fund, and servicing it through the Revenue 
Support Grant system; providing a one-off grant to clear the overhanging debt; and 
transferring the overhanging debt from the local authority to the acquiring landlord. 
The DETR regarded options involving retaining overhanging debts within the HRA or 
the General Fund as unsatisfactory, because of the administrative burden this would 
impose. Transfer of overhanging debts to acquiring landlords is also seen as 
unsatisfactory, as they would take on a burden that would have to be covered by 
borrowing, which they could not support from the rental income they receive. The 
burden of the HRA debt would drive the transfer price down, and the local authority’s 
capital receipt would be lower. The attempt to cover debt would be self-defeating.  In 
a number of cases, however, the acquiring landlord might be able to absorb the 
additional cost if the overhanging debt is small in comparison to its overall borrowing 
requirement.  
The DETR appears to favour a system of providing grants to redeem overhanging 
debts.  A one-off grant to redeem overhanging debt would establish a “clean break” 
after transfer. The DETR would not be required to provide HRA subsidy or support 
additional debt in local authorities’ general funds. Although this proposal offers 
perhaps the neatest solution to the problem of overhanging debt, it would require a 
significant commitment of additional DETR resources.  The repayment of 
overhanging debt would cost more than the amount of the outstanding principal, as 
authorities would face a number of repayment penalties.  
Tenant Consultation  
Central Government guidelines from 1988 onwards emphasised that tenants would 
take the decision whether or not stock should be transferred.  The 1993 guidelines set 
out rules on the consultation process. Consultation must be conducted in a way that 
provides honest explanations and justification of the case for transfer. There was no 
requirement that those opposed to a transfer should receive any funding for publicity 
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from the local authority, presumably because the Government believed that local 
authorities would put both the pros and cons of transfer to tenants in the consultation 
process.  The Guidelines explained how consultation was divided between ‘informal’ 
and ‘formal’ periods, leading to a ballot of all secure tenants, and possibly also of 
long leaseholders.  The 1993 Guidelines introduced the concept of the “Tenants’ 
Friend” - an independent advisor who advises tenants throughout the process. The 
Tenants’ Friend is independent of both the authority and new landlord, although (s)he 
is funded by the council as one of the costs of transfer.  
The Government’s commitment to the shift in decision making power from local 
authorities to tenants is reinforced by the 1998 guidelines.  Local authorities must be 
able to demonstrate that all tenants have been consulted, and have had an opportunity 
to express their views. DETR does not offer any guidance on whether local authorities 
should consult with tenants who will remain with a local authority following a partial 
transfer. Although a transfer will affect tenants who remain with their authorities, the 
DETR does not require local authorities to consult them.  
DETR recognises that there are various consultation mechanisms - public meetings, 
exhibitions, tenants forum meetings, and visits to individual tenants – but does not 
express any views on the merits of each particular method. Authorities are required to 
submit their consultation material to DETR and the Housing Corporation before it is 
issued to tenants. This particularly applies to the Formal Consultation Document, 
which contains the details of future rents, repairs programmes, and the rights tenants 
will enjoy under the new tenancy agreements.  This helps to ensure that the material is 
balanced, to prevent accusations of bias or overselling.  
To assist tenants during the consultation process, local authorities are required to 
provide an independent advisor. The Guidelines suggest that the selection process for 
the advisor should involve tenants. The working brief for the advisor should also be 
agreed with tenants' representatives. This will help to ensure that tenants have greater 
ownership of the work of their advisors, and reduce the potential for accusations of 
bias.  
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Informal Consultation 
DETR suggests that tenants need to be given the necessary information to make a 
well-informed and genuine choice. During the informal consultation, councils need to 
outline the costs and benefits of staying with the council and moving to a new 
landlord. During this stage, the authority can also tell residents about the new 
landlord’s plans for the repair and improvement of their homes and estates, and about 
future rent levels.  
The Guidelines suggest methods of informal consultation, used by other transferring 
authorities, of which DETR approves. Methods include distributing pamphlets, 
leaflets, videos, posters; placing advertisements in the local press; holding public 
meetings; face-to-face contact through door-knocking; exhibition caravans; telephone 
hot lines; and telephone canvassing.  DETR says that its own research indicates that 
tenants find written material the most useful method of consultation. 
Formal Consultation 
The aim of the Formal Consultation exercise is to seek tenants' views on the terms of 
the transfer. Formal Consultation starts after the Business Plan is fully developed and 
the acquiring landlord can make a firm offer to tenants. It is covered by the 1985 
Housing Act, Schedule 3A (as inserted by section 6 of schedule 1 to the Housing and 
Planning Act 1986). 
The Guidelines suggest that authorities should conduct their ballot immediately after 
the Stage 2 notice has been served. The DETR considers a simple majority of those 
voting to be a sufficient indicator of support. However, DETR recognises that 
authorities may wish to impose a more stringent test. During the ballot period, 
authorities are not permitted to issue further material about the transfer, except where 
this would be necessary to counter any false information circulated by another body, 
such as one of the anti-transfer campaign groups.  
3.  EXPLAINING THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we discuss how the legal and regulatory framework outlined in section 
one of this chapter fits within the core thesis set out in Chapter two.  We discuss how 
the legislative framework helps the State to withdraw from direct provision; how it 
helps to deliver organisational change; and how it shifts responsibility for managing 
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and financing investment in socially rented housing towards the private sector.  Table 
5.4 sets out the legislation and regulatory regimes within the framework outlined in 
Chapter two.  
Enabling the state to withdraw from direct provision 
The legislative and regulatory framework enables the State to withdraw in a way that 
ensures that the interests of the public are safeguarded, both in terms of value for 
money for the taxpayer, and protection of tenants rights.   
The Housing Act 1985 permits local authorities to dispose of housing occupied by 
secure tenants.  It provides protection of existing tenancy rights, helping to make 
stock transfer acceptable to councillors and tenants.  The main mechanism through 
which transfers are facilitated – the Annual Disposals Programme – enables Central 
Government to control which authorities withdraw from direct provision so that wider 
public interests can be protected and ensure that withdrawal provides value for 
money.   
The Tenanted Market Valuation (TMV) method enables local authorities to establish 
landlords with long term stability and certainty.  By taking full account of income, 
running costs and backlog repairs, the acquiring landlord only has to pay the 
disposing authority a price that reflects the true value of the stock, assuming its 
existing use continues.  The TMV method ensures that the public sector can 
demonstrate probity in the sale of council housing, but at the same time enables 
acquiring landlords to develop viable and sustainable business plans.   
The Central Government levy on capital receipts from transfers helps the process of 
withdrawal continue, by clawing back some of the value unleashed by stock transfer. 
This value, through the levy, is used to offset some of the additional costs incurred by 
the Treasury.  In future, proceeds from the levy might be used to help local authorities 
with negatively valued stock to transfer, by providing dowries or grants to redeem 
overhanging debts.  In the absence of a clawback mechanism, it is possible that the 
process of gradual withdrawal through LSVT might halt, if costs to the Treasury were 
to increase.   
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Table 5.4: Explaining the Legislative and Regulatory Framework  
Act/Instrument 1. Withdrawal 2. Organisational change 3. Private sector involvement 
1985 Housing Act Permits local authorities to dispose of housing occupied by secure 
tenants.  Provides protection of existing tenancy rights, helping to 
make stock transfer acceptable to councillors and tenants.  
Moves housing departments from multi-
purpose local authority organisation to single 
purpose landlord organisation.  
Encourages tenant involvement through ballot 
process. Enfranchisement of tenants helps 
shift power from local authorities to tenants. 
1988 Housing Act Seeks to encourage tenants and private sector landlords to force 
their local authority landlord to withdraw from direct provision.  
Tenants Choice and HATs designed to help 
break up large housing stocks into smaller and 
more diverse landlord organisations. 
Introduces new financial regime for housing 
associations, encouraging them to rely more 
on private finance than public grants. This 
helps Housing associations become favoured 
model for raising investment through stock 
transfer.  
Tenants Choice provides the private sector 
with opportunities to acquire public housing 
estates, providing that tenants are supportive. 
1988 DoE 
guidelines 
Provide Tenanted Market Value (TMV) method for valuing stock. 
The TMV method takes full account of repairs backlogs and 
running costs, enabling local authorities to transfer. The acquiring 
landlord pays a price that allows them to put together a viable and 
sustainable business plan.  
Limit on the size of transfers of 10,000 to 
avoid the conversion of large public landlords 
into large private landlords.  
Requirement for recipient landlords to be 
clearly in the private sector and independent 
of the local authority. Landlords must limit 
local authority board representation to 20 per 
cent.  
1989 Local 
Government and 
Housing Act 
New financial regime makes direct ownership of housing less 
politically attractive to local authorities.  Councillors feel the new 
constraints mean they will not be able to provide services that 
match tenants aspirations and expectations.  
 Introduces a new, tougher financial regime 
for local authority housing finance. Some 
local authorities seek to access new resources 
from the private sector.  
1993 Housing & 
Leasehold Reform 
Act 
Central Government attempt to control numbers of authorities 
transferring, and to seek to claw back some value released through 
transfer to compensate for additional Housing Benefit costs.  
 Requires local authorities to provide and fund 
a tenants’ adviser. 
1993 DoE 
guidelines 
Put in place rules for the use of capital receipts arising from transfer 
to ensure HRA debts are redeemed, as authorities would have no 
way of servicing the debts once the housing is transferred.  
Limit on the size of transfers of 5,000 to 
encourage partial and split transfers. 
Suggests that funders should be involved in 
the transfer process at an early stage.  
1998 Housing 
Corporation 
Regulations 
Sets out key criteria for stock transfer landlords seeking to become 
registered social landlords.  
Sets out ground rules for the creation of group 
structures, and the relationships between 
subsidiaries and their parents.  
Limits private sector involvement in stock 
transfer to registered social landlords.  
1999 Consultation 
on programme 
administration 
Assists the process by enabling authorities to complete their 
transfers over two years, rather than one.  
 Assists in securing funding and improving 
terms of funding.  
1999 Proposals on 
overhanging debt 
Central Government proposes to provide one-off grants to help 
local authorities redeem their HRA debts, in cases where capital 
receipts are less than outstanding loans, leaving an overhanging 
debt.  Without this grant, transfer would not be possible. 
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Changing the organisation and management of council housing 
Central Government has used its legislative and regulatory control over the LSVT 
process to attempt to reduce the size of newly created landlords by placing limits upon 
the numbers of units that may be acquired by single landlords.  However, the limits 
have also been relatively high, enabling a sizeable proportion of authorities to transfer 
their entire housing stocks to single landlords.  Size limits made more of an impact in 
urban authorities, where housing stocks are much larger, making whole stock transfers 
to single landlords unacceptable to central government. 
Central government and Housing Corporation guidance help to bring about 
organisational change by requiring new landlords to meet a range of performance and 
regulatory requirements.  The Housing Corporation process for registration as a social 
landlord forces acquiring landlords to consider different approaches to service 
delivery, a process which can help to deliver change before the stock has transferred.  
Guidance on board membership of acquiring RSLs helps bring a range of influences 
to bear upon the organisations.  Independent board members can bring a fresh 
approach and new insights to the organisations, resulting in changes in service 
delivery methods and organisational structures.   
Shifting responsibility for social housing towards the private sector 
A key feature of LSVT is the shift in responsibility for owning, managing and 
investing in socially rented housing to the private sector.  In this section, we describe 
how the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors are defined, and where LSVT associations are 
located within this dichotomy.  We go on to describe how the legislative and 
regulatory framework for LSVT help to move local authority housing from the public 
to the private sector, and the changes in their finances that occur as a result.  Finally, 
we describe how Central Government has created a form of ‘quasi market’ by shifting 
decision making power from local authorities to tenants.  The legislation and 
regulation force local authorities to consult with tenants, and ultimately let them take 
the decision as to whether a transfer should proceed or not.   
Private or Public? 
Firm control of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) by central 
government has been a feature of public sector finances in the UK since 1976. These 
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controls have adversely affected public corporations and local housing authorities, 
which legitimately need to borrow against their revenue streams to reinvest in the 
assets they own. The distinctive characteristics of public corporations, such as the 
Post Office, and local housing authorities, as entities with their own revenue streams, 
has led to arguments that they should be taken out of the PSBR calculations, thus 
enabling them to borrow more freely.  
The system of National Accounts divides the economy into institutional sectors, with 
reference to their capital, ownership and functions. Most economic activity of local 
authorities is classified to the General Government Sector, and to the Local 
Government Sub-sector. The institutional units are non-market producers, whose 
output is intended for individual and collective consumption. Borrowing by these 
sectors contributes to Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR).  
Local Authority Companies (e.g. limited companies set up to run transport services or 
airports) are classified to the Public non-financial corporations sector, which is 
outside general government. They are recognised as separate institutional units and 
are market producers and so they are classified as corporations rather than 
government but are still subject to control by Government units, and so they are 
public rather than private. The public-private classification is determined largely by 
ownership, but also by control, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Classification of activity by reference to ownership and control 
 
Less than 50% LA ownership? ÎNO Î PUBLIC SECTOR 
Ð 
YES 
Ð 
  
LA owns 20%-50% of 
company, but has effective 
control? 
 
ÎNOÎ 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
The Company’s transactions 
will not score against the LA’s 
capital finance allocations. 
Ð 
YES 
Ð 
  
PUBLIC SECTOR   
 
Source: Adapted from DoE, 1993 
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Moving local authority activities to the private sector 
In order to free local authority activities from controls on borrowing by Central 
Government, it is necessary to move the activity outside public sector ownership and 
control. Any private sector companies established to run local authority activities may 
not be under effective control of the sponsoring authority. In the case of LSVT 
associations or Local Housing Companies, which have been established to take over 
council housing, DETR will generally not allow local authorities to have more than a 
third of voting rights on boards.  Any borrowing by private sector companies taking 
over local authority activities does not count towards PSBR.  
Changing public borrowing rules 
The Chartered Institute of Housing (1995) and others have, for a number of years, 
argued that the system of national accounts should be adapted. Advocates of change 
argue that the PSBR makes no distinction between borrowing to invest and borrowing 
to spend.  
Moving from PSBR to General Government Financial Deficit (GGFD) might enable 
wholly owned local authority corporations (and other public corporations, such as the 
Post Office and London Underground) to borrow outside Central Government’s 
constraints (see figure 5.3). Local authorities could establish wholly owned 
corporations to take over their housing stocks. These corporations would be able to 
access private finance to reinvest in the stock without the need to transfer to a RSL. 
However, the Government is not likely to adopt any changes in borrowing definitions 
in the near future.  
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Figure 5.3 Definitions of borrowing and the implications for Public Corporations 
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Source: Adapted from CIH (1995)  Note: Heavily shaded areas indicate where 
borrowing is classified as Government borrowing. 
Creating a quasi market by empowering tenants through LSVT ballots 
Stock transfer takes the key decision making power out of the hands of local 
authorities and places it firmly with tenants.  Central government guidance has always 
emphasised that no transfer can proceed unless an authority can demonstrate that 
tenants support it.  By placing power within tenants’ hands, the government has 
created a form of quasi market, in which service providers are forced to get closer to 
users and promise to provide the types of services that they want.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we present an overview of the legal, regulatory and financial 
framework under which LSVTs are undertaken. This framework enables local 
authorities to dispose of their housing stocks; it helps to change the organisation of 
housing by placing limits upon transfers and setting out minimum requirements for 
acquiring landlords; and enables the private sector to take more responsibility for 
socially rented housing, by defining clear boundaries between public and private.  The 
principal law that enables local authorities to transfer their stock to other bodies is the 
Housing Act 1985. Other legislation relevant to the transfer process itself is contained 
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in the Housing Act 1988 and the Leasehold, Housing and Urban Reform Act 1993. 
Regulation of the transfer process is largely determined by the DETR in its guidelines 
on housing transfer, and by the Housing Corporation, in its registration criteria for 
stock transfer landlords. Central government has not always led the LSVT process, 
and some of its guidance has evolved as some of the implications of local decisions 
upon national policy have become known. The Labour Government elected in 1997 
has considered changes to the way stock transfers are managed to make the process 
easier and available as an option to more local authorities. The Government has made 
key changes to the way the Annual Disposals Programme operates, and has enabled 
many more authorities to consider transfer by providing new mechanisms to deal with 
overhanging debt.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine practical evidence on the LSVT programme and explain 
how I used this evidence to select LSVT associations for a sample survey.  I start by 
analysing the nature of transfers under the LSVT programme. I examine the extent of 
withdrawal through LSVT in terms of numbers of units and regional distribution of 
transferring authorities; the extent of organisational change by examining the types of 
authorities transferring and whether they undertook whole, split or partial transfers; 
and how transfer has helped shift responsibility for ownership and financing 
investment in socially rented housing.  In the second section of this chapter, I examine 
the characteristics of the first fifty-one LSVT associations to provide a framework for 
the selection of a representative sample for in depth study. This framework includes 
the regional distribution of the first 51 LSVTs; their size; the population density of 
area of operation; political control of transferring authority; and tenure patterns in the 
area of operation. In the final section, I outline the process used to select a 
representative sample of twenty associations for a survey, which forms the basis of 
chapters seven, eight and nine.  
EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL THROUGH LSVT 
Between 1998 and 2001, 118 local authorities completed 146 transfers, involving over 
582,000 units. Table 6.1 shows the number of transfers in each financial year; the total 
number of dwellings transferred; and the average number of dwellings per transfer. 
Annual averages have only exceeded 7,000 units in two years so far. The annual 
average towards the end of the 1990s fell further, as estate based transfers became 
more common, but large city transfers are likely to increase the average size in future.  
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Table 6.1: LSVTs 1988 – 2001 
 
 Year  Number of 
transfers 
Number of 
dwellings 
transferred 
Average 
number of 
dwellings 
per 
transfer 
1988 1 4,650 4,650 
1989 2 13,579 6,790 
1990 8 38,229 4,779 
1991 5 19,947 3,989 
1992 2 17,912 8,956 
1993 5 23,479 4,696 
1994 14 38,983 2,785 
1995 12 44,417 3,701 
1996 9 30,033 3,337 
1997 5 21,004 4,201 
1998 18 35,690 1,983 
1999 30 90,121 3,004 
2000 17 71,928 4,231 
2001 18 132,556 7,364 
Totals 146 582,528 3,990 
  Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Between 1988 and 1997, 88 per cent of transfers completed were whole stock 
transfers to single landlords. Just six per cent of authorities completed whole stock 
transfers to two landlords, and a further six per cent of authorities completed partial 
transfers. The pattern emerging from 1998 onwards is quite different. In 1998, the 
number of partial transfers was almost double the number of whole stock transfers. A 
similar pattern emerges in 1999. During 1998 and 1999, authorities that had 
successfully bid for grants from the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) 
completed their estate transfers and partial transfers (see table 6.2).  In 2000 and 2001, 
the whole stock transfer has, again, dominated the transfer programme, in part 
because all the ERCF transfers had been completed and the programme wound up.  
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Table 6.2: Whole stock, split and partial transfers 1998 – 2001 
 
Year Whole stock 
transfer to 
single 
landlords 
Split whole 
stock 
transfers 
Partial 
transfers 
1988 - 1992 18 - - 
1993 - 1997 37 4 4 
1998 5 1 11 
1999 10 2 18 
2000 10 2 6 
2001 15 1 2 
Totals 95 10 41 
  Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
 
Regional distribution of transferring authorities 
Table 6.3 shows the regional distribution of LSVTs between 1988 and 2001.  
Table 6.3: Transfers by Region 
Region  No of units 
transferred          
(% of total) 
Per cent of total 
units 
transferred 
South East 207,164  36% 
South West  84,957 15% 
West Midlands 94,042 16% 
North West  79,401 14% 
East 39,267 7% 
East Midlands 17,397 3% 
Yorkshire & Humberside 20,380 3% 
North East 39,920 7% 
Totals 582,528 100% 
 Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
 
51 per cent of transfer activity is concentrated in the South East and South West 
regions, and northern regions account for 21 per cent of transfer activity. The regions 
with the lowest numbers of transfers are the East Midlands (3 per cent of all transfers) 
and Yorkshire and Humberside (3 per cent of all transfers) and the North East (1 per 
cent of all transfers). These regions, and other parts of the north, are more likely to 
suffer from pockets of low demand and transfers in these areas are likely to be less 
attractive to lenders than transfers in the South of the country, where demand is 
generally higher. The housing in the northern regions may require major capital 
investment to make them as attractive to potential applicants as other housing options 
available to them at similar rents.  
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ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH LSVT 
Up to 1996, smaller district councils, transferring their entire housing stocks to single 
landlords, dominated the LSVT programme. These transfers did not break up housing 
into smaller entities.  After 1996, urban authorities started to transfer estates or groups 
of estates, breaking up the large housing stocks that they owned.  In this section, we 
analyse transfer activity by different types of councils, and the types of transfers they 
pursued.  
Types of authorities undertaking transfers  
Table 6.4 and figure 6.1 summarise transfer activity by each type of council - that is 
districts, boroughs, London boroughs, cities and metropolitan boroughs. Between 
1988 and 1999, 57 per cent of all transfers were undertaken by district councils, and 
26 per cent by borough councils.  While the number of transfers by London boroughs 
and city councils has grown in recent years, activity by district and borough councils 
remains an important part of the transfer programme.  However, in the latest 
programme (2001), transfers by city councils made the largest contribution to the 
number of units transferred.  
Table 6.4: Types of authorities undertaking transfers 
 
 TOTAL District 
Councils 
Borough 
Councils 
London 
Boroughs 
City 
Councils 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Councils 
1988 - 1992 18 12 5 1 - - 
1993 - 1997 45 30 13 - 1 1 
1998 18 4 3 9 2 - 
1999 30 7 6 10 5 2 
2000 17 7 2 3 3 2 
2001 18 7 3 2 5 1 
Totals 146 67 32 25 16 6 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
 
 
Chapter Six ~ Study of LSVT Associations  Page 149 
Figure 6.1: Transfers by authority type 1988-2001
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 Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
District councils overwhelming transfer their entire stocks to single landlords (see 
tables 6.5 and 6.6. Borough councils have undertaken a few more whole stock split 
transfers, but the pattern is much the same as district councils (see figure 6.2). Seventy 
out of the seventy six whole stock transfers to single landlords were undertaken by 
either district or borough councils.  
Table 6.5: Type of transfer by Council type – number of transfers 
 
 Total 
transfers 
District 
Councils 
Borough 
Councils 
London 
Boroughs 
City 
Councils 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Councils 
Whole Stock 
Transfers 76 59 26 2 3 1 
Whole stock 
split transfers 14 4 6 2 1 2 
Partial 
transfers 38 4 - 21 12 3 
Totals 146 67 32 25 16 6 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
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Table 6.6: Type of transfer by Council type – number of units 
 
 Total 
transfers 
District 
Councils 
Borough 
Councils 
London 
Boroughs 
City 
Councils 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Councils 
Whole Stock 
Transfers 452,284 (100%) 
263,969 
(58%) 
109,625 
(24%) 
19,532 
(4%) 
46,399 
(10%) 
12,759      
(3%) 
Whole stock 
split transfers 77,898 (100%) 
12,633 
(16%) 
19,558 
(25%) 
8,215 
(11%) 
20,125 
(26%) 
17,367    
(22%) 
Partial 
transfers 52,346 (100%) 
3,799   
(7%) 
- 23,676 
(45%) 
22,304 
(43%) 
2,567        
(5%) 
Totals 582.529 
(100%) 
280,402 
(48%) 
129,183 
(22%) 
51,424 
(9%) 
88,829 
(15%) 
32,693     
(6%) 
Source: DTLR LVST database, 2001 
Figure 6.2: The pattern of transfer activity by type of authority
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Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Neither district councils nor borough councils are likely to undertake a partial transfer. 
This indicates two things – firstly, their stocks are small enough to transfer to single 
landlords without breaking the Government’s limit on the size of transfers. Secondly, 
it indicates that district and borough councils do not face the pressing problems of 
London Boroughs and City Councils, and do not need to transfer parts of their stock 
to attract funding under schemes such as the ERCF. The picture for London Boroughs 
is somewhat distorted by the Bexley, Bromley and Richmond transfers. If they were 
disregarded, there would be a greater proportion of partial transfers than whole stock 
or split transfers. There was little activity in metropolitan borough councils, and the 
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split transfer by Tameside dominates activity by this group of authorities.  In 2000 
and 2001, large city councils have begun to transfer their entire stocks in single 
transfers to RSL groups.  
SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOUSING TOWARDS THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
In this section, I analyse the extent that transfer has encouraged the private sector to 
take on more responsibility for providing resources for long term investment in 
socially rented housing.  Firstly I present an analysis of valuations of stock 
transferred. Secondly, I analyse the size of private sector involvement through direct 
investment in LSVT associations. Thirdly, I present an analysis of LSVT ballots, 
through which central government has attempted to empower tenants and shift the 
balance of power away from local authorities.  
Stock Valuation 
Stock valuations, based on Tenanted Market Value (TMV) determine the price that a 
new landlord pays a local authority for its stock. (The TMV methodology is discussed 
in Chapter five.) Average stock valuations in district and borough councils are £9,489 
and £7,713 respectively (see table 6.7). These average valuations indicate that the 
stock transferred is generally in good condition. This does not mean that there are not 
significant problems in parts of the stock, but that the overall stock condition results 
in a positive value. Average valuations for London boroughs and city councils are 
negative, and some of these transfers required grant funding from the Estates Renewal 
Challenge Fund. In contrast to district and borough councils, the London boroughs 
have generally transferred only their stock in poorest condition. The transfers do not 
usually include stock in a good condition that might help enhance the valuations.  
Whole stock transfers by London boroughs and city councils have so far all had a 
negative value.   
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Table 6.7: Stock values – transfer price per unit 
 
 District 
Councils 
Borough 
Councils 
London 
Boroughs 
City 
Councils 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Councils 
Highest Value per unit £14,752 £14,456  £11,996 £7,175 £7,057 
Average value per unit £9,489 £7,713 -£8,023 -£1,904 £574 
Lowest value per unit -£9,562 -£8,941 -£24,898 -£17,401 -£10,655 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Twenty-two transfers by London borough councils involved negatively valued stock, 
and required grant funding.  The average negative value of £8,023 would have been 
worse had the London boroughs of Bromley, Richmond and Bexley not transferred, 
all of which had positively valued stock.  The average value per unit for the twenty 
two transfers (excluding the three positively valued transfers) was -£13,097. Only one 
district council – Basildon - undertook a transfer with a negative value. This partial 
transfer attracted grant funding from the ERCF.  Three borough councils, six city 
councils and two metropolitan borough councils also undertook ERCF transfers.  
For metropolitan borough councils, the highest and lowest values per unit are for 
transfers from the same council. Tameside MBC transferred a small part of its stock 
with £9.6m of ERCF grant funding to a local housing company, and transferred the 
remainder of its stock a year later to two new local housing companies.  
Private sector financing for stock transfers 
Table 6.8 summarises the amounts paid to councils by acquiring landlords; grants 
received; and private finance raised. Local authorities received a total of £4.5 billion 
from the landlords acquiring their housing stock, of which £2.6 billion (57 per cent) 
was paid to district councils, and £1.1 billion (24 per cent) was paid to borough 
councils. This reflects the higher valuations in these councils’ stock and their higher 
propensity to transfer their entire stocks, instead of partially transferring the stock in 
worst condition.  
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Table 6.8: Transfer Price, Grants received and private finance raised 
 
 District 
Councils 
Borough 
Councils 
London 
Boroughs 
City 
Councils 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Councils 
All 
transfers
Price received by 
council for stock 
£2,602m £1,090m £261m £350m £167m £4,470m 
Total Grant 
received 
£6.77m £19.31 £292m £137m £15m £470m 
Private finance 
raised 
£4,662m £2,087m £1,092m £1,086m £364m £9,291m 
Private finance and 
grants, net of 
payment to council 
£2,067m £1,016m £1,123m £873m £212m £5,291m 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
A total of £470 million of Estates Renewal Challenge Fund grants were paid to local 
authorities, of which £429 million was paid to London boroughs and city councils.  
After deducting payments to local authorities, a total of £5.3 billion in private finance 
and grants was available to the recipient landlords to invest in their newly acquired 
housing. Figure 6.3 shows how the total private finance raised is divided between 
transferring authority and acquiring landlord. District and borough councils receive 
more than half the private finance raised by their associations, as stock valuations are 
high and repairs requirements are relatively low. In contrast, payments to London 
Boroughs and city councils are low, due to negative stock valuations, and the 
payments of grants, which go directly to the new landlord. 
Figure 6.3: Distribution of Private Finance and Grants 
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 Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
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Ballot results 
A key component of transfer is the process of consulting and balloting tenants, 
through which decision making power is shifted from local authorities to tenants.  
Local authorities have undertaken a total of 172 LSVT ballots of their tenants, 128 
(74 per cent) of which were successful. The average turnout for all ballots is 78 per 
cent, and an average of 59 per cent of tenants participating in the ballots voted in 
favour (see table 6.9).  
Table 6.9: LSVT Ballot Results 
 
Year of 
transfer 
Average 
Turnout 
Average 
votes in 
favour % 
Number 
of 
successful 
Ballots 
Number 
of failed 
Ballots 
Success 
rate 
1988 74% 36% 1 3 25% 
1989 82% 42% 2 5 29% 
1990 81% 59% 8 4 66% 
1991 79% 68% 5 0 100% 
1992 71% 41% 2 3 40% 
1993 80% 53% 5 7 42% 
1994 81% 63% 14 2 86% 
1995 79% 60% 12 0 100% 
1996 78% 73% 9 1 90% 
1997 78% 67% 5 2 71% 
1998 74% 68% 18 3 86% 
1999 77% 72% 30 5 86% 
2000 75% 70% 17 3 85% 
2001 72% 73% 17 6 74% 
AVERAGE 78% 59%   70% 
TOTALS - - 128 44 - 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Table 6.10 summarises the average turnout and votes in favour of transfer, and the 
highest and lowest results.  The highest positive ballot result was for the transfer of 
the Colshaw Farm Estate in Manchester to Riverside HA in 2001, where 97 per cent 
of those tenants voting were in favour.  The lowest positive ballot result was for the 
transfer of homes in Cherwell to Banbury Homes, a subsidiary of Shaftesbury Homes. 
In all ballots, turnout was at least 62 per cent, and as high as 91 per cent. These levels 
of participation are high in comparison to participation in local elections for 
councillors.  
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Table 6.10: Successful LSVT Ballot results 1988-2001 
 
 Average (%) 
 
Highest (%) Lowest (%) 
Turnout 75 91 62 
Votes in favour 72 97 43 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Tenants rejected 44 transfers (23 per cent) in ballots run by their local authorities (see 
table 6.11). At best, 49.8 per cent of tenants voted in favour, and at worst just 7 per 
cent voted in favour of transfer. At 44 per cent, the lowest turnout figure is 
considerably lower than the lowest turnout figure for positive ballots, of 62 per cent.  
Table 6.11: Un-successful LSVT Ballot results 1988-2001 
 
 Average (%) 
 
Highest (%) Lowest (%) 
Turnout 76 88 44 
Votes in favour 35 49.8 7 
Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Local authorities attempting the early transfers had particular difficulty in convincing 
tenants of the merits of their proposals, due at least in part to the programme being 
new. There were very few examples of stock transfer organisations for local 
authorities to point to as examples of what could be achieved through transfer. In 
1988 and 1989, 11 local authorities held ballots and tenants in 8 authorities rejected 
transfer.  1990 and 1991 were more successful years with positive results in 13 ballots 
out of a total of 17 held.  Results in 1992 were poor, with tenants in 3 out of 5 ballots 
voting against transfer. In 1992, there was a General Election, and there was a strong 
feeling that there may have been a change of government, ready to devote more 
resources to housing, possibly resulting in a feeling among tenants that transfer would 
therefore be unnecessary (see figure 6.4).  
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Figure 6.4: LSVT Ballots - Average Votes in Favour (all ballots)
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Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Following the Conservative Party’s re-election in 1992, more tenants voted in favour 
of transfer, and average result stabilised at around 70 per cent of tenants in favour of 
transfer. This trend continued throughout the 1990s, including throughout Labour’s 
first term from 1997.  
ANALYSIS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF FIFTY-ONE LSVTS 
In this section, we examine some of the characteristics of the first fifty-one LSVTs, 
including region, size of association, population density of areas of operation, and 
political control of transferring authority.  
Why only the first fifty-one LSVT Associations? 
This analysis forms the first stage of a process to select a representative sample of 
twenty LSVT associations to be included in a survey of twenty. To obtain meaningful 
data on the process of forming LSVT associations and how they operate, I wanted to 
include only associations that had been in existence for at least two years at the time 
the survey was undertaken in the autumn of 1998. The first fifty-one associations all 
came into existence before the end of the 1995-96 Transfer Programme. In 1998, the 
most mature LSVT association was ten years old, and the youngest was just over two 
years old.  
Regional Distribution of the 51 LSVT associations 
Table 6.12 shows the regional distribution of the 51 LSVT associations. The majority 
of associations (87 per cent) are based in the South East, South West and Eastern 
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regions. The remaining 13 per cent were located in the West Midlands (7 per cent), 
Yorkshire and Humberside (4 per cent) and the North West (2 per cent). There had 
been no transfers in the East Midlands or the North East. The reasons for the strength 
of LSVT activity in the South East are unclear. The strength of demand for social 
housing in this region, and councils’ inability to meet burgeoning housing needs, 
might help account for this.  Positive stock valuations might also have encouraged 
local authorities to transfer, but does not help to explain why local authorities in the 
south east were more likely to transfer, as all 51 transfers were positively valued. 
Table 6.12: Regional distribution of 51 LSVT associations 
 
Region Number of 
associations 
Number of Units  
(% of total) 
South East 27 122,508             
(57%) 
East 9 38,519               
(18%) 
South West 7 26,395               
(12%) 
West Midlands 5 14,712               
(7%) 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
2 7,621                
(4%) 
North West  1 3,445                
(2%) 
Total 51 213,200          
(100%) 
  Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
Size of associations 
Taking the group of 51 associations as a whole, there was a fairly even distribution of 
sizes of associations across four bands (see figure 6.5). 22 per cent of associations 
owned up to 2,549 units; 31 per cent owned between 2,550 and 3,999 units; 29 per 
cent owned between 4,000 and 5,999 units; and 18 per cent owned 6,000 units or 
more.  
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Figure 6.5: Size of 51 LSVT associations
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 Source: DTLR LSVT database, 2001 
The South West and Eastern regions most closely reflected the pattern of all 
associations. In the South East, there were more medium sized associations and less 
small associations, while in the West Midlands, there were many more small 
associations (60 per cent of the total for the region) and medium sized associations 
(40 per cent of the total for the region).  
Population density of local authority area 
Population density can be used to indicate how “rural” or “urban” an area is. Although 
this measure takes no account of how concentrated populations might be, it is an 
indicator of relative concentration of housing. Among the 51 associations, 50 per cent 
operate in very sparsely populated local authority areas (see figure 6.6). Only ten per 
cent of the associations operate in areas with a population density of 12 or more 
persons per hectare.  The population densities in all 51 local authorities areas are low 
in comparison to urban areas. Outer London boroughs, for example, have an average 
population density of 37 persons per hectare, while average density in inner London 
boroughs is 81 persons per hectare. 
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Figure 6.6: Population Density
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Source: Municipal yearbook, 2001 
Associations in the South East are more likely to operate in more densely populated 
areas than associations in other regions. Just over twenty per cent of South East 
associations operate in areas with a population density of up to 2.5 persons per 
hectare, compared to 86 per cent in the South West, 67 per cent in the East, and 100 
per cent in both the West Midlands and Yorkshire and Humberside.  
Political control of transferring authority at time of transfer 
At the time of transfer, the majority of councils transferring were controlled outright 
by the Conservative Party (26 councils, or 55 per cent of the total). In a further 9 
authorities (20 per cent) no party was in overall control, but the Conservatives had the 
largest number of councillors. The Labour Party controlled no transferring councils, 
and the Liberal Democrats controlled just 2 councils (4 per cent). 
Figure 6.7 shows political control of the transferring authorities at the point of 
transfer. Councils with no overall control are identified as such, and the party with the 
largest number of councillors is indicated. Upon initial examination, the pattern 
emerging appears to suggest that LSVT is a Conservative dominated policy.  
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Figure 6.7: LSVT authorities: Political control at transfer
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Source: Local Election Statistics 1988-1996.   NOC = No overall control, with largest party in brackets 
However, by 1996, the political landscape of the LSVT authorities had changed 
significantly (see figure 6.8). The Conservatives lost control of 20 councils, Labour 
gained control of 4 and the Liberal Democrats gained 5. The number of councils 
under no overall control increased from 14 to 24, with parties other than the 
Conservatives becoming the largest single political presence in 14. This change may 
be attributed to several factors. Firstly, it is possible to explain the change as a 
reflection of changes in voting patterns nationally. Alternatively, the change could 
indicate that the authorities changing hand were not “rock solid” Conservative 
strongholds, and that LSVT was undertaken for pragmatic rather than ideological 
reasons. 
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Figure 6.8: LSVT authorities: Political control May 1996
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Source: Local Election Statistics 1988-1996.   NOC = No overall control, with largest party in brackets 
Tenure patterns in the transferring authorities’ areas 
In the 51 local authority areas, council housing formed a small proportion of total 
housing in comparison to urban authorities. Council housing accounted for an average 
of 11 per cent of total stock in the 51 authorities at the time of the 1991 census. To 
provide a comparison with urban authorities, a small random sample of cities was 
selected. A major urban authority in each region was included (see table 6.13).  
Table 6.13: Sample urban authorities used to provide comparisons with 51 LSVT 
local authority areas 
Region Urban Authority 
West Midlands Sandwell 
East Norwich 
South West Bristol 
South East Islington 
Yorkshire and Humberside Sheffield 
North West  Manchester 
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In the sample urban authorities, council housing accounted for 34 per cent of total 
stock (see table 6.14).  
Table 6.14: Tenure division in transferring authorities’ areas 
 Owner 
occupied 
Private 
rented 
Housing 
association 
Local 
authority 
LSVT Authorities 75% 10% 4% 11% 
Urban Authorities  50% 10% 5% 34% 
 Source: Census data 1991 
Figure 6.9 compares the average proportions of council housing for each region 
among transferring authorities to the proportions in the sample urban authorities. In 
the transferring authorities, council housing accounted for as little as 9 per cent of 
total stock. In urban authorities, council housing accounts for as much as 48 per cent 
of total stock. It is likely, therefore, that council housing occupies more of 
councillors’ time and attention in urban authorities than it did in the transferring 
authorities.  
Figure 6.9: LA housing as a proportion of all housing
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Source: Census data, 1991 
What this analysis tell us 
The regional distribution of the 51 associations suggests that LSVTs are more likely 
to take place in southern commuter-belt areas, rather than northern and industrial 
areas. This can be attributed to both excess demand for housing in the South, and 
councils’ inability to meet needs, and lack of demand for social housing and low rents 
in parts of the north. Unlike the bulk of council housing – which is owned and 
managed by large councils – LSVTs are more likely to occur in authorities who own 
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small to medium housing stocks. LSVTs are more likely to operate in areas that are 
predominantly rural, whereas the majority of council housing is in urban areas, 
particularly large cities. The 54 largest local authorities own 53 per cent of the total 
council stock.  Local authority housing in transferring authorities is likely to have 
formed a smaller proportion of total housing than in urban authorities. As such, it is 
likely that the management of housing was less of an important issue for councillors 
in these authorities. Finally, the analysis indicates that whole stock LSVTs are more 
likely to occur in Conservative controlled or hung councils, whereas Labour 
controlled councils are more likely to transfer small portions of their stock which are 
in urgent need of major reinvestment.  
SAMPLE OF TWENTY REPRESENTATIVE ASSOCIATIONS 
The aim of this process was to select a sample of 20 out of the 51 LSVT associations, 
which would be included in a survey. The 20 organisations would be selected to be as 
representative of all the organisations as possible. The following criteria were used: 
1. Region – the sample should reflect the regional breakdown of the 51 LSVTs. 
2. Size – as far as possible, the sizes of the case study associations should reflect the 
variations in size of the 51 organisations. 
3. Population density – as a measure of how “rural”, “mixed” or “urban” the areas 
of operation are.   
4. Date of transfer – the range of case studies should reflect the variations in age of 
the 51 associations. 
5. Political control of the transferring authority at the time of transfer – where 
possible, a range of political colours are reflected in the chosen case studies.  
6. Performance – where organisations are similar on all the above characteristics, 
variations in performance (rent collection, new development, void levels and rent 
increases) are examined. Performance measures were extracted from Housing 
Corporation HAR10/1 data for year ending 31st March 1996. 
7. County – where possible, we avoided selecting associations from the same 
county. 
Information in the categories above was entered into a spreadsheet. Associations were 
sorted by region, then date of transfer. In order to select cases, each characteristic was 
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simplified into either three or four categories (see table 6.15). For example, density 
was measured as either “very rural”, “rural”, “mixed” or “urban”. 
Table 6.15: Groupings of characteristics used in the selection process 
Characteristic: Groupings: 
Size of association A  up to 2,549 units 
B  2,550 – 3,999 units 
C  4,000 – 5,999 units 
D  6,000 or more units 
Population density of local authority area A  up to 2.5 persons per hectare  
B  2.6 – 5 persons per hectare 
C  5.1 – 12 persons per hectare 
D  12 or more persons per hectare 
Performance Measure 1:  
Percentage of rent due that was collected 
A  99.8% or more  
B  99.2% - 99.7% 
C  up to 99.1% 
Performance Measure 2: 
Voids as a percentage of total stock 
A  up to 0.63% 
B  0.64% – 0.99% 
C  1% or more 
Performance Measure 3: 
Rent Increases 
A  up to 3.9% 
B  4% - 7.4% 
C  7.5% or more  
Performance Measure 4: 
New Units built or acquired 
A  86 or more 
B  20 – 85 
C  up to 19 
 
Regional breakdown 
The twenty associations to be included in the survey represent 39 per cent of all the 51 
LSVT associations. All 51 associations were grouped by region, using the boundaries 
adopted by DETR for its Government Offices. The chosen associations would 
represent these regional breakdowns (see table 6.16). 
Table 6.16: Regional breakdown of the 51 LSVTs 
 
DETR Region: Number of associations: Proportion of all 51 transfer 
associations: 
South East 27 53% 
East 9 18% 
South West 7 14% 
West Midlands 5 10% 
Yorkshire and Humberside 2 4% 
North West 1 2% 
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It was not possible to select the survey LSVTs to reflect exactly the regional 
breakdown of 51 associations. This is due to the smaller number of associations in the 
West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside and North West regions, which would 
require a fraction of an organisation to be precisely representative. A sample was 
selected to represent the 51 associations as closely as possible (see table 6.17).  
Table 6.17: Regional breakdown of 20 sample survey associations 
 
Region: Number of associations selected: 
South East 9 
East 4 
South West 3 
West Midlands 2 
Yorkshire and Humberside 1 
North West 1 
 
Size of association and population density of local authority area 
The size of the 51 LSVT associaions at the time of transfer varies widely, from 1,322 
units to 12,393 units. Thirty-seven LSVT associations owned less than 5,000 units. 
The associations were divided into four categories according to number of units 
owned (see table 6.18). 
Table 6.18: Size of 20 associations 
Category Number of units owned 
  
A 1,000 - 2,549 units 
B 2,550 – 3,999 units 
C 4,000 – 5,999 units 
D 6,000 - 12,500 units 
 
Population density was calculated for each local authority region. These were 
similarly divided into four categories (see table 6.19). This measure of density cannot 
take account of concentrations of populations in towns. However, it is useful as a 
general indicator. 
Chapter Six ~ Study of LSVT Associations  Page 166 
Table 6.19: Population densities in 20 local authority areas 
 
Category Population density of LA area 
A 0 – 2.4 persons per hectare 
B 2.5 – 4.9 persons per hectare  
C 5.0 – 11.9 persons per hectare 
D 12 or more persons per hectare 
 
Political control of transferring authorities 
Information on the political control of transferring authorities at the time of transfer 
was gathered from the Municipal Yearbook (1988 – 1996). A number of councils 
were in no overall control by one party. In these cases, the councils were classed as 
“no overall control” but the party with the largest number of seats was also noted, as 
they might reasonably be expected to have a greater influence over policy than other 
parties.    
Performance 
Information on a number of performance indicators was extracted for each association 
from Housing Corporation HAR/10 data. The indicators chosen are shown in table 
6.20. Performance was grouped into three categories (A, B and C) with A indicating 
the best performers, B indicating average performance and C indicating the poorest 
performance. 
Table 6.20: Measures of performance of the 20 associations 
 
Rent collected as % of 
total due 
Units built/acquired 
in financial year 
Voids as % of total 
stock 
Rent Increases 
    
A = 99.80+ A = 86+ A = 0.09 - 0.63 A = 0 - 3.9% 
B = 99.20 - 99.70 B = 20 – 85 B = 0.64 - 0.99 B = 4 - 7.5% 
C = 95.10 - 99.10 C = 0 – 29 C = 1.0 - 2.06 C = 7.5% + 
Selection of twenty survey associations 
The regions were taken as the basic framework for selecting the twenty associations 
for the survey, as shown in table 6.17. 
1. West Midlands 
In the West Midlands, there are five associations, and two were selected for inclusion 
in the survey (see table 6.21).  
Chapter Six ~ Study of LSVT Associations  Page 167 
Table 6.21: Associations in the West Midlands 
Association Size: Population Density Political Control 
South Shropshire A A Independent 
Leominster Marches #  A A Independent 
Droitwich A A Conservative 
Evesham and Pershore # C A Conservative 
Elgar C A No overall control 
# Associations selected for the survey 
All five associations had a population density in the “a” category indicating that they 
are likely to operate in rural areas. Three associations fell into the “a” size category 
and the remaining two fell into the “c” size category.  Two of the transferring 
authorities were Conservative controlled at the time of transfer, two were independent 
and one was in no overall control, with independents as the most dominant political 
group. One case was selected from the most rural category (a) and the other from the 
most urban category (c). Leominster Marches is a small association operating in a 
rural area. The transferring authority was independent at the time of transfer. 
Evesham and Pershore also operates in a rural setting but is among the largest 
associations. The Conservative Party was in control of the transferring authority. The 
performance of the two associations also varies significantly.  
2. East 
In the East, there are nine associations, and four were selected for inclusion in the 
survey (see table 6.22).  
Table 6.22: Associations in the East 
Association Size: Population Density Political Control 
Aldwyck A C Conservative 
Plume # A A No overall control 
Wherry # B A Conservative 
Mid Bedfordshire B A Conservative 
Suffolk Heritage C A Conservative 
Hereward # C A Independent 
Ridgehill C C Conservative 
Bedfordshire Pilgrims # D B No overall control 
Peddars Way D A Conservative 
# Associations selected for the survey 
Sizes in this region range from small to large, with two associations in category “a”, 
two in category “b”, three in category “c” and two in category “d”. Dates of transfer 
range from 1990 to 1995. Two of the associations are in the county of Norfolk, two 
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are in Hertfordshire, two are in Bedfordshire and the remaining three are located in 
Essex, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. Six of the nine transferring authorities were 
Conservative controlled. One authority was controlled by independents, while there 
were two in no overall control with the Conservative Party as the dominant group. 
One case was selected from each size group. Plume HA is a small association 
(category “a”) operating in a predominantly rural area (category a). Wherry HA is an 
association in the “b” size category, also operating in a predominantly rural area. 
Bedfordshire Pilgrims HA was selected, as it is the only case where the population 
density is higher than category “a”. It was created by a local authority in no overall 
control, with a dominant Conservative group. It is one and the largest associations 
(category d) and also the oldest in the region. Mid Bedfordshire HA would appear to 
provide an exact opposite, but was not selected as it is in the same county as 
Bedfordshire Pilgrims HA.  The next suitable association is Hereward. It is in the “c” 
size category and operates in a predominantly rural area. The transferring authority 
was independent. There are variations in the performance of the four associations. 
3. Yorkshire and Humberside 
In the Yorkshire and Humberside region, there are two associations, and one was 
selected for inclusion in the survey (see table 6.23).  
Table 6.23: Associations in Yorkshire and Humberside 
Association Size: Population Density Political Control 
Ryedale # B A No overall control 
Broadacres  C A Conservative 
# Association selected for the survey 
The two associations were quite similar. Both were operating in rural areas, they were 
of similar size (categories b and c) and performance was comparable. One 
distinguishing feature was that one of the transferring authorities was Conservative 
controlled and the other was under no overall control with a dominant Liberal 
Democrat group. Ryedale HA, the association created by a council in no overall 
control, with a strong Liberal Democrat representation, was selected. 
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4. South East 
In the South East, there are twenty seven associations, and nine were selected for 
inclusion in the survey (see table 6.24).  
Table 6.24: Associations in the South East 
Association Size: Population Density Political Control 
South Wight A B Conservative 
Rosebery # A D Independent 
Hart A B No overall control 
Banbury Homes # A A Conservative 
Medina # B B Conservative 
Beacon B B Conservative 
Surrey Heath B C Conservative 
Hermitage B D No overall control 
Thanet Community B C Conservative 
Maidenhead & District B C No overall control 
Windsor & District # B C No overall control 
Spelthorne B C Conservative 
Chiltern Hundreds # C B Conservative 
Mid Sussex C B Conservative 
High Weald C B Conservative 
Vale C A Conservative 
Basingstoke & N Hants C A No overall control 
Basingstoke & Upper Test C A No overall control 
Rushmoor C D Conservative 
East Hants C A Liberal Democrat 
Ten Sixty-Six # C D No overall control 
West Kent # D B Conservative 
Sovereign # D A Conservative 
Swale D B No overall control 
Medway HS D C Conservative 
Tonbridge & Malling D B Conservative 
Broomleigh # D D Conservative 
# Associations selected for the survey 
Selection of this number of cases could have been approached in a number of ways. 
The method chosen was to select two cases in the a, b and c size categories and three 
cases in the d size categories reflecting the actual distribution. Secondly, population 
density and political control were examined to choose between the associations 
available in each size category.  
Banbury Homes is an “a” size association operating in a predominantly rural area. 
This association was selected because it has received stock through a trickle transfer, 
in addition to a LSVT. An interesting contrast is Rosebery HA which is a similar size 
to Plume but operates in a predominantly urban area (category “d”). The performance 
of the two associations is quite similar. 
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Medina HA is in the size “b” category and “b” population density category. The 
transfer was undertaken in 1990. The other three associations in size category “b” are 
in density category “c”. Two of these associations are in the same local authority 
district. Windsor and District HA offers most contrasts to Medina on performance.  
Chiltern Hundreds HA is a larger association (category “c”) operating in a mixed 
area (category “b”). It is one of the earliest transfers, undertaken in 1988 by a 
Conservative controlled local authority. Ten-Sixty Six HA is of a similar size to 
Chiltern Hundreds, but operates in a more urban area (category “d”). It is also one of 
the most recent transfers, which was undertaken by an authority under no overall 
control with a dominant Liberal Democrat group. 
Sovereign HA, Broomleigh HA and West Kent HA all fall in size category “d”. 
Broomleigh is the largest of all LSVT associations. However, Sovereign operates in a 
very rural area (category “a”) while Broomleigh operates in a very urban area. West 
Kent operates in a semi-rural area. It was chosen because of its well-publicised 
financial problems in the early 1990s. The experience of West Kent provided useful 
lessons for all subsequent LSVTs. There are considerable variations in performance. 
5. South West 
In the South West, there are seven associations, and three were selected for inclusion 
in the survey (see Table 6.25).  
Table 6.25: Associations in the South West 
Association Size: Population Density Political Control 
East Dorset A A Conservative 
Twynham # A C No overall control 
Penwith # B A No overall control 
Signpost B A Independent 
Sarsen C A No overall control 
Magna C A No overall control 
N Wiltshire # D A Liberal Democrat 
# Associations selected for the survey 
Associations were selected within size categories.  The three cases were selected from 
the size categories as follows:  
- 1 association from category “a”; 
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- 1 association from category “b”; 
- 1 association from category “d”. 
Twynham HA is in the size category “a” but operates in an area with a relatively 
dense population. At the time of transfer, the Council was in no overall control, with 
more councillors from the Conservative party than any other party. Penwith HA is an 
Association in size category “b”, operating in a predominantly rural area. 
North Wiltshire was the only association in the category “d” size group. It is a 
recently created association, operating in a predominantly rural area. 
SUMMARY  
This chapter explains how transfers in practice facilitated State withdrawal between 
1988 and 2001. District councils transferring their entire stocks to single landlords 
dominated the LSVT programme up to 1996. Urban authorities started to transfer 
estates or groups of estates from 1996 onwards, leading to considerable breakup of 
ownership of social housing in some urban areas. Whole stock transfers by large city 
councils will, in future, change the pattern significantly.  LSVT is still predominantly 
a southern-based phenomenon, with well over 50 per cent of transfers having taken 
place in the South East, South west and eastern regions.  The transfers undertaken so 
far have helped to shift the balance of service provision from the public to the private 
sector.  Over twelve years, transfers have raised over £9 billion in private finance, of 
which some £4.5 billion was paid to transferring authorities to redeem debt and to 
provide resources for new development.  Ballots of tenants have helped to shift the 
balance of power from councils to tenants, helping create a form of quasi market.  The 
data points to a high level of tenant support for transfers, with votes in 146 ballots 
supporting transfer, while only 38 transfer have been rejected.  
In chapters seven, eight and nine, I present evidence from the twenty LSVT 
associations selected to illustrate how stock transfer helps the State to withdraw from 
direct provision; change the management of council housing; and shift responsibility 
for service delivery to the private sector.  I examine staff perceptions of the reasons 
for transfer; how the associations have changed management and organisational 
cultures; and the impact of the shift of responsibility for service delivery from the 
public to the private sector upon the organisations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter and chapters eight and nine, I present the evidence from the 
representative sample survey of twenty LSVT associations. The findings are based 
upon fifty-four interviews with staff in the twenty LSVT associations, twenty-five of 
whom had previously worked in the sponsoring authorities.  No councillors, local 
authority officers or tenants in the twenty cases were interviewed, and these chapters 
therefore present the perspective of one group only.  The twenty associations are 
predominantly non-urban, small and predominantly southern based, as outlined in 
Chapter six.  This chapter focuses on the respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for 
transfer among the twenty associations I study closely.  I examine the respondents’ 
perceptions of reasons for stock transfer, campaigns against transfer and why they 
believed tenants voted in favour; their perception of performance of the transferring 
authorities; and how important they felt that housing was as an activity to the 
transferring authorities.  Chapter eight examines how the respondents believe LSVT 
has brought about organisational change within the twenty case study areas.  Chapter 
nine examines how respondents feel that LSVT has shifted responsibility for housing 
provision from the public to the private sector.  There is considerable cross-
fertilisation between the three core themes of State withdrawal from direct housing 
provision, organisational change and the shift to the private sector, and my aim is to 
build up a clear and comprehensive picture.  For clarity, I divided the three core 
themes into three chapters, and chapters ten and eleven will weave the themes 
together.  
INTERVIEWS 
Fifty-four interviews were conducted in the representative sample of twenty LSVTs 
between August 1998 and March 1999. Where possible, I interviewed the Chief 
Executive, Housing Director and Finance Director of each association. I also 
interviewed Tenant participation officers in five of the associations. In five 
associations, only one senior director was available for interview. These five 
interviews covered the same range of topics as in other associations, but in slightly 
less depth. Table 7.1 lists staff members interviewed in each association. 
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Table 7.1: Staff Interviewed 
Association Chief 
Exec 
Housing 
Director 
Finance 
Director 
TP 
Officer 
Other Total 
Windsor & Dist 9 9 9 9 - 4 
Medina 9 - - 9 9 Housing Manager 3 
Chiltern Hundreds 9 9 9 - - 3 
1066 - 9 - - - 1 
Sovereign 9 9 9 9 - 4 
West Kent - 9 - - - 1 
Broomleigh 9 9 9 - - 3 
Twynham 9 - - - - 1 
Penwith - 9 - - - 1 
North Wilts 9 9 9 - 9 - Dir Prop Services 4 
Leominster Marches 9 - 9 - - 2 
Evesham & Pershore 9 9 9 - - 3 
Plume 9 - 9 - 9 Housing Manager 3 
Wherry 9 - - - - 1 
Hereward 9 9 9 - - 3 
Bedfordshire 
Pilgrims 
9 9 9 - - 3 
New Progress 9 9 - 9 9 Chief Accountant 
9Tenancy Services 
Manager 
5 
Ryedale 9 9 9 - - 3 
Rosebery 9 9 9 - - - 
Banbury 9 - 9 9 - 3 
Totals  17 14 13 5 5 54 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
All interviews were structured around a list of issues relating specifically to the roles 
of staff. Checklists for each post are attached as Appendix 1, and the topics covered 
are summarised in table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2: Summary of topics discussed with staff  
 
Topic Staff interviewed 
Chapter seven 
• Perception of rationale for transfer 
• Perception of the performance of 
sponsoring local authorities as 
landlords 
• Perception of the importance of 
housing as an activity to the 
sponsoring authorities. 
 
Chief Executive 
Housing director 
Finance director 
Chapter eight 
• Staff background 
• Perceptions of breaking away 
from sponsoring local authorities 
• Developing a new culture 
• Perceptions of how the 
associations are different from 
local authority past 
 
Housing director 
Housing manager 
Property services manager 
Tenancy services manager 
Chapter nine 
• Involving tenants in management 
• Governance and accountability  
• Long term sustainability  
• LSVT finances  
 
Finance director 
Housing director 
Chief accountant 
Tenant participation officer 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999  
 
RATIONALE FOR TRANSFER 
In this section, I examine the respondents’ perceptions of cultures of the authorities 
undertaking transfers; their perceptions of the sponsoring authorities’ reasons for 
transferring; the nature of campaigns against; and their perceptions of why tenants 
voted in favour.  Evidence from the representative sample survey provides an insight 
into the authorities undertaking transfers in the earlier period of the late 1980s and 
first half of the 1990s, from the perspective of the senior management in the LSVT 
associations created.   
Respondents’ perceptions of Local Authority Culture  
Senior managers were asked to describe their perception of the culture of their 
sponsoring authorities prior to transfer. Their responses are summarised in table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3: Sponsoring authority culture 
 
Perception of culture Elements No of 
authorities 
Paternalistic • Authority did not appear to 
seek tenant opinion on 
service delivery 
• Approach to service delivery 
believed to be decided by 
councillors and/or officers 
11 
Housing seen as a 
“Cinderella service” 
• Housing seen as being low 
on political agenda. 
• Small proportion of voters 
housed by council 
• Housing felt to lack a strong 
voice in council 
7 
Keen to encourage 
participation 
• Methods in place to 
encourage and facilitate TP 
• Councillors believed to be 
committed to involving  
• Participation in housing 
committees 
4 
Lacking a long term strategy • Seen as having a short term 
and reactive approach to 
service delivery 
• No consensus on long term 
approach. 
• Perception of lack of drive 
from politicians to adopt long 
term strategy 
2 
Committed, but constrained 
by lack of resources 
• Medium to long term 
strategy in place 
• Insufficient resources 
available to implement long 
term plan 
1 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
 
Eleven respondents felt that their sponsoring authorities were caring, but in an old-
fashioned paternalistic way. They characterised the councils as knowing what was 
best for tenants, and tenants were not invited to express their opinions on service 
delivery: 
“They were looked after in a paternalistic way quite well. But they didn’t 
have any say on anything. It was very much a case of ‘this is the service, 
Chapter Seven ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
How LSVT came about  Page 176 
 
we provide it, you receive it.’ If they were unhappy about anything, they 
were politely told to get lost.” (Chief Executive) 
Seven respondents felt that their sponsoring authorities treated Housing as a minor or 
“Cinderella service”. Housing was believed to be low on councillors’ agendas, whose 
priorities were planning, protecting the green belt and leisure. In contrast to urban 
authorities, the proportions of voters living in council housing in the sponsoring 
authorities was low, and respondents believed that many councillors felt that there 
were few votes to be gained by promoting the cause of social housing. Respondents 
felt that the councillors’ approach to housing was reflected in the way the service 
interacted with other parts of the council:  
“In terms of officer input into strategy, housing was a bit of a weak link. 
In corporate management terms, there was no strong Housing push. The 
housing voice was very quiet.” (Housing Services Director) 
In four authorities, respondents believed that councillors had taken a different 
approach to Housing and had actively encouraged tenant involvement and 
participation. In three authorities, respondents believed that tenant involvement was 
developed to the extent that there were tenant representatives on the housing 
committees. These representatives were permitted to speak at meetings, but were 
legally barred from voting. One respondent felt that the Authority was willing to meet 
tenants’ wishes for additional spending on repairs, as long as they were willing to 
finance these works through higher rents. The Council was not, in the respondent’s 
opinion, proactive in finding innovative ways of funding additional repairs. 
Respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for transferring the housing stock 
Respondents were asked about their perceptions of their councils’ reasons for 
transferring their housing stock.  They believed that the authorities had a number of 
motivations for transferring their housing stocks to RSLs. Directors identified one or 
more major driver in their sponsoring authority. These are detailed in Figure 7.1. In 
all but one local authority, respondents believed that political ideology of the ruling 
party did not play a major part in the decision to transfer.  
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Figure 7.1: Respondents' perceptions of LAs' reasons for transferring stock
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 Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Twelve respondents believed that their local authorities transferred to develop new 
stock. The ability of the local authorities to develop new stock themselves had 
effectively ended by 1990: 
“…the Council saw their ability to develop was going to be zilch. The 
reason that [the authority] wanted to do a stock transfer was to do with 
the fact that an Association would be free from constraints on 
development.” (Chief Executive) 
 The Right to Buy had reduced existing housing stocks, but at the same time, the 
demand for affordable social housing had continued to increase. Three respondents 
felt that their authorities transferred to help stem stock losses through Right to Buy. 
Independent councillors controlled one of these authorities, while the other two were 
hung councils.  
“The stock was being sold at an obscene rate. At its peak, the Council 
owned 3,500 properties, we’re now down to 1,650. [Councillors] 
recognised that the waiting list was growing and growing. There were 
more and more homeless families coming along.” (Chief Executive) 
Although most of the authorities had reasonable to good stock condition, nine were 
believed to have transferred to invest in their housing to bring about improvements.  
Six respondents felt that their authorities had transferred to address repairs backlogs.  
Seven respondents believed that their authorities transferred because they faced the 
prospect of increasing rents considerably as the new finance regime introduced under 
the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 came into force: 
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“[tenants] had had rent increases of 50-60% three years prior to the 
decision to transfer, so the ability to restrict rent increases to RPI plus 
1%, and to invest in the property seemed like Christmas.” (Chief 
Executive) 
Six respondents felt that, for their authorities, the prospect of a large capital receipt 
had, in part at least, motivated councillors to transfer. The receipt would enable the 
councils to redeem debt and provide social housing grant and fund other activities. In 
an early transfer authority – controlled at the time of stock transfer by the 
Conservatives – the respondent believed that councillors were not attracted by the 
prospect of a capital receipt, and would have preferred to transfer their stock at nil 
value, as this would have strengthened the recipient landlord and enabled it to do 
more for tenants and housing applicants: 
“The District Council did not want a capital receipt for their stock. Their 
motivation was entirely about the tenants – wanting to improve the 
situation for tenants. In a way, the less the Association pays [for the 
stock], the more it will be able to do. The only discussions about money 
that I’m aware of were the council trying to say ‘we don’t want anything 
for this stock, we want the Association to have financial strength to be 
able to address housing issues in the District’.”  (Finance Director) 
Two respondents believed that their authorities transferred  to avoid Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering of housing management, which was perceived as not “a 
terribly positive thing to have to do” (Housing Services Director). Two other 
respondents felt that the authorities also used stock transfer as a way of protecting 
their housing stocks from Tenants’ Choice legislation. At the time of the introduction 
of Tenants’ Choice under the Housing Act 1988, there was perceived to be a real fear 
among tenants that their homes would be transferred to private landlords: 
“At the time, there was a lot of confusion about what would happen if we 
didn’t transfer…whether private landlords could bid for the stock… and if 
tenants were away, they could find their houses transferred without them 
knowing about it.” (Chief Executive) 
Campaigns against stock transfer 
In thirteen authorities, respondents believed that there were no significant campaigns 
against the principle of stock transfer, and there was believed to be a political 
consensus that it represented the best way forward. In seven authorities, there were 
campaigns against transfer. Respondents reported that councillors led six of these 
campaigns, and tenants led one campaign.  
Chapter Seven ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
How LSVT came about  Page 179 
 
One campaign against transfer was led by tenants and respondents understood that 
they were concerned that the housing stock was moving from a body which tenants 
perceived as being democratically accountable to local people, to a body that was not 
controlled by councillors.  
Labour councillors from a neighbouring authority led one campaign. Respondents 
believed that they were opposed to any form of privatisation, and actively campaigned 
against transfer, even though the local party was said to be in favour.  
Opposition councillors within the transferring authorities led six campaigns. Labour 
councillors led five campaigns, and Conservative councillors led the sixth. 
Respondents identified a number of issues that they perceived to be at the heart of 
councillors’ campaigns. In one authority, a Conservative opposition group was 
belieived to be opposed to the plans of the Liberal Democrat controlled council to 
transfer on the grounds that the stock valuation was too low. The Chief Executive of 
the stock transfer association feels that the Conservative group “didn’t want the 
Liberal Democrats getting their hands on the capital receipt before the election”. In 
another authority, a Labour group ran an opposition campaign, as the respondent 
believed that they had formed the view that the Council’s consultation campaign was 
biased. The respondent believed that Labour councillors felt that they “owed it to the 
tenants to campaign against and put the opposite case,” which was understood to be 
that “you will lose control by the Council”. (Chief Executive). Ownership also 
featured in a campaign led by one councillor in another authority, who was believed 
to hold council ownership as the best means of being accountable to service users.  
One authority faced the prospect of being forced by the Department of the 
Environment to split its stock between two landlords to obtain approval from the 
Secretary of State. The Authority’s stock was approximately 1,000 units higher than 
the Government’s limit on the size of transfers at that time of 5,000 units. 
Respondents believed that councillors supported transfer to a single landlord, but were 
opposed to a break up of the housing stock and would have preferred to retain council 
ownership had a split transfer been imposed on the authority: 
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“I think we would have had problems if we had gone forward with a split 
transfer. There was a degree of opposition, certainly from the small 
Labour group, and they could have got a sizeable vote against.” (Chief 
Executive)  
Respondents’ perceptions of the reasons for tenants’ support for transfer  
Respondents identified a number of factors that they believed would explain their 
tenants’ decision to vote in favour of stock transfer (figure 7.2). Fourteen of the 
respondents believed that tenants were concerned about the prospect of increasing 
council rents and were attracted by an offer by prospective landlords of a guarantee to 
limit future increases. Eight respondents stressed their council’s inability to maintain 
their housing in the future combined with the offer of a catch up repairs programme as 
being important in securing a positive result.  
 
Figure 7.2: Tenants' Reasons for voting in favour
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Five respondents attributed their successful ballot to effective consultation campaigns. 
In their view, consultation campaigns offered reassurance about the type of landlord 
that would receive the stock, and who would be running it. A Chief Executive 
observed that his sponsoring authority had run what he saw as effectively a marketing 
campaign: 
“I think in any LSVT if the questions are just put, people won’t vote for it. 
I don’t think it was oversold, but there was a lot of selling.” (Chief 
Executive) 
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A respondent in another Association felt that the consultation campaign in his 
authority presented only the case for stock transfer, and not any of the possible 
disadvantages to tenants: 
“I think there was a gross manipulation of tenants to make them go for 
transfer…the impression I gained was that transfer to a Housing 
Association was presented very much as the only solution.” (Tenant 
Participation Officer) 
Respondents believed that the positive messages from staff about stock transfer also 
helped to reassure tenants. Staff who tenants had known and come to trust over a 
number of years were on their doorsteps providing reassurance and saying that stock 
transfer was a good idea. A Chief Executive observed that tenants of sheltered 
schemes were effectively a “captive audience” and wardens were reported to have 
been very positive towards the potential outcomes of transfer.  
Respondents in four associations felt that the sponsoring authorities’ inability to 
develop new stock was a strong ‘push’ factor encouraging votes in favour of transfer. 
This was believed to be a particular concern in parts of the country where there was 
high demand for housing and high private rented sector rents: 
“[The council] couldn’t guarantee that for the sons and daughters of the 
current tenants who would have housing needs in the future their needs 
would be satisfied.” (Chief Executive) 
Two respondents believed that poor service provision by their sponsoring authorities 
had played an important part in tenants’ decision to vote for transfer. They felt that 
lack of confidence in the Council as a manager of housing meant that tenants were 
receptive to the option of transfer: 
“…they were frustrated with the services. We promised that service 
delivery would improve, and that the new organisation would focus on 
that.” (Chief Executive) 
In one authority, a respondent attributed the positive ballot result partly to the 
prospect of local government re-organisation. In the run up to transfer, the Local 
Government Commission was reported to be considering merging authorities in the 
area to form unitary authorities. While the housing problems of the sponsoring 
authority were significant, they were not perceived to be dire. However, the housing 
problems in the neighbouring authority were reported to be dire. The Chief Executive 
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believed that tenants feared that the few resources coming into the area would all be 
“drained” into the other authorities’ stock.  
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF 
SPONSORING LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS LANDLORDS 
In this section, I examine respondents’ perceptions of performance of their local 
authorities, which can act as a push factor for transfer, as councillors seek to shift 
responsibility for management to the private sector.  Eight respondents in the twenty 
associations felt that the housing service provided by their sponsoring authorities was 
“good”, seven thought services had been “satisfactory”, while four felt they had been 
“poor”. One Chief Executive who had joined sometime after transfer was not able to 
comment.  
There are some marked differences in views of performance between directors who 
had worked with the sponsoring authority and those who did not. This is, perhaps, not 
surprising as former local authority directors may wish to defend the past performance 
of their departments.  Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show senior staff views on performance. 
The numbers of officers responding to this question were split evenly between those 
who had worked with the sponsoring authority, and those who had not. While six 
former local authority officers thought that performance had been good, only two 
directors from outside felt that the sponsoring authority had performed well.  
Figure 7.3 Views on LA performance 
(staff not with LA)
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Figure 7.4: Views on LA performance 
(staff formerly with LA)
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
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Performance issues 
Respondents believed that performance in the transferring authorities ranged from 
good to bad, but that there were issues for all authorities that they believed 
strengthened the case for transfer.    
‘Good’ performers 
Two authorities had received very high ratings from the Audit Commission before the 
stock was transferred. A Housing Director who worked with one of these authorities 
acknowledged that the Audit Commission rating was based on cost and financial 
performance only.  He felt that there were ‘…certain quality issues that were missing, 
purely because of the fact that cost was a big factor”.  
Respondents felt that a lack of resources had prevented their authorities from doing 
more, and they believed that this had hampered their ability to take a more positive 
approach towards service delivery:   
“We didn’t have much money to do a great deal, so it started off with ‘no 
you can’t’, rather than a positive outlook on how services could be 
improved.” (Housing Services Director) 
‘Satisfactory’ performers  
In three authorities, respondents felt that little attention had been paid to involving and 
consulting with tenants, even though there was perceived to be a general willingness 
to do so. They attributed this lack of consultation partly to fear of unleashing 
expectations among tenants that the authorities knew they would be unable to fulfil 
due to constraints on resources: 
“…whilst there was a will to involve tenants, at the end of the day what 
tenants want is their repairs to be done and their houses improved. And 
that is the thing that the Local Authority was finding more and more 
difficult to do.”  (Housing Director) 
While resources for all local authority services are constrained, one respondent felt 
that housing was low in the council’s order of priority: 
“Like most districts, it tended to be a bit of a Cinderella service.” (Chief 
Executive) 
In local authorities, Housing departments can be seen as being part of a complex 
public bureaucracy, and respondents felt that they have to compete for both 
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councillors’ time and financial resources with other departments. In some councils, 
respondents believed that Housing is afforded a low priority, while other issues, such 
as planning and leisure, are more important to councillors, as theses issues are 
perceived to be more important to a majority of the local electorates.  
‘Poor’ performers 
In two local authorities, respondents believed that there were cross subsidies from the 
Housing Revenue Account to their council’s General Fund, even though the housing 
departments required additional resources. ‘The HRA had been drained of resources, 
which was going into the General Fund’ (Chief Executive).  Before ring fencing of 
Housing Revenue Accounts from the early 1990s, HRA resources were sometimes 
used to cross subsidise councils’ general funds to keep the level of Rates down. Other 
respondents described their authorities as ‘minimalist’, ‘sparsely staffed’ and 
‘paternalistic’. In one authority, there were serious stock condition problems: 
‘Fundamentally, our stock was the worst. It had had nothing done to it for 
thirty years. We had 400 properties that were declared unfit. Tenants had 
very low expectations and would never complain. I was shocked going 
into a house. I thought I’d seen the worst of the HMOs and the worst of 
the 1960s built housing when I worked in [inner London]. I was staggered 
to find it here.” (Housing Director) 
Combined with financial constraints upon local authorities, the performance issues 
across the range of authorities arguably helped to build the case for transfer. 
Authorities that were performing well were constrained by a lack of resources, and 
were prevented from enhancing the quality of their services had they wished to do so. 
Other authorities that were seen as providing a satisfactory service were reported to 
avoid involving tenants too much for fear of increasing expectations beyond their 
ability to meet them. Authorities with serious disrepair were reported to be unable to 
tackle the problems because of lack of resources. Respondents believed that stock 
transfer would help all these authorities by giving the new housing organisations 
access to resources to tackle the various problems they faced. For authorities in which 
Housing was perceived as not being seen as important to councillors, stock transfer 
would arguably enable staff to work in a single purpose organisation with its own 
dedicated resources. For councillors who did not see Housing as an important activity, 
stock transfer arguably enabled them to divest themselves of direct management 
responsibility, so that they would have more time to concentrate on other issues.  
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RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HOUSING AS 
AN ACTIVITY TO THE SPONSORING AUTHORITIES 
Directors in the twenty associations were asked about their perceptions of how 
important Housing was to their sponsoring authorities prior to transfer (see figure 
7.5).  If housing was not a service to which councillors attached much importance, it 
is perhaps possible to argue that they would be more willing to transfer their stock.  In 
eleven authorities, Housing was perceived as not being important, while it was 
believed to be somewhat important in six. Housing was reported to attract a high 
status in only three authorities.  
Fig 7.5: Perceptions of the status of Housing within Sponsoring LAs
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
In authorities where housing was perceived as having had a high status, respondents 
suggested that the sheer size of the activity meant that it could be nothing other than 
important. In one of the authorities, the Housing Service accounted for approximately 
half of all the activity: 
“It was the key service. It’s a shire district council. If you take Housing 
out, there’s not a lot left. It was the major service, and was the platform 
for a lot of councillors coming onto the Council in the first place.” (Chief 
Executive) 
In the authorities where Housing was perceived as less important, directors suggested 
that councillors had made some effort to ensure that staff provided good services, but 
ultimately, they were perceived as being more interested in other activities: 
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“Things like recreation were the in-things at the time. They were good 
landlords, but it wasn’t one of their top priorities. Some of the money from 
the HRA went outside.” (Chief Executive) 
A Housing Director suggested that councillors were only concerned with council 
housing when an issue arose affecting a constituent. The respondent believed that the 
councillors’ interest did not extend to the Housing Service as a whole: 
“Councillors tended only to worry about what was going on in their own 
ward, and they didn’t care about what was going on half a mile up the 
road.” (Housing Director) 
In the remaining eleven authorities, respondents believed that Housing had not been 
important to Councillors, largely because their councils housed only a small minority 
of their electorates. A majority of voters did not need or want council housing. 
Respondents felt that the authorities had made few efforts to focus on the needs of 
tenants, and efforts were reported to be focused in other directions, including ensuring 
that the size of activities was minimal: 
“It was appallingly neglected. They had a disturbing attitude towards 
their tenants. It was very antiquated, patriarchal…not even paternalistic. 
The view was ‘what do they want central heating for, they’re only 
tenants’. If I said a man and a dog were managing the stock, that’s about 
all it was. It was all about low rents, low rates and minimal services.” 
(Chief Executive) 
Respondents felt that although councillors could possibly derive advantage from their 
control and influence of Housing, the problems they perceived to arise from the 
negative image of council housing meant that they preferred to ignore it wherever 
possible: 
“It could be politically advantageous, if it suited. I think it was the poor 
relation, and often a liability, because of the problems it created…the 
constant drain upon resources. And because of the image people in the 
private sector had of council housing and council tenants. In so far as 
councillors could gain kudos for getting someone a property, it was 
looked upon favourably. But not if it was the other side of the coin.”  
(Housing Manager) 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter I use evidence from the representative sample survey of twenty LSVT 
associations to point to factors that help us to understand how and why local 
authorities use LSVT to withdraw from direct provision of housing.  Respondents’ 
believed that local authority culture; campaigns against transfer; tenants views; 
performance; and the importance of housing all influence a council’s decision to 
transfer their housing stock.   
Respondents in this representative sample survey believed that the transferring 
authorities were largely caring, but old fashioned.  Housing was thought to be low on 
the agenda of councillors, and only a minority of councils were reported to have 
encouraged active tenant participation.  Respondents believed that the low status of 
housing within the sample areas helped to make the decision to transfer easier for 
many councillors.  Only a minority of councillors were reported to have actively 
campaigned against stock transfer, and respondents felt that they were driven by their 
concern about moving housing from a body that they believed was democratically 
accountable, to a body over which they would have significantly less control.  Tenants 
were believed to be willing to change landlords, upon their councillors’ 
recommendations, because they were reportedly concerned about the prospect of rent 
increases forced by changes to the financial regime for council housing.  They were 
reported to have been persuaded by effective consultation campaigns. Other 
respondents felt that tenants were concerned about the inability of their council to 
develop new stock, and the impact this would have upon sons and daughters seeking 
housing.  Perceptions of performance in the transferring authorities ranged from good 
to bad, but there were issues for all authorities that respondents felt had helped to 
build the case for transfer.  In authorities where services were believed to be good 
prior to transfer, a lack of resources was reported to have prevented ambitious 
councils from enhancing their services.  Satisfactory performers were said to have 
wanted to involve tenants more, but were believed to be concerned about raising 
expectations, and not having the resources to meet them. In poorly performing 
authorities, transfer could prevent the transfer of resources from the HRA to the rate 
fund, prior to ring fencing in 1990.   
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Respondents believed that the factors outlined above helped to pave the way for 
councillors to take the strategic decision to transfer their housing stock.  Respondents 
identified a number of core motivations that they felt lay behind the decision of 
councillors to transfer; it would enable other bodies to develop new stock in their 
areas; it would stem stock losses through right to buy; it would enable them to address 
the growing problem of disrepair; it would provide a solution to some of the problems 
brought about by the new financial regime for council housing and the impact of CCT 
for housing management; and it would deliver a capital receipt with which councillors 
could redeem debt and provide new housing and other facilities.   
Staff also perceived councillors as being more interested in other activities, even 
though Housing formed a significant part of local authority activity.  Where 
councillors took an active interest in housing, respondents believed it was usually 
around solving the problems of individual constituents, rather than extending to the 
housing service as a whole.  Councillors’ apparent primary focus on non-housing 
activities, combined with a strong financial and organisational case, and backing from 
tenants, was perceived by respondents as having helped pave the way for transfer in 
the authorities included in the survey.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine how respondents in 20 early LSVT associations perceive 
the role of LSVT in helping to bring about organisational change within publicly 
owned rented housing, based on the experience of 20 early LSVT associations.   I 
examine whether senior management teams transferred from the local authority or 
were employed from the private sector, and the impact this is seen to have upon 
organisational change and development. I examine respondents’ perceptions of the 
process of breaking away from the transferring authorities as an illustration of change, 
and how the new organisations have forged relations with their councils.  I examine 
how the twenty organisations went about developing new cultures and changing the 
way they worked; and respondents’ perceptions of the change brought about as a 
result of a break with local authority council housing tradition. It should be noted that 
the evidence presented in this chapter sets out the views of senior managers who 
either transferred from the local authority or were employed from outside, and that 
there is no contribution from councillors local authority officers. 
ABOUT THE STAFF 
This section examines the background of staff members interviewed; and their views 
on the importance of the background of senior staff in helping to create an 
environment that helps to make organisational change possible.  In ten of the twenty 
associations, the entire senior management teams – chief executive, housing director 
and finance director - were interviewed. All those interviewed were asked about their 
working background, including whether or not they had been employed by the 
sponsoring local authority prior to transfer. In Table 8.1, a tick indicates that a 
member of staff had been employed by the local authority prior to transfer, and a 
cross indicates that they were employed elsewhere, and joined the Association prior to 
or after transfer.  The table shows that just over half of the senior staff in the twenty 
associations were previously employed outside the transferring authority.  
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Table 8.1: Employment of senior managers prior to transfer 
 LSVT association senior managers  
Association Chief 
Exec 
Housing 
Director 
Finance 
Director 
TP 
Officer 
Other 
Windsor & District ✗  ✓  ✗  ✓  - 
Medina ✗  - - ✗  ✗  Housing Manager 
Chiltern Hundreds ✓  ✓  ✓  - - 
1066 - ✓  - - - 
Sovereign ✓  ✓  ✓  ✗  - 
West Kent - ✗  - - - 
Broomleigh ✗  ✗  ✗  - - 
Twynham ✓  - - - - 
Penwith - ✓  - - - 
North Wilts ✓  ✓  ✓  - ✓  - Dir Prop Services 
Leominster Marches ✗  - ✓  - - 
Evesham & Pershore ✓  ✗  ✓  - - 
Plume ✗  - ✗  - ✓  Housing Manager 
Wherry ✗  - - - - 
Hereward ✗  ✗  ✗  - - 
Bedfordshire Pilgrims ✗  ✓  ✗  - - 
New Progress ✓  ✓  - ✗  ✗  Chief Accountant 
✗  Tenancy Services Manager 
Ryedale ✓  ✓  ✗  - - 
Banbury ✗  - ✗  ✗  - 
Rosebery ✗  ✓  ✗  - - 
Total interviewed 54 17 14 13 5 5 
With LA before 
transfer 
25 7 10 5 1 2 
✓  - Employed by sponsoring local authority before transfer 
✗  - Employed elsewhere and joined Association prior to or after transfer  
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Figure 8.1 shows the number of holders of each post interviewed, and those who had 
previously worked with the sponsoring authority. Housing directors are more likely to 
have worked with the sponsoring authority than chief executives, finance directors or 
tenant participation officers. Many district councils do not have senior finance staff 
working exclusively for housing, and consequently a new finance director of adequate 
calibre is often brought in to LSVT associations from outside. Similarly, the 
perception that many of the sponsoring authorities did not devote much attention to 
tenant participation activity might help to explain why a high proportion of tenant 
participation officers are employed from outside the local authority. 
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Fig 8.1: Staff members interviewed and employment background
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Five senior management teams were comprised of a mix of former local government 
officers and employees from RSLs and private sector organisations. Three senior 
management teams were comprised wholly of former local government officials, 
while two were comprised entirely of employees of RSLs and private sector 
organisations.  
Respondents’ views on the importance of the origins of senior staff  
The respondents were asked about the importance of the working background of the 
senior managers of the new organisations, and specifically whether or not they had 
worked with the transferring authority. The aim of senior management teams is seen 
as providing leadership and strategic direction for their organisations, in consultation 
with management committees, and are believed to be key to organisational change. 
Respondents expressed a number of views about the relative merits of senior 
management teams comprised of former local government officers versus teams from 
other organisations. Table 8.2 summarises the range of views on the relevance of the 
working background of senior staff to the organisations.  
Respondents felt that for tenants, staff delivering services at the frontline are more 
visible and immediately relevant than senior staff. Staff transferring with the stock 
reportedly gave tenants a degree of confidence in the new organisations. For tenants 
who are familiar with the senior staff in housing departments of their councils, their 
presence in the new organisation was believed to provide additional comfort.  
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Table 8.2: Respondents’ perceptions of importance of the working background 
of senior staff to their organisations 
 
Respondent previously employed by transferring authority 
Origin of senior staff less important to tenants than origins of frontline staff. (Chief 
Executive) 
Continuity of senior staff provides comfort to tenants and staff. (Chief Executive) 
Senior Management Teams that were with LA face steep learning curve to adapt to 
private sector culture. (Chief Executive) 
Managers from outside the authority may not be aware of local sensitivities, 
making the potential for conflict between the association and authority greater. 
(Chief Executive) 
Respondent from outside the transferring authority 
Bringing in staff from outside can bring a fresh approach and help secure early 
gains. (Chief Executive) 
Employing senior managers from outside the authority can help establish the new 
organisation’s independence (Chief Executive) 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Respondents believed that senior management teams comprised wholly of staff that 
were with the sponsoring authority may not fully appreciate the challenges that they 
face in bringing about change following transfer. A chief executive remarked that her 
senior management team faced “…a very steep learning curve” after transferring to 
the new organisation. The entire team had been accustomed to “being cushioned by 
something else” within the local authority.  
Directors who had not worked with the sponsoring authorities felt strongly that 
bringing in senior staff from outside had a very positive effect on the new 
organisations. They felt that new staff can help to bring a fresh approach to 
management in the critical early stages, where both tenants and staff are believed to 
be looking for early gains.  
Respondents felt that employing staff from outside the sponsoring authority can also 
serve to help establish the new organisation’s independence. One Chief Executive 
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described his appointment as a “pre-emptive strike” against councillor attempts to 
become involved in the running of the organisation. It was “an early blow for 
independence” and sent a clear message to councillors that “this organisation is not 
part of the council”.  
Other respondents felt that there were potential dangers in recruiting senior 
management teams from outside. New staff may not be aware of local sensitivities, 
and the respondents felt this might increase the possibility of conflict between the 
association and sponsoring authority.  
BREAKING AWAY FROM SPONSORING LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
In this section, I examine the respondents’ perceptions of the process of housing 
departments breaking away from their sponsoring authorities to become housing 
associations. This process can be difficult, and it often determines how relations 
between the two organisations will develop in the future. I examine respondents’ 
perceptions of the associations’ relations with their sponsoring local authorities, both 
in the immediate post-transfer period, and at the time the interviews were conducted 
in late 1998 and early 1999. I also examine how some of the associations physically 
break away by expanding beyond the boundaries of their sponsoring authorities.  
Breaking away from sponsoring authorities 
Respondents thought that the ‘divorce’ of housing departments from local authorities 
can often occur amicably, although the potential for conflict between former 
colleagues is reportedly a danger that all LSVT associations are aware of. 
Respondents felt that there is also a potential for conflict on a corporate level.  
Eleven respondents described the relationship of their associations with their 
sponsoring authorities as being good. Two of these associations had encountered 
difficulties between personalities on both sides. Nine respondents felt that their 
relationship with the sponsoring authorities had been difficult on a corporate level, 
with three associations also suffering difficulties on a personal level (see table 8.3). 
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Table 8.3: Perceptions of relationships between associations and transferring 
authorities post-transfer 
 
Good relationship 
between organisations 
Good relationship 
between 
organisations, but 
difficult relationships 
between staff 
Difficult relationship 
between organisations 
Difficult relationships 
between organisations 
and staff 
11 2 9 3 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
There are a number of factors that respondents felt had affected the associations’ 
relationships with their sponsoring authorities. In addition to general tensions and 
misunderstanding of new roles, major factors include were reported to include 
negotiating the stock valuation and transfer ‘deal’; councillors not accepting that they 
had lost control of the stock; a change of members in a subsequent election and a lack 
of understanding about the association; sponsoring authorities inviting other 
associations to develop in the area; and a basic jealousy of the new organisations and 
the freedom they gain. Table 8.4 shows the frequency of these problems among the 
associations reporting a difficult relationship. 
Table 8.4: Factors thought to affect post-transfer relationships 
Factor No of 
associations 
Difficult negotiations on stock valuation/deal between 
HA staff/shadow board and LA officers/councillors 
5 
General tensions and misunderstandings between HA 
staff and LA officers and councillors 
4 
Councillors not accepting that they have lost control 3 
Jealousy  3 
Difficulties in establishing effective communications 2 
Inviting other HAs in to the area to develop 2 
Total 19 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Senior staff in the new housing associations and senior local authority officers 
negotiate stock transfer valuations. Shadow boards and councillors will also have a 
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role in approving the deal negotiated by officers. When negotiating the transfer ‘deal’, 
the sponsoring authority is likely to aim to maximise the stock valuation to enhance 
the capital receipt it will receive. In contrast, the recipient landlord aims to depress the 
valuation to keep borrowings as low as possible to ensure that business plans are not 
too tight. Ultimately both parties aim to strike a sensible balance between maximising 
the council’s capital receipt, and ensuring that the new landlord is financially viable 
and is able to fulfil its promises to tenants. Respondents reported that negotiations are 
often difficult, and this can affect the relationship between the associations and 
sponsoring authorities:  
“…you’re bound to have a difficult relationship. All the time, the same 
people are around on the Council side and the Association side…it’s not 
easy to overcome, because the negotiations are tough. There’s blood on 
the carpet almost when you’re talking about money.” (Housing Services 
Director) 
Respondents believed that one method used by councils to enhance stock valuation 
was to depress predicted costs of the new organisation, either in terms of staffing 
requirements or exceptional repair works. One association director believed that the 
sponsoring authority was demanding more services with fewer staff resources: 
“There were a lot of arguments about staffing levels, because they were 
trying to impose upon us the numbers of staff that would be required. They 
wanted us to decentralise and provide more services, but they weren’t 
willing to allow us to have the staff to carry those functions out. What we 
saw was the effect upon the valuation, and that’s why it got a little bit 
difficult towards the end. That spilled over for a few months afterwards.” 
(Housing Director) 
Difficulties in developing relationships were said to occur when sponsoring 
authorities attempted to depress costs by not permitting the recipient landlord to make 
allowances for the costs of addressing major problems in the housing stock: 
“We’ve got some difficult to let estates, where, frankly, we need to replace 
some of these properties – which are mainly flats – with houses. We’re in 
negotiation with the Housing Corporation, and they say ‘you should have 
taken account of that in your transfer deal’ but of course, the local 
authority wouldn’t let us. Now its left this problem not only for us, but 
also for the local authority. We’ve got this inappropriate housing that 
doesn’t fit its Housing Strategy. There’s all that baggage left behind, 
which we’ve got to overcome.” (Housing Services Director) 
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In other associations, respondents felt that difficulties in the relationship with the 
sponsoring authority occured when both sides did not ‘stand down’ from their 
negotiating positions. This inevitably led to an adversarial relationship, where staff 
were reported to have developed “them and us” stances, rather than seeing the other 
side as a partner: 
“During the first two years of operation, it was almost as if someone 
forgot to tell everybody at the Council’s end that ‘that’s it, the battle’s 
over, we can go back to friendly relations’. Its almost as if the false 
regime of Chinese walls that gets set up between the ballot and transfer, 
and the messages that ‘thou shall not talk to them, we’re negotiating with 
them’ never got switched off.” (Chief Executive) 
In three cases, respondents believed that councillors found it difficult to accept that 
they had given up their authority’s role as a direct provider, and attempted to continue 
to control the new landlord. The recipient landlords attempted to resist this control, 
causing tensions between the two organisations: 
“Initially, there was a big fallout between us and the local authority. The 
Council wanted to continue to run the stock after it had been transferred. 
They thought it was going to be business as usual, and this would be an 
operating arm of [the council]. We had a very independent minded Board, 
and at that time, a very independent minded Managing Director, who 
were coming from a very different direction. They just couldn’t agree on 
the independence of the Association.” (Chief Executive) 
Respondents reported that difficulties appeared to occur when members changed in an 
election shortly after transfer. The respondents suspected that, unlike their 
predecessors, the new councillors may not have been aware of the concept of LSVT, 
and may not have understood why a housing association was running ‘their’ housing 
stock. Respondents felt that it may have taken time for councillors to understand their 
council’s role as an enabler, and not a direct provider of housing.  
Three respondents observed a basic jealousy amongst council staff of the position of 
the new organisations. Staff in councils were thought to have seen a change in culture 
and attitude in the newly established landlord organisations. There was reportedly a 
move away from political control and a perceived focus on service delivery. The staff 
who remained “…would quite like to be in that arena” (Chief Executive) and escape 
from a structure that respondents felt that they might have found frustrating.  
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Finally, two respondents felt that their associations’ relations with their sponsoring 
authorities had been damaged in the early stages by attitudes towards development 
opportunities. One of the associations had expected that it would receive all social 
housing grant available in the area. Although it came to recognise that it was right that 
they should compete for grant, there was an impact on the relationship with the 
council. The other association had never expected that it would receive all or even 
most of the grant available in its area, but that there would be a level playing field 
between it and other competing associations. This was not the case however: 
“…we felt as though we were being treated less than equal with the other 
associations. There was an absolute discrimination against us almost, not 
to give us grant, or not to give us a particular area of work. We didn’t 
expect any favours, but we certainly hoped that we would be treated as 
equals.” (Chief Executive) 
Perceptions of relations with local authority in 1998/99 
By 1998/99, eighteen respondents described their perception of relations with the 
sponsoring authorities as good. One association was reported to have had difficult 
relations at an organisational level, while the other had difficult personal and 
organisational relationships. Both of these associations were approximately four years 
old.  
Three associations whose relationships had reportedly improved attributed this to 
changes in councillors. Although most relationships were perceived to be good, there 
were still some problems in two associations around the issue of councillors who were 
thought to be attempting to control or influence decision making. A Chief Executive 
observed that councillors were said to promote the cause of certain constituents and 
that there was still a feeling of “can’t we tell you what to do?”  
Two associations felt somewhat frustrated by their sponsoring authorities’ distribution 
of social housing grant. In one of these cases, the sponsoring authority was seen as 
being wary of giving favourable terms to the LSVT Association. The Association felt 
that perhaps the council had erred the other way and were too cautious in its handling 
of the grant issue.   
Three of the associations who were reported to have seen an improvement in the 
relationship with their sponsoring authority attributed this to changes in council 
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officers. New personnel and members were said to have developed more effective 
working relationships with the associations. Unlike their predecessors, new members 
and officers did not have a history of either line managing the staff who had gone over 
to the Association, or controlling them through the political process. 
Geographical expansion  
All the associations were attempting to develop new stock to some extent, largely to 
replace units lost through Right to Buy sales, and to spread overheads over a greater 
number of units. The extent to which the twenty associations have expanded outside 
their original sponsoring authorities’ areas varies. Geographical expansion is 
significant because it has the potential to  force changes to an association’s approach 
to housing management.  Figure 8.2 shows the numbers of associations developing 
outside their region; within their region; in adjacent local authority areas; or in their 
own local authority area only.  
Figure 8.2: Geographical Expansion
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Three associations had been developing aggressively and owned stock in a number of 
regions. One of these associations owned stock in nine counties, although 77 per cent 
of its stock was based in its sponsoring authority’s county. Respondents reported that 
the Association had never intended to expand geographically, but opportunities to 
develop in the sponsoring authority’s area were limited.  Respondents attributed this 
to competition with other associations who were invited by the sponsoring authority 
to apply for social housing grant.  Another Association expanded outside its own area 
because the need and capacity to develop in its own area had become more and more 
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limited. Development had reduced homelessness, and land for developing new stock 
was increasingly scarce. The Association’s senior management took the view that “it 
would have been a criminal waste of resources not to use them to address social 
housing in a wider area” (Finance Director). The Association progressively widened 
its boundaries, first beyond its own district to neighbouring districts in the same 
county, then to the counties surrounding the county.  
Respondents reported that expanding geographically can present LSVT associations 
with management challenges. They originate from local authority style housing 
organisations, which provide services to tenants in very restricted geographical areas. 
Service delivery can be difficult when expanding beyond these geographical areas. A 
Chief Executive observed that his association had not “…thought through the 
management implications” of expansion, and that management of distant stock was 
believed to be quite different from management of stock in the same town. Before 
establishing local offices to provide services to dispersed stock, respondents reported 
that the associations felt that they needed to build up a critical mass of units so that 
the additional costs could by fully justified.  
In contrast, five associations were developing in their own sponsoring authorities’ 
areas only. Two of these associations were subsidiaries within group structures, and 
their directors reported that they did not face pressure to expand into other areas, as 
their parents or other group members would seek out new opportunities elsewhere. 
They were established as community based associations for their locales, and as such 
their mission was said to be to concentrate on service delivery and investment in 
existing and new stock in those areas only. Respondents reported that their parent 
organisations or other subsidiaries in the same groups aimed to address needs in other 
areas.  
One of the associations was said to have developed aggressively outside its own area 
in the past, while at the same time reportedly neglecting its original area. The Housing 
Director observed that “…we had a very poor housing stock, yet we owned properties 
in Essex, in Newham… and yet our tenants weren’t happy with the service they were 
getting here in [the local area].” The Association has subsequently disposed of all 
stock outside its own boundaries in order to re-focus its efforts and improve services.  
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Another Association was reported to have taken a view from the outset that it would 
not develop outside its sponsoring authority’s area, until it had completed all catch up 
repairs and works to existing stock. The Board was understood to have taken the view 
that the Association’s role was to “look after what we have, that was what it was set 
up for” (Chief Executive).  
Tenants and sponsoring landlords were believed to be generally supportive of their 
associations’ geographical expansion. Respondents felt that tenants and councillors 
recognised that the associations needed to develop to remain cost effective and to 
avoid stagnation. Councillors and tenants were said to be less supportive of 
development if it distracted their association from either core service delivery or 
repairs and maintenance of existing stock, particularly the catch up repairs 
programme: 
“The Council said to us that their main concern is that they want us to 
keep our promises to our transfer tenants first and foremost. If we are 
able to deliver those, then there’s not a problem with us expanding 
outside the boundary. If it starts to affect the quality of what we’re doing, 
or if we’re [outperforming] the business plan by not undertaking the 
capital repairs that we’d promised to do, they would take a very dim 
view.” (Housing Director) 
Respondents also believed that tenants were supportive of geographical expansion as 
they were said to recognise that their associations may be able to offer opportunities 
for individual transfers to other areas. 
CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
LSVT arguably has the potential to offer staff and managers an opportunity to adopt a 
new culture and to completely re-configure the way they deliver services to tenants. 
This section examines the respondents’ perceptions of the organisational cultures of 
the twenty associations, and the implications for staff and staff structures, housing 
management ethos and style, impact upon customer service, maintenance of tenant 
involvement and the creation of group structures. 
Management Ethos and style 
Directors in all twenty associations felt that their organisations were focused on the 
needs of their customers, although this was in many cases just the perception of 
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respondents, while others had conducted surveys which backed up their view.  This 
focus was reported to have developed fairly rapidly after transfer in most associations. 
Two respondents reported that their associations had not developed new cultures until 
much later on. Directors in another association felt that they had already developed a 
more customer-focused approach while Housing was still under the control of the 
sponsoring authority.  
The management ethos in the associations was characterised by respondents as being 
led by responsiveness, innovation, specialisation, and with a focus on customers. 
They felt that the associations had were aware of people’s expectations and demands 
upon them. This was said to be coupled with a feeling among staff that the 
associations should be delivering what customers wanted. In practical terms, this was 
thought to involve making it easier for customers to deal with the organisations. For 
example, staff in one Association visited tenants in their homes whenever possible, 
rather than expecting tenants to come to an office.  
In the two associations where respondents reported that a customer-focused ethos had 
not been developed until much later on, senior managers attributed the lack of 
progress to their predecessors, who they felt had failed to drive this process forward. 
The Housing Services Director in one of the two associations joined five years after 
transfer, and felt that the organisation had not progressed much in that time: 
“It looked to me to be a local authority in exile. The staff appeared to 
have done many years in the Association and the local authority prior to 
that, but many of the housing staff were unskilled, untrained, de-
motivated. As an organisation, it was quite disorganised. My job was to 
modernise the Housing Service. We set about looking at how policies and 
procedures were written, looking at the competence of staff, and 
measuring the quality of service with our tenants.” (Housing Services 
Director) 
The Association adopted new systems and its performance reportedly improved. 
Senior staff were said to be managing their departments more effectively, and staff 
were thought to have responded positively and work more flexibly. The Association 
recently achieved ISO 9002 accreditation for the Housing service; a Government 
Chartermark; and Investors in People accreditation.  
Chapter Eight ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
Perceptions of organisational change through stock transfer 
Page 202 
 
 
Adapting to New Culture and Working Practices  
Directors in all twenty associations felt that the Associations were more demanding of 
their staff than the sponsoring authorities had been. Respondents argued that this was 
largely because the organisations were thought to focus more closely on the needs of 
tenants. Respondents reported that this approach required greater flexibility and the 
acquisition of new and different skills. Staff were reported to have adapted well to 
new cultures following transfer. Figure 8.3 shows the respondents’ perceptions of 
obstacles and opportunities for staff.   
Figure 8.3: Cultural changes to which staff had to adapt 
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Many staff coming from a local authority background were reported to have become 
accustomed to strict lines of demarcation in their work. Respondents felt that the new 
organisations put staff under the spotlight, where they could no longer say “that’s 
nothing to do with me”. Some were reportedly reluctant to make decisions, and sought 
approval from line managers, apparently to protect their own positions. Respondents 
said that they increasingly expected their staff to take ownership of an issue, make a 
decision based on policy and procedure, and to implement that decision. While many 
staff seemingly welcomed the autonomy this gave them, some were reported to have 
had difficulties adapting: 
“Something that should have disappeared, but got dragged over from the 
Council, was staff wanting to have everything rubber stamped and 
someone else having to approve it. But the tenant wants to have a yes or 
no answer straight away. Staff should know what our policies and 
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procedures are, and shouldn’t need to come back for reassurance. I 
encourage them to make a decision.” (Housing Director)  
Respondents reported that their associations appeared to put a great deal of effort into 
giving staff the support and confidence they need to be able to deal with decisions that 
they have often not been used to making, often  because decisions had been taken by 
more senior staff.  
Directors in seven associations felt that some members of their staff had had 
difficulties in adapting to the pressure of increased demands upon them. One Chief 
Executive took a hard line with staff that could not adapt: 
“We expect performance. We will treat people well, but we expect them to 
work hard for us. And if they don’t like those terms, then they can go.” 
(Chief Executive) 
A number of staff had taken the opportunity of transfer to retire early. A senior 
manager observed that this process “weeded out the people who would not have fitted 
into the new culture”. Staff who were able to adapt were said to have responded 
positively, because they reportedly felt that their efforts were helping to deliver a 
service that tenants were happier with: 
“However hard worked we are, they can see the improvement. Pre-
transfer, we used to get people coming off the phone in tears because 
tenants were yelling and screaming at them. We don’t get that sort of 
thing now - we have a totally different relationship with them.” (Housing 
Manager) 
Staff in seven associations seemingly had difficulties in adapting to the semi-
commercial culture of their new organisations. Respondents reported that members of 
staff had become accustomed to being in a department that was part of a much larger 
organisation. The LSVT associations were completely independent, and respondents 
felt that this independence brought pressure to perform and to meet business plan 
objectives. This pressure was reportedly most intense in the early years following 
transfer, as the associations were most likely to be running at a loss: 
“The change in culture came as a bit of a shock. The fact that money is so 
important to the business, the fact that we kept stressing the need to keep 
very tight control of our costs.” (Chief Executive) 
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Staff in five associations were said to be adapting to a culture where tenants are 
treated more as customers, and meeting customers’ needs became a high priority. 
Respondents believed that the process of consulting and balloting tenants in the run 
up to transfer had brought the organisations closer to them. This process was thought 
to have raised expectations, and the associations were thought to be increasingly 
judged by how they deal with tenants as customers. Consequently, respondents felt 
that there was pressure upon staff to ensure that the organisations were delivering 
effective services: 
“We’ve become more conscious that tenants matter. Within a Local 
Authority, of course tenants mattered, but they weren’t the prime 
consideration. With our staff now, [tenants] have to be the prime 
consideration. I think their motivation is that they want to deliver a good 
service. At the Local Authority, it was ‘how much am I getting paid?’ 
That’s still a consideration, of course, but I think their prime 
consideration is ‘I want to deliver a good service…where aren’t we 
delivering a good service? What can we do to improve it?’” (Chief 
Executive) 
One Association was reported to to be encountering difficulties in encouraging some 
members of staff to adopt the organisation’s culture where tenants were treated as 
customers: 
“It’s an organisation almost of two sections, one section that had been 
here a long time and were with [the sponsoring authority], and the new 
staff. There was clearly a tension here, between – putting it simplistically 
– a more paternalistic approach and a more customer orientated 
approach. That goes throughout the organisation.” (Housing Services 
Director) 
Staff in two associations were believed to have had difficulties in adapting to change 
and uncertainty, that had become a feature of their associations. The Associations 
were believed to be quick to recognise areas of their operations that were not working 
as effectively as they might, and were said to be willing to change them. Respondents 
felt that some members of staff had become accustomed to an environment within 
their sponsoring authorities where there was greater stability in the way services were 
delivered. Some members of staff were thought to be nervous about the impact of 
constant change and evolution on their own position.  
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Management structures 
Respondents were asked to describe the management structure of their associations. 
Four respondents felt that the management structure of their association was 
hierarchical. Eleven respondents felt that their management structures had been 
somewhat flattened following transfer, but that there was scope for further change. 
Five respondents felt that the management structure was flat, that is, that there were 
few tiers of management between the frontline staff and the Chief Executive.  
Flattening the structure of the associations involved removing layers of management 
between the Chief Executive at the top, and the interface with the customer. 
Respondents reported that part of this process involved giving people at the bottom of 
the hierarchy more responsibility and authority, both to avoid overload at the top, and 
also to help ensure that customers can get answers to their questions as quickly as 
possible: 
“Originally, our structure was set up the way it is for monitoring 
purposes. Now its not. Effectively, we’re trying to provide a better service 
and we believe that this is the best way of doing that. Originally, every 
letter went out with my name on. That’s how local government orientated 
we were. Now every housing officer does their own correspondence.” 
(Housing Services Director) 
Devolved Budgets 
Nine associations had devolved some degree of control over budgets to staff. Table 
8.5 describes the types of devolved budget, which include team budgets; budgets for 
small scale projects; delegation of specific budgets, such as responsive repairs; and 
delegation of all budgetary control to middle management. 
Table 8.5: Extent of devolution of control over budgets 
 Description of devolved budget No of 
associations 
A Budgets devolved to area teams  3 
B Estate Managers/Housing Officers have small budgets for 
environmental improvements 
3 
C Budgetary control delegated to middle management  2 
D Housing officers responsible for responsive repairs budgets. 1 
E All staff given a budget 1 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
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Devolved budgets in three associations involved giving all housing officers a small 
amount of money each year, which they could spend at their discretion, within certain 
parameters. The aim was to “give them the idea that they can get something done” on 
their patch outside the programme of stock reinvestment (Housing Director). 
One of the associations had attempted to devolve control of budgets and spending 
decisions to tenants, but the respondent reported that tenants were reluctant to grasp 
the opportunity: 
“We did try to go the whole hog in two pilot projects on resident 
democracy - effectively creating local boards of tenants, where they could 
say where they wanted the money to be spent. At that time, the rent 
envelope wasn’t around, and they could say ‘let’s have another 50p a 
week on rents to do X’. We actually found that it was the staff who were 
more flexible and open minded about it than the tenants. We were 
prepared to break down the old landlord-tenant relationships of the 20th 
century, but the tenants weren’t.” (Chief Executive) 
A Housing Services Director in one of the nine associations had given all his staff a 
budget, in an attempt to “teach them some good housekeeping” and to help them 
understand how small items of expenditure contributed to the total expenditure of the 
association. Devolved budgeting were reported to have been effective and popular 
among the staff: 
“When you’re at the bottom level, and you haven’t got budgetary 
responsibility, you’d always say ‘Can I have a bit of money for this, 
because I think it’s a good idea’. It was a good idea, but they never had a 
vision of how it fitted into the whole…whereas by giving them all a 
budget, they learn, and it makes them think. It’s theirs, and once it’s gone, 
they don’t get any more. They’re cunning buggers, because they barter 
their budgets among themselves. If someone’s got a big project that’s 
more than their budget, they’ll try and get other people’s budgets on the 
understanding that next year, they’ll give some of theirs back.” (Housing 
Services Director) 
Local Offices  
A majority of the twenty associations made use of area offices to deliver services to 
tenants, and many local teams offered a generic service. Table 8.6 shows the number 
of associations operating from single offices and from more than one area-based 
office and if staff offer a generic service.  
Chapter Eight ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
Perceptions of organisational change through stock transfer 
Page 207 
 
 
Table 8.6: Organisation of housing management services 
HA Approximate 
number of 
units owned 
Operating 
from 
single 
office 
Area 
Offices 
Generic 
service 
Description 
1 3200 ✓    Staff operate from Head office 
2 2600  ✓   Two area housing teams, dealing with all HM 
functions. Separate Housing Needs Team. 
3 4500  ✓  ✓  Operates from six area housing offices, 
providing generic services. 
4 4600  ✓   Two area offices, which have limited opening 
hours and are, shared with other service 
providers. 
5 9000  ✓  ✓  A regional structure. Generic housing 
officers. 4 regional offices. 
6 5500  ✓  ✓  Two area offices with generic housing 
officers. 
7 12000  ✓   Three area offices with devolved decision 
making in each. 
8 1900  ✓  ✓  Three area offices each with generic teams. 
9 3300  ✓   Two area offices, not entirely generic. 
Another office will be opened when a 
“critical mass” reached. 
10 6000  ✓  ✓  Five area offices, all generic teams. 
11 1800 ✓   ✓  Operating from Head Office. Five housing 
officers are “reasonably” generic, plus two 
specialists. Staff go out to tenants.  
12 4000  ✓  ✓  Two area offices. Generic teams in each. 
13 2000 ✓   ✓  Two generic area teams operate from Head 
Office. Staff go out to tenants as much as 
possible. 
14 4000 ✓   ✓  Generic housing officers operating from 
Head Office.  
15 4100  ✓   Three area offices. Functional teams (generic 
teams scrapped). 
16 8200  ✓   Three area teams operating from local 
offices. 
17 3500  ✓  ✓  Three area offices. Generic teams. 
18 3400  ✓  ✓  Three area offices. Generic teams. 
19 1400 ✓    Stock divided into HO patches, operating 
from Head Office. 
20 1700 ✓    Four patches, not completely generic, 
operating from Head Office.  
Totals 6 14 11  
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Area offices and generic teams were clearly favoured by a majority of the 
associations. One association was reported to have taken the decision not to open 
local offices because there was no obvious site, and because the additional cost was 
thought to outweigh the benefits. The Association’s standard practice of visiting 
tenants, rather than expecting them to come to an office, had helped it to avoid 
pressure to open local offices: 
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“A small office in terms of bricks and mortar is quite expensive. Two 
[members of staff] is not the right number. Three is the right number, but 
you can’t necessarily afford that in terms of unit costs by the time you’ve 
added the office costs on as well. We’ve taken a conscious decision to try 
and avoid opening that type of area office. There is some political 
pressure to do that.” (Chief Executive) 
An association who had started with generic teams had scrapped them a few years 
after transfer. Generic teams had dealt with almost all aspects of the service within 
their areas. The respondent reported that the Association found that it had been 
difficult to take an area wide view, because the only person outside the generic teams 
was the Housing Director: 
“We found that we weren’t concentrating on the service as a whole, 
particularly in sheltered housing. We decided that if we had a team that 
looked after sheltered housing, and a centralised repair taking team 
(because one office was significantly under-performing the other two) 
then we might be able to get some consistency back into it.” (Chief 
Executive) 
Creation of Group Structures 
Respondents felt that establishing or joining a group structure offered a number of 
advantages for LSVT associations – the ability to share overhead costs; to “hive off” 
non-core activities (those activities not directly related to the provision of social 
housing) to separate organisations and enable a core part of the group to concentrate 
on service delivery to local tenants; to undertake stock transfers for other authorities; 
and to enable charitable associations to establish profit-making enterprises. 
In common with the rest of the RSL sector, many of the twenty LSVT associations 
were actively considering establishing or joining group structures, or had already done 
so. Figure 8.4 shows the stages that the twenty associations had reached. 
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Figure 8.4: Steps taken towards establishing or joining group 
structures
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
By establishing a group structure, and inviting other associations to join it, an LSVT 
association can spread overhead costs over a greater number of units. Each individual 
association in the group can maintain its own local board and own identity, and can 
arguably operate with a degree of autonomy. By joining a group structure, 
respondents believed that small but expanding associations could access a good IT 
system, IT manager and finance director, without paying the full cost.  
Respondents felt that group structures might in the future result in more efficient 
delivery of stock transfers and stock transfer landlords: 
“I look around and see all these LSVTs coming into existence, and they’ve 
all got their managing directors, their finance directors, their IT 
managers, their chief accountants. And you think…do they really need all 
that? Wouldn’t it be better if they were in some form of group 
organisation, where the central services are provided? You’ve still got to 
provide the local service, and the local choice, the local board. But do 
they all need to employ this expensive bunch of individuals? I think there 
is scope for mergers and assisting other stock transfers, where you have 
that central expertise at the right marginal cost.” (Finance Director) 
Respondents reported that new stock transfer associations that join a Group formed by 
an existing LSVT association might also be able to negotiate more preferential terms 
with funders than newly created standalone associations: 
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“If we were to finance another stock transfer, and put that alongside our 
current one, I expect margins on both deals to drop. The margin that 
would have been applied if you had been an untried, untested, 
inexperienced, vulnerable organisation would have been reduced, 
because they’ll take account of the fact that you’ve got a partner who has 
experience.” (Finance Director) 
One Association is part of a group that was established to enable the stock transfer in 
its area to take place. The Group has since undertaken a further transfer in an inner 
urban area. Respondents reported that directors from the LSVT association played a 
major role in establishing this new organisation, including undertaking much of the 
financial planning in the run up to transfer. Respondents believed that the organisation 
appears to able to deliver stock transfers efficiently and effectively because it has 
practical experience through the original transfer. 
Directors at another Association were also reported to be keen to share their 
experience and understanding of stock transfers. They felt that their existing structure 
was not able to accommodate stock from other authorities without having an impact 
upon original tenants. A group structure would enable the Association to undertake 
other stock transfers while at the same time protecting the position of original tenants: 
“If we said that we would do a stock transfer for Authority X, and make 
[the acquiring association] a subsidiary, or if we said we’ll merge with 
the another LSVT, then I think the Council and the tenants would think 
that this was a distortion of what they voted for four years ago. But if we 
have a group structure, [the original association] can sit within the Group 
and do its own thing. But we have a much more robust vehicle for tacking 
on stock transfers from elsewhere, without distorting Big Brother.” (Chief 
Executive) 
Six respondents reported that their associations were not currently considering 
establishing group structures.  Some held a certain degree of scepticism about the 
aims and objectives of other associations who might want to join a group structure. A 
Housing Director felt that his association was “a unique kind of body” which might 
not be compatible with others. 
Respondents’ perception of staff morale 
According to directors, staff morale in fifteen of the twenty associations was generally 
high. Although it might be predicted that a high proportion of directors would believe, 
from their position, that morale further down their organisations was high, it is 
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interesting to note that respondents in five out of twenty of the associations admitted 
that morale was low.  Respondents who reported that morale was good attributed this 
to a feeling among staff that they were better placed to provide a good service to 
tenants. A director observed that for local authority housing staff there was ‘nothing 
so soul destroying as saying ‘no we can’t house you, don’t call us, we’ll call you.’ 
Staff reportedly spent less time explaining to tenants why certain things could not be 
done and more time on enhancing and improving services. Another director felt that 
his Association delivered a degree of certainty about the future, whereas the future of 
the Housing operation within the local authority had been uncertain: 
“The future is clearer. That always helps morale. The future of this 
organisation is certain, it’s mapped out in the Business Plan, and 
everyone knows where we’re going. Council housing has always been an 
area of great debate and consternation, and that doesn’t help morale.” 
(Housing Services Director) 
In five associations, respondents felt that morale was mixed. The five associations had 
been in operation for between four and ten years. Respondents believed that the main 
problems for staff centred on second or third rounds of re-organisation, change and 
weariness with the fast pace of work. While respondents felt that staff had positive 
feelings towards their associations, poor morale was believed to be focused on 
uncertainty about individuals’ personal positions within the organisations. Low 
morale was seen by respondents as being a short-term problem, which would improve 
as staff became accustomed to new structures.  
In the immediate post transfer period, staff morale in five associations was reported to 
be either mixed or poor. Only one of these associations also reported mixed or poor 
morale at the time of interview. In four associations, staff were thought to have had 
encountered difficulties in adapting to a shift in culture. A director in one of these 
associations observed that staff had to adapt to a culture where individual 
performance was monitored and measured for the first time. Associations seemingly 
recognised that individual performance contributed to the success of the organisation 
as a whole, including meeting business plan targets: 
“Staff morale definitely dipped after transfer. If you worked in Housing, it 
dipped, because we had to face up to performance. That was a real 
culture change for us. We moved from a Council who couldn’t give a toss 
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about rent arrears and that sort of thing to an organisation that did. That 
was faced up to mainly in the first year. After that, things improved.” 
(Housing Services Director) 
Staff in the fifth association that suffered from low morale after transfer had to cope 
with structural re-organisation and change. Respondents reported that there was a 
period during which members of staff were reviewed and jobs were evaluated. This 
process culminated in a number of people being re-graded, both up and down. 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF HOW THE ASSOCIATIONS ARE 
DIFFERENT FROM LOCAL AUTHORITY PAST 
This section examines respondents’ views on how the associations are different from 
the housing departments under the control of the sponsoring authorities. These 
perceived differences are important in helping us understand LSVT associations. I 
examine respondents’ views on the importance of housing as an activity to the 
sponsoring authorities; changes from the past; and developing customer focused 
organisations.  The respondents arguably have a direct interest in demonstrating 
improvements in performance and structures following transfer, and the arguments 
presented here should be read in that context.  Further research, including, for 
example, interviews with councillors in the transferring authorities, or with tenants, 
might reveal a contrasting picture to the respondents’ assertions.   
Changes from the past  
Respondents were asked to identify key organisational changes following stock 
transfer (see figure 8.5).  
Single Purpose Organisations 
Respondents in twelve associations identified the move from a multi-purpose 
organisation to a single purpose organisation as being important. I discussed the pros 
and cons of single purpose versus multi-purpose organisations in chapters two, three 
and four.  Respondents tended to favour a move away from multi-purpose 
organisations towards single purpose bodies.  In local authorities, respondents felt that 
housing departments were in competition with other services for councillors’ time, 
resources and attention. They also believed that there were constraints on innovation 
from other parts of the authorities.  
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Figure 8.5: Respondents' perceptions of how LSVT associations are 
different from local authority housing departments 
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
 
Following transfer, respondents felt that staff were able to concentrate on their role as 
a landlord, and tenants were treated more as customers. In local authorities, this was 
believed to be much more difficult, as the councillors – who formulate strategy and 
policy for Housing – were said to have many other interests. Housing departments 
may find themselves competing for resources with other departments: 
“It is easier from a Housing point of view to deliver a good service, 
simply because you’re focused on a much narrower range of activity. In a 
local authority, you get pulled in so many different ways when you go to 
the Corporate Management Team – you’ve got Social Services and 
Planning and Highways and Engineering. And the local authority has 
pressures from all directions. This organisation focuses on housing, and 
that makes it much easier.” (Chief Executive) 
Operating outside local authority structures seemingly gives staff more freedom to 
innovate. Within the local authority structure, respondents felt that councillors or 
other departments stifled innovation. In contrast, the only constraints on associations 
were believed to be cost and time: 
“We’re now freer to operate, and we’re not constrained by the Corporate 
Management Team, or the political infighting. We’re much more able to 
develop that culture. We’re seeking to be far more entrepreneurial than 
we ever could have been within the constraints of the local authority.” 
(Chief Executive) 
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New Influences  
Transfer to a housing association reportedly brings new influences upon the Housing 
Service. Respondents in ten associations believed that a positive influence was 
brought by private funders and independent board members. Respondents pointed out 
that local authority housing committees were made up of elected councillors, who 
were often “well meaning, but people who just happened to have the time, but didn’t 
have a lot of expertise in the area” (Housing Manager). Respondents felt that the 
complexities of local government finance led to increasing reliance on finance 
directors and chief executives, as the election system does not necessarily deliver 
councillors with a sufficient understanding to ask challenging questions: 
“By being elected, there’s nothing in the election system that actually says 
that you’ve got any skills to do things, which I think is one of the big 
problems. You’ve got a lot of people in local government who are 
committed politically and socially. But they might not have a clue what 
they’re doing.” (Chief Executive) 
However, the idea that councillors should be expected to have a full grasp of all issues 
under their consideration and that they should develop policy has been criticised by, 
for example, Wilson et al (1998).  Indeed, similar criticisms could be applied to an 
expectation that LSVT board members should be able to lead their organisations 
without the advice of their senior paid staff. For example, the NFHA (1995) has 
suggested that the housing association movement might consider a more business 
orientated model, with committees reconstituted as boards comprised of senior staff 
and paid non-executive directors.  
Respondents argued that independent board members were selected to ensure that an 
association is led by people with sufficient skills and understanding. Boards 
reportedly contained a range of skills “from accountants to architects to surveyors” 
(Housing Director).  While the selection process may well put together a board with 
various skills, it may been seen as undemocratic, resembling what Greer & Hoggett 
(1995:27) describe as “self perpetuating oligarchies”.  
Respondents also highlighted the influence of funders, who seemingly bring a culture 
of cost control and financial discipline which respondents felt was often of some 
benefit to the organisations: 
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“They bring constructive control. They’re not just interested in money, 
they’re interested in our tenants, and that was a real shock to me.” (Chief 
Executive) 
Freedom to innovate  
Respondents in ten associations felt that the local government system had constrained 
and stifled innovative ways of working. This was not only due to competition for 
resources with other departments, but also due to incentives built into the system to 
prevent staff taking risks: 
“Too many decisions are made by committee and the philosophy is to be 
risk averse, because you don’t want to get blamed. If you’re risk averse, 
you don’t learn. Those organisations that don’t make mistakes won’t 
learn. They become bureaucratic and it becomes stifling. Its much more 
difficult for a local authority to be innovative.” (Chief Executive)  
Freedom from local authority politics 
Respondents in ten associations highlighted their associations’ freedom from local 
authority politics. The origins of the associations meant that they were “not divorced 
from politics, but separate from politics” (Chief Executive). Directors reported that 
they had often been frustrated when putting housing issues before committee, and 
finding them being turned into “political footballs” (Housing Director). This view 
tends to be supported by Stoker (1991) who argues that opposition party councillors 
have very few resources at their disposal in order to act in the interests of their 
constituents.  However, “publicity and political embarrassment can provide useful 
resources” (ibid: 100). 
Prior to stock transfer, respondents reported that some councillors had sometimes 
become involved in operational matters, rather than concentrating on strategy and 
setting the parameters within which staff should operate. This criticism of councillors’ 
by the respondents may be unjustified, as they may see their role as “monitors and 
progress chasers” (Stewart, 1990:27).  However, Widdecombe (1986) raised concerns 
over the tendency for some councillors to increasingly challenge their directors’ ‘right 
to manage’ their own departments.  Respondents reported that some councillors were 
thought to have become accustomed to bringing pressure to bear on staff on behalf of 
individual constituents: 
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“There’s nothing wrong with political influence. If the members decide 
that the strategy is to build houses in village A or town B, fine. They’re 
elected to make that decision. But getting involved in who gets what 
house, and who works for whom, that kind of nonsense doesn’t help.” 
(Housing Services Director) 
Respondents also felt that political considerations were high in the order of priority 
factors in decision making on financial issues.  This criticism was referred to in earlier 
chapters (Emms, 1990; Henney, 1984). The respondents believed that the associations 
were able to move business considerations higher in the order of priorities: 
“Rents are really set with an eye to the politics of a situation on an annual 
basis by the government – with some local manoeuvring possibly – then 
its not a business decision…its not related to the standard of service 
tenants get or the standard of properties that the tenants get.” (Finance 
Director) 
Long term Approach 
Respondents in six associations believed that  their organisations were well placed to 
adopt a long term approach to housing investment. The associations were reportedly 
not geared to a political cycle, which tends to last for four to five years. Under the 
local authority. respondents felt that priorities for the service may have changed if the 
ruling political group had changed: 
“The trouble with local authorities is that they work on a political cycle, 
and members quite dramatically challenge and officers challenge quite 
radically as well. That gets in the way of the long term view being taken.” 
(Chief Executive) 
Respondents believed that there was also a high level of uncertainty about future 
funds for investment in the stock. Levels of investment were determined largely by 
central government. Although councils were able to make long term plans for stock 
re-investment, respondents felt that they could never guarantee that they would be 
fulfilled, because “…the resourcing side is always subject to government 
intervention” (Chief Executive). Respondents felt that transfer had given staff the 
opportunity to plan a long term stock re-investment programme, which would be fully 
funded and guaranteed: 
“We can say to people that we will refurbish their house in three years, 
and know that we can deliver that. Its about saying to people that their 
rents in three years time will be X, and that you can deliver. Its not 
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waiting each Christmas to see what you’re going to be allowed to spend 
on your capital programme with some ministerial announcement. It was 
so difficult to establish credibility and so difficult to plan. You don’t have 
the abortive work. You know where you’re going. You can take a view 
over the long term.” (Chief Executive) 
Developing a Customer Focus 
There was a consensus among respondents that, while their perception of the 
performance of the former local authority housing departments was adequate or good, 
there was scope for improvement. In many cases, respondents felt that a lack of 
resources meant that the departments were unable to meet customers’ needs, leading 
to a perception of defensiveness amongst staff, as they seemingly sought to resist 
additional demands from tenants. In turn, tenants were believed to have become 
accustomed to not expecting too much from their landlords. Transfer of the housing 
stock reportedly gave staff an opportunity to refocus on the needs of customers. 
Respondents believed that the organisations were able to operate outside the 
constraints of the local government financial regime, and that they had additional 
resources to address re-investment needs. In turn, respondents felt that tenants were 
encouraged to expect more from their landlord.  It is possible to argue that, had the 
sponsoring authorities enjoyed the same level of resources as the LSVT associations, 
they too could have done more to meet tenants’ expectations.   
Respondents in all twenty associations reported that steps had been taken towards 
providing a service focused on the needs of customers. Respondents in eleven 
associations felt that the customer service ethic had penetrated every level of their 
organisations. Respondents in nine associations felt that a customer focus was 
developing, but that further progress was required.  
Respondents believed that LSVT forced staff, managers and politicians to really listen 
to tenants and act upon their wishes. They seemingly recognised that tenants largely 
had the power of veto over the process, as it would be them who would ultimately 
decide whether or not the transfer would proceed. Respondents reported that the 
closeness of staff to tenants continued after transfer, although as discussed in the next 
chapter, tenants did not always reciprocate by participating: 
“We work very hard at trying to engender tenant participation and tenant 
consultation. But we’re not tenant led, we’re not as good as we should be 
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at having tenants’ views on what the service should be. But we do react 
very quickly to tenants’ issues and problems. Part of what an LSVT forces 
you to do is actually get close to tenants. Every tenant is visited once, or 
maybe twice. Once that level of expectation has been built up, its very 
difficult to move away from. The very act of LSVT makes landlords closer 
to their tenants.” (Housing Services Director) 
Respondents believed that expansion and development outside the sponsoring 
authorities’ areas meant that associations had to some extent not focused sufficiently 
on providing customer services tailored to the varying needs of tenants in different 
areas. The original housing management services were designed for a traditional shire 
district council housing stock, where all units were located in a relatively small area. 
This style of management was reportedly not well suited when associations built units 
outside their core areas, and this has forced re-configuration of services: 
“Our big anxiety is that our growth is avoiding us focusing as clearly as 
we might on services delivery, and that’s beginning to show in our core 
stock as well as our dispersed stock. We’re thinking about getting some 
groups or consumer panels into play, but we’re not quite sure what the 
questions are yet, let along what the answers are. Some of the ideas we’re 
looking at include trying to re-focus our [original area] operation, and to 
recognise that the services needed by our original stock are different to 
the services – or the delivery of them – that we need in other places. 
Whilst we want consistency in terms of how telephones are answered, how 
enquiries are dealt with, it’s apparent to us that the needs of our original 
stock in terms of the staff groups we have are different to the people who 
are living 50 – 60 miles away. We might need generic teams who are 
much more mobile, who are able to go out by appointment, whereas in the 
[original area] base, we might well need a public office still open where 
people can come in. We’re trying to get to grips with all that to see where 
that might lead us.” (Housing Services Director) 
Respondents believed that LSVT associations faced a conflict between their apparent 
desire to provide a better quality of customer service with the need to contain costs in 
order to meet covenants and ensure financial viability. All the associations are entirely 
debt funded, and have to operate primarily as businesses, because they have loans to 
pay. They are also social landlords, and they need to “steer a route between the two” 
(Housing Director). One respondent observed that his Association did not always 
strike what he considered to be an appropriate balance between business objectives 
and social objectives: 
Chapter Eight ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
Perceptions of organisational change through stock transfer 
Page 219 
 
 
“We tended to be very lean and mean… probably too mean…to provide 
the services we want. The biggest fear during the first few years was ‘are 
we going to make it financially?’ We were very much aware that we had a 
very tight two or three years that we had to get through. Everybody was 
driven to make sure that we didn’t overspend.” (Housing Services 
Director) 
Respondents in another Association felt that the customer service focus had been 
stronger immediately after transfer than it was five years later. Again, the 
requirements of the business plan seemingly had to take precedence over customer 
focus when the Association encountered financial difficulties: 
“I think it was stronger at the start than it is now. That was one of the 
things that there was a big push on when we first became an Association. 
People were excited by the new organisation, and there was a feeling that 
we had to prove ourselves. I sometimes get the impression that that’s 
drifted a little – that’s one of the things that’s suffered as a result of the 
budgetary issues. For example, we’re now making housing officers spend 
more time on rent arrears and voids control, so we meet business plan 
targets. So they spend less time on customer service.” (Housing Director) 
Although tenants were involved in varying degrees in establishing the LSVT 
associations, respondents indicated that their role appears to have been most effective 
in shaping customer services in the two newly created subsidiary associations. Staff 
reportedly worked with tenants to ensure that they delivered an organisation focused 
purely on local needs. Respondents felt that this may have stemmed from a fear 
among staff that tenants may not have voted for transfer to an organisation that too 
closely resembled the parent organisation: 
“There was an opportunity to start something afresh. So this new Board 
was in a position to ask ‘what sort of services do these people want, and 
how can we deliver a service that meets their expectations?’ We were 
starting with no history, so we could do nothing other than get things 
right.” (Tenant Participation Officer) 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter, I explored respondents’ perceptions of how LSVT can help to deliver 
organisational change.  I examined perceptions of the influence of senior management 
upon change and the pressures upon staff to change; perceptions of the process of 
breaking away from the transferring authority and its links with organisational 
development; perceptions of how the new organisations develop new cultures; and 
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how the new organisations are perceived to be different from the former local 
authority housing departments.   
Approximately half of the senior staff in the twenty LSVT associations were former 
local government officers. While respondents felt that staff at the frontline were more 
important in helping to shape tenants’ views of the new organisations, they believed 
that former local government staff faced steep learning curves in adapting to the post 
transfer environment.  Senior staff brought in from outside the local authority 
reportedly took a more proactive stance towards organisational change.   
During the process of breaking away from the transferring authority, respondents felt 
that there was potential for conflict between the authority and LSVT association due 
to general tensions, tough negotiations, lack of understanding by councillors, and a 
basic jealousy of the new organisations’ perceived freedom outside the local 
government structure.  However, difficult relations during the early period are 
seemingly resolved after a short period has elapsed, and both sides adapt to new ways 
of working with each other.  Some of the twenty LSVT associations have physically 
broken away from their sponsoring authority’s area by developing elsewhere.  
Respondents felt that this process had presented its own management challenges, 
driving further organisational.   
The new organisations were reported to have taken steps towards developing new 
cultures, particularly a focus upon the needs and aspirations of customers.  The twenty 
LSVT associations were seemingly more demanding of their staff as a result, with the 
majority of staff adapting well to this change.  Following transfer, senior managers 
have taken steps to flatten management structures, with a reduction in the number of 
tiers between the chief executives and frontline staff.  Respondents felt that this 
process has helped to drive the organisations in the direction of change to place 
customers first, including more devolution of budgets and the provision of local 
offices.  Respondents felt that this change also helped to drive the creation of group 
structures to enable growth and change, while protecting the interests of tenants of 
group members.  Respondents believed that staff morale has generally risen as a result 
of change, and they attributed this to improved relations with tenants. 
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Respondents perceived a number of changes delivered through stock transfer.  The 
new organisations were felt to have a single focus on housing, which enabled them to 
concentrate more closely on their landlord role.  There are new influences, including 
private lenders and independent board members, which reportedly help to drive 
organisational change.  Respondents felt that the new organisations are free from local 
authority politics, which enabled somewhat greater scope for innovation.  Finally, 
respondents felt that the organisations were better placed to take a long term approach 
to investment and organisational development, largely due to their ability to work 
outside the constraints of the local government financial regime.      
In the next chapter, I explore respondents’ perceptions of how the shift of housing in 
the twenty survey areas from the public to the private sector has impacted on the 
organisations, staff and tenants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I explore respondents’ perceptions of how the shift of housing in the 
twenty survey areas from the public to the private sector has impacted on the 
organisations, staff and tenants.  I explore their perceptions of the impact of greater 
tenant involvement and the creation of a form of quasi market during and after the 
transfer process, particularly whether respondents feel that tenants have used their 
new role to push for enhanced services from their landlords.  I examine how the new 
private sector organisations are governed and how respondents believe these 
structures provide continuing accountability to tenants and the wider community.  I 
explore how a shift towards the private sector can arguably help create the conditions 
for greater long term sustainability of socially rented housing.  Finally, I examine 
respondents’ views on how private sector influence affects the funding and financial 
performance of LSVT associations.  As with the previous two chapters, readers 
should note that the views presented here are expressed by one particular group with 
particular interests.  Further research, exploring the views of tenants, local authority 
officers and councillors, would provide a further valuable dimension to this 
discussion.  
CREATING A FORM OF QUASI MARKET BY INVOLVING TENANTS 
Respondents reported that the run up to transfer involves intensive consultation with 
tenants. They believed that the consultation process is likely to bring staff closer to 
tenants than they have ever been before, or will be again in the future. While I did not 
interview tenants of the twenty LSVT associations, due to time constraints, Lee, 
Power and Tunstall (1999) demonstrates clearly how an authority which had largely 
ignored its tenants is forced to involve them as key partners in a transfer and the on-
going management of the recipient landlord.  The process is reported to offer LSVT 
associations an opportunity to encourage tenants to get involved in the running of the 
organisation. However, respondents in fourteen of the twenty associations felt that, 
despite efforts to encourage tenants, there was little continuing interest in routine 
tenant participation.  Respondents in five associations felt that tenants were interested, 
but their interest was attributed to the non-traditional methods of participation that the 
associations had adopted. These methods included focus groups and panels of tenants 
Chapter Nine ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
Respondents’ perceptions of how the organisations changed under the influence 
of a more private sector style of provision 
Page 223 
 
who were contacted by telephone when their association required tenants’ views on a 
particular issue.  
Respondents in the fourteen associations reported that they were struggling to 
maintain tenant interest found that tenants would only get involved when there was an 
issue that affected them directly, or if part of the service was failing. This 
phenomenon is believed to be a common feature in many social landlords and has 
been attributed to a mismatch in the perceptions of structures for participation held by 
the landlords and tenants (Department of the Environment, 1993a). When things did 
go wrong, respondents reported that the associations found this to be an effective way 
of encouraging tenants to set up Tenants’ Associations. These groups would, 
however, quickly dissipate once the problem had been addressed. A Chief Executive 
had begun to question the presumption of housing professionals that tenants 
necessarily want to be involved at all: 
“I had someone say to me at a public meeting not long ago ‘Why do you 
keep bombarding me with all this information? Why do you keep 
assuming I want to be involved? I buy my gas from British Gas…it 
normally doesn’t go wrong…I don’t want to be involved in the running of 
British Gas. I pay my rent, please leave me alone.’ And I thought maybe 
that the new paternalism is assuming that we know tenants want to be 
involved. Maybe we’re wrong. Tenants don’t want to be involved, and in 
fact they just want to be left alone. I haven’t quite got there yet…I want 
them to be involved. I want them to be telling me what they want.” (Chief 
Executive) 
Respondents argued that tenant participation is something that landlords need from 
their customers. They felt that in the private sector, customers can let their provider 
know they are happy with the service they receive by going back and buying the 
service again. Conversely, if customers are unhappy they can buy the service from 
another supplier. In social housing, tenants arrive in their home through an allocation 
process. They often have no choice in where they are housed, and often lack the 
opportunity to leave if they are unhappy. Tenant participation is therefore believed to 
be an important substitute for “choice” by helping to give landlords signals that tell 
them when they are doing well and when they need to improve or change. 
Another respondent also argued that as long as tenants were “happy” with the service 
they received, the Association should not necessarily assume that they want to be 
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involved. The danger in such an approach is that a landlord could assume its tenants 
are satisfied, withdraw its efforts to involve tenants, and no longer learn about the 
areas in which it needs to change or improve.  The respondent argued, perhaps 
naively, that a better approach was to offer the opportunity to get involved, but not 
assume that the Association was doing anything wrong if tenants decided not to: 
“People tend to be a bit apathetic. If they’ve got a grouse, they’ll respond. 
Tenants don’t want to be involved. I think they should have the right to be 
involved. Some of them have actually said to me ‘you’re paid to do this, 
why should I do it for nothing?’ Fair enough – why should they? It’s only 
when they’ve got a grouse that they actually want to get involved. As soon 
as that problem is solved, they disappear. They’ve got their own lives to 
lead. I think we’ve got it right – they can participate, we encourage them 
to participate, but the decision is down to them.” (Chief Executive) 
In six associations, tenant participation appeared to attract a body of tenants who 
respondents felt might not be representative of the views of all tenants. For example, 
Tenant Participation activities were said to attract the same group of tenants who 
attended all meetings and events, or only older tenants. This was particularly the case 
for broad conceptual consultation, such as deciding upon the future aims of an 
association: 
“We get increasingly elderly tenants who I fear are not representative of 
our tenant body. We’ve worked very hard to engender interest among our 
younger or even middle aged tenants, and that’s difficult. We make sure 
we have childcare available, we’ll pay people’s taxi fares. We’ve tried to 
target the newsletters more at the younger audience. It’s an uphill 
struggle. Younger people seem to want to tell us very quickly when 
something goes wrong, which is fine, but they don’t want to stick around 
and tell us when things go right.” (Tenant Participation Officer)  
The five associations that had reportedly been able to maintain tenant interest in 
participation had adopted a number of non-traditional approaches. According to 
respondents, traditional methods had proved to be unpopular, but tenants had shown 
more interest in focus groups. One Association had established a Tenants’ Forum 
which was used as a sounding board for testing out new approaches to service 
delivery. The tenants were initially interviewed over the phone through a consultant, 
and the Association speaks to the same tenants again on a range of issues throughout 
the year. Although the number of tenants involved is small, the forum was believed to 
include a wider range of tenants than the Association had been attracting to traditional 
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meetings. Other associations had also run focus groups to seek tenants’ views on 
issues they faced.  
A drive for improvements in customer service? 
Respondents in sixteen associations felt that the push for better customer service was 
coming exclusively from the senior management team. Two respondents felt that both 
tenants and senior management were demanding better service, while one respondent 
felt that staff, tenants and senior managers were all pushing for improvements.  One 
respondent felt that the push for better service came exclusively from tenants.  
Respondents expressed a certain amount of disappointment that tenants were not more 
demanding of their landlord: 
“Initially, we expected them to be, but it didn’t transpire that they were. I 
found that quite strange.” (Chief Executive) 
This was believed to be linked to the lack of interest in participation, which 
respondents claimed was due largely to high levels of satisfaction among tenants. 
Low levels of participation were also believed to indicate that tenants were not 
organised enough to put pressure on their Association.  A contrary view might be that 
tenants did not participate because they did not believe that any substantive change 
would occur as a result.  It might also be possible that some tenants had participated 
before, but did not continue as their inputs did not appear to create any impetus for 
change within their association.   
Respondents in one Association argued that there was a great deal of common ground 
between staff and tenants in terms of improvements to customer service. It was in the 
interests of both groups that services should improve: 
“If you’re providing the service, your day to day job is easier because you 
haven’t got to spend a lot of time going round to discontented tenants, 
writing letters of apology, having people banging on your desk and 
threatening you. It makes your job much more enjoyable and gives you 
more time to get on with it. You’re not fire-fighting, you’re doing what 
you should be doing. That’s the difference. The staff we’ve got want to 
provide an effective and efficient service. The tenants want an effective 
and efficient service.” (Tenant Participation Officer) 
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Respondents felt that a lack of involvement was not always matched by low 
expectations.  In one Association, however, tenants’ expectations were said to be low 
as they had become accustomed to dis-repair and lack of investment in their homes. 
Respondents believed that several factors contributed to increases in expectations 
among tenants. The re-investment in the stock by the LSVT association served to 
raise tenants’ expectations of the Housing Management service. A respondent in 
another Association attributed improvements in customer service to the pressure 
brought to bear on the organisations by tenant representatives on the Board:  
“We’ve got seven tenants on the Board of twenty, and they always put 
pressure on us. They receive a service, and they’re always looking for 
improvements, and they often come up with recommendations.” (Housing 
Manager) 
GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
In this section, I outline the board structure of LSVT associations, and examine the 
respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of boards; how tenant board members 
are selected; and respondents’ perceptions of councillors’ roles on boards. I examine 
perceptions of the accountability of LSVT associations to their tenants and wider 
communities, and how they believe this compares to the accountability of councils’ 
housing committees.  
LSVT Board Structure  
Boards or management committees govern all RSLs, including LSVT associations. 
Boards are made up of approximately twenty members who give their time 
voluntarily. Unlike other RSLs, the boards of LSVT associations have places reserved 
for tenants and local authority representatives. The balance of places on the boards is 
filled by independent members, who, according to respondents,  are selected to 
provide the board with the range of skills required to run the organisations effectively. 
These skills reportedly include finance, housing management, business experience, 
personnel and surveying. Board members also sit on sub-committees, including a 
Housing committee and Finance committee.  
Effectiveness of boards 
Sixteen respondents described their boards as challenging, while four felt that their 
boards did not challenge enough. The relationship between senior management teams 
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and their boards was said to be generally one of partnership, and decisions were 
reportedly reached by building a consensus around issues. A Chief Executive 
observed that the partnership between his Senior Management Team and the Board 
was based on “…mutual trust, but not blind trust”. The Board would not object to 
sound proposals, but in return, the Board expected the directors not to attempt to “get 
through some outrageous proposal”.  Further research, into the views of board 
members, might add an alternative dimension to this discussion.   
Directors saw the role of their boards as developers of strategy and policy. In this role, 
they took their lead from the senior management team: 
“We should be leading the Board, not the Board leading us. At the end of 
the day, the Board is the body that says ‘yes’. We as directors go the 
Board and say ‘this is what we think you should do and this is why you 
should do it’.” (Finance Director) 
A Chief Executive of one Association felt that his Board did not concentrate 
sufficiently on “the big picture” of setting a strategy and broad policy framework, and 
instead challenged on the detail of operational matters or proposals presented to them. 
Others had sent a clearer message to their boards, that “…directors run the 
association on a day to day basis, and [members] set the strategy and policy”. 
Within board memberships, respondents believed that members are not always 
equally effective. A Chief Executive observed that it is impossible to expect tenant 
members to have a grasp of all the issues that the Board will be engaging in. An 
alternative view might be that it is the responsibility of directors to communicate with 
board members in an accessible manner.  Whilst this perceived problem can be 
addressed in part through training, recruiting independent members with a range of 
skills was believed to be equally important. In another Association, only five of the 
independent Board members were said to be effective and brought the organisation 
into focus. The other Board members were reported to “make up the numbers” (Chief 
Executive). This is seen as a big problem for LSVT associations, as boards are 
essential to ensure that senior staff are working effectively and not taking risks with 
their association’s future viability.  
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When recruiting new board members, a Chief Executive expressed a preference for 
people in employment, as they were said to be more up to date with current 
developments than candidates who had retired.  Others stressed the importance of the 
business focus that independent members were said to bring. Respondents believed 
that they helped the associations to develop a business attitude, which was seen by a 
finance director as “…vital to the whole exercise” as LSVT associations are debt 
funded during their formative years, and reportedly require effective controls and a 
strong focus.  
Respondents argued that it was becoming increasingly difficult for associations to 
recruit board members of the right calibre. This is seen as a widespread problem 
throughout the RSL movement (NFHA, 1995).  Respondents suggested that this may 
begin to present problems for Associations when the current generation of board 
members retire: 
“We are beginning to feel that we’ve got a problem brewing, because the 
Housing Corporation are expecting much more responsibility from Board 
members. There is going to be a problem getting the right sort of people. 
There will be a time when we will have to pay people.” (Chief Executive) 
Selection of Tenant Board Members 
Table 9.1 shows methods used by associations to select tenant board members. Few 
associations ballot all their tenants, apparently due to the cost of sending out ballot 
papers. The most common method of selection is through elections organised by the 
existing tenant participation infrastructure, for example, a Tenants’ Forum or tenants’ 
associations. Two associations have open shareholding and have asked shareholders 
to elect tenant representatives to the board. In four associations, existing board 
members select new tenant representatives.  In many cases, therefore, the tenants 
taking decisions on appointment of new representatives were self-selecting.   
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Table 9.1: Method of selection of tenant board members 
 
Selection method No of 
associations 
Election by whole area tenants’ forum/panel members 6 
Election by other Board members 4 
Ballot of all tenants 3 
Election by area panel members 3 
Election by representatives of tenants’ associations 2 
Election by association shareholding members 2 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Respondents’ perceptions of councillors’ role on boards 
In sixteen associations, councillors were believed to see their role as being the same as 
any other board member (see table 9.2). This had not always been the case in one of 
these associations. Respondents felt that councillors on boards see their role as 
helping to manage a business that has a series of social objectives and does not 
operate politically. In four cases, respondents felt that councillors also played an 
additional role of “monitoring” their associations on behalf of their communities.  
Both these roles would appear to correspond with the councillor’s role as ‘watchdog’ 
or ‘case-worker’ described by Gyford (1984).  Gyford argues that the councillor’s role 
as a watchdog has been increasingly replaced by “surrogates” as the pressure of 
demands has increased.  It is arguable that transfer of direct ownership of housing 
reduces pressure upon councillors somewhat, enabling them to devote more attention 
to their role as watchdog.   
Table 9.2: Councillors’ roles on boards 
Perceived role No of 
associations 
Same as any other board member 16 
Councillors behave as delegates of council (all LA 
representatives on the association’s board) 
2 
Councillors behave as delegates of council (only 
one LA representative on the association’s board) 
2 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
In the other four associations, there were said to be some stark differences in how the 
councillors viewed their roles. In two associations, respondents believed that 
councillors sometimes or always saw themselves as delegates of their councils. In the 
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other two associations, respondents felt that one of the three nominees from each 
council saw themselves as delegates, while the others acted in the same way as any 
other board member.  
A number of Chief Executives expressed concerned about the quality of council 
members nominated to their boards. They believed that local authorities tended to 
nominate junior or backbench councillors, none of whom were believed to be 
“leading power brokers” (Chief Executive).  A number of authors point out that 
councillors who concentrated on lobbying on behalf of individual constituents and on 
‘case work’ are believed not to be involved in policy processes in matters affecting 
their wards, and this role was undertaken by more senior councillors (Elkin, 1974; 
Lambert et al, 1978, Muchnik, 1970).  In one association, the relatively junior status 
of the council representatives apparently caused difficulties when attempting to 
construct a working relationship with their sponsoring authority: 
“It’s a valuable link with the Local Authority, but it doesn’t work in the 
way you might expect it to. It certainly hasn’t promoted dialogue and 
understanding. If anything, it counters it. From the Local Authority side, 
they say ‘we don’t need to do anything, because we’ve got three members 
on the Board anyway. And the members on the Board are not necessarily 
the members who are in power.” (Chief Executive) 
In other associations, directors view the presence of councillors on their boards more 
positively: 
“It’s a very good link with the Local Authority, and I’ve no doubt it’s a 
very useful thermometer for both of us to use as to whether or not one of 
us is doing something that is not to the benefit of the other.” (Chief 
Executive) 
As associations expand geographically, they face the dilemma of having nominees of 
the sponsoring authority on their boards in perpetuity, while a third or more of their 
stock might not be in the “home” area. Group structures may help in this respect, by 
passing control of stock outside the original area to another association in the group, 
whose board is not obliged to invite nominations from the local authority.  
Instances of council nominees abusing their positions as board members to gain 
political advantage were said to be rare. Respondents believed that council nominees 
are the same as any other Board member, and once the board has made a decision, 
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they must accept it, or resign. In one association, respondents claimed that a council 
nominee decided that she might gain more political advantage from attacking the 
association than defending and promoting its record. This councillor was not re-
elected in the subsequent local council elections and was not therefore eligible for re-
appointment to the Board of the association. 
Respondents perceptions of the roles of housing committees in comparison with 
LSVT boards 
 
Table 9.3 outlines respondents’ views on the roles of LSVT association boards in 
comparison with a local authority housing committee. 
Table 9.3: Respondents’ perceptions of roles of LSVT HA Board in comparison 
with a local authority Housing Committee 
 
LSVT HA Board LA Housing Committee 
A single purpose body Councillors also have other concerns and 
are members of other committees 
Includes tenant representatives who rank 
alongside others as full board members 
with voting rights 
Tenants can attend Housing Committee 
but are legally barred from voting. 
Tenant board members represent as few 
as 500 tenants 
Councillors represent between 2000 and 
3000 constituents 
A tendency towards a culture of secrecy Arguably there is a more honest and 
open relationship between board and 
staff due to the less adversarial style of 
boards 
Complex committee structure 
Decisions reported to be based on 
business case and customers’ interests 
Decisions necessarily based largely on 
politics 
Board members are not elected, but are 
commonly selected by other board 
members 
Councillors elected in local elections, but 
often with low turnouts.  
 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Respondents reported that LSVT Boards have no other purpose except to set the 
policy and strategy for their organisations, including financial strategy. In contrast, 
councillors were said to have many other concerns, and would very often be members 
of other committees. A respondent observed that a council “…could have someone 
chairing the Housing Committee who’s got no social housing in their ward” (Housing 
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Services Director).  However, it can also be argued that independent members of 
LSVT board members may have fairly tenuous connections with the area of operation, 
including perhaps living elsewhere.  For example, a study of 36 housing associations 
in Bristol by Malpass (1997) discovered that only one third of the members gave a 
Bristol postcode, which extends beyond the city boundaries.   
LSVT Boards are able to have tenant representatives on their boards, who are full 
members in every respect, including having voting rights. In contrast, although a 
number of councils had recruited tenants to their housing committees, they were 
legally barred from allowing tenants to vote by the Local Government and Housing 
Act 1989. Respondents argued that tenants were able to participate at the highest level 
of management in LSVT associations.  
According to respondents, tenant representatives on LSVT HA boards typically 
represented a smaller number of people than councillors did.  Furthermore, 
respondents argued that tenants represented other tenants only, whereas councillors 
also had to consider the interests of owner-occupiers and constituents renting in the 
private sector.  The extent to which councillors represent their constituents is also 
questioned by Green (1981), Dennis (1975) and Davies (1972) who assert that 
councillors in the ruling party are constrained by the need to ‘tow the party line’, 
while Stoker (1991) argues that the demands of opposition party councillors can 
easily be ignored by the ruling party and officers.     
A Chief Executive argued that in his experience a culture had developed in local 
government where staff kept as much information from councillors as possible. “The 
officer’s job is to get on and run it, and tell the members as little as possible. If you 
tell them something, they want to get involved.” In contrast, the respondent thought 
that board members had little interest and no incentives to get involved in service 
delivery. Consequently he believed that staff did not feel compelled to hold back 
information from their boards.  
Respondents asserted that decision making in a Board is based on examining 
information; by listening to the case presented by directors; and on objective factors. 
In a Housing Committee, respondents believed that an issue was often not considered 
in such a manner: 
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“Whatever the item on the agenda, it is rarely considered on its merits. It 
is nearly always considered by politicians as ‘he is proposing that, 
therefore I should oppose it’”. (Chief Executive) 
Boards of LSVT HAs are not elected, and this is, in most cases, believed to be by 
design. Respondents reported that the Board of an LSVT HA requires a range of key 
skills to successfully manage a multi-million pound operation, which is heavily 
indebted in the first stage of its life. Respondents felt that a selection process that is 
based on popular appeal may not deliver a Board with these skills: 
“If I had democracy, I’m not sure that I’d have the skills and the profile 
on the Board that would deliver the best results. When it comes down to it, 
however much one aspires to democracy and fairness, it is very difficult to 
use democracy to find a group of people who can deliver the goods.” 
(Chief Executive) 
Although housing committees are made up of elected councillors, respondents felt 
that their composition was not decided upon democratically: 
“You might have been elected as a Councillor, but they divvied up 
between them who went on finance and who went on Planning and who 
went on Housing. The Public weren’t asked. Most councillors liked 
Planning and Finance, because its power. So the senior politicians nab 
those…and all the new boys and girls get stuffed on Environmental Health 
and Housing, and Leisure.” (Chief Executive) 
The seniority of councillors on housing committees, generally, can be debated, but it 
can be argued that whatever the composition of any committee, members have to 
account for all decisions they take to the full council and also to their electorates.   
Accountability 
Directors were asked about their views on the accountability of their organisations to 
tenants and the community, compared to their perception of the accountability of a 
housing department within a local authority. None of the directors believed that local 
authorities were more accountable than the LSVT associations.  There are concerns, 
however, from outside the LSVT associations themselves that housing associations 
generally and LSVTs specifically have considerable flaws in their accountability to 
tenants and wider communities.  The second report of the Nolan Committee (1996) 
argued that the Housing Corporation as regulator “should pay close attention to the 
stewardship of LSVT associations…which are monopolistic suppliers in specific 
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localities”.  Turning to the housing association management committee model in 
general, Page (1993) raises concerns that associations were beginning to recreate the 
problems associated with difficult to let estates in the LA sector.  For associations 
which have expanded across regions, Malpass (1997:85) raises concerns regarding 
“the claim that HAs, as small locally based organisations were less bureaucratic than 
allegedly remote LAs has been thrown into question by expansionism”.  Finally, the 
NFHA (1995) expressed concern about the ability of management committees to 
govern associations effectively in a changed environment.  It suggested that the 
movement may need to “consider a more business orientated model, with committees 
reconstituted as boards comprised of senior staff and paid non-executive directors”. 
In spite of the criticisms outlined above, directors in all twenty associations believed 
that their organisations were more accountable to tenants than local authorities are. 
Respondents argued that tenants, as key stakeholders, were able to make a more 
meaningful contribution to an Association than they were able to in a local authority. 
As members of boards of the associations, tenant representatives were believed to 
have a real influence and are able to vote. Although local authority housing 
committees sometimes invite tenants to participate in debates, they are legally barred 
from voting: 
“At the time of transfer, some tenants were saying ‘we’ve got 52 elected 
members that we can turn to if the housing service is bad. If we go 
through transfer, there will be 15 board members, and they’ll probably be 
more remote’. Our response to that was that there would be three local 
authority nominees on the Board. There would also be five tenant reps on 
the Board, who would have full voting rights, which they didn’t have on 
the Housing Committee. And you’ll still be able to go to your elected 
councillor if you want to.” (Chief Executive)  
Councillors are, however, elected by local people, who can exercise their democratic 
right to vote for alternative candidates at the following elections.  The extent to which 
electorates use local elections to hold councillors to account is questionable 
(Dearlove, 1973), and it is argued that national politics are more important in 
determining local election results (Gyford, 1984).  Tenant representatives are 
normally not elected by the wider tenant body, arguably they face little pressure to be 
truly representative, or to find out what tenants actually think or want.  There is also a 
danger that self selection of colleagues by tenant representatives “could lead to 
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perpetual control by a small group of people who would become closed to new ideas” 
(Nolan Committee, 1995: 8).  
Respondents argued that although councillors are elected by tenants, LSVT 
associations were, in their opinion, far more in tune with tenants’ wishes, as they had 
no other issues to distract them:  
“While councillors would argue that they have the interests of their 
tenants at heart, they also have their wider constituents.” (Housing 
Services Director)  
Some respondents pointed out that low turnout in many authorities blunted 
councillors’ accountability to their electorates: 
“I’ve spent so many years as a local government officer that I ended up 
completely disillusioned that any councillors are truly accountable to the 
community…the average turnout at elections is 30 per cent, and if they get 
52 per cent of their votes, that means that 1 person in 5 voted for them.” 
(Housing Services Director) 
Respondents argued that councillors also have to pay regard to the electoral cycle, 
whereas board members do not have to be concerned about seeking re-election. A 
Finance Director observed that “the service you get from your elected representative 
depends on how close it is to the election”.  This sentiment is echoed by Gyford 
(1984: 130) who argues that in between elections “councillors can be remarkably well 
insulated from public sentiment, communicating primarily with each other and with 
their officers rather than with the public”. 
Five respondents believed that their organisations could be held more accountable to 
the wider community than the local authority. Although their primary responsibility 
was to their service users, LSVT associations also “…have a duty to be good 
members of the community and should seek to be responsible and involve the 
community in issues that the Association is involved in” (Finance Director). Very 
often, a LSVT Association will be the largest landlord in a district, and respondents 
believed that its activities inevitably attract media attention, because its decisions will 
impact upon thousands of people locally. Lack of other news in local areas was said to 
ensure that activities of LSVT associations receive attention, including financial 
problems, rent increases, and plans for new development.  Respondents felt that this 
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high level of public scrutiny may help provide comfort to tenants and councillors that 
the associations will not undertake activities that may be to the detriment of tenants 
and the wider community.  
One of the respondents belieived that the system of both formal and informal 
regulation of RSLs made them more accountable than local authorities: 
“We’re accountable to the Council – if they start to say we’re not very 
good, then we’re not going to do very well in terms of Housing 
Corporation allocations. Secondly, we’re regulated by the Housing 
Corporation, who are very stringent regulators in comparison with the 
Audit that happens in local authorities. Then we’re audited internally and 
externally. Then we’re accountable to funders – if we start performing 
badly on basic performance indicators – rent arrears, void turnover, void 
rates – then they’ll be jumping on us.” (Housing Services Director) 
LONG TERM SUSTAINABILITY 
This section examines the respondents’ perceptions of the level of demand for social 
housing within the twenty associations’ areas.  The shift to the private sector makes 
long term sustainability vital, as the associations’ funding is arranged over periods of 
up to 25 years.  They need to ensure that they take steps to protect long term 
sustainability to pay back their loans. I examine the strategies they have adopted to 
address demand problems, including local lettings policies; the income mix of tenants 
in the stock; and the development of housing for market renting to run alongside 
social housing.   
Level of Demand for Social Housing 
Over half of the twenty LSVT associations were operating in the South East or 
Eastern regions of England, both areas with relatively high demand for social housing. 
The low numbers of associations identifying problems with demand in some of their 
areas, as show in Figure 9.1, reflects their regional distribution as primarily southern 
based.   
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Figure 9.1: Demand for Social Housing
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Figure 9.2 shows demand for social housing by region. Respondents in the 
associations based in the South West and Yorkshire and Humberside reported strong 
demand in all their areas of operation. Interestingly, a third of associations in the 
South East had areas where demand was low. One of the West Midlands based 
associations had some areas of low demand, while the other did not.  The one 
association based in the North West also had areas where demand was low.  
Figure 9.2: Demand for Social Housing by Region
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Respondents in fourteen associations reported strong demand throughout their areas 
of operation, while six reported low demand for their stock in some areas. In South 
East based associations, there were problems in terms of excess demand for stock and 
long waiting times: 
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“Even our worst and most unpopular flat…people will bite their hands off 
for it. There are no demand problems here…too much demand. The 
council always used to damp it down by making the list too restrictive, so 
half the people in the Borough couldn’t even apply.” (Housing Director) 
In associations with areas of low demand, respondents reported that the most 
problematic areas tended to be the more remote villages.  Villages with low demand 
had poor access to shops and other facilities, and expensive and infrequent transport 
to the nearest towns, which presented tenants on low incomes with a particular 
challenge.  In one of these associations, senior staff took the view that properties 
based in remote villages were no longer financially viable: 
“I’ve got six properties at [      ], a place with no pub, no shop and a bus 
service two times a week. Those six properties need a lot of work done on 
them. Had they been social housing in [the town], we’d have stood 
making a loss on them, because there’s a demand for them. But because 
it’s a village with no demand, we may as well get shot of them.” (Housing 
Director) 
Low demand for certain types of stock  
While a majority of the associations did not have areas with demand problems, the 
reverse is true of the level of demand for certain types of stock. Respondents in eleven 
associations reported low demand for particular types of their stock.  Figure 9.3 shows 
the types of stock in low demand:  
Figure 9.3: Low demand for certain types of stock
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
 Unpopular and difficult to let sheltered accommodation was reported to have become 
a major strategic issue for seven of the associations.  Although vacancies in general 
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needs stock were heavily oversubscribed, demand for sheltered bedsit stock with 
shared facilities was reported as being low.  Respondents attributed this to a lack of 
privacy and poor amenities, and because the units did not meet peoples’ increasing 
expectations:  
“Demand for sheltered stock is dwindling. We’re finding that people don’t 
want to live in small flats anymore, and people don’t want to live in 
bedsits at all. People want two bedrooms, because they’ve got loads of 
furniture that they don’t want to get rid of…they want their grandchildren 
to come and stay.” (Housing Manager) 
In two associations, respondents reported that general needs flats were in low demand, 
while at the same time there was excess demand for family-type houses with gardens. 
In one case, the unpopularity of flats was believed to be linked to the provision of 
newly built houses by the Association, which had heightened tenants and applicants 
expectations: 
“Most people who want social housing are expecting high quality social 
housing. Part of that’s our own making.  During the first seven years, [the 
council] was able to provide funding for two thousand new high quality 
homes – so why would someone go into a grotty three bedroom flat when 
they can get a three bedroom house down the road?” (Housing Director) 
One Association had a surplus of single person accommodation, and another had 
problems with demand on some of its estate-based properties, which respondents felt 
has a poor first impression among applicants. 
Strategies to deal with low demand 
Respondents in nine of the Associations reported that they did not currently have any 
problems with low demand for their stock. Respondents in eleven associations were 
experiencing low demand for their stock to varying degrees, and ten of these eleven 
were reported to have devised strategies to deal with the problem. Strategies adopted 
included re-development of difficult to let stock; refurbishment; conversion; 
marketing; relaxation of allocations policies; and disposal. Table 9.4 shows the 
strategies adopted by each of the associations with low demand stock.  
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Table 9.4: Strategies adopted to deal with low demand 
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1.  ✔ ✔ ✔    Bedsits in sheltered schemes to be re-developed 
as family housing. Rural sheltered stock to be 
demolished unless there is proven demand. 
2.        No long-term strategies currently in place. 
3. ✔       Six year programme to demolish all sheltered 
bedsit stock and general needs bedsits 
4.    ✔ ✔   Marketing unpopular stock. Some units used for 
Sure Start and other schemes. 
5. ✔    ✔   Regeneration of all sheltered stock. Has 
attempted marketing, but not found to be 
successful. 
6.    ✔ ✔   Change of use of some stock to market renting. 
Local lettings on other estates with low demand. 
7.       ✔ Relaxation of allocation policies for DTL stock. 
8.     ✔   Marketing of DTL new build stock in small 
rural town. 
9.     ✔ ✔  Sale of stock in poor condition in remote rural 
locations.  
10.       ✔ DTL converted for use as market renting. 
Relaxation of allocations policies in some areas. 
11.    ✔ ✔   Combination of de-sheltering, and marketing of 
retained EP sheltered accommodation.   
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Six associations had adopted two or more strategies. The most commonly adopted 
strategy was marketing of stock in low demand, including; advertising vacancies in 
local newspapers; placing cards in local shop windows; and running open days. At the 
heart of marketing strategies was the aim of challenging potential applicants’ views of 
social housing, including the perception that there are long waiting times, or that it is 
always reserved for non-working people. Conversion and re-development of 
unpopular stock were also reported to be widely adopted strategies. Associations have 
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adopted such drastic measures when properties do not meet modern day standards, 
and respondents believed that increasing choice for applicants in some areas of the 
country meant that they did not have to accept properties that did not meet their 
expectations.  
Two associations have relaxed allocations policies to widen access to their stock and 
enable applicants who would not normally be eligible for re-housing to be offered 
difficult to let stock. Both associations operate in areas where demand for housing is 
relatively high, but the stock profiles do not match applicant requirements. They are 
filling their difficult to let stock by widening access to lower priority applicants, such 
as single people and couples without children. One of the two associations has gone a 
stage further, by combining relaxation of allocations policies with a move into market 
renting: 
“The Marketing Manager in the Private Lettings Team is actually now 
meeting with our three area managers to talk about how he can share his 
list of people who phone up saying ‘I want a flat tomorrow, what have you 
got?’ with what they have available. The local lettings policies we now 
have in place give us a lot more flexibility.” (Housing Services Director) 
Local Lettings Policies 
Local lettings policies can help the associations to address the problem of low demand 
by dealing with imbalances in communities that develop as a result of poor lettings 
decisions in the past. Local lettings policies can help reverse stigmatisation and 
restore an area’s popularity among housing applicants. The associations’ approaches 
to local lettings policies varied considerably. Nine associations had either adopted 
local lettings policies for parts of their stock, or were at various stages of developing 
or attempting to develop them. Four associations had not yet developed any local 
lettings policies, but were committed to the principle of sensitive lettings. Seven 
associations had not considered adopting any form of local lettings policies (see 
Figure 9.4). 
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Figure 9.4: Use of local lettings policies 
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
The Associations had developed local lettings policies to attempt to create more 
balanced communities; to reverse stigmatisation; to deal with blocks housing 
concentrations of tenants with problems; and to reduce child densities. 
Respondents reported that the Associations had become increasingly concerned about 
the social mix on some of their estates. Estates were believed to be increasingly 
unbalanced, as allocations systems had led to concentrations of “desperate people in 
the most desperate situations” (Finance Director). Respondents stressed the 
importance they attached to achieving a balance of lettings in their new developments: 
“We are looking to get a balance – people who are older, people who 
already have children – not to end up letting it to top of the waiting list, so 
that in about ten years time, every single family has two or three 
teenagers – that’s a management problem for the future.” (Housing 
Director).  
Following the Housing Corporation’s relaxation of guidelines, associations were 
adopting local lettings policies in an attempt to stabilise their tenant bases. One 
Association had adopted local lettings as part of its attempt to regenerate its most 
unpopular estate. One of the aims of local lettings was reported to be to remove some 
of the stigma attached to estate, by opening up eligibility, and letting accommodation 
to people who were not at the top of the waiting list. Two other associations had 
adopted local lettings policies to address problems in individual blocks, where there 
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were concentrations of tenants with very high support needs, or very high child 
densities.  
The associations encountered a number of difficulties when developing and 
introducing local lettings policies. Respondents felt that local authorities with very 
pressing homelessness problems tended not to support the associations’ attempts to 
introduce local lettings policies, especially when these policies involved letting 
housing to applicants who were not in the most dire need: 
“We’re trying to change the allocations policy so that when a two or three 
bedroom flat becomes available, we don’t stuff it full of families with 
young children. So perhaps under occupy some units…bring in some 
older people…some professional people…so we can break the mould of 
the typical resident on that estate being a single parent with 2.4 children. 
But the Council are concerned. They see us as trying to gentrify the estate. 
And what’s going to happen to all their homeless families in their hostels 
if they can’t go there?”  (Housing Director) 
There is clearly a tension between making the maximum possible use of a scarce 
resource by providing for people who are in most need, and the desire of landlords to 
create stable and sustainable communities by deliberately not letting some of their 
housing to the most needy. Respondents felt that LSVT associations need to ensure 
that their tenants will want to stay with them, and so it is essential for them to avoid 
becoming the landlords of last resort.  
Respondents reported that the associations also faced problems in their stock outside 
their sponsoring authorities area, as they did not have the same levels of concentration 
of stock, and the same high level of local neighbourhood knowledge. They may not 
have the same level of control and influence in those areas, and they lack “the luxury 
of provision of property that can balance the allocations” (Housing Director). In 
those areas, associations were said to be in danger of receiving groups of residents 
with profound needs, who are being housed in developments that may not be 
appropriate for them: 
“Councils are bound to nominate people who are in the greatest need, 
even when it might not be sensible for the property that’s vacant.” 
(Housing Director) 
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An Increasing ‘Welfare Housing’ Role? 
The majority of respondents’ perceptions was that their associations are housing 
increasingly marginal sections of society.  This might have a deleterious impact upon 
long term sustainability, and encouraged the associations to consider diversifying 
away from their core business of social housing provision.  Only six respondents felt 
that their associations’ housed tenants on a range of different incomes. Half of these 
respondents observed that their associations were housing increasingly poorer 
households with each new letting: 
“One factor that’s changed [since transfer] is the mix of our tenants, from 
a typical suburban commuter belt shire district, with very few tenants in 
financial difficulties, very few tenants on benefits…a middle class sort of 
housing association, into one where we have a very much larger number 
of problem tenants and tenants on benefits, particularly the newer 
tenants.” (Finance Director)  
Thirteen respondents felt that their associations were already catering for only the 
poorest people in their communities (see figure 9.5).  
Figure 9.5: Staff perception of social mix of new tenants 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
N
o 
of
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
ns
Continuing to let to tenants on a range of incomes
Housing increasingly poorer h'holds
 
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999  Note: four respondents did not comment on this 
question 
A Chief Executive observed that average income excluding social housing occupants 
in his association’s area was £43,000. When occupants of social housing are included, 
the average drops to £30,000. Looking at social housing tenants only, average income 
was £7,000. Six of the thirteen directors that believed their associations were already 
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catering for the poorest people in their communities felt that the residualisation of 
their tenants and future tenants would continue: 
“We’ve got an income mix between poor and very poor. Increasingly our 
new tenants are benefit dependent. Eighty per cent of new tenants are 
benefit dependent, less than twenty per cent are in full or part time work.” 
(Chief Executive) 
Three respondents observed that the continuing popularity of owner occupation 
among all income groups had served to intensify residualisation, particularly in areas 
where house prices were low. A Chief Executive remarked, “if anyone’s got any sort 
of income, they tend to buy”. The continuing popularity of Right to Buy was said to 
stabilise areas to a limited extent, by helping to retain working people on estates.  
Two associations had converted to charitable status, and as a consequence housing 
applicants must not exceed certain income limits set by the Charity Commission. All 
new tenants are therefore on low incomes, although the Charity Commissioner’s 
income limits are currently quite generous at £15,000 gross per household.  This 
prevented the Association from housing people on higher incomes, who were more 
likely to be working and socially included.  
Increasing residualisation presents a major challenge for LSVT associations. They are 
in danger of becoming landlords of last resort, and in areas with fragile demand for 
social housing, a future collapse in demand could wreck an LSVT association’s 
business plan.  LSVT associations are relatively well placed to deal with the problem, 
however. They have access to resources to convert or adapt stock to meet different 
needs. They are able to diversify into new areas of business, including market renting, 
which can help cross subsidise the social housing sections of their businesses.  
Market Renting 
Figure 9.6 shows market renting activity among the twenty associations. Three 
associations had already developed and let housing for market rents, whilst eight 
associations were considering developing market renting schemes, either actively or 
as a possible future activity. For these associations, respondents felt that market 
renting can be seen as a way of diversifying away from social housing in order to 
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protect long term sustainability.  Six associations were not currently considering 
marketing renting, while three had considered and rejected the idea.  
Figure 9.6: The twenty LSVT associations' market renting activities
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
The three associations were said to have entered into this activity to produce profits to 
cross subsidise the development of the social housing side of their businesses. Being 
heavily indebted following transfer, LSVT associations are often unable to compete 
for development opportunities against traditional associations who have large reserves 
and the ability to borrow to develop. The profits from market renting would enable 
them to compete more effectively against traditional associations for development 
opportunities: 
“As an organisation, we made a decision that we wanted to grow. One 
way of achieving that is to become more competitive in bidding for new 
properties, and one way you make yourself more competitive is to be able 
to put in more of your own resources. In order to have more resources, 
you’ve got to have something that creates a surplus, and market renting – 
apart from providing another aspect of renting in the community, which is 
an objective in itself – provides the opportunity to plough resources back 
into the organisation.” (Chief Executive) 
Respondents reported that the three associations were committed to market renting 
being seen as peripheral to their core business of social housing, and its growth would 
be limited. They recognised that market renting was a distinctive activity that would 
require separate management if the number of units continued to grow. A Chief 
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Executive suggested that the management of market renting properties would need to 
be passed to a separate company within the Group, so that the properties could be 
managed in an entirely different way from social housing. 
Two associations were actively considering developing stock for market renting. 
Although one Association was said to be primarily motivated by making profits to 
plough back into social housing, the other felt that it was well placed to meet an 
identified need for additional rented accommodation in its area: 
“There is a tremendous number of people on our housing register who are 
never going to be housed by us. A lot of people lower down the register 
have some financial ability to pay extra amounts, and will never qualify 
for social housing.  Therefore, there is some logic in trying to assist 
people who are often trying hard to look after themselves, are in 
employment, but can’t quite find the rented accommodation they need.” 
(Finance Director) 
Of the three associations who had considered and rejected the idea of developing 
housing for market rents, respondents in two cited demand in their areas as the main 
reason. In both areas, there were believed to be pockets of low demand, and one of the 
associations found its social housing stock was in direct competition with existing 
private rented sector stock: 
“There’s a very buoyant private rented sector down here. I’m not sure it’s 
within our role to do market renting. We’re in direct competition with the 
private rented sector. The high turnover [in the Association’s stock] is 
because people have such a wide choice down here, or partly that. Rents 
are quite low generally – they’re still higher than ours, but still within 
Rent Officer levels.” (Housing Services Director)  
The other Association rejecting market renting had done so because the Board was 
believed to have felt that the risks of the activity outweighed potential benefits to 
tenants. Although the Board was generally said to be risk averse, it also took the view 
that there were a range of other agencies that were already supplying adequate private 
rented accommodation: 
“The Board has been very clear that we are about providing housing for 
people who can’t afford to do that themselves. Whenever the Board would 
look at running housing for another authority, or doing housing for nurses 
and so on, they will want to look at the business risks involved. And unless 
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it’s a copper-bottomed certainty, they’ll ask us why we’re doing it, why we 
need to do it, what’s the pressure for us to do it.” (Chief Executive) 
Respondents in one Association felt that market renting might not be an activity 
compatible with its status as a charity. Charitable associations are required to house 
only those people who are “in need”. In more recent transfers, the Charity 
Commission has applied a narrow definition of need1. Another respondent suggested 
that there should be no reason why a charitable association could not provide housing 
at market rents, provided that a separate company within the group managed it.  
Profits could be recycled back to the Association by covenant. 
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS 
In this section, I examine how the finances of LSVT associations are arranged and 
how they relate to their private as well as public status. I examine the process of 
arranging funding; financial performance against business plans; factors accounting 
for financial performance; the perceived impact on LSVT associations of the Housing 
Corporation’s rent regulation regime; the impact of Right to Buy sales on finances; 
respondents’ perceptions of the influence of boards over business planning; and 
respondents’ perceptions of the influence of funders. 
Although the finances of each LSVT association are unique and tailored to local 
circumstances, they share a number of common features. All LSVT associations take 
out loans from day one, to pay the sponsoring authority the tenanted market value of 
the stock and to provide funding for repairs. Most LSVT associations will make losses 
in the first few years, and will continue to borrow to finance these losses. Once the 
intensive period of catch up repairs has been completed, the associations move into 
surplus, and can start to repay their loans. Payback of loans is usually within 25 years. 
Three of the twenty associations were reported to have never made losses at any time. 
Their operating surpluses were sufficient to cover the costs of catch up repairs and to 
service their loans.  
 
1 See for example Lee, Power and Tunstall (1999), where the Charity Commission questioned whether 
the tenants on three estates being transferred to a Local Housing Company were “appropriate 
beneficiaries of charitable status”. The Company was eventually granted charitable status. 
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LSVT finances are very different from the finances of local authority housing 
departments. Housing departments receive revenue subsidies, which can help cover 
both running costs and loan repayments. Their debts attract favourable rates of interest 
through the public sector. In contrast, LSVT associations are responsible for their 
entire debts, and have to meet all repayments from their own resources. They do not 
receive any subsidies towards running costs or loan repayments. As a result, LSVT 
associations are reported to be extremely cautious in their formative years, because 
they will be making heavy losses and debts will increase. Consequently, finances and 
“meeting the business plan” are said to become key drivers for staff throughout the 
organisations.  
Arranging funding  
Arranging funding for the first LSVTs was reported to be difficult but the process 
became more straightforward once lenders were familiar with housing associations 
and the LSVT process. The private finance regime for housing associations was also 
unfamiliar to funders, having been introduced in 1989. Among the twenty case study 
associations, the earliest transfers took place in 1988, 1989 and 1990. All three 
experienced difficulties in arranging funding, largely due to bankers’ lack of 
familiarity with housing associations: 
“It wasn’t just that it was an LSVT, it was also that nobody knew anything 
about housing associations, really. So it was difficult. I think the fact that 
the first LSVT was funded by a French bank tells you how difficult it was. 
None of the British banks could pluck up the courage to fund us.” 
(Finance Director) 
Respondents believed that the size of loans required by the associations also caused 
difficulties for early transfers. Lenders had become extremely cautious in 1989 and 
1990 because of high interest rates and large numbers of mortgage holders who were 
unable to keep up repayments. Funders were said to be willing to lend smaller 
amounts, which meant that syndicates of funders were often established to meet the 
full funding requirements of the associations.  
For early transfers, respondents felt that the funding market was not at all competitive, 
and funders were said to be in control of the terms upon which they would lend. The 
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cost of loans was thought to be much higher for early transfers as bankers sought 
“compensation” for the perceived risk they took: 
“We went out to 30 organisations and got proposals back from 6, and 
they were very much in the driving seat in those days, so the margins they 
could command were colossal compared to today. They were like the 
traditional bank manager – they would lend to you if you met all their 
needs.” (Finance Director) 
The market for funding housing associations and LSVTs soon became more familiar 
to banks, and there was greater competition to fund most transfers: 
“The market is such that they’re falling over themselves to get our 
business.” (Finance Director) 
Funders are believed to be attracted to lending to LSVT associations by Housing 
Corporation regulation, which implicitly guarantees that they will not go out of 
business. As funders have come to understand this, they have reportedly become more 
willing to lend at lower rates, as lending to housing associations is seen as low risk 
compared to other businesses. Funders are also said to look for a quality management 
team and a Board with a good breadth of experience.  Respondents reported that 
LSVT associations that are subsidiaries of established associations are often able to 
negotiate better funding deals than standalone associations, especially where the 
parent already has a track record in raising private finance. 
Financial Performance against Business Plans 
Respondents identified a number of key determinants of performance of a stock 
transfer association. Stock valuation determines the price the new association will pay 
their sponsoring landlord for the stock, and valuation is in turn determined in part by 
stock condition and repairs requirements. Interest rate movements can affect the cost 
of servicing of an association’s loan facility. Right to Buy sales deliver a capital 
receipt, which is often shared with the sponsoring authority, but sales mean that 
associations lose rental income. Turnover of tenancies is also important, as transfer 
tenants pay lower rents than re-let tenants.  Development of new stock increases rental 
income. In this section, I examine financial performance, and not other types of over 
or under performance, such as the acceleration of catch-up repairs programmes.  
Chapter Nine ~ Findings from Representative Sample Survey:  
Respondents’ perceptions of how the organisations changed under the influence 
of a more private sector style of provision 
Page 251 
 
Figure 9.7 shows the financial performance of the twenty associations. Respondents 
reported that the financial performance of fifteen of the twenty associations was better 
than predicted in their business plans. One association’s performance was as had been 
predicted in the business plan, while four had performed worse than predicted. 
Respondents identified a number of reasons for over and under-performance of their 
associations against their business plans.  
Figure 9.7: Financial Performance against Business Plans
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Finance directors of the fifteen associations who had beaten business plan predictions 
identified the following factors for their performance: lower than predicted overheads; 
lower than anticipated funding costs; low stock valuations; higher than predicted 
tenancy turnover; greater than predicted development activity; and better stock 
condition than had been estimated before transfer. The numbers of respondents 
identifying each factor as a cause of over performance in their association is shown in 
figure 9.8. 
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Figure 9.8: Factors Accounting for Financial Outperformance
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
In nine associations, a lower than anticipated cost of borrowing was reported to have 
had enabled them to outperform predictions in their business plans. The period 
between 1990 and 1997 saw large changes in interest rates, which lowered funding 
costs for the associations: 
“The financing costs that we had assumed in the business plan were based 
on the situation before we left the Exchange Rate Mechanism. So interest 
rates were quite high – 11, 12, 13 per cent – so with a bit of luck of some 
careful husbandry, we saved a fortune in financing costs.” [Finance 
Director] 
Respondents felt that the benefits of lower interest rates to the Associations depended 
partly on the structure of their loans, and the extent to which rates of interest were 
fixed. Some associations will have continued to pay high rates on loans arranged 
before 1993 for a number of years until they re-financed their borrowings, or until 
fixings were re-negotiated.  
There are additional long-term benefits for associations who were able to take 
advantage of lower funding costs. In the initial period of the associations’ loan profile, 
it is common to capitalise interest payments, that is, to add interest payments to the 
loan, until surpluses are achieved. If interest payments are lower, then the associations 
add less to their loans, which in turn lowers interest payments over the whole loan 
period. 
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In eight associations, respondents attributed outperformance partly to overhead costs 
being lower than predicted. Overheads for initial business plans following stock 
transfer are usually based on historic costs of the housing service within the 
sponsoring authority structure, including overheads for central services. Respondents 
felt that the division of overheads between different departments was often unclear, 
and once released from the sponsoring authority, associations found that they were 
able to spend less, while maintaining the same service levels: 
“We found that we were paying a third of the costs of the computers…but 
we were only using 15 per cent of that service. By bringing our IT service 
in house, we saved substantially later.” [Finance Director]  
Associations were also reported to be able to reduce overheads by becoming more 
focussed on costs at all levels of the organisations. The idea of every activity having a 
cost, which staff had to consider, was said to be a concept not widely adopted in the 
sponsoring authorities.  
Three associations had accelerated their development programmes, which yielded 
additional income, helping them to outperform original business plan predictions. The 
associations began to develop in the very early stages after transfer, which was quite 
uncommon: 
“A lot of people have a development scheme or two in their first year 
programme, but know they’ll never deliver, because you’re starting from 
a standing start.” (Chief Executive) 
One Association had begun working up a development programme in the year prior to 
transfer, and was on site “literally on day one” (Chief Executive). The scale of 
development in one of the associations was said to have had delivered a dramatic shift 
in its financial position. The original business plan had predicted a move into surplus 
in year 11, but six years after transfer, the finance director predicted a move into 
surplus by year seven because of the impact of the development programme. At that 
point, the Association had to decide how those surpluses might be used most 
effectively: 
“Decisions then had to be made, what to do. We can carry on developing 
and innovating or we consolidate and make use of those surpluses in other 
ways. We felt it was important not to stagnate. Perhaps unusually for 
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LSVTs at the time, after the initial business plan, we did then start to make 
allowances for stock growth outside the host local authority.” (Chief 
Executive) 
Respondents in two associations attributed outperformance to higher than predicted 
tenancy turnover. Tenancy turnover from transfer tenants to re-let tenants yields 
additional income because of the differentials in rent. LSVT associations expect this 
to happen over time, and are said to make prudent assumptions about the rate at which 
it will happen. If turnover occurs at a higher rate, an association will receive 
additional income. Conversely, if turnover fails to meet predicted levels, income will 
be lower than forecasts in the business plan. The Housing Corporation has recognised 
that additional income from tenancy turnover in is relatively unpredictable, and allows 
associations to disregard it when calculating rent increases for the purposes of rent 
regulation.  
Two associations were reported to have had outperformed their business plans, due to 
the condition of the stock being better than had been thought at the time of transfer 
negotiations. Respondents reported that this enabled them to push the replacement of 
building components further down the maintenance cycle, thus delaying spending on 
these items until much later than initially forecast: 
“In the stock condition survey we’ve produced, we’re trying to predict the 
timing and cost of replacing all the components of a property, so over a 
sixty year period, you probably get everything at least once, some things 
you’ll get two or three times. We’ve just spent £20m on refurbishing all 
the houses that we own. So a combination of a bit of pessimism at the 
start, and the significant investment that we’ve made has taken that sixty 
year cycle - and left it more or less the same - but within it, what we had 
in our business plan to spend over the first ten to fifteen years has slipped 
back down the timescale. So what we had in for the first fifteen year 
period, we have now been able to half. In monetary terms, its gone down 
from £100m to £55m.” (Finance Director) 
Respondents in one Association attributed its performance to a low stock valuation at 
the time of transfer, which enabled it to buy the stock at a very good price. The low 
stock valuation was largely attributed to the low rents charged by the sponsoring 
authority. Following transfer, central government encouraged local authorities to 
increase rents, and at the end of the Association’s rent guarantee period, it was 
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charging much lower rents than the neighbouring local authorities. The Association 
felt that this situation was inequitable: 
“…we wanted to spend a lot of money on the stock anyway, and we had 
tenants coming in at much higher rents. So we decided that it was 
appropriate to raise our rents to the level of our neighbours.” (Finance 
Director) 
Having purchased the stock on the basis of a valuation which was based on an average 
rent of £18 a week, the Association was later charging a third more, which meant that 
its income increased far beyond the amounts required to service its loans. This has 
greatly enhanced the Association’s financial strength and development capabilities: 
“We’re a strong organisation financially, possibly too strong, to the 
extent that we really ought to be doing more than we are doing.” (Finance 
Director) 
Four associations were reported to have failed to meet some or all of their original 
business plan predictions. Respondents attributed the failure to achieve financial 
targets to a number of factors – investment in the stock had been brought forward; 
increases in interest rates; an under-estimate of staffing requirements; Housing 
Corporation restrictions on rent increases; inaccurate stock condition surveys; and 
lower than predicted Right to Buy sales. Table 9.5 shows the number of associations 
affected by one or more of these factors. 
Table 9.5: Factors accounting for performance of the four associations not 
meeting their business plan targets  
 
 HA 1 HA 2 HA 3 HA 4 
RTB Sales lower than predicted ✓   ✓  ✓  
Housing Corporation rent regime  ✓   ✓  
Inaccurate Stock Condition Survey ✓     
Investment in stock brought forward  ✓    
Under-estimate of staffing requirements ✓     
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
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Three associations were said to have been adversely affected by lower than predicted 
Right to Buy sales. One association transferred in 1989, and the other two transferred 
in 1990. Assumptions about the likely levels of RTB applications were made pre-
transfer, at the height of the late1980s house price “boom”. Interest rates rose from 
eight per cent in 1988 to 15 per cent in 1989. Rates began to fall a year later, but by 
that point the housing market had collapsed. The number of tenants applying to buy 
their homes fell, as did the value of properties that were sold. Two of the associations 
were reported to have experienced major difficulties as a result. In one Association, 
the Housing Corporation imposed its own nominees on the Board, placing it under 
supervision. In the other, the response to the financial difficulties were reported to 
have led to a major breakdown in the relationship between the Association and its 
sponsoring authority: 
“Effectively we were insolvent back in 1993. Our Board took a very brave 
decision to sell some of the worst properties. They took the decision to sell 
200 properties on the open market and that involved the Housing 
Corporation’s consent, as well as the DoE’s. That brought the Council 
into conflict not only with us, but also with the Corporation and the DoE. 
It was a pragmatic, sensible, business solution for us, but politics got in 
the way. They were opposed to any sales policy.” (Housing Director) 
The third association was said to have been able to absorb the impact of lower RTB 
sales by slowing down its repairs programme from an eight year period to between 
twelve and thirteen years. The respondents felt that the repairs programme, as 
originally envisaged, had been over ambitious, and slowing it down made it more 
manageable: 
“Although there were financing problems with the programme, it was 
never an issue. The Council had only spent £1-£2m a year, and there was 
no way that the organisation could gear itself up to spend £10m a year. 
We couldn’t consult that many tenants quickly enough.” (Finance 
Director) 
Two associations’ performance against their business plans were reported to have 
been adversely affected by the imposition of rent controls by the Housing 
Corporation. In both cases, business plans had been drawn up with forecast rent 
increases of more than RPI plus one per cent, once the rent guarantee period had 
expired. Respondents believed that future increases in rents will have to be scaled 
back to RPI plus one per cent, and adjustments made elsewhere to compensate: 
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“Our loan profile, officially, at this stage is kicked out beyond what it was 
before. Its gone up a year or two years because of RPI plus one per cent. 
The Business Plan was originally drawn up on the basis of RPI plus two 
for transfer tenants, and RPI plus one for new tenants.” (Housing 
Services Director) 
Extensive stock condition surveys carried out by one association were reported to 
have revealed greater repair and replacement requirements than the survey carried out 
for valuation purposes had. This meant that the Association’s initial funding was 
insufficient to cover the cost of all repairs that were now required, and adjustments to 
the timing of programme have been necessary. 
Conversely, another Association was reported to have taken the decision to accelerate 
its repairs programme. This had caused short term financial under-performance, in 
terms of when the Association will move into surplus, and its position on its debt 
profile. In the medium term the effects of undertaking more repairs at the initial stages 
were believed to be limited, as the Association would have made savings later on. 
One Association had under-performed financially because the negotiation process 
during transfer was said to have underestimated the number of staff that would be 
required to run the new organisation effectively and to meet tenants’ heightened 
expectations: 
“Now I understand that transfers are told to increase their staffing 
complement by at least twenty per cent, so you’ve got some built in slack. 
We didn’t have any. And we’ve had to accommodate regulation and all 
the other pressures that have come upon us within the existing Business 
Plan.” (Chief Executive) 
 Impact of Housing Corporation Rent Controls 
LSVT Associations are in a unique position with regard to rent setting and rent 
controls. Unlike traditional housing associations, LSVT associations have 
traditionally started with two rent streams – one stream for transferring tenants, and a 
stream for re-let tenants. Over time, the number of transferring tenants will decline, as 
properties are re-let. Separately from tenancy turnover, LSVT associations might also 
try to “converge” the two rent streams, either by freezing or decreasing some rents, or 
increasing some rents at a faster rate than others.  
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At the time of interviewing respondents in the associations (late 1998 and early 1999), 
the implications of the Housing Corporation’s rent influencing policy were emerging.  
Firstly, turnover of tenancies yields “additional” income for the associations, as re-let 
tenants’ rents are set at a higher level than transferring tenants’ rents. This additional 
income may cause LSVT HAs to breach the RPI plus 1 per cent envelope. Secondly, 
limits on rent increases were reported to restrict the ability of LSVT associations to 
converge rents. Thirdly, LSVT associations often needed to “store up” cost reflective 
rent increases until the rent guarantee period has expired. These increases, when 
finally applied, result in additional income, which push total income above the rent 
envelope. Figure 9.9 shows the impact of rent controls upon the twenty LSVT 
associations. For ten associations, respondents reported that there has been little 
impact, while the other ten have had to reduce planned rent increases.  
Figure 9.9: Impact of Housing Corporation rent controls
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999  
Respondents felt that limits on future rent increases are potentially very difficult for 
LSVT associations. The price they paid their sponsoring authorities for the stock was 
based on Tenanted Market Values that often included future rent increases above RPI 
plus 1 per cent. TMVs assumed that re-let rents would be higher than transfer tenants’ 
rents. After the initial rent guarantee period expired, transfer tenants’ rents would 
increase faster than re-let rents, until all rents converged at the same level. Increases 
for transfer tenants were often planned to be up to two or three times faster than the 
Corporation regime would allow. As a consequence of limits on rent increases, 
respondents reported that future income might not meet forecasts contained in 
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business plans, which may mean adjustments to repairs programmes or staffing levels 
would be required.  
The associations have adopted a number of strategies to deal with the impact of 
Housing Corporation rent regulation on convergence plans. Rent convergence plans 
built into associations’ business plans typically involved increasing transfer tenants’ 
rents at a faster level than re-let rents. Over a period of time, transfer tenants’ rents 
would catch up to the level of re-let rents. Rent convergence would yield additional 
income for a number of years, which would cause the associations’ income to breach 
the RPI plus 1 per cent envelope.  
At the time the respondents were interviewed, the Housing Corporation’s regulation 
of rents was still a matter of some debate and uncertainty. Senior staff and boards 
were attempting to find the best strategy towards rent convergence. A number of 
strategies had been adopted or were under discussion.  
Associations could choose to abandon rent convergence as an aim. This would mean 
that the two rent streams would remain in place, and the differential between streams 
would not change. Associations were reported to be reluctant to abandon rent 
convergence plans because they would have forgone the additional income that the 
process yields.  
 “Everybody’s dealing with rent convergence, apart from those LSVTs 
which have transferred in the last year, and those transferring now may 
not have convergence as part of their business plans. Certainly before last 
year, convergence would have been a key feature of the Business Plan.  
Convergence is no longer a feature because of RPI plus 1.” (Finance 
Director) 
Associations who have abandoned rent convergence policies might decide to rely on 
tenancy turnover to converge rents. When a transferring tenant leaves, the new tenant 
will immediately pay the higher rent level. Over time, all transfer tenancies will turn 
over, but this may be a slow process: 
“There was a rent convergence policy, until rent influencing came in. 
That’s gone in the bin now. They’ll only converge if all protected tenants 
become new assured tenants. It won’t take that many years until that 
happens.” (Housing Services Director) 
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Respondents felt that associations could have decided to reduce future income by 
freezing or even reducing re-let rents to allow transfer rents to catch up. This strategy 
would, however, reduce future income below levels predicted in the business plan. 
Consequently, re-investment plans would need to be re-phased or the scope of works 
would need to be reduced: 
“Our highest rents have been frozen for three years. Over time, the 
standard rent will rise and pick up all the others on their way up. So we 
haven’t got the higher rents reducing, and the lower rents going up. The 
effect will be that we can converge by bringing those higher rents down 
rather than freezing them, which will still allow us to jack those lower 
rents up. But that means we won’t be converging at our average rent of 
£50. We’ll be converging somewhere lower than that. So what we’ve got 
to work out is whether we can afford to converge at something lower, or 
whether we have to extend the period over which convergence takes 
place.” (Finance Director) 
 
One Association had taken the view that they should implement their convergence 
policy as planned and continue to breach the RPI plus 1 per cent envelope until 
convergence had been achieved. The Association risked falling foul of the 
Corporation, but respondents believed that there were unique reasons for LSVT 
associations to receive special treatment: 
“The Business Plan still assumes rent increases after the guarantee 
period of 2%. We’re obviously well aware of the national debate with the 
Housing Corporation around RPI plus 1%. Our view remains robust 
about our argument that [the business plan] was built up in the first place 
on RPI plus 2%. Realistically, that’s going to be an on-going debate with 
the Housing Corporation. If we go on improving the business plan, then 
the Corporation will expect us to use that to keep the rent increases 
lower.” (Finance Director) 
A number of associations were reported to have used the opportunity of making 
changes to convergence policies to deal with existing inequities within rent regimes 
inherited from the sponsoring local authority. This usually involved allocating a 
number of points to each property, based on size and amenities. Each rent would 
move towards the target rent over a number of years, but total income would not 
increase by more than RPI plus 1 per cent per annum:  
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“There are some huge inequities within the rent structure. The average 
rent for a two bedroom flat is more than the average for a three bedroom 
house.  So all rents have now moved onto a points basis. So the ability to 
converge is therefore the ability to move everybody over to a pointing 
basis. Over the next couple of years, we will be looking at moving people 
on a phased basis from existing rents onto a pointed rent. That would be 
the way of achieving a convergence.” (Finance Director) 
All LSVT associations receive “additional” income when units are re-let for the first 
time at a higher rent level. The differential between transfer rents and re-let rents is 
larger in the earlier period before the associations make any attempts to converge the 
two rent streams. This additional income is reported to be unpredictable, and depends 
wholly on the pattern of turnover in the stock. Some units (e.g. flats) might be re-let 
two or more times before other units (e.g. houses) are re-let for the first time. The 
Housing Corporation is reported to recognise that this feature is unique to LSVTs, and 
in most cases it is willing to allow associations to disregard some of this ‘additional’ 
income when calculating the rent envelope.  
Impact of Right to Buy 
All tenants who transfer from a local authority to a LSVT association have a number 
of preserved rights, including the Right to Buy. Re-let tenants do not have the Right to 
Buy. Fifteen of the twenty associations were reported to have experienced levels of 
RTB above or below the predictions in their business plans. In nine associations, sales 
were higher than had been predicted, and in six associations, sales were lower (see 
figure 9.10). 
Figure 9.10: Levels of RTB sales against predictions
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
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Four of the five associations whose predicted RTB sales had been achieved 
transferred between 1992 and 1995. One had transferred in 1989, prior to the collapse 
in house prices in 1990 and 1991. To a certain extent, respondents reported that the 
association had met its sales target before the market collapsed, as many tenants had 
applied to buy before the transfer:  
“When we did the consultation, over 1000 tenants put Right to Buy 
applications in, to protect their position, just in case the stock transfer 
changed their rights, albeit they were guaranteed that they would keep 
them.” (Finance Director) 
Following stock transfer, 700 units were sold in the first three years, accounting for 
approximately ten per cent of the stock. The target for the first four years was 14.5%, 
and this was achieved by introducing an incentive scheme to assist people in buying.  
The four associations who transferred later were established with the benefit of the 
experience of LSVT associations who had suffered the effects of the collapse in the 
housing market and its impact on Right to Buy sales. By 1992, officers and staff were 
said to be wary about relying on Right to Buy receipts. All four had negotiated “claw 
back” agreements with their sponsoring authorities whereby the associations retained 
the net present value of future rental receipts, and the balance of the capital receipt 
was passed back to the council. This arrangement compensated the associations for 
the outstanding debt on the unit sold. Claw back agreements leave associations in a 
“standstill position” (Finance Director).  
One of the four associations had reduced the number of Right to Buy sales included in 
its business plan to completely remove the possibility of any negative financial 
impact: 
“I almost have none in my business plan now. That means that every time 
we sell a property, the business plan doesn’t rely on it, so there’s a cash 
benefit, and we can use that money to replace the housing stock.” 
(Finance Director) 
In six associations, Right to Buy sales had not met the baseline level in business 
plans. Respondents reported that this had caused cash flow difficulties in five 
associations, with two suffering serious problems. All six associations had begun 
operating between 1989 and 1991. One of the two associations who encountered 
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serious difficulties as a result of lower than predicted Right to Buy sales was subject 
to intervention by the Housing Corporation, who imposed its own nominees on the 
Board. The other association was able to take action itself to avoid intervention by the 
Regulator: 
“There was a short term facility that was highly expensive. We had to 
keep dipping into this short term facility because the Right to Buy sales 
weren’t being achieved. The major crunch was over this arrangement that 
existed between the District Council and ourselves – they gave us a loan – 
effectively a top up for any shortfall in the housing sales, as if they knew it 
was going to happen. There was talk of mergers and palming us off to 
another Association, but our Board decided to fight for its independence. 
It was a short term problem.” (Housing Services Director) 
A Chief Executive of one of the six associations attributes part of the problem of 
unrealistic assumptions about the level of Right to Buy sales to central government 
pressure on councils and associations in the period from 1989 to 1991: 
“We were the first LSVT to get the Treasury to agree to a reduction in the 
Right to Buy projections. Every stock transfer up to ours had an 
increasing expectation of Right to Buys because the property market was 
rising all the time. We got the expectation depressed…it wasn’t enough. 
When we transferred, the property market went kaput.” (Chief Executive) 
Nine associations’ Right to Buy sales had exceeded baselines in their business plans. 
For all nine associations, respondents felt that higher than anticipated sales delivered 
capital receipts, which were shared with sponsoring authorities under sharing 
agreements. In most cases, the short term effect was said to be largely neutral. Sales 
reduced the associations’ housing stock and income bases over the long term.  
Tenants’ decisions to purchase their properties were said to be influenced by a number 
of key events, the first being transfer itself. One Association saw a large increase in 
sales immediately after transfer because tenants “panicked and thought they would 
buy” (Housing Director). Respondents felt that sales also increased in response to the 
Government’s changes in Right to Buy regulations. Although the changes do not 
affect tenants of the twenty associations, a number of tenants were said to believe that 
they would.   
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Improvement works to tenants’ properties were also believed to affect the timing of 
their purchases. One respondent observed how tenants delayed their purchase until 
improvements works had been carried out: 
“It must be the case that people are holding off until certain 
improvements are done. We’ve actually seen it – we’ve seen properties 
where the tenant has put in a RTB 1 form. They’ve come off the 
programme for new windows, and they’ve withdrawn the RTB 1. As soon 
as the windows are in, they put the RTB back in again.” (Finance 
Director) 
Unsurprisingly, associations would prefer to sell properties earlier rather than later, 
and before improvements had been carried out: 
“If you can have Right to Buy sales early on, it benefits you. You lose your 
rental stream, but you’re also not paying out for maintenance. If you have 
enough sales, let’s say 400 extra, you’ll employ one less Housing Officer. 
The main thing that impacts on us is improvements – let’s say for one 
property you’re going to put in new windows in year 4 and new central 
heating in year 6, and new kitchen and bathroom in year 8. If you can sell 
it before year 4, that is before you spend £3000 putting new windows in it, 
then it must be beneficial.” (Finance Director) 
Respondents felt that LSVT associations rarely wish to encourage tenants to purchase 
their properties. They recognise that tenants have the right to do so, and have to 
include predictions in their business plans. In exceptional cases, associations may 
wish to sell properties in the short term to meet their cash flow covenants. For the 
majority of the associations, Right to Buy sales would give them short term cash 
receipts, but would reduce long term cost effectiveness, as the cost to rental income 
ratio would deteriorate: 
“We don’t actually predict any Right to Buys from a planning point of 
view. We aren’t reliant on this type of up front injection of cash from 
Right to Buy sales. From a financial point of view, Right to Buy sales 
mean cash in the bank. From a housing management point of view, it’s 
negative. If we could, we would actively discourage anyone from putting 
in an application. We’d bombard them and say ‘please don’t do it, please 
go elsewhere…we will be as obstructive as possible’. But the law prevents 
us from doing that.” (Finance Director)  
Influence of Funders 
Standalone LSVT associations are newly created organisations with no financial track 
record. Senior managers do have a track record within local government and possibly 
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other organisations, including housing associations, although Housing Departments sit 
within a much larger organisation which provides support and control. Lending to a 
newly created LSVT association therefore entails a degree of risk for funders. In the 
first few years of operation, the associations normally make losses, which are funded 
by more borrowing. Funders need to be assured that the Associations have adequate 
controls in place to ensure that costs are contained so that losses eventually become 
surpluses, and that loans can be repaid.   
During these early stages, respondents reported that funders have quite a strong 
influence over LSVT associations. A Chief Executive observed that during his 
Association’s first year, the funders are “all over you like a rash”. This is the point in 
an association’s life where it is most at risk – if costs are not contained, it will never 
move into surplus, and will never be able to repay its loans. Funders’ influence over 
the associations was said to decline after the initial period, and they adopt a 
“maintenance” approach.  
Respondents reported that funders require their LSVT association clients to observe a 
number of basic ground rules, which are not usually onerous or restrictive. Although 
individual loan agreements vary from association to association, all funders require 
directors to obtain approval before taking certain decisions. A Housing Services 
Director gave a number of examples: 
“We can’t sack a member of the Senior Management Team without 
consulting the funders. If we change the Chair, or if we want to change 
the Committee structure, they want to know. They would also want to 
know about any change in external auditors.” (Housing Services 
Director) 
Respondents observed that funders expect the associations to run in accordance with 
their business plans, which contain a number of financial ratios that provide an 
indication of the financial health of the organisations. Ratios include the value of the 
stock to outstanding debt; income to expenditure; and net interest cover. If 
associations meet the ratios, respondents believe that the funders will be reassured that 
their loans will be repaid. If an association does not meet the ratios, respondents felt 
that funders may become nervous and might take more of an active role: 
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“As long as you’re running in accordance with your Business Plan, and 
you’re meeting the ratios, they’ll pretty much let you get on with doing 
what you want. If you run into financial problems, you’ll have them 
crawling all over you.” (Finance Director) 
Funders are said to be very keen to ensure that the associations take a measured and 
perhaps cautious approach to new activities. Respondents felt that lenders are unlikely 
to welcome new activities that add to existing risk associated with their loans. A Chief 
Executive observed that the funders of his Association were keen on facilitating new 
activities, as this was “good lending” for them, as long as risks were minimised: 
“The funders won’t let you be cavalier. Even if I wanted to be cavalier, 
the [funders] would simply switch off the tap and say ‘calm down’.” 
(Chief Executive) 
Influence of boards on their associations’ finances 
The respondents’ perception of the influence of Boards over the twenty associations’ 
finance and business planning ranged from a significant influence in some to little or 
no influence in others (see figure 9.11).  
Figure 9.11: Perceptions of the influence of Boards
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Respondents in the twelve associations where Boards were said to have a significant 
influence felt that members had a sense of responsibility for the financial health of 
their organisations, and therefore sought more than just an overview.  A Finance 
Director observed that board members were “gambling their reputations” on the 
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success of the association and consequently they tended “to be fairly careful about 
any business risks we put to them”.  
Board members’ involvement was reported to commonly involve examining the 
results of benchmarking exercises; comparing staffing levels over time; examining 
income and expenditure forecasts over time; and monitoring expenditure against 
budgets. More importantly than all these activities, Board members were reported to 
play a role in developing corporate plans, which dictate the direction of the business. 
This in turn determines the formulation of the business plan: 
“The Board, in conjunction with the Management Team, set the direction 
for the organisation, and the Business Plan reflects that. So we try to 
make sure that the Board are actively involved in setting the direction, 
and not just rubber stamping something we present to them.” (Finance 
Director) 
 In one Association, the Finance Director felt that Board members had become a little 
too involved in the organisation’s finances, at the expense of their other interests, such 
as developing the wider housing strategy. He attributed the Board’s keen interest in 
the organisation’s finances to earlier financial difficulties, which had been dealt with a 
number of years ago. In his view, the Board appeared to be prioritising the 
organisation’s finances at the expense of the needs of tenants and social housing 
objectives:  
“The Board is tending to become more financially turned on…financially 
harder. There are some people on the Board who almost think the 
organisation is just about the financial bottom line. There are some 
interesting culture clashes. There’s a lot of pressure from the Board to 
disagregate the stock and analyse it financially and get rid of the stock 
that doesn’t work financially. It’s good in the sense that it keeps us on our 
toes.” (Finance Director) 
 Respondents in the two associations where there was said to be little board influence 
took the view that it was not necessarily wrong that members were not involved in the 
detail of financial issues. One of the finance directors observed that the senior 
management team was paid to run the Association’s finances, and if they were doing 
their job well “that shouldn’t leave much for the members to have a go at”. This view 
was reiterated by a second Finance Director, who observed that “[the Board] don’t 
understand the business like we do” and that their role was to challenge any senior 
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management team “group think” or a dominant Chief Executive. A Board was good 
“at asking simple and basic questions” and should not get involved in the detail, 
which was within the domain of the senior management team: 
“[Board members] have the opportunity, the absolute power and 
authority. They’re only charged with long term planning and corporate 
governance of the Association. Really what they should influence is what 
[the Association] should be involved in. If the management got things 
financially wrong, then they may have to take more of an interest. They 
look at the judgement we make. They tweak it here and there, but 
fundamentally, the vision is held by the management team, as you would 
expect. You wouldn’t expect a group of non-executive part time people 
who only spend a few hours a year together to be able to develop a vision 
for a business. It’s not realistic.” (Finance Director). 
Board members were said to take a more active interest in their associations’ finances 
than funders, largely because they are ultimately responsible for any decisions taken.  
It is interesting to note that a small minority of the Board members of the associations 
encountering financial difficulties had been removed by the Housing Corporation. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I presented evidence which shows how LSVTs are perceived to help 
shift responsibility for rented housing from the public to the private sector and the 
implications of this for how they operate.  I explored respondents’ perceptions of the 
impact of tenant involvement and the creation of a form of quasi market during and 
after the transfer process, particularly looking at whether tenants have used their new 
role to push for enhanced services from their landlords.  Although tenants have been 
offered more opportunities to get involved in the management of their homes, few 
have taken the opportunity to do so.  The push for better customer service was 
reported to have come predominantly from within the organisations, rather than from 
tenants.   
I explored how the new private sector organisations are governed to help ensure their 
continuing accountability to tenants and the wider community.  Local authority, 
tenant and community interests are protected through council and tenant board 
representation, alongside independent members with the range of experience required 
to run large complex organisations.  I explored how a shift towards the private sector 
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is perceived to help create the conditions for greater long term sustainability of 
socially rented housing.  The organisations are said to able to formulate strategies to 
access resources to tackle low demand, but also to formulate strategies to deal with 
the problem, including adopting local lettings policies and converting some housing 
for market renting to improve social mix.  Finally, I examined how private sector 
influence is believed to affect the funding and financial performance of LSVT 
associations.  Private sector funders were perceived to be initially reluctant to fund 
LSVTs, but soon became heavily involved in funding social housing.  The shift 
towards the private sector has prompted an emphasis upon performance against 
business plans.  Funders are reported to have generally taken a laissez faire stance 
towards the associations they fund, but are said to be ready to take action against 
those who break covenants or take risks.  LSVT boards have also played a positive 
role in developing financial strategy and reigning in over ambitious senior staff.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I present an integrated analysis of the three core themes of this thesis – 
that LSVT is a method for the state to withdraw from direct provision of housing; that 
it helps to change the way council housing is organised; and that it shifts 
responsibility for service delivery from the public to the private sector.  In order to 
understand the core themes and their interaction, I analyse four key catalysts for 
organisational change, – the transfer process itself; geographical expansion; the need 
to change management structures to adapt to changes in the housing stock; and 
diversification away from the core business of providing social rented housing.  I 
examine how these organisational changes are associated with State withdrawal and 
the public to private shift in service delivery, drawing upon evidence presented in 
chapters seven, eight and nine, and data on comparative performance collected by the 
Housing Corporation.  These links are shown in table 10.1.  
Data sources 
The chapter rounds up the evidence from the survey, and uses it to compare LSVT 
associations to traditional housing associations and local authorities, in order to 
explore the changes brought about.  In addition to the evidence presented in chapters 
seven, eight and nine, I draw upon two data sources – Housing Corporation 
performance indicators for RSLs and LSVT associations, and Audit Commission 
performance indicators for district councils. The Housing Corporation collects data 
from 371 of the largest RSLs, which own 96 per cent of all RSL stock. The Audit 
Commission has a statutory duty to publish indicators of local authority performance. 
Both data sets cover the financial year ending 31st March 1999, released during 2000, 
and cover rent levels and the collection of rent; management and maintenance costs; 
lettings to statutory homeless people; vacant dwellings; and average re-let times. In 
addition, the Housing Corporation data set includes rent losses through voids and bad 
debts; rent arrears; financial performance; staffing and staff functions; and stock 
turnover.  
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Table 10.1: Catalysts for organisational change and links to withdrawal of state 
and public-private shift 
Catalysts for 
organisational change 
Linked to State’s desire 
to withdraw 
Public to private shift 
TRANSFER PROCESS 
ITSELF 
• Political pressure to 
improve service 
delivery 
• Financial problems 
• Removal of housing 
from politics 
• No longer subject to 
political cycle 
• New influences – 
independent board 
members and funders 
• Empowering tenants 
through transfer 
process helps them 
demand changes to 
service delivery 
EXPANSION BEYOND 
THE CORE LOCAL 
AUTHORITY AREA 
• A need for new 
housing, but no 
resources to develop.  
Stock transfer 
provides access to 
resources for the 
provision of new 
housing. 
• LSVT associations 
seek to expand to 
share overheads and 
reduce financial 
pressure. 
ADAPTING 
MANAGEMENT 
STUCTURES TO 
MANAGE EXPANDED 
STOCK 
• Pressure from 
councillors who see 
expansion in other 
areas as a dilution of 
the organisations 
originally created to 
take responsibility for 
their stock. 
• Shift to the private 
sector forces an 
emphasis on 
performance against 
targets. 
• Existing management 
structures not capable 
of delivering effective 
services, threatening 
financial performance. 
DIVERSIFICATION 
AWAY FROM SOCIAL 
HOUSING BUSINESS 
• Removal of housing 
from risk averse 
public sector. 
• Commercial freedom 
and access to 
resources.  
• Focus on sustainability 
to protect long term 
position. 
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1. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE RESULTING FROM THE TRANSFER 
PROCESS ITSELF 
Some of the organisational change occurring after stock transfer can be linked to the 
transfer process itself.  In Chapter seven, we discussed how the process forces local 
authorities and the proposed landlords to get closer to their tenants during the 
consultation programme, in order to achieve a positive ballot result.  Although tenant 
participation activities following transfer do not attract a wide range of tenants, LSVT 
associations make it easier for tenants to get involved if they wish to.  LSVT 
associations reserve a number of places on their boards for tenants, and they also 
facilitate the establishment of tenants associations whenever tenants show an interest.  
Tenants are generally ready to take up this opportunity if they feel that something 
could be done better, or if services are failing.  This step-change in relations with 
tenants makes organisational change more likely, as the organisations invite criticism 
and appear to take action in response.   Organisational change can also be linked to 
the other two core themes of this thesis of state withdrawal and the public to private 
shift in responsibility for service delivery.  I explore these links in the next two 
sections.   
Links to State withdrawal 
In chapter two, we outlined a number of accounts of housing policy that help us to 
understand stock transfer.  We discussed how the State sought to withdraw from 
direct service provision by transferring responsibility for services to the private sector.  
State withdrawal helps to deliver organisational change in two ways. Firstly, there is 
political pressure from central government for local authorities to tackle poor service 
delivery.  Once the stock is transferred, councillors are no longer directly accountable 
for service delivery, and are better placed to place pressure upon service providers to 
ensure that tenants are receiving the services they need and want.  As a result, LSVT 
associations are subject to a degree of political pressure to change the organisation 
and management of services.  Secondly, by removing housing from the local authority 
structure, the landlord organisations can make decisions along business lines, rather 
than having to have regard for the political wishes of councillors.  We discuss the 
changes in political influence brought about by withdrawal below.   
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 LSVT associations and their boards are not subject to political cycles in the way that 
local authorities are. They are better placed to take decisions that are based upon the 
interests of service users without being concerned about the impact upon their chances 
for re-election. LSVT associations are able take a long term approach, whereas local 
authorities are often subject to short term changes in political control, and the shifting 
priorities of central government.  In LSVT associations, housing management services 
are freed from direct political intervention in operational matters by councillors. Staff 
work according to policies and procedures, rather than at the direction of councillors 
who sometimes sought to bring their influence to bear upon staff decisions in the 
interests of individual constituents, when housing was under the control of councils. 
Once freed from responsibility for the housing service, councillors are able to 
concentrate on their enabling role, and to act as the consumers “champion” if the 
LSVT association does not perform effectively.   
Rent setting 
Rent setting provides an example of the way state withdrawal changes political 
influence over the organisation of housing providers.  Rent setting moves from a 
political environment – where politicians often have regard to the impact of rent 
increases to their chances of re-election – to a business environment – where rents are 
set at a sufficient level to fund services, undertake repairs and investment in the stock, 
and to service loans, while at the same time being affordable for tenants who do not 
receive Housing Benefit.  Long term planning over 25 years effectively enables LSVT 
associations to plan rent increases over the same long term period, providing certainty 
for both the associations themselves, but also their tenants.  
In order to explore the impact of political control upon rent setting, I examined data 
on average rent levels for RSLs, LSVT associations and district councils.  Average 
rent levels in the 51 LSVT associations were 3 per cent lower than average rents of all 
RSLs, while average rent levels of the sample of 20 LSVTs were 4 per cent lower 
than the average for all RSLs, as shown in figure 10.1 (Audit Commission, 2000; 
Housing Corporation, 2000).  
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Figure 10.1: Average Rents 
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Source: Audit Commission (2000); Housing Corporation (2000) 
Rents charged by the LSVT associations were some thirty per cent higher than 
average rents of all district councils. Higher rent levels in the LSVT associations can 
be accounted for partly by their regional distribution, with a majority located in the 
south. The LSVT associations had also made some progress in increasing their rents 
someway towards the levels of rents charged by comparable RSLs in their areas. This 
adjustment is made necessary by the shift from public to private sector provision, 
where income has to be sufficient to meet financial targets and to provide sufficient 
funds to service loans and provide resources for long term investment.   
Comparing the LSVT associations to other RSLs, the LSVT associations were more 
heavily concentrated in the south of the country where average rent levels were higher 
than in northern regions and therefore we might reasonably have expected average 
rents of the LSVT associations to be higher. There are two possible explanations for 
the average rents of LSVT associations being lower than rents of all RSLs. Firstly, 
twenty of the 51 LSVT associations were still in their “rent guarantee” period, and 
rents for transferring tenants were increasing slowly often at RPI plus one per cent 
only. Secondly, the turnover within the stock, from transferring tenancies (with low 
rents) to re-let tenancies (with higher rents) was occurring slowly.  
Rent Increases  
LSVT associations increased rents by 6.4 per cent on average, compared to an average 
increase by all RSLs of 4 per cent, and an average increase of 2.2 per cent by district 
councils (see figure 10.2).  
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Figure 10.2: Average annual rent increase
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Source: Audit Commission (2000); Housing Corporation (2000) 
LSVT associations increased their rents more quickly than other RSLs because they 
are aiming to increase their rent levels to the average for RSLs in their areas. The 
average increase is also higher because of turnover of tenancies from transferring to 
re-let tenancies. Rent increases by RSLs and LSVTs were at least double the average 
increase of district authorities. Local authorities’ rent increases are constrained by the 
Housing Revenue Account subsidy regime, which penalises authorities that raise their 
rents by higher amounts than centrally set guideline rents. At an average increase of 
two per cent per annum, district council rents are barely rising in line with inflation.  
The differences in the levels of rent increases reflects LSVT associations’ freedom 
from politics, and their ability to set rents at a level which raises sufficient income to 
maintain and invest in the properties, and to meet business plan targets for income.  
Housing associations rents have, however, come under increasing scrutiny and 
regulation by the Housing Corporation.   
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery 
Organisational change can also be linked to changes brought about by the shift in 
responsibility for service delivery from the public to the private sector.  Private sector 
involvement in service delivery brings a range of new influences to bear upon LSVT 
associations, including independent board members and funders.  They have different 
perspectives on service delivery from councillors, and can help LSVT associations 
change by bringing new ideas and having higher expectations of staff.  The new role 
of tenants can also help bring about organisational change.  The LSVT process creates 
a form of ‘quasi market’ by empowering tenants and giving them decision making 
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power.  This new role can also help tenants to push for organisational change after 
transfer.  
New influences – Boards and funders 
Interviewees in the survey felt that their boards were generally effective in 
supervising the activities of their associations.  Interviewees felt that independent 
members were particularly effective at examining new proposals presented by 
directors, as many are skilled professionals who have experience of development and 
housing management. Very few LSVT associations have been placed under 
supervision by the Housing Corporation, despite the risks associated with their debts.   
Independent board members are drawn from various backgrounds, including law, 
development, housing management, finance and business.  They can bring a fresh 
perspective and new approach to service delivery.  LSVT associations operate in an 
environment where their customers do not usually have a choice of service provider. 
However, independent board members can help the organisations operate as if they 
faced competition by holding senior members of staff to account on behalf of 
customers.  They can help the associations to question the way they deliver services, 
which can lead to organisational change.   
Funders also take an active interest in the operation of the LSVT associations they 
fund.  They are interested in ensuring that the associations do not take undue risks, 
which could threaten their future viability.  Funders are also interested in the extent to 
which the LSVT associations are meeting the aspirations of tenants, which will 
determine whether or not tenants will want to remain with their landlord.  Funders are 
keen to see changes to the way services are delivered, if these changes could help to 
protect long term demand for the housing stock.   
Empowering tenants and the creation of a quasi market 
Tenants expectations are raised by the transfer process, during which a local authority 
sets out its proposals for repairs and improvements to their homes. They often become 
more demanding following transfer, and find that the associations are able to meet 
their expectations. Housing management services in the survey associations have 
become slightly more responsive and have become easier for tenants to deal with. 
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This is often due to the involvement of tenants in groups which explore new ways of 
delivering services.  
The presence of tenants on LSVT associations’ boards has changed the way that they 
are accountable to service users. Housing departments were accountable to service 
users through councillors, who were accountable to thousands of constituents, many 
of whom were not council tenants. Tenant board members represent several hundred 
tenants, and their only interest is to ensure that the association operates in the interests 
of tenants.  
Greater tenant input has helped LSVT associations to adopt a management ethos that 
places customer interests as a high priority. In the sponsoring authorities, tenants’ 
interests were often not considered in decision making, and tenants frequently felt that 
there was little to be gained from trying to influence their councillors. Following 
transfer, although many tenants do not participate in routine tenant participation 
activities, they do tell their landlords when services are not performing as effectively 
as they could be. They are willing to make the effort to make their voice heard, as 
they feel more confident that they will be listened to and that the association will 
respond positively.  
Summary  
The process of transferring housing to an LSVT association can create the conditions 
and the momentum required to deliver organisational change.  There are links 
between these changes and withdrawal of the state from direct provision.  Transfer 
itself is driven by political pressure to improve service delivery, and this pressure 
continues to bear upon the LSVT association.  Transfer removes housing from 
politics, and housing issues are dealt with along business lines, rather than political 
lines.  Housing is no longer subject to political cycles, helping managers to take a 
long term approach driven by private funding.  There are also links between 
organisational change through the transfer process and the public to private shift in 
responsibility for service delivery.  The shift to the private sector brings new 
influences, including funders and independent board members. The transfer process 
empowers tenants and creates a form of quasi market, enabling them to demand 
changes to service delivery to meet their needs and aspirations.   
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2. EXPANSION BEYOND THE CORE LOCAL AUTHORITY AREA 
LSVT associations have access to private sector resources, which enables them to 
develop new stock, subject to their financial position and constraints imposed by 
lenders.  For many chief executives and senior staff, development and expansion can 
lead to enhanced salaries, as well as more prestige and kudos. Figure 10.3 shows the 
key drivers for expansion through development.   
Figure 10.3: Drivers for expansion through development 
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Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
Growth outside the “home” area can also be linked to personality clashes between 
former colleagues: 
“In business terms, we had all our eggs in one basket, so spreading it over 
the other LA areas meant that if we fell out with [the sponsoring 
authority’s chief officers], we wouldn’t be totally reliant on their good 
favour.” (Chief Executive)  
LSVT associations could, alternatively, chose not to develop, but to concentrate their 
efforts on delivering on their promises to tenants, including catch up repairs and 
improvements.  There are, however, a number of pressures on LSVT associations to 
develop new stock. Associations that simply deliver a stock improvement programme 
and do not seek out new opportunities risk losing more ambitious and effective staff 
to other organisations: 
Chapter Ten ~ The significance of LSVTs in changing the organisational structure, 
culture and financing of social housing 
Page 279 
 
“If you worked for me when we transferred, you’d have come as a very 
excited young man, with this new, vibrant organisation, with this job to 
do, and you’d have loved it – new building, new opportunities, new staff, 
new structures, money to spend. I reckon within four years, you would 
have left, because the initial job is done, and the future would be about 
containment, just sitting within [        ], never venturing over the 
boundary, just doing what work came up – almost a looking after the shop 
exercise.” (Chief Executive)  
Grow or face pressure to merge 
LSVT associations who do not develop and grow also face pressure to merge with 
other associations or join group structures. This is particularly a problem as an LSVT 
association moves into surplus and starts to repay its loans, as they become asset rich 
organisations, making them attractive targets for other RSLs or LSVT associations. 
An association in the eastern region, which had chosen not to expand, faces this 
prospect:  
“We shall probably be taken over at some time. I wouldn’t be surprised if 
there was some sort of merger in the long term. We’re financially robust 
enough to be an attractive target. There are sixty odd LSVT associations 
who are trying to operate as social businesses. But its daft that we’ve got 
60 odd organisations who do exactly the same thing, who’ve all been set 
up in the same model more or less, and some of them have moved into 
group structures, but 50 haven’t. And we all sit here and do the same 
thing. And in the market place, that’s going to get rationalised.” (Finance 
Director) 
Links to State withdrawal 
Local authorities have faced a downward pressure upon their resources for developing 
new housing for the last 25 years.  This pressure intensified after the 1989 Local 
Government and Housing Act, which changed the financial regime for housing and 
placed further downward pressure on resources for new development.  State 
withdrawal from direct provision can be seen as a response to this pressure.  Local 
authorities with pressing needs for new accommodation sought to withdraw to 
provide resources for developing new housing, and to provide additional resources for 
reinvesting in their existing stock.  The public sector sought to shift responsibility for 
funding services to the private sector, as voters were becoming more and more 
resistant to pay additional taxes to fund public services, including developing new 
housing.   
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Links to the public-private shift in service delivery 
Stock transfer shifts responsibility for financing and delivering services to the private 
sector.  LSVT associations face new risks and different pressures to public sector 
landlords, including the burden of the large debts taken on to finance the purchase of 
the stock and to reinvest in the housing stock. LSVT associations are under greater 
pressure initially than traditional housing associations, as demonstrated below.  LSVT 
associations seek to expand as a response to this financial pressure.  Expansion can 
help by spreading overhead costs over a larger stock.   
 Two key financial ratios for RSLs are net interest cover – the number of times 
income net of expenses can cover interest payments – and gearing – debt as a 
proportion of total assets. These ratios are important indicators of an association’s 
ability to deal with short term cash flow problems, as well as the level of 
indebtedness.  The average interest cover ratio for all RSLs is 2.12, so net income 
could meet interest payments more than twice over.  In LSVT associations, the 
average interest cover ratio is 0.96, which means that net income does not fully cover 
interest payments (see figure 10.4).  
Figure 10.4: Net Interest Cover
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
All RSLs 51 LSVTs Sample of 20
N
et
 In
te
re
st
 C
ov
er
 
Source: Housing Corporation (2000) 
The associations whose net incomes are insufficient to pay interest to their lenders 
need to borrow more cash to make up the difference. This is known as “capitalising” 
an interest payment. 22 of the 51 LSVTs associations’ interest cover ratios exceeded 
1.0, which meant that net income was sufficient to cover the full interest charge. 
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LSVTs are much more heavily indebted than average RSLs. The average gearing ratio 
for LSVT associations is almost twice as high as the average for all RSLs (see figure 
10.5).  
Figure 10.5: Gearing Ratio
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Source: Housing Corporation (2000) 
The difference in gearing ratios between LSVT associations and other RSLs reflects 
their different traditions and origins. RSLs grew up gradually and traditionally did not 
borrow heavily against their assets until the 1990s, when they were encouraged to 
substitute Housing Corporation grant with private finance. In contrast, LSVT 
associations are heavily indebted from their inception, as they require finance to pay 
their sponsoring local authorities for the housing stock, and to fund catch-up repairs.  
Expansion as a response to financial pressure 
Expansion can be driven by the large debt burdens taken on by LSVT associations.  
Faced with downward pressure upon costs to help meet business plan targets, an 
association might seek to expand as a way of spreading overhead costs across a larger 
number of units.  The burden of their debts can act as an incentive for LSVT 
associations to diversify into other business areas, including market renting, in order 
to provide resources for investment in new stock, as additional borrowing against the 
core stock may not always be possible until much later in the associations’ lives.  
Summary 
LSVT associations have developed new stock both within and outside their original 
areas of operation.  They face a degree of pressure to expand to maintain the 
momentum of improvement in service delivery, and also to avoid becoming a target 
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for mergers with other RSLs.  Expansion can be linked to State withdrawal, as 
councillors often transfer to access new resources to develop new stock.  Although 
they are sometimes reluctant to see their local LSVT developing in other areas, they 
recognise that this will release resources for reinvestment in the stock, as well as 
development in their own area in future.   Expansion can also be linked to the public 
to private shift in responsibility for service delivery.  Expansion can be seen as a 
response to the financial burden of the large debt taken on by LSVT associations to 
fund stock transfer.  Developing new stock increases turnover and can help share 
overhead costs across an expanded housing stock.   
3. ADAPTING MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES TO MANAGE THE 
EXPANDED STOCK 
The rush to grow has brought problems for LSVT associations. Their origins as 
former local authority housing departments mean that their management structures are 
not adapted to geographical expansion. LSVT associations have sometimes developed 
outside their local areas, but have not developed an effective strategy for managing 
the new dispersed stock until much later:  
“I don’t think we’ve particularly thought through the management 
implications. Being an ex-local authority management service, we’ve been 
used to a very restricted geographical area to providing services.  Now 
what we find is that we’ve got 100 properties in [    ] – trying to manage 
them 30-40 miles away is different from how you manage it here. The 
problem is that we haven’t got any local authority area where we’ve got 
enormous numbers of properties, other than [our own area]. In terms of 
regional committee structures, everything tends to be skewed back 
towards [the sponsoring authority’s area] anyway.” (Chief Executive) 
Geographical expansion over wide areas eventually leads to changes in the way 
housing management services are configured. Figure 10.6 shows the impact of 
development upon the management structures of LSVT associations.  Management 
structures change from a service that focuses most of its attention on a small area, to a 
structure capable of delivering a consistently high quality of service over a wider area: 
“Being so spread out started to present a problem, because we had one 
Housing Director, who was going all over the place, same for the 
Development Director. This is why we regionalised. So each region has 
its own Director, and each Director has his own complement of housing, 
development and administration staff. They’re totally responsible for their 
own patch, expect for finance, which is centrally controlled, because it 
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makes sense for us to borrow for the whole organisation, its cheaper and 
we can control it better.” (Chief Executive) 
Figure 10.6 The impact of development upon management structures  
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balance allocations. This compounds the general difficulties that LSVT associations 
face in managing their dispersed stock.    
Lack of strategy in development  
The way some associations have grown shows that there was to some degree a lack of 
strategy for development and growth. A director of an association that was not 
expanding outside its local area observed that some LSVTs had in the past been very 
aggressive in seeking out new opportunities, including in other LSVT associations’ 
areas. This was not necessarily bad for the local authorities offering grant funding for 
development or for the associations themselves. It is not clear, however, that the 
associations had developed a clear strategy for expansion, other than to grow. One 
association developed aggressively in its first years in operation, but did not 
concentrate sufficiently on updating its existing stock, to ensure that it still met 
people’s expectations. In the late 1990s, the association found parts of its stock 
increasingly difficult to let, partly as a result of its own development activities: 
“Most people who want social housing are expecting high quality social 
housing. Part of that is our own making. During the first seven years after 
the transfer, [the sponsoring authority] was able to provide enough 
funding for 2000 new homes. That built a lot of brand new high quality 
houses. So why would someone go into a grotty three bedroom flat when 
they can get a three bed house down the road.” (Chief Executive) 
Another association had developed aggressively outside its local area while neglecting 
its existing stock, some of which was deemed as statutorily unfit. For both 
associations, the location of their core stock was key. One was located in an area of 
very high demand, and its neglect of its core stock was straightforward to remedy 
later. The other association is located in an area where demand is not as strong. The 
association is facing a degree of pressure from its board to sell some of its stock if 
measures taken to tackle low demand are not effective. For this association, over 
zealous development has exacerbated demand problems in its existing stock. A more 
effective strategy for this Association might have involved examining how existing 
stock could have been modernised and improved rather than developing new stock.  
Links to State withdrawal 
Some local authorities withdrew from direct service provision as a way of releasing 
housing from the constraints of the public sector.  LSVT associations face a degree of 
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political pressure to focus on ways of delivering effective customer services.  
Councillors recognise the need for LSVT associations to expand, but see that 
expansion over wider areas can have a detrimental effect upon the core housing stock.  
Some organisational change can be attributed to political pressure from councillors 
who sanctioned withdrawal, but see expansion beyond the original local authority area 
as a dilution of the organisations they established.  Organisational change, including 
the formation of group structures, can help ringfence the ‘original’ stock to prevent 
distortion of the body that councillors helped to establish, while enabling the 
association to continue to grow.  
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery 
Changes to the way services are delivered become necessary when existing structures 
are not capable of managing the housing stock effectively.  This can threaten financial 
performance, leading to financial pressure and greater emphasis on costs and budgets 
than service delivery.  Restructuring of management can help LSVT associations 
provide more effective services to their new and existing stock while at the same time 
meeting their financial targets.   
Emphasis on performance 
The pressure of LSVT associations’ debt burdens forces them to focus on financial 
performance.  Expansion over wider areas often meant that existing management 
structures were not best placed to provide services and meet the targets set for them.  
This is because they lacked a local presence in outlying areas, making it difficult for 
them to stay close to tenants, or for them to keep in touch with conditions on the 
ground.  Reorganisation has helped LSVT associations to deliver more effective 
services and to achieve consistently higher levels of performance than other RSLs and 
local authorities in most areas, including collecting greater proportions of rent due and 
lower rent arrears and void losses.  
LSVT associations collected a higher proportion of rental income due than all RSLs 
did, but district councils’ performance was better than both groups (see figure 10.7). 
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Figure 10.7: Rent Collection
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Source: Audit Commission (2000); Housing Corporation (2000) 
The performance of district councils may be explained by their closer links with the 
offices that administer Housing Benefit. For LSVT associations, income 
maximisation is extremely important to ensure that they collect adequate revenue to 
meet their obligations to funders.  
The importance of income maximisation to LSVT associations is also reflected in 
figures on rent losses through bad debts and voids. While LSVT associations lost 2.09 
per cent of rental income through bad debts, all RSLs lost some 3.2 per cent (see 
figure 10.8).  
Figure 10.8: Rent losses through bad debts and voids
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Source: Housing Corporation (2000) 
LSVT associations are also more effective at controlling rent arrears than all RSLs, 
with a difference in performance of over 2 per cent (see figure 10.9). Better 
performance by LSVT associations on both rent losses and rent arrears reflects the 
tough targets set in early years, which require the organisations to maximise income 
collection and minimise losses.  
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Figure 10.9: Rent arrears as a proportion of total rental income
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Source: Housing Corporation (2000) 
Financial pressure 
LSVT associations do not have the same comfort financially as other RSLs do. They 
start from a position where they have to work hard to achieve targets in their business 
plans. Business plans are tight initially, as sponsoring authorities want to maximise 
the sale price of the stock, and their capital receipt.  Transfer negotiations start from 
the position of the cost of provision of a local authority style service, where costs and 
expectations have been kept to the minimum possible level for substantial periods 
before transfer. The consultation process unleashes new expectations of a better 
quality of service, which inevitably costs more than the local authority style service. 
LSVT associations have to meet their loan repayments and business objectives, as 
well as meeting expectations for better services: 
“We are an entirely debt funded organisation, so we have to operate as a 
business, because we have loans to pay off. But we’re also a social 
landlord, so the trick is to steer the route in between the two. There are 
times when we have to drop down on the business side. There are times 
when we will drop down on our social responsibilities. That is our 
culture.” (Housing Services Director)  
Staff throughout the organisations are forced to become aware of the costs of 
everything they do, especially in the early stages when finances are most tight. The 
concept of every activity having a cost is not widely adopted in many local 
authorities. 
Too much focus on business aims at the expense of customer service? 
A Tenant Participation Officer observed that there was “very much a business focus” 
in his Association, and this focus “detracted from it being a people business”. 
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Focusing on costs and the “business” side of social housing does not necessarily mean 
that associations cannot pursue their “social aims”. Ultimately, all costs to the 
associations are costs that are passed on to tenants in their rents, and staff in LSVT 
associations are more aware of this than perhaps staff in RSLs or local authorities: 
“We have a social objective, but we do run it as a business. We are quite 
used to looking at things from a business perspective. To take the 
financial costs to our tenants of the activities we get into fairly high up the 
agenda.” (Finance Director)  
The presence of businessmen and women on the boards of LSVT associations can 
also strengthen the influence of the “business side” of running social housing at the 
expense of service delivery aims: 
“The Board is tending to become more financially turned on… financially 
harder. There are some people on the Board who almost think the 
organisation is just about the financial bottom line. There are some 
interesting culture clashes. There’s a lot of pressure from the Board to 
disagregate the stock and analyse it financially, and get rid of the stock 
that doesn’t work financially. It’s good in the sense that it keeps us [the 
senior management team] on our toes.” (Finance Director) 
Concerns with cost control can become more important than service delivery, 
particularly if business plans are very tight, or senior staff are too cautious. Figure 
10.10 shows how an LSVT association might approach competing organisational 
goals of expansion, pressure to meet financial resources and pressure to improve 
services.  
Figure 10.10: Approaches to competing organisational goals 
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Emphasis on cost control might be a particular problem for senior managers from 
local authorities, who are unaccustomed to dealing with the risks associated with an 
independent organisation taking on a large debt burden. A Housing Director observed 
that his Association had made a number of attempts to introduce initiatives to shift the 
focus back onto service delivery, including a Tenants Charter. The success of these 
initiatives was limited, partly because the Association did not initially release enough 
funds to implement them, because of its focus on cost control:  
 “We were slow to provide sufficient resources to enable some of these, 
and we’ve addressed that over the last year. We’ve introduced a Tenant 
Participation Officer, we’re bringing in more housing officers. Previously 
we’ve tended to be very lean and very mean – probably too mean and lean 
– to provide the services we want. The biggest fear during the first few 
years was ‘are we going to make it financially’. We were very much 
aware that we had a very tight two or three years that we had to get 
through. Everybody was driven to make sure we didn’t overspend.” 
(Housing Director) 
Comparing management costs and staffing levels of LSVT associations to those of 
RSLs and district councils can demonstrate the emphasis on cost control.  RSLs and 
district councils spend around £450 per dwelling per annum on management of their 
stock. In contrast, the LSVT associations spent just £322 per dwelling per annum (see 
figure 10.11).  
Figure 10.11: Management Costs
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Source: Audit Commission (2000); Housing Corporation (2000) 
Higher management costs in district councils can be explained in part by the division 
of central service costs between departments. Housing departments sometimes bear a 
higher proportion of the costs of IT and finance than other departments, such 
proportions often not reflecting their actual usage of those services. The difference 
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between RSLs and LSVT can be explained by the incentives and pressures faced by 
LSVTs. RSLs are commonly not heavily indebted and will normally achieve a surplus 
of income over expenditure.  They also grew accustomed to revenue grant support 
from Central Government, which meant that they were able to devote more resources 
to management.  LSVTs in contrast are heavily indebted, and will often make losses 
in the early years of their operation. They need to contain costs to keep deficits within 
levels agreed with their funders, so that they can eventually move into surplus and pay 
off their debts.  
RSLs employ approximately double the number of full-time equivalent staff per 100 
dwellings than LSVT associations (see figure 10.12).  
Figure 10.12: Average number of FTE staff per 100 dwellings
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Source: Housing Corporation (2000)  
Part of this difference, but by no means all, is accounted for by the low number of 
care staff employed by the LSVT associations, whose housing stock is almost 
exclusively for general needs. LSVT associations clearly display their origins as 
former local authority housing departments, in which constraints on resources place 
limits on staffing. The smaller number of staff also demonstrates that LSVTs are 
leaner than RSLs, and strive to provide comparable services at a lower cost. This is 
driven by the large debts taken on by the LSVT associations at the point of transfer, 
and the need to meet targets to ensure that loans can be paid off within agreed 
timescales.  
Summary 
The shift in responsibility for service delivery to the private sector brings an emphasis 
on performance and pressure upon staff to meet financial targets.  This can sometimes 
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lead to a perception that the associations focus too much on their ‘business aims’   at 
the expense of their ‘social aims’.  These pressures are exacerbated by the difficulties 
the associations face when management structures have not grown or adapted to 
changes in the distribution of housing stock as a result of development.  This has an 
impact on performance, which can create financial difficulties.  Both financial 
pressure and the demands from councillors for more effective service delivery for the 
‘core’ housing stock bring about organisational change.   
4. DIVERSIFICATION AWAY FROM SOCIAL HOUSING PROVISION 
For LSVT associations in the early stages following their creation, the growth and 
development aspirations of senior staff can sometimes by frustrated by lack of 
available resources. Unless they can find new sources of funds for investment, they 
may not be able to develop until much later, when they have moved into surplus and 
have started to repay their loans. To generate new sources of funds, LSVT 
associations have often ventured into new activities, including student 
accommodation, housing for NHS key workers and market renting. Directors in some 
LSVT associations argue that market renting is “a dilution of what we’re meant to be 
about” (Chief Executive). Although housing for market rent does not meet the core 
aim of social housing organisations – to provide affordable housing for people in 
housing need – it does meet a need for good quality housing that might not be met by 
other providers. At the same time, expansion into this area of housing can generate 
profits, which can help associations provide additional resources to develop more 
housing for its core social housing client base: 
“Its something we could make money at, we could be good at, and help 
subsidise social housing development, and possibly charge lower rents.” 
(Finance Director) 
For staff and tenants of a local authority, transfer to an LSVT association offers 
opportunities and threats. In Chapter seven, we examined the core reasons for the shift 
in service delivery from the public to the private sector. Transfer enables the former 
housing departments, constituted as housing associations, to access private finance.  
Placing the ownership and management of housing at arms length from local 
authorities gives staff more freedom to develop new areas of business, including 
development of new homes. This freedom is limited to some extent by the 
associations’ boards and also by funders and limits on resources. Some of the 
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associations in the sample survey have expanded rapidly across whole regions of the 
country.  
Withdrawal from direct provision, organisational change and greater private sector 
responsibility for service delivery brings opportunities, risks and constraints, which 
are illustrated in figure 10.13.  
Figure 10.13: Constraints, opportunities and risks  
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Withdrawal from direct provision frees housing organisations from the culture of risk 
adversity in local authorities.  LSVT associations are more likely to encourage 
innovation and experimentation by their staff. They are often more willing to let staff 
take measured risks and to learn from their mistakes.   
Links to the public-private shift in service delivery 
Diversification has clear links with the public to private shift in responsibility for 
service delivery.  As private sector organisations, LSVT associations have 
commercial freedom to engage in a wider range of activities than local authorities, 
which are legally prevented from engaging in activities outside the range set by 
central government.  LSVT associations also have a strong focus on long term 
sustainability, and diversification can help them protect their financial viability.   
Commercial freedom 
The activities of Housing departments within local authorities are strictly controlled 
by Central Government.  In contrast LSVT associations are private sector 
organisations and have more freedom to invest in new markets and alternative 
activities, subject to government regulation through the Housing Corporation.  LSVT 
associations can also establish subsidiary organisations to provide services outside the 
scope of government regulation.  These subsidiary organisations could provide 
housing for NHS key workers or other sub-market and market rented housing.  
Focus on sustainability 
The shift of housing formerly owned by local authorities to the private sector locks it 
into a long term programme of investment, financed by borrowing.  LSVT 
associations have to ensure that their housing stock is financially viable for at least the 
length of the loan taken to finance stock transfer.  If an LSVT association finds that 
demand for its core social housing business is declining, it needs to diversify into 
other markets to ensure that the organisation can continue to service its loans, and to 
survive in a different form with alternative businesses.  
Summary 
Lack of resources for new development leads to a search for other sources of funds for 
investment.  Some LSVT associations have diversified from their core business of 
providing social housing into other related areas, such as providing housing for 
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market rent, and accommodation for students or key workers.  These activities can 
produce surpluses, which can be used to fund development of new social housing.  
There are clear links with State withdrawal from direct provision.  Transfer moves 
landlords from the risk averse public sector to the private sector, which is better 
placed to innovate and experiment.  There are also links to the public to private shift 
in service delivery. Moving landlords to the private sector gives them commercial 
freedom and their focus on long term sustainability drives diversification from core 
business. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I examined four key catalysts for organisational change – the transfer 
process itself; geographical expansion; the need to change management structures to 
adapt to changes in the housing stock; and diversification away from the core business 
of providing social rented housing, in relation to the key explanations of stock 
transfer.   
Changes in service delivery following transfer can be attributed to withdrawal by 
local authorities from direct provision, access to resources through private finance, 
which is unavailable to local authorities; the break of links with politicians; changes 
in incentives; and changes in the input of tenants into the organisations which result 
from changes in their role during and following the transfer process.  Table 10.2 
shows the key differences between LSVT associations, traditional housing 
associations and local authorities emerging from this analysis.   
The process of moving staff and housing from the relative security of the local 
authority environment to independence in the private sector, unleashes a number of 
opportunities – freedom to borrow, to develop and to expand – and risks – a heavy 
debt burden, over expansion, and management problems. LSVT associations often 
feel that expansion is necessary to avoid being merged with another association. 
Expansion has brought associations problems where they have spread their 
development activities too widely and thinly, with dispersed stock that is difficult for 
their existing structures to manage. There is also a risk that development takes priority 
over the existing stock and service delivery.  
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Table 10.2: Key differences between LSVT associations, traditional housing 
associations and local authority housing departments 
 LSVT association Traditional HA LA Housing 
Department 
Tenant 
involvement 
Transfer forces landlords 
to get closer to tenants, 
which can lead to changes 
in the way services are 
delivered. 
No pressure to engage 
with tenants, no pressure 
to change methods of 
service delivery.  Some 
pressure to change, 
through competition for 
social housing grant. 
Tenants can get involved 
through contact with 
councillors.  Councillors 
have competing interests 
and attempt to satisfy all 
or most of their 
constituents.   
Political 
involvement 
Indirect involvement by 
politicians, through 
council nominees on 
boards. 
Little or no direct 
involvement by 
politicians in 
management.  
Direct control and 
ownership of stock by 
councils.   
Rent setting Rents determined through 
long term business needs, 
within constraints set by 
Housing Corporation. 
Rents set at sufficient 
levels to fund services 
and reinvestment, subject 
to Housing Corporation 
constraints.   
Rents set within limits 
determined by Central 
Government, and with 
regard to councillors’ 
chances of re-election.   
Rent levels Start at level of local 
authority rents, but 
increase towards rent 
levels of RSLs, subject to 
Housing Corporation 
limits on annual 
increases. 
Determined by 
reinvestment and service 
delivery needs.  
Lower rents, often not 
sufficient to fund 
reinvestment in the stock. 
Private sector 
influence 
Supervision by funders 
and involvement of 
independent members on 
Board.  
RSLs have grown 
increasingly accustomed 
to private finance since 
1989. 
Little or no private sector 
influence or involvement.  
Accountability 
to service users 
Through tenant board 
representatives and 
councillor nominees. 
Varies between RSLs. Through councillors. 
Expansion Opportunities to expand 
in home area and 
elsewhere, funded 
through private finance 
and LA social housing 
grant, funded by capital 
receipt from transfer. 
Opportunities to expand 
in home area and 
elsewhere, funded 
through private finance 
and LA social housing 
grant, funded by capital 
receipt from transfers. 
Few opportunities to 
expand stock, due to 
Central Government 
constraints on capital 
expenditure.   
Ethos Cost driven, with 
emphasis on effective 
delivery of services and 
good value for money. 
Service driven, although 
focused on costs and 
value for money. 
Driven by aims and 
objectives of politicians.   
Structure Management structure 
designed for concentrated 
stock, but often has to 
change to manage a more 
dispersed stock. 
Structure designed to 
manage a dispersed stock. 
Structure designed to 
manage a concentrated 
stock.   
Range of 
activities  
Determined by access to 
resources, financial 
strength and drive of 
staff. 
Determined by access to 
resources, financial 
strength and drive of 
staff. 
Narrow range of 
activities, defined by 
Central Government and 
statute.   
Source: Interviews, 1998 and 1999 
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In the concluding chapter of this thesis, we draw together the evidence presented, in 
order to assess how far it advances our understanding of the key issues set out in 
chapter one – how the State’s attempts to transfer can be explained; the organisational 
changes introduced by LSVT; and how transfer reflects wider changes in the 
Government’s approach to service delivery.    
 
 
Chapter Eleven ~ Conclusions: Moving on from Council Housing   Page 297 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding chapter, I summarise how the evidence presented in this thesis 
helps to advance our understanding of the three core issues set out in chapters one and 
two, as follows: 
1. To what extent has LSVT helped the Conservative Government achieve its 
aims of encouraging local  authorities to withdraw from direct provision?  
2. How have the new housing organisations developed at ground level, in 
terms of management, ethos, goals, operation and structure? 
3. Has the influence of a shift away from public provision towards a more 
private sector style of provision affected how the organisations develop and 
operate? 
In the second section of this chapter, I explore ways in which the type of whole stock 
transfers examined in this thesis might have helped pave the way for inner urban and 
citywide transfers from 1996 onwards.  I start by summarising the evidence presented 
in the thesis and drawing key conclusions on how LSVT fits within the core theories 
presented in chapters one and two. 
1. EXPLAINING THE STATE’S ATTEMPTS TO WITHDRAW FROM 
DIRECT PROVISION 
In chapters two, three and four, I attempted to set what is a significant structural 
change at ground level in the context of broader changes driving the new role of local 
authorities in housing - a contraction in their role as direct providers, as a result of the 
shift in responsibility for provision to the private sector, driven by reductions in public 
funds made available for investment; which has resulted in changes in the way social 
housing is organised and managed. 
Central Government’s involvement in stock transfer 
Although the Labour Government first started the reductions in public housing 
programmes in 1976, primarily for fiscal and economic reasons (Merrett, 1979; 
Malpass, 2001), the Conservative Government elected in 1979 introduced far deeper 
cuts (Cooper, 1985).  The Conservative Government believed that the State was too 
enmeshed in direct provision, and this threatened individual choice and freedom 
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(Thompson, 1990).  The policy response was to shift financial support from public 
housing to support for owner occupation (Forrest & Murie, 1987; Hamnett, 1987) and 
selling homes to tenants under the Right to Buy (Forrest & Murie, 1988).  From the 
mid 1980s onwards, the Conservative Government appeared to recognise that not all 
the remaining tenants would be able to buy their homes under the Right to Buy, and 
argued that local authority landlords needed to improve service delivery (Waldegrave, 
1987; Malpass & Mullins, 2002), which was identified as being problematic in larger 
urban authorities (DoE, 1981; Henney, 1984; Audit Commission, 1986; Clapham, 
1989).  Estate Action was introduced in 1985, with an ambition that the incentive of 
grants for reconfiguration of estates would lead to transfers to private sector landlords 
(Provan, 1993).  Following the Conservative Government’s third consecutive general 
election victory in 1987, ministers proposed transfers of council housing through 
HATs and Tenants Choice, to further reduce the State’s role as a direct provider 
(Waldegrave, 1987; DoE, 1987; Ridley, 1988), but also arguably to address some of 
the management problems associated with council housing (Henney, 1984; Power, 
1987; Clapham, 1989; Malpass & Mullins, 2002).  Stock transfer could change the 
way public rented housing was managed by, for example, passing it to single purpose 
bodies with access to private finance, more akin to the European models of social 
housing (Power, 1993; Kleinman, 1996).   
Such a shift to private sector bodies would reduce the State’s financial commitment to 
housing provision, enabling the Conservative Government to achieve its ideological 
objective of supporting owner occupation and private provision (Forrest & Murie, 
1987; Hamnett, 1987).  The shift could also arguably enfranchise tenants by giving 
them more decision making power over the future of their housing (DoE, 1987), 
although this right was limited and was not available after transfer out of the council 
sector (Clapham, 1990).  Local authorities, once having passed ownership of their 
housing stock to other bodies, would be left with an enabling role, involving 
identifying needs and monitoring the performance of providers (Goodlad, 1993; 
Aldbourne Associates, 1997). 
Local authorities, tenants and private sector organisations appeared reluctant to accept 
the shift in the way Central Government proposed (Mullins, 1991).  Tenants were 
reluctant to change landlords even though services provided by some local authorities 
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were arguably only barely adequate.  Their fears of the private sector and the 
Government’s models of transfer were heightened by the initial refusal of ministers to 
allow ballots of tenants on HAT proposals (Kemp, 1989; Woodward, 1991). Local 
authorities were reluctant to use the models developed by central government, 
arguably because of the perception among tenants and councillors that they might 
have allowed private landlords and property speculators to take over their estates.  
Under pressure from the financial regime introduced by the Conservative 
Government, many local authorities were interested in exploring ways of involving 
the private sector (Kleinman, 1996), but in a way that offered tenants more protection 
and opportunities to participate, and that addressed their housing departments’ 
problems in a more structured and holistic way.  
The independent sector - in the form of housing associations - resisted the shift from 
the public sector in the way the Conservative Government had proposed, as they 
wanted to work in partnership with local authorities (Mullins, 1991). The housing 
association movement was reluctant to involve itself in anything that would threaten 
its relationship with local authorities (NHFA, 1987).  
Explaining local authorities’ approach to stock transfer  
The Conservative Government’s increasing tightening of the financial regime for 
council housing encouraged many authorities to consider transfer (Kemp, 1989; 
Kleinman, 1996), while others with the most acute problems were arguably forced to 
transfer.  In addition to their financial problems, some councils’ began to experience 
management problems by the 1970s and 1980s (DoE, 1981; Audit Commission, 1986; 
Power, 1987). The perception of council housing held by voters living in other tenures 
was often negative, even though council tenants were believed to be generally 
satisfied (Gyford et al, 1989; Maclennan et al, 1989).  Some councils responded to the 
difficulties of owning housing, related to the financial regime for council housing, by 
withdrawing from direct provision, at least partially (Tym et al, 1988; Mullins et al, 
1995; Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999; Nevin, 1999; Malpass & Mullins, 2002). Other 
councils who rejected transfer attempted to address their problems by changing 
housing management, through initiatives including decentralisation (Seabrook, 1984; 
Mainwaring, 1988). These reforms, while successful in delivering some improvement 
in management, appeared to do little to help address the local authorities’ financial 
problems, which resulted from the Conservative Government’s reductions in the 
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public housing budget. Reforms were arguably vulnerable to shifting political 
priorities (Mainwaring, 1988), which appeared to strengthen the case for more 
fundamental change (Power, 1997). Finally, local authorities were pressured to shift 
responsibility for the provision of socially rented housing to the private sector to 
provide access to long term sources of investment (see Glasgow DC, 1986; LB 
Hackney 1995; LB Tower Hamlets 1995; Wilcox, 1993), and possibly also to bring an 
alternative vision for managing the stock (see for example Tym et al 1988). The 
Conservative Government wanted to force local authorities to withdraw from direct 
provision (DoE, 1987; Waldegrave, 1987), and arguably tightened the financial 
regime for council housing in order to do so.  This appeared to leave local authorities 
with the most severe stock condition and management problems with little choice but 
to involve the private sector.  However, local authorities appeared to be willing to 
work with the private sector but on agreed terms (NHFA, 1987; Chumrow, 1995) and, 
with the help of tenants’ campaigns, successfully resisted the Conservative 
Government’s compulsory transfer models. 
2. ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES INTRODUCED BY STOCK TRANSFER 
AND IMPACTS ON SERVICE DELIVERY 
The Conservative Government’s policies towards council housing can be divided into 
two phases (Kemp, 1991).  During the first phase, between 1979 and 1986, the 
Government focused on promoting home ownership through the Right to Buy, and in 
the second, it turned its attention to the stock that remained in council ownership.  In 
the second phase, the Conservatives recognised that there was a need for a significant 
rented sector to provide for people who could not afford to purchase their homes 
(Waldegrave, 1987).  However, ministers were critical of the services provided by 
local authorities (ibid; Patten, 1987) and sought to bring about organisational change 
(Malpass & Mullins, 2002). While outside observers on council housing may also 
have advocated organisational change (Henney, 1984; Clapham, 1989; Power, 1993), 
there is little evidence to confirm that local authorities transferred for anything other 
than as a way of escaping from the financial straightjacket imposed by the 
Conservative Government.  For example, the transfer of whole council housing 
departments to single, newly created landlords with an element of continuing 
councillor involvement, can arguably be interpreted as resistance from councils to the 
break-up of their stocks.  This appears to be in direct conflict with the aim of the 
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Conservative Government to “get rid of these monoliths” (Patten, 1987) as whole 
stock transfers merely moved near monopoly landlords from the public to the private 
sector. Research into the motivations of transferring councils may shed further light 
on the role organisational change plays in building the case for transfer.  
Whether or not local authorities transferred as a way of changing the organisation of 
their housing service, as well as to escape from the financial regime for council 
housing, evidence presented in this thesis suggests that LSVT has achieved a degree 
of organisational change.  In Chapter two, I discussed Handy’s (1993) examination of 
organisational structures.  Public landlords generally adopt the ‘role’ management 
style, where workers operate within very tightly defined and demarcated roles.  These 
types of organisations find it difficult to adapt quickly, and can ‘collapse’ if there are 
changes to their operating environments.  Stock transfer has moved public landlords 
from the role style to the ‘task’ style of organisation, where workers are able to 
operate more flexibly and focus more on outcomes, rather than the procedures 
required to achieve those outcomes. Evidence from the survey of twenty LSVT 
associations suggests that they are more likely to focus on service delivery and less 
likely to be concerned about rules, job descriptions and procedures.     
How significant is management change? 
By applying Peters and Waterman’s (1982) eight attributes for excellence to 
management by local authorities and LSVT associations, we can see that differences 
emerge. Generally, as a result of the way they are structured, local authorities do not 
appear to possess any of the eight attributes for excellence, as shown in table 11.1, 
whereas LSVT associations appear to be capable of achieving all eight. 
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Table 11.1: Applying key attributes for excellence: Management change as a 
result of stock transfer 
 
Attribute Management by local authority Management by LSVT association 
1. Bias for action Political process prevents speedy 
reactions. LA arguably slow to respond 
to customer needs (Stewart, 1988). 
Structures are set up and structured to 
change and avoid stultification. 
2. Close to 
customers 
Service providers have divided loyalties 
between tenants and politicians (Leach, 
Stewart & Walsh, 1989; Clapham, 
1989). 
Focus on customer – survival arguably 
depends upon it. Systems in place to 
seek customer feedback and 
involvement, including Tenant Board 
members. 
3. Autonomy and 
entrepreneurship  
LA structure largely prevents 
entrepreneurship. Culture of avoidance 
of risk and blame (Stoker, 1991). 
Organisation avoids making mistakes 
and does not learn (Stewart, 1988).  
Staff given autonomy and encouraged 
to innovate. Capable of learning from 
mistakes with little risk of blame from 
politicians.  
4. Productivity 
through people  
A strong ‘them and us’ culture between 
staff and politicians (Gyford, 1984) 
Management close to staff and 
relationships and communications are 
generally informal. 
5. Hands on – 
values driven 
Constantly changing values as power 
changes hands between parties. Local 
authority structures are complex and 
senior staff are often remote from 
frontline staff (Power, 1987).  
Simple structure brings managers closer 
to the frontline and to customers. 
Tenants on board help to ensure that 
senior staff hear customer viewpoint.  
6. Stick to the 
knitting 
Local authorities are multi-purpose 
organisations. Politicians determine 
policy and strategy, yet are rarely 
experienced in housing management 
(Wilson et al 1998). Politicians’ time 
and attention is divided across a range 
of local authority activities (Stoker, 
1991).  
Focus on one core business of 
providing housing.  
7. Simple focus – 
lean staff 
Housing is part of a complex 
bureaucratic organisation.  High staff to 
tenant ratios, but very few at ground 
level (Power, 1987).  
Very few layers of management 
between chief executives and frontline 
staff.  
8. Simultaneous 
loose-tight 
properties 
High level of centralisation of decision 
making, as staff avoid making 
responsibility to avoid risk and blame 
(Stewart, 1988). Values are owned by 
councillors.  
Autonomy pushed down to lowest 
possible levels. Staff afforded decision 
making power within limits set at 
centre.   
 
Source: Peters & Waterman (1982), references cited in the table and Interviews, 1998 
and 1999 
Are there fundamental organisational changes?  
A key theme running throughout this analysis is the role of politicians and the 
political process. The very nature of the political process arguably prevents autonomy 
being delegated to staff (Leach, Stewart & Walsh, 1994). Where councils attempt to 
delegate responsibility to staff, individual officers are likely to be reluctant to accept it 
for fear of being blamed by politicians who might seek to make political capital from 
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highlighting mistakes (Stoker, 1991). The political process arguably prevents service 
providers from getting close to their customers, as their first priority is to satisfy 
politicians (Clapham, 1989:33) and politicians see it as their role to provide 
accountability to voters, who in the case of council housing are also customers 
(Power, 1997). The tensions in this role arguably create difficulties for public 
landlords, including, for example, rent setting determined by political considerations, 
leading to a lack of resources for reinvestment in the stock (Emms, 1990).  A clear 
message emerges – ownership and management of housing by bodies outside local 
authorities is likely to be a prerequisite for achieving excellence in the provision of 
services to tenants.  
LSVT can be seen as a break from the traditional method of managing public housing.  
The new single-purpose landlords operate at arms length from politicians and bring in 
private and voluntary sector skills and resources (Power, 1997).  The survey evidence 
suggests that LSVT associations are better placed than local authorities to focus on 
customers, provide innovative services, have a single purpose, all of which help to 
deliver organisational change.   
Whole stock transfers to date have generally led to the creation of standalone 
organisations, each with their own chief executives, finance directors, IT and finance 
departments. Evidence from the survey seems to suggest that this was the only way 
that councils and tenants could be satisfied that there would be local ownership of 
policy and decision making in the acquiring landlords.  Perceptions of respondents in 
the survey, for example, indicate that councillors were reluctant to accept split 
transfers, where proposed, and were also thought to be opposed to any organisational 
change, including mergers, which changed the structure of the ‘original’ LSVT 
association. 
Consequently, LSVT has not created much diversity of ownership of socially rented 
housing at ground level.  Up to 1996, the dominant model was whole stock transfer to 
a single, specially created housing association.  Ownership was not broken up into 
smaller and more diverse bodies, due in part to the size of the housing stocks 
involved, many of which were relatively small.  Dividing all these housing stocks 
might not have been feasible, as the organisations created might have been too small 
to be financially sustainable on a standalone basis (DETR, 1998).   
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How transfers are evolving beyond the whole stock model 
The pattern of transfers is changing, and transfers of estates and partial transfers in the 
late 1990s appear to have created more diversity (Nevin, 1999; London Housing 
Federation, 1999).   In future, large city transfers appear to have the potential to create 
greater diversity of ownership, depending on the structures adopted, and the 
autonomy afforded to the local subsidiaries of city-wide trusts (Malpass & Mullins, 
2002).  They also have the potential to replicate the former local authority 
departments if control is not passed on to local housing organisations.  
Although the whole stock single transfer model of stock transfer was dominant 
between 1988 and 1996, more authorities began to consider transfer as a possible 
option for parts of their stock in the second half of the 1990s. They included inner 
urban authorities, whose stock often contained estates in very poor condition (see for 
example LB Hackney, 1995; LB Tower Hamlets, 1995). Whole stock LSVTs 
appeared to demonstrate to urban authorities that stock transfer could help address 
their housing problems, but this type of transfer was not a viable option for them, as 
any receipt would not have been large enough to cover outstanding debts, due to the 
need to undertake substantial catch up repairs (Wilcox, 1993).  
The Conservative government was keen to continue to encourage and facilitate urban 
transfers, and introduced the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund in 1996, which 
provided dowries for new landlords receiving partial transfers of negatively valued 
stock (DoE, 1995c). Debts associated with the transferred housing stock were retained 
in the authorities’ HRAs and serviced by income from the retained stock and Central 
Government HRA subsidy.  
The Labour Government did not continue the ERCF scheme after the third bidding 
round. It has instead signalled major changes to regulations on local authorities’ 
outstanding housing debts, which make large city-wide whole stock transfers possible 
(DETR, 1999b). The Government’s New Deal for Communities funds may also be 
used to facilitate stock transfer as part of a wider regeneration package in very poor 
communities, creating more diversity of ownership and tying the private sector into 
inner city regeneration (DETR, 1999c).  These initiatives have made partial transfers 
possible in inner urban authorities, following on from the success of shire district 
councils in transferring their stock. 
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Evidence from the survey also points to a move away from the independent, 
standalone model of LSVT through the formation of group structures with other 
RSLs, which respondents in the survey argue can enable individual members to retain 
local autonomy over large areas of policy. This move towards group structures 
arguably helps to reduce the duplication of senior staff and central services, including 
IT and finance.  
What were the impacts of organisational change on housing services? 
Having transferred their housing stocks, housing departments were released from the 
local authority structure to become single purpose bodies with a focus on housing. 
They were freed from direct political control and were arguably able to take a long 
term approach to their activities, focusing more effectively on the needs of their 
customers.  Evidence from the survey suggests that this long term approach is driven 
partly by the organisations’ funding arrangements, which requires a sustainable 
income stream to service loans taken out to purchase and invest in the stock.  
The survey of twenty LSVT associations shows that the process of breaking away 
from the sponsoring authorities is not always straightforward and that the process of 
negotiating a transfer is said to leave feelings of resentment between former 
colleagues. Other difficulties are reported to arise when councillors and officers 
misunderstand or misinterpret the nature of the relationship between the council and 
the association.  
The LSVT associations in the survey have used the opportunity of transfer and the 
establishment of a new organisation to reconfigure services in an effort to focus more 
clearly on the needs of customers. Respondents reported that this was a process that 
some staff found difficult, but most staff were believed to have welcomed the new 
ways of working, and their morale was said to have improved as their efforts 
produced results. New methods of service delivery have gone hand in hand with 
efforts to encourage tenants to provide feedback on the quality of services provided, 
and how services could be better tailored to meet their needs and aspirations. 
Respondents claimed that tenants were generally not willing to get involved in tenant 
participation activities unless they felt that services were failing to deliver.  Further 
research into the reasons for tenants’ limited participation may reveal a different 
perspective, or that they may simply be content with the service they receive.  For 
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example, tenants may be sceptical about their landlord’s willingness to change, or 
may have tried to participate before, with no perceptible results.  
LSVT association boards were generally perceived by respondents interviewed in the 
survey as effective at governing their organisations and managing risk, although the 
contribution of independent members was regarded as more effective than the 
contribution of tenant and local authority board members. In terms of formal 
accountability, respondents reported that LSVT associations offer places on their 
boards to tenant representatives; they are subjected to a level of local media scrutiny 
that is high in relation to other private sector organisations; the sponsoring authority, 
as a stakeholder, pays close attention to LSVT associations’ activities; and they are 
subject to public regulation through the Housing Corporation, as well as supervision 
by their funders.  However, there is a danger that LSVT boards – as self selecting 
groups – may tend to be unaccountable to users and closed to learning from outside 
influences (Nolan, 1996). 
While LSVT associations cannot escape from the problems associated with being a 
landlord, the survey suggests that they are well equipped to address them, as they 
have access to resources, more freedom to change the way they operate and a long 
term perspective.  For example, LSVT associations in the sample survey had 
relatively minor problems with low demand for their stock, but had the resources and 
the ability to formulate solutions, including re-development, re-configuration, change 
of use, disposal and relaxation of allocations policies. The associations were reported 
to be aware of the problems of concentrations of vulnerable and difficult to manage 
tenants in parts of their stock, and some had adopted local lettings policies in an 
attempt to bring more balance to communities. Since transfer, the associations were 
said to be housing more people on lower incomes and more vulnerable tenants, and 
they consequently faced the prospect of becoming landlords of last resort. In response, 
some associations had sought to diversify into areas such as provision of sub-market 
housing for key workers and market renting, which meets a different kind of housing 
need, and provides subsidy for social housing development.  
Three key organisational changes flow from stock transfer.  Firstly, LSVT 
associations use their freedom outside the constraints of public sector control and 
public finances to expand in the original local authority area or over wider areas.  
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Expansion is often followed by changes to management structures, as LSVT 
associations inherit a system designed to manage a relatively concentrated stock, and 
later discover a need to change those systems to provide effective services to the new, 
dispersed units.  Secondly, moving housing to the independent sector provides long 
term stability and is reported to encourage diversification and innovation.  This long 
term focus enables landlords to plan for long term investment in their housing stocks.  
Thirdly, transfer create single purpose organisations, with a focus on providing 
housing.  Removing housing from politics arguably enables managers and staff to 
focus directly on the needs of customers, bypassing the “overburdened channels of 
accountability and control” in local authorities (Clapham, 1989:33).   
3. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN COUNCIL HOUSING 
LSVT can also be interpreted as part of a wider shift in the balance between the public 
and private sectors in the provision of public services. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
the Conservative Government attempted to reduce its direct role, through outright 
privatisations – such as the Right to Buy or flotations of nationalised industries such 
as BT and British Rail – and by breaking up multi-purpose bodies into smaller 
entities, and the splitting of commissioning of services from provision (Glennerster, 
2000).  In local authorities, schools were given opportunities to manage themselves; 
many direct labour organisations faced competition, often resulting in the contracting 
out of services; and some authorities have transferred the ownership and management 
of housing through LSVT. In other public services, such as the National Health 
Service, providers of services have been given  limited autonomy as NHS trusts, 
while strategic health authorities are responsible for identifying needs and 
commissioning services to meet those needs (Ham, 1991).   
There are clear ideological undertones to the shift towards private provision, but there 
are arguably strong links with a desire on the part of the Conservative Government to 
change the way services are delivered (Veljanovski, 1987; Kemp, 1991; Malpass & 
Mullins, 2002).  Conservative Government housing policy after the 1987 General 
Election can be interpreted as an attempt to introduce market disciplines into public 
housing by encouraging consumerism; giving tenants a right of collective exit; and 
creating independent landlords which operate at arms length from local authorities.  
Although local authorities responded to the financial pressure placed upon them by 
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the Conservative Government, there is little evidence to suggest that there was also an 
explicit aim of changing the way council housing was managed.   
The private and voluntary housing sectors were initially cautious about getting 
involved in owning or managing council housing stock (NFHA, 1987; Mullins, 1991).  
They quickly recognised, however, that stock transfer was an opportunity to expand 
their housing role and play a leading part in regenerating and reforming council 
housing.  The survey evidence suggests that private funders, too, were thought to be 
initially cautious, but quickly recognised the LSVT association model as being robust 
and having the potential to offer long term and stable rewards.  
By shifting the balance of responsibility for service delivery to the private sector, the 
State sought to share risk – the risk of changes in future demand; the risk of future 
repair and maintenance liabilities being higher than originally anticipated; and the risk 
of being able to manage the stock.  Transfer of risk is a common theme in the shift of 
service delivery to the private sector, including for example, long term maintenance 
and repair of the London Underground network and construction of new schools and 
hospitals through the Private Finance Initiative (DETR, 2000).  In practice, the State 
effectively underwrites the borrowing required for the whole transfer programme, 
although the borrowing is off the public balance sheet.  Central Government could 
arguably never allow an LSVT association to collapse, as this might result in tenants 
losing their homes.  There is believed to be an implicit Government guarantee to 
private sector funders, through the Housing Corporation, that LSVT associations 
would be placed under supervision and possibly later merged with stronger RSLs or 
given other forms of assistance, rather than being allowed to become insolvent 
(Housing Corporation, 2002).  Central government appears to be prepared to make 
this implicit guarantee, as the risk of an LSVT association collapsing is seen as low.  
Critics of the public to private shift have argued that the private sector is not taking a 
fair share of the risks in return for the returns made by the  companies involved (see, 
for example Pollock, 2001; IPPR, 2002).  The Labour Government’s decision to place 
Railtrack in administration also arguably demonstrates that the public sector 
ultimately has to provide public money to fill the gaps left by the private sector in 
public service areas.   
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The public to private shift and organisational changes 
Many of the organisational changes resulting from transfer can be attributed to the 
shift of responsibility to the private sector.  Evidence from the survey suggests that 
the process of moving staff and housing from the relative security of the local 
authority environment to independence in the private sector, unleashes a number of 
opportunities – freedom to borrow, to develop and to expand – and risks – a heavy 
debt burden, commitments to tenants that may be difficult to fulfil, and management 
problems, although Housing Corporation regulation helps to limit the risks LSVT 
associations may take on. LSVT associations in the survey reported that there is a 
perception that expansion is necessary to avoid being merged with other associations. 
Expansion has brought problems where associations have spread their development 
activities too widely and thinly, with dispersed stock that is difficult for their existing 
structures to manage. There is also a risk that development takes priority over the 
existing stock and service delivery, possibly leading to lower tenant satisfaction.  
Private sector funding for LSVT associations 
The LSVT model quickly established itself as a secure and low risk form of lending 
for banks, as shown by the survey LSVT associations, which generally outperformed 
their business plan predictions, while a only minority had underperfomed, due 
primarily to the collapse in the private housing market in the early 1990s; imposition 
of rent controls by the Housing Corporation; inaccurate stock condition data; higher 
spending on repairs; and under-estimates of staffing requirements prior to transfer.  
Early LSVT associations in the survey found the process of arranging funding for 
their transfers difficult, but this reportedly became easier as lenders grew more 
familiar with funding housing associations. All these associations were able to 
weather their short term financial difficulties without any significant impact upon 
services to tenants or catch up repairs programmes.   Funders were also said to be 
attracted by Housing Corporation regulation of LSVT associations, and the implicit 
guarantee that it would prevent any housing associations in financial difficulties from 
becoming insolvent (Housing Corporation, 2002).  Steady income streams and 
regulation by the Housing Corporation arguably made lending to LSVT associations a 
low risk activity for private funders.   
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Private sector involvement in whole stock transfers 
Up to 1996, whole stock shire district transfers were undertaken with little or no 
involvement of existing housing associations.  Housing associations are regarded as 
quasi-private bodies, which receive some public funding, but are controlled by 
independent boards (Malpass, 1997).  LSVT associations were somewhere between 
housing associations and public bodies, as they took control of a major public asset, 
with a continuing element of public sector control through councillor membership of 
boards, but their debts are not included in the public accounts.  In 1988, housing 
associations were very different from the LSVT associations that were being created 
(Malpass and Murie, 1994). Housing associations were largely unfamiliar with private 
finance, but LSVT associations were entirely debt funded. Housing associations have 
become increasingly familiar with private finance (ibid), and in this respect have 
moved forward alongside the LSVT associations.  This closeness has arguably opened 
up opportunities for more alliances and partnerships between existing RSLs and 
LSVT associations (London Housing Federation, 1999; Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999; 
Nevin, 1999). These alliances provide potential to move LSVT associations away 
from the model where they were closely associated with a single local authority area. 
The private finance regime has encouraged existing RSLs to seek out new 
opportunities and to expand, including developing partnerships with local authorities. 
Many local authorities recognised the cross-over between housing associations and 
LSVT associations, and have invited existing RSLs to take on parts of their stock 
through partial transfers.  
By shifting responsibility for the delivery of public services, the State has given up 
direct control in favour of regulation of independent providers.  The shift appears to 
bring about three key changes.  The shift moves the risk of changing demand and 
future costs, to the private sector landlords taking over the stock, reducing the public 
sector’s future financing obligations.  Secondly, the shift helps to create the impetus 
for a number of organisational changes, including pressure to expand.  Thirdly, by 
pushing responsibility for providing housing to the private sector, central government 
sought to make services more responsive and accountable to users (DoE, 1987; 
Waldegrave, 1987).  Central government shifted power from local authorities to 
tenants, in an apparent attempt to empower them to make decisions about the future of 
their homes and to demand changes in service delivery following transfer. 
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OVERVIEW 
In the preceding sections, I explored key drivers for change brought about through 
withdrawal of the State from direct provision; management and organisational 
development; and the shift of responsibility for service delivery from the public to the 
private sector.  In these sections, I attempted to show how transfers can be seen as a 
combination of processes that are interlinked. Figure 11.1 summarises the process of 
LSVT and key changes.   
Figure 11.1: Elements in LSVT development that bring about key changes in the 
three areas considered 
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by tightening of 
financial regime 
 
  
 
     
 Organisational change 
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The first LSVTs were undertaken by district councils with housing stock that was 
generally in good condition with good management.  At these early stages, transfer 
did not address problems of the majority of council housing, located in urban and 
inner urban areas, which required significant reinvestment (Wilcox, 1993) and 
arguably a change in management style to make the stock viable (Tym et al, 1988).  
The continuation of a role for council housing did not form part of the Conservative 
Government’s vision for service delivery (DoE, 1987; Waldegrave, 1987), leading to 
attempts to sell the stock to sitting tenants under the Right to Buy (Forrest & Murie, 
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1988) and through a tightening of the financial regime to encourage local authorities 
to transfer (Kleinman, 1993).  Central government reductions in funding for council 
housing and controls on rents meant that district councils recognised that their ability 
to continue to provide high quality services, and to respond to new demands from 
tenants in a new climate of consumerism, were limited (Kleinman, 1993; Cole & 
Furbey, 1994: 223).  These authorities arguably withdrew proactively, primarily to 
release their housing departments from the Conservative Government’s financial 
constraints, but also possibly to a lesser extent to bring about organisational change 
and to bring in private sector skills and finance to help staff to meet the needs and 
aspirations of tenants. 
By withdrawing from direct provision, local authorities have escaped from the tight 
financial regime by placing housing at arms length, thus shifting responsibility by 
sharing risk with the private sector.  Housing associations are willing to take on the 
risk of running former public housing as they can expand their core business of 
providing social housing, while private funders can make a steady return with 
relatively low risk.    
In the mid 1980s, the Conservative Government also recognised that there would be a 
continuing need for a rented sector to provide for those who could not access owner 
occupation, or preferred to rent (Waldegrave, 1987).  The Conservative Government 
perceived a need for change in the management and organisation of council housing. 
Withdrawal helped to change council housing by passing day-to-day management to 
single purpose, arms length organisations, arguably with a focus on housing and 
customers.   
While there is little evidence to confirm the view that local authorities transferred for 
any reason other than to escape from the financial ‘straighjacket’ put in place by the 
Conservative Government, it also helped councils escape from some of the perceived 
problems of public landlordism (see, for example, DoE, 1981; Audit Commission, 
1986). For example, politicians saw it as their role to provide accountability to voters, 
who in the case of council housing are also customers.   This confusion of roles and 
accountability arguably led to breakdown, as politicians were said to be too close to 
tenants to undertake an effective landlord role (Emms, 1990).  The process of transfer, 
involving balloting tenants, arguably helped to make services more responsive and 
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accountable to users by placing the management of housing at arms length from 
politicians.  This shift helped create the impetus for organisational change, and LSVT 
associations have responded by expanding and developing new management 
structures to reflect the changes in their stock profiles.   
HOW EARLY TRANSFERS PAVED THE WAY FOR INNER URBAN AND 
LARGE CITY-WIDE TRANSFERS 
Whole stock transfers by predominantly shire district councils in the late 1980s and 
the first half of the 1990s arguably helped pave the way for partial and estate transfers 
by inner urban authorities in a number of ways, as shown in Figure 11.2.   
Firstly, LSVT demonstrated that it was possible for a local authority to transfer 
responsibility for a key public service to the private sector with the agreement of 
tenants.  To achieve tenants’ support, local authorities argued that LSVT was a 
pragmatic solution to solve their financial problems, and pointed towards the status of 
the new landlords as quasi-public bodies, which traded not for profit.  This approach 
to finding new methods of service delivery arguably helped inner-urban, 
predominantly Labour-led authorities to recommend stock transfer to some of their 
tenants as a solution to stock condition and management problems that beset some of 
their estates.  Transfer proposals in urban areas have, however, met stiffer resistance 
from some tenants, trades unions and Defend Council Housing, and political support 
has not always guaranteed a successful outcome in ballots (Malpass & Mullins, 2002).  
Secondly, early LSVTs demonstrated that it was possible for local authorities to shift 
services to the private sector while ensuring that tenants’ existing rights were 
protected, as well as ensuring public access to social housing in perpetuity, through 
local authority nominations.  Inner urban authorities recognised that they could 
transfer some of their worst estates, without affecting the rights of their existing 
tenants and with no loss of access for their waiting list applicants.   
Thirdly, early LSVTs demonstrated that the complex operation of housing 
management could be moved to single purpose organisations, with access to resources 
for long term reinvestment.  Inner urban authorities struggled to find the resources 
they needed to maintain their stock (Glasgow DC, 1985; Wilcox, 1993; LB Tower 
Hamlets, 1995; LB Hackney, 1995) and the idea of passing responsibility for 
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management of difficult stock and funding reinvestment was increasingly attractive as 
problems grew worse (Tym et al, 1988; Malpass & Mullins, 2002).   
Figure 11.2: How early LSVTs helped shape inner-urban and  
large city transfers 
 
WHOLE STOCK SHIRE DISTRICT TRANSFERS 
Demonstrated that responsibility for public services could be transferred to the 
private sector with the agreement of tenants. 
Provided a holistic solution to a local authority’s housing repair burdens. 
Shifted responsibility for service delivery and funding to the independent sector, 
while protecting access for people in housing need. 
Moved housing to single purpose bodies with access to resources for long term 
reinvestment. 
Developed a new style of landlord organisation, which bridges the public-private 
divide. 
Retained local authority representation and a limited degree of control over the new 
landlords 
 
 
INNER URBAN PARTIAL AND ESTATE TRANSFERS 
Broke the ideological logjam against private sector financial involvement in public 
housing in urban areas. 
Demonstrated that urban transfers could work and arguably led to changes to central 
government rules on outstanding debt. 
Created new types of organisation with higher proportions of tenant and local 
authority Board representation.  
Involvement of existing RSLs brought in expertise and track record, helping to 
reassure funders and tie private sector funding in to urban renewal.  
 
 
LARGE CITY-WIDE STOCK TRANSFERS 
Combined the comprehensive approach of whole stock LSVT with an element of 
break up of landlords achieved through partial transfers. 
A risk that the new landlords will replicate the large municipal landlords they 
replace, and that the new organisations may not attract funding from the private 
sector. 
Difficulties in securing a positive ballot result at Birmingham and continuing 
difficulties in Glasgow indicate that these early transfers did not provide a clear 
model for large city-wide transfers. 
 
 
In 1996 a number of authorities had already been encouraged to consider transfer by 
the success of the LSVT programme (London Housing Federation, 1999).  The 
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Estates Renewal Challenge Fund provided added impetus by facilitating partial 
transfers of negative value stock to existing or newly created RSLs. Local authorities 
seized upon the opportunity to form partnerships with existing RSLs in a way that had 
never been seen before (Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999). Many councils had worked 
with housing associations since the 1970s, but appeared reluctant to cede their 
landlord role to them.  By working together, urban local authorities and RSLs 
discovered that they had complementary aims and objectives - councils wanted to find 
ways of providing resources to repair and improve their estates, while RSLs had 
strong asset bases and were seeking to expand and utilise their skills and experience 
(ibid).  
Towards the end of the 1990s, city councils including Birmingham and Glasgow 
considered whole stock transfer as an option for their housing stock.  They were 
arguably encouraged by the success of small scale, partial inner-urban transfers, but 
also appeared to be attracted by the holistic solution offered by the whole stock 
transfer model.  They argued that the only way to fund reinvestment in the worst stock 
was to transfer the best stock as well to provide adequate security for private funders 
(Glasgow Housing Partnership Steering Group, 2000).  Inner-urban transfers can be 
seen as having helped pave the way for fledgling city transfers in four ways.   
Firstly, inner-urban transfers arguably broke the political logjam against private sector 
involvement in public housing in urban areas.  Strong objection to private 
involvement in shire districts had largely dissolved eight years before the first inner-
urban transfer, and in 1995, all 12 LSVT ballots held were successful.  Although a 
very small number of inner-urban authorities had transferred their stock much earlier 
(Tym et al, 1988; Clapham, Kintrea & Whitefield, 1991; Clapham & Kintrea, 1994), 
these transfers appeared to do little to break through the wider ideological barrier.   
Secondly, inner-urban partial transfers served to demonstrate that urban transfers 
could be financially viable, despite very difficult management conditions and large 
repairs backlogs (Wilcox, 1993; HACAS, 1999).  This success has arguably 
encouraged Central Government to change the rules on overhanging debt, to enable 
authorities with low or negative capital receipts to transfer their entire stocks by 
providing one-off grants to redeem outstanding debts and to help meet the cost of 
early redemption penalties (DETR, 1999b).   
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Thirdly, inner-urban authorities worked creatively, sometimes with existing RSLs, to 
establish new landlord structures that provided greater accountability to users.  Local 
housing companies were promoted by councils as being more democratic than the 
traditional whole stock LSVT model, as they enabled greater councillor and tenant 
involvement at board level (Zitron, 1995).  
Fourthly, many inner urban transfers involved existing RSLs with strong track records 
and financial backing (Lee, Power & Tunstall, 1999; Nevin, 1999; London Housing 
Federation, 1999).  Their involvement arguably helped to reassure private funders that 
investment in inner cities was a secure form of lending.  Funders’ involvement on a 
smaller scale in partial transfers appears to have helped to stimulate interest in city 
wide transfers, which require a commitment from funders on a scale never seen before 
(Nevin, 1999).   
Stock transfers have evolved from the early LSVT model, which enabled local 
authorities to withdraw from direct provision by establishing a new private sector 
monopoly landlord, which took on responsibility for service delivery and funding 
reinvestment in the stock it acquired.  Some councillors in inner urban areas were 
attracted by the notion of involving housing associations to provide new resources, 
but could not arguably cede their landlord role in the same way that district councils 
had through whole stock LSVT as housing was perceived as more politically 
important, housing a larger proportion of urban than suburban and rural populations.  
The partial transfer model arguably helped to reduce the scale of public landlords, 
while at the same time enabling councillors to retain control of the stock.  For large 
city councils with multiple problems, both models were problematic.  Council 
housing is an important issue for councillors in large cities, making the decision to 
recommend transfer to their tenants highly sensitive.  Partial transfers could not 
address the problems of these authorities in a comprehensive way.  City-wide 
transfers are effectively a hybrid of the two models, providing a solution which 
encompassed an entire City’s housing stock, while enabling councillors to maintain a 
relatively high level of involvement, and the possibility of breaking up management 
into smaller and more local entities.  Conversely, there is a danger that the new 
landlords may simply replicate the large municipal landlords that they replace.  There 
is a risk that control will never be handed down to the local subsidiaries (Malpass & 
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Mullins, 2002), or worse, that they are never established once the stock has been 
transferred to the city-wide groups.   
CONCLUSION: MOVING ON FROM COUNCIL HOUSING 
In this thesis I examine explanations of the State’s attempts to withdraw from direct 
housing provision; the organisational changes LSVT has brought about and the 
impacts on service delivery; and how LSVT fits within the State’s changing approach 
to the delivery of public services.  Outside former communist countries, the scale of 
state provision of housing is something unique to Britain. Provision by local 
authorities has played a vital role in expanding the nation’s housing stock, but the 
election of a radical Conservative Government in 1979 signalled the end of the post 
1945 consensus around the role of the state.  At around the same time as introducing 
the Right to Buy in 1980, the Conservative Government shifted financial support 
towards owner occupation, thus engineering an environment for council housing that 
encouraged, or arguably forced, local authorities to consider whether they could 
continue as direct providers of housing.   
The evolution of transfers from small scale community transfers by Glasgow Council 
in the mid 1980s, through to LSVTs by district councils, to a third phase of partial and 
city-wide transfers under a Labour government supports the three core theories 
outlined in chapter two.  Transfers have evolved from a monopolistic withdrawal 
model, in the form of whole stock LSVTs by district councils, through to a break-up 
model in the form of inner-urban partial and estate transfers, through to the hybrid 
model of city-wide transfers, with the potential for local control and influence through 
subsidiary organisations.  This evolution confirms the view that the financial regime 
put in place by the Conservative Government encouraged or pressurised local 
authorities to withdraw from direct provision of housing; that this development led to  
a change in the way housing is managed and organised, through the creation of new 
style, business orientated social landlords, although whether this was a deliberate aim 
of the policy is questionable; and that transfer has provided a method of involving the 
private sector in the running and financing of housing, while at the same time 
maintaining a strong role for the State as regulator.   
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GENERAL QUESTIONS 
How long in post?  
With council before transfer? 
 
LSVT SURVEY – CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
 
Accountability and relations with local authority 
Accountability and governance 
 Who is on the Board? 
 How are members selected? 
 Public meetings – how many tenants and residents attend?  
 What is the councillors’ role and involvement 
 Tenants’ role on board / in area committees etc.  
 
Relations with local authority and other local housing providers 
 How would you describe relations between the HA and the LA? How have these 
changed over time? 
 Does the association have its own offices or shares with council? 
 Is the Association the most favoured in the area or all in area treated equally? 
 How much does HA identify with LA?  
 Has the HA carved it’s own identity – what brought this about – what helped – 
what hampered this? 
 Is the association a monopoly provider in the area? Who are the other providers 
and how many units do they own? Relations with other HAs in the area 
 How has LA used its capital receipt from the transfer?   
 How has enabling role developed? 
 Is HA operating in other areas – purchasing / building / managing? 
 
Special initiatives 
 Housing Plus type initiatives 
 Social facilities / community halls / playgroups / youth clubs / OAPs 
 Establishment of foyer schemes etc.  
 Employment and training schemes and initiatives; resident employment 
 Provision of management services to other organisations (e.g. HAMA) 
 Expansion of provision outside local authority area.  
 Market renting / commercial activity 
 Racial or other social issues or initiatives 
 Partnerships 
 
Transfer and ballot 
 Why did the council transfer when it did? 
 What factors explain the positive result? 
 How would you rate the performance of the LA as a landlord? 
 What would have happened to rents and stock condition if the LA had retained its 
stock? 
 Was it a pragmatic decision – driven by stock condition/financial problems – or 
political/ideological decision? 
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Changes from local authority past 
 How important was housing – as an activity – to the LA before transfer? And 
now? 
 The effect of release from public sector financial constraints – on repairs and new 
build – on the organisation itself 
 The process of building a new organisation free of political constraints 
 The move from control by local authorities to remote political influence. 
 Business planning and long term approach to running housing 
 New influences e.g. banks, community representatives etc.  
 How well have local authority staff adapted to the organisation and culture? 
 Other activities the association is able to engage in that local authorities cannot.  
 Feeling for the benefits and costs of an LSVT – to tenants, to Local authority and 
Central Government. 
 
New development 
 Is the HA attempting to expand its stock – through new build and/or acquisitions? 
 What has been achieved already? Are there plans for the future? 
 Where does funding for development come from? 
 Is the association working with any partners? How well does this work?  
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LSVT SURVEY – FINANCE DIRECTOR 
 
Finances 
 The influence of the aims and values of the association on the Business Plan 
 What assumptions underlie the Business Plan 
 What has been the actual performance against business plan? What factors have 
influenced performance? What was different?  
 What influence do funders have? What covenants and conditions did they attach 
to their loan? What ratios do they look at? How often do they require information?  
 How sensitive is the Business Plan to changing circumstances? How much 
confidence does the association have that it’s Business Plan can be kept on track? 
 What practical influence does the Board have over the Business Plan? 
 How easy/difficult was it to arrange funding for the association?  Have there been 
any repayment problems? 
 Details of current funding structure: interest rate – fixed or variable; how many 
different lenders involved; any re-financing since original loan package? 
 Major investment 
 What are the levels of RTB and what is their impact on finances? 
 
Rents 
 Level of rent guarantee (RPI plus x%) 
 What has been the level of rent increases since expiry of guarantee? 
 How different are rents for transferring tenants and new tenants/new properties? 
 Are rent levels above or below the average social rents in the area? 
 Have arrears increased, decreased or stayed the same since transfer? Any special 
factors to explain this? 
 What is the association’s policy on rent arrears? 
 
New development 
 Is the HA attempting to expand its stock – through new build and/or acquisitions? 
 What has been achieved already? Are there plans for the future? 
 Where does funding for development come from? 
 Is the association working with any partners? How well does this work?  
 
Changes from local authority past 
 How important was housing – as an activity – to the LA before transfer? And 
now? 
 The effect of release from public sector financial constraints – on repairs and new 
build – on the organisation itself 
 The process of building a new organisation free of political constraints 
 The move from control by local authorities to remote political influence. 
 Business planning and long term approach to running housing 
 New influences e.g. banks, community representatives etc.  
 How well have local authority staff adapted to the organisation and culture? 
 Other activities the association is able to engage in that local authorities cannot.  
 Feeling for the benefits and costs of an LSVT – to tenants, to Local authority and 
Central Government. 
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LSVT SURVEY – HOUSING SERVICES DIRECTOR 
 
Housing management 
 How would you describe the Association’s ethos and style? 
 Please describe the Management structure – hierarchical or flat? 
 How is the housing stock organised? In estates? Any large estates? How are these 
managed? 
 Lines of communication 
 How are budgets carved up? How are decisions made? 
 Procedural style 
 How many staff are there at the frontline – ratios? HM staff to dwgs 
 Innovations in HM 
 What Guidelines are followed 
 
Staff 
 How staff are divided into teams? 
 How would you rate morale? 
 How flexible are the roles of staff? Narrow focus or more open approach?  
 Decision making – which staff make decisions – how much autonomy do staff 
have? 
 Do staff have control over budgets? 
 Are staff given freedom to innovate? 
 How is staff performance appraised? 
 What training is provided to staff? 
 
Services to tenants 
 Has the Association developed a customer service “ethos”? How was this 
achieved? What was difficult about this process?  
 What are the association’s repairs targets? 
 How would you rate performance of repairs services? 
 Have you undertaken any surveys of tenants? What were the results? 
 How are complaints dealt with?  
 Does the association provide caretaking / security / handymen etc? 
 
Tenants’ role and involvement 
 What are the methods used to communicate with tenants? How effective are 
these? 
 Are any events organised for tenants? 
 In what ways are tenants able to participate in the running of the association? In 
what ways are they represented? Are there any tenant board members? How are 
they selected? 
 Do tenants’ play a role in putting pressure on the association to improve 
performance? 
 Are there any opportunities for tenants to participate in training programmes?  
 Does the Association have any budgets for promoting TP or supporting TAs? 
 Does the association make any facilities available for tenants? 
 Do tenants have control over any discretionary budgets (e.g. for small 
improvements)? 
 Does the Association employ any Community workers or support workers? 
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Allocations 
 Which groups of people have priority for re-housing?  
 How many homeless applicants? 
 Who manages waiting list – council or Association? 
 Does the allocations system take account of family links?  
 How would you describe the level of demand for the Association’s stock? Is this 
the same for all stock? 
 Turnover of tenants 
 Does the Association use any marketing techniques for less popular housing? 
 Is it the Association’s aim to create balanced communities? If so, how is the 
Association doing this? 
 Does the Association have an income mix in it’s housing? 
 Does the Association have any housing available for market renting? Is this under 
consideration? How important will this become? 
 Furnished lets? 
 
Stock condition 
 What types of work have been undertaken since transfer – catch up repairs – 
progress on repairs? 
 Was there any “problematic stock” which the Association took over from the LA? 
How was this dealt with? 
 Has the Association undertaken any major refurbishment works? 
 What are the Association’s long term plans for investing in it’s stock? 
 Has the Association demolished and/or replaced any stock?  
 
Maintenance 
 Cyclical and planned maintenance 
 How is maintenance service administered? Is there an appointments system? Is 
there any compensation for missed appointments? 
 Who provides service? In house or contractor? How well does this arrangement 
work? 
 How are emergency repairs dealt with? 
 Measures of quality and conditions 
 Feed-back mechanisms 
 
Caretakers 
 How many and where? 
 JDs, functions 
 Skills and training 
 Innovations? 
 Handyman / welfare role / viewings / youth etc. 
 
New development 
 Is the HA attempting to expand its stock – through new build and/or acquisitions? 
 What has been achieved already? Are there plans for the future? 
 Where does funding for development come from? 
 Is the association working with any partners? How well does this work?  
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LSVT SURVEY - TENANT PARTICIPATION OFFICER 
 
Services to tenants 
 Has the Association developed a customer service “ethos”? How was this 
achieved? What was difficult about this process?  
 What are the association’s repairs targets? 
 How would you rate performance of repairs services? 
 Have you undertaken any surveys of tenants? What were the results? 
 How are complaints dealt with?  
 Does the association provide caretaking / security / handymen etc? 
 
Tenants’ role and involvement 
 What are the methods used to communicate with tenants? How effective are 
these? 
 Are any events organised for tenants? 
 In what ways are tenants able to participate in the running of the association? In 
what ways are they represented? Are there any tenant board members? How are 
they selected? 
 Do tenants’ play a role in putting pressure on the association to improve 
performance? 
 Are there any opportunities for tenants to participate in training programmes?  
 Does the Association have any budgets for promoting TP or supporting TAs? 
 Does the association make any facilities available for tenants? 
 Do tenants have control over any discretionary budgets (e.g. for small 
improvements)? 
 Does the Association employ any Community workers or support workers? 
 
Transfer and ballot 
 Why did the council transfer when it did? 
 What factors explain the positive result? 
 How would you rate the performance of the LA as a landlord? 
 What would have happened to rents and stock condition if the LA had retained its 
stock? 
 Was it a pragmatic decision – driven by stock condition/financial problems – or 
political/ideological decision? 
 
Changes from local authority past 
 How important was housing – as an activity – to the LA before transfer? And 
now? 
 The effect of release from public sector financial constraints – on repairs and new 
build – on the organisation itself 
 The process of building a new organisation free of political constraints 
 The move from control by local authorities to remote political influence. 
 Business planning and long term approach to running housing 
 New influences e.g. banks, community representatives etc.  
 How well have local authority staff adapted to the organisation and culture? 
 Other activities the association is able to engage in that local authorities cannot.  
 Feeling for the benefits and costs of an LSVT – to tenants, to Local authority and 
Central Government. 
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Accountability and relations with local authority 
Accountability and governance 
 Who is on the Board? 
 How are members selected? 
 Public meetings – how many tenants and residents attend?  
 What is the councillors’ role and involvement 
 Tenants’ role on board / in area committees etc.  
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Association name: …………………………………………… 
Interviewees:         ……………………………………………   Date(s) of interviews: ……………… 
 
Transfer 
1. An employee of LA before transfer? Yes 
 
No 
 
 
 
2. Employment status during transfer None Seconded to 
HA 
Remained with 
LA 
Role during transfer Tenant 
Consultation 
Set up HA Arranging 
loan etc 
Other 
 
 
 
3. Most senior staff from LA? Yes No 
4. A problem in developing an independent 
identity? 
Yes Somewhat No 
5. Reason for transfer  Stock 
condition 
Development Rents/ 
financial 
constraint 
Political 
 
 
 
6. Campaign against? No Yes- 
councillors 
Yes- 
tenants 
Yes- others 
7. Performance of LA as landlord Good Satisfactory poor other 
 
Condition of stock pre-transfer? Good Satisfactory poor other 
 
8. Culture of LA Paternalistic Customer 
focused 
Not interested 
in housing 
 
 
 
9. Conditions now if LA had retained stock? Same as 
now 
Higher 
rents 
Worse 
disrepair 
Higher 
rents and 
disrepair 
 
 
 
 
10. Why did tenants vote in favour? Rent 
guarantee 
Catch-up 
repairs and 
improvements 
New 
Development 
Poor LA 
performance 
 
 
 
10. Pragmatic decision Yes - driven by stock 
condition / rents / 
development 
No - driven by ideology  
 
 
 
 
Accountability and Governance 
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1. Membership of HA Open to all Open to 
tenants  
Board members 
only 
 
2. Who selects Board members Self 
selection 
by Board 
  Election of 
all board 
by 
members 
 
 
 
 
3. How frequently do board members have to stand 
for re-election 
Less than every 
3 years 
Every 3 years  More than 
every 3 years 
 
4. Board structure Tenants: Councillors: Independents: 
 
 
5. Effectiveness of Board Very 
challenging 
Somewhat 
challenging 
Rubber stamp 
 
 
 
 
6. Tenants’ role? Same as any 
other Board 
member 
Board members 
bringing 
specific 
knowledge of 
being a tenant 
As delegates of 
tenants 
Able to detach themselves from personal interests?  
Using board for complaints?  
Tenants’ priorities Development Repairs/ 
improvement
s 
Lower 
rents 
Other 
Councillors role? Same as any 
other Board 
member 
Delegates of 
Council 
 
Ever use position to further political objectives On occasion  Never  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relations with Local Authority 
1. How were relations while breaking free from the 
local authority? 
Good Poor - 
organisational 
level 
Poor - personal 
level 
What factors affected the break from the LA?  
 
What were difficulties focused around?  
 
2. How are relations with LA now? Good Difficult at an 
organisational 
level 
Difficult at a 
personal level 
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3. Is the HA the most favoured HA in the District Yes Initially, but 
now one of 
LA’s approved 
partners 
No 
4. Monopoly provider? Yes Yes, but some 
other HAs own 
stock 
No 
5. Use of capital receipt  Yes - re-
investment in 
development - 
LSVT HA 
Yes - re-
investment in 
housing - 
LSVT and 
other HAs  
No - other 
purposes 
6. Enabling Role  Well developed 
- clear aims and 
objectives 
Developing  No real 
attempts to 
develop 
 
 
7. Is HA operating in other areas? Yes - 
developing in 
other LA areas  
No - 
concentrating 
on own area 
only 
 
LA views on out of area development  
 
Support Ambivalent  Do not support 
 
 
Changes from Local Authority past 
1. How important was housing to LA as an activity Very important 
 
Somewhat 
important 
Not important - 
thorn in side 
 
2.  Resources: 
 
3.  Investment:  
 
4.  Freedom: 
 
 
 
New Activities 
1. New Activities undertaken Social facilities  
 Foyer schemes  
 Employment/training schemes  
 Provision of management services to 
other organisations 
 
 Multi-agency working  
 Market renting/ commercial activity  
2. Group structures  
 
  
3. Establishing subsidiaries: Function  
 
 
4.  Working collaboratively with 
other agencies  
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Housing Management 
1. Ethos and management style Paternalistic, 
driven by 
organisational 
needs 
Somewhat 
paternalistic, 
striving 
towards more 
of a customer 
focus 
Customer 
focused  
 
 
2. Structure Hierarchical Getting flatter, 
but still too 
hierarchical 
Flat 
 
 
3. Budgets Strong central 
control 
Central control, 
attempting to 
push more 
control to staff 
Devolved to 
area staff 
 
4. HM staff to dwellings [HC data] 
 
 
 
Staff 
1. Structure Centrally based  Area teams 
 
 Non-generic teams Generic teams 
 
2. Morale  Good  Fair 
 
Poor 
3. Staff roles and JDs  Rigid, 
jobsworth 
Becoming 
more flexible 
Flexible 
4. Budgets  Full staff 
control over all 
budgets for 
area 
Some staff 
control 
No significant 
control or 
influence 
5. Innovation Staff freedom 
to innovate and 
systems in 
place to 
communicate 
ideas 
Staff 
encouraged to 
think 
innovatively  
No time/ not 
encouraged to 
innovate 
6. Appraisal  Full staff 
appraisal 
system 
Some degree of 
staff appraisal 
No staff 
appraisal 
7. Training All staff 
receive training 
linked to 
appraisal 
Some staff 
receive training 
No organised 
training 
programme. 
Only ad-hoc 
8. Expectations of staff performance HA expects increasingly 
better performance from 
staff 
Expectations no higher 
than with LA 
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Services to tenants  
1. Customer Service ethos Well developed 
throughout 
organisation 
Developing 
through all 
levels of the 
organisation 
Aspiration at 
top-level only, 
staff not on-
board 
 
 
 
2.  Repairs targets 
 
[HC data] 
3. Surveys undertaken Frequently Sometimes  Never 
 
4. Survey results - customers’ perception of 
performance 
HA is 
responsive to 
needs and 
performing 
well 
Adequate 
performance, 
somewhat 
responsive 
Poor and not 
responsive  
5. Provision of caretakers / handymen / security Yes  No Considering for 
some areas 
 
 
Tenants’ role 
1. Are there effective methods to communicate HA’s 
message to tenants  
Wide range of 
methods to 
engage with 
tenants 
A few methods 
which appear 
to be effective  
Ineffective 
communications 
2. Public events / meetings Regular public 
events with 
good 
attendance  
Yes, but not 
well attended 
None  
3. Tenants’ Associations Well 
developed, 
effective and 
representative 
A fair number 
of reasonably 
representative 
and effective 
TAs 
Few TAs and 
tend to be only 
issue based  
 
 
 
4. Are tenants pushing for better customer service? Push for better customer 
service coming from 
tenants 
Senior staff pushing for 
better customer service 
5. Is there a tenants’ training programme? Training for 
TAs and board 
members 
Training for 
Board members 
only 
No training 
offered or 
arranged by 
HA 
6. Any small discretionary budgets which tenants 
control? 
Yes  No No, but 
planning to 
introduce 
7. Does the Association provide TAs or 
tenants representative body with any 
facilities 
IT 
equipment 
 
Office 
space 
Meeting 
facilities 
Support 
staff 
Grants 
 
 
8. Is there a TP officer / Community Development 
officer 
Yes No No, but 
planning to 
appoint 
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Allocations 
 
1. Priority determined by   
 
2. Homelessness  
3. Waiting list Managed by LA Managed by HA under 
contract  
4. Do allocations take account of family links Yes No No, but we 
acknowledge 
the need 
5. Level of demand for social housing Strong in all 
areas 
Generally 
strong demand, 
some areas 
with mild 
unpopularity 
Difficult to let 
stock in some 
areas, generally 
enough demand 
in other areas 
 
 
 
6. Turnover   
 
 
7. Marketing techniques used for less popular stock? No Yes  No, but 
planning to use 
 
 
8. Social mix  Association 
aims to create a 
social mix 
through 
allocations 
Association 
would like to 
create social 
mix, but so far 
unsuccessful 
Not an aim 
 
 
9. Income mix in stock? Yes  No Housing 
increasingly 
poorer people 
10. Market Renting HA has built/is 
developing 
schemes for 
market renting 
HA is 
considering 
market renting 
Not 
considering 
market renting 
11. Furnished lettings HA has 
furnished 
lettings  
HA is 
considering 
furnished lets  
Not 
considering 
furnished lets 
 
 
Stock condition 
1. Types of work undertaken since 
transfer? 
 
 
 
 
2.  Any problematic stock 
 
PRC units    
3. Major refurbishment works New PVC 
windows 
New 
kitchens 
New 
bathrooms 
 
5. Any stock demolished? Yes No No, but some 
demolition 
planned 
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4. Long term plans for stock re-investment Stock condition 
survey 
undertaken, 
and fully 
costed long 
term 
programme 
developed 
Stock condition 
survey due 
No long term 
plans beyond 5 
years 
 
 
Maintenance 
1. Is maintenance service structured to reflect needs 
of customer? 
Appointments 
system? 
Compensation 
for missed 
appointments  
Repairs 
reporting by 
telephone 
available? 
 
 
 
2. Who provides maintenance service Local 
Authority DLO 
In-house team Contractor(s) 
3.  How are emergency repairs dealt with? 
 
 
4. How is quality assured? Reply cards Call-back 
sample of 
tenants 
ordering 
repairs 
No methods 
5. Do you employ caretakers  Yes No  No, but 
considering 
6. What is their role? Cleaning/ 
supervision 
only 
Cleaning / 
supervision 
plus handyman 
/ welfare role 
Supercaretaker 
 
 
New Development  
1. Is HA expanding through development Yes No No, but 
development is 
planned 
 
 
 
2. How many units have been built?  
 
3. Sources of funding for development Hsg Corp 
 
LA SHG Loan facility 
4. Working with partners? No 
 
Other HAs  LA 
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Finances 
1. Assumptions underlying Business Plan 
 
 
 
 
2. Actual performance against business plan Better than 
predicted 
As predicted Worse than 
predicted 
3.  Factors explaining performance 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Influence of funders “Heavy 
handed” 
supervision 
Somewhat 
heavy handed 
supervision 
Hands off 
supervision 
 Regular visits 
 
Expect to 
receive regular 
progress 
reports 
Strict 
enforcement of 
covenants? 
 
 
 
5. Covenants   
 
  
6. Ratios      
 
7. Sensitivity to wider 
changes? 
Interest rates 
 
  
Demand for stock RTB Other 
8. Influence of Board over business plan Board fully 
reviews 
performance 
against BP on 
a regular basis, 
and has a role 
in changing it. 
Board review 
of performance 
against BP 
No 
involvement 
9. Ease of arranging funding? No significant 
problems  
Somewhat 
difficult 
Difficult 
Factors explaining this   
 
 
10. Has the Association re-financed its loan package 
since transfer? 
Yes No 
 
 
11. RTB impacts on Business Plan RTB levels as 
predicted 
RTB levels 
somewhat 
lower than 
predicted 
RTB levels 
significantly 
lower than 
predicted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rents 
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1.  Level of Rent guarantee 
 
 
RPI plus           % 
 
2. Rent level since expiry of guarantee  
RPI plus           % 
3.  How different are re-let rents to transfer rents 
 
 
4.  Convergence Policy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Are rents below or above average RSL rents in 
area? 
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